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BATTLE     OF     JUTLAND 

30th    May    to 
I  St  June  19 16 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES 

WITH    APPENDICES 


LONDON: 
PUBLISHED     BY     HIS     MAJESTY'S     STATIONERY     OFFICE 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Commaader-in-Chief's  letter  1396/0022  of  18th  June  1916    -  -       1 

Enclosures    to      f  Commander-in-Chief's  Narrative  -  -       5 

letter  1396  0022  j  Organisation  of  Fleet     -  -  -  -     33 

of  18th  June        1  Sinking  of  Enemy  Ships  -  -  -     35 

1916.  [^Extract  from  Captain  (S)'s  Report  -      -  -     42 

List  of  Ships  and  Names  of  Commanding  Officers  -     43 

Commander-in-Chief's  letter  1415  0022  of  20th  Jime  1916    -  -     47 

List  of  Enclosures  to  letter  1415  0022     -  -  -  -     47 

Commander-in-Chief's  letter  of  29th  August  1916      -  •  -     51 

Report  from  "  Iron  Duke  "  -  -  -  -     52 

Reports  from  First  Battle  Squadron  -  64—107 

Reports  from  Second  Battle  Squadron  -  1(J8-118 

Reports  from  Fourth  Battle  Squadron  -  119-129 

Letter    from    Vice-Admiral     Commanding    Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet,  No.  B.C.F,  01  of  12th  June  1916    -     129 
"Report  from  "  Lion  "  -  143-146 

Reports    from    First    Battle    Cruiser 

Squadron     -  -  -    -         146-157 

Reports  from  Second  Battle  Cruiser 


Enclosures 
to  Home 
Fleets' 
letter 
1415  0022 
of  20th 
June  1916. 


Enclosures 
to  B.C.F. 
letter  01 
of  12th 
June  1916. 


Squadron     -  -  -  157-162 

Reports    from  Third    Battle    Cruiser 

Squadron     -  -  -  163-171 

Report     from     First     Light     Cruiser 
"^       Squadron     -  -  -  172-175 

Reports    from  Second  Light  Cruiser 

Squadron     -  -  -  175-184 

Reports    from    Third    Light    Cruiser 

Squadron     -  -  -  185-191 

Reports  from  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  192-223 
Reports     from      Destroyer     Flotillas 

(Battle  Crmser  Fleet)  -  224-269 

Reports  .frorn  Second  Cruiser  Squadron  and  "  Duke 

of  Edinburgh  "  and  "  Warrior  "  -  -  270-295 

Reports  from  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  and 

"  Abdiel,"  *'  Oak,"  and  "  Active  "  -  295-302 

^Reports  from  Destroyer  Flotillas  (Battle  Fleet)     303-340 
Commodore  (T^s  Diary  of  Events     -  -  -  -  341,  342 

Captain  (S)'s  Submarine  Report         -  -  -  -  -     343 

Interned  Officers'  Reports  ("  Nestor  "  and  "  Nomad  ")         -  344-352 

Supplementary  fleports  from  Second  and  Foiirth  Battle  Squadrons  353-380 


APPENDICES. 


I. — Gunnery  Reports           .....  381-397 

II. — Record  of  Messages  bearing  on  the  Operation               -  398-586 

III. — Admiral  Scheer's  Despatch       ....  587-600 

IV. Letter  from  Commander-in-Chief  dated   30th  October  1914 

and  Admiralty  reply  dated  7th  November  1914        .  601-603 


Ill 


TABLE    OF    CHARTS. 


In  Book. 


Nunil)cr  fo 
Plate. 


Battle  Plan  showing  positions  of  Fleets,  6.40  p.m.,  31st  May  1916  - 
"  Iron  Duke,"  6  p.ra.-9  p.m.,  31st  May  1916  -  -    Track 

"  Marlborough,"  Port  to  Port         ....    Track 

'  Colossus  "  .  .  .  .  ,    Track 

"  Revenge  "  -  -  -  -  -  Diagrams 

"  CoUingwood  "       -  -  -  -  -  -    Track 

"  King  George  V "  -  -  -  -  -    Track 

Diagrams  illustrating  Letter  B.C.F.  01  of  12th  Jmie  1916  - 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  2  p.m.  to  9.24  p.m.,  31st  May  1916  - 
Battle  Crviiser  Fleet,  9.24  p.m.,  31st  May  1916  to  1.^30  p.m., 
1st  June  1916      ..---. 
"  Princess  Royal  " 
"Indomitable"       ...... 

"  Nottingham  "       - 

"  Falmouth  "-.---. 
Diagrams  illustrating  action  of  Fifth  Battle  Sqi\adron 
"  Warspite  "----.. 

"Valiant"  ...... 

"Malaya"  ...  .  . 

"  Attack  "  - 

"  Lydiard  "--... 

"  Canterbury  "        . 

"Minotaur,"  5  p.m.  to  dark,  31st  May  1916 

"  Minotaur,"  Noon,  31st  May  1916,  to^Noon,  1st  June  1916  Track 

"  Warrior,"  Diagrams  illustrating  phases  of  action 

"  Porpoise  "-.... 

"  Superb  "  ..... 

"  Orion  "     - 

"  Thunderer  "  - 

**  New  Zealand  "  and  Enemy  Battle  Cruisers 


1 
2 
3 
4 
5,6 
7 
8 


Track        10 


Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 
Diagrams 

-  Track 

-  Track 


-  Track 
Diagram 

-  Track 

-  Track 

-  Track 


11 
12 
13 
14 

15 
16 
17 

18 

19 

20 
21,  22 

23 

24 

25 
26  a-g 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 


In  Case  (British) 


Commander-in-Chief's 


letter, 


Plan     of    Battle    enclosed    with 

1396/0022  of  18th  June  1916 
Track  of  Operations  during  Night  Action  .  .  .  - 

Track  of  Operations  during  Night  Action  to  2  a.m. 
Plan    of    Battle    sent    by    Commander-in-Chief    to    Admiralty, 
29th  August  1916  .---.. 

Diagram  showing  Order  of  Battle  Fleet  sent  by  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  Admiralty,  29th  August  1916  -  .  -  . 
"  Iron  Duke,"  30th  May  1916  to  2nd  June  1916  -  -  Track 
"  Marlborough,"  6  p.m.  to  8  p.m.,  31st  May  1916  -  Track 
Plan  of  Battle  sent  by  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Battle  Cruiser 

Fleet  to  Commander-in-Chief,  17th  July  1916    - 
Second    Battle    Cruiser    Sqiiadron,    2    p.m.,    31st   May    1916    to 
4  a.m.,  1st  June  1916      -  -  -  -  -    Track 

"  Barham  "  .  .  .  .  -  .    Track 

"  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "       .  .  -  -  -    Track 

Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron       ....    Track 

X     12372      • 


la 
2a 
3a 

4a 

5a 
6a 
7a 

8a 

9a 
lOo 
11a 
]2« 


IV 

Number  of 
In  Case  (German)  Plate. 


Plan'of  Intended  operations,  31st  May  1916  -  -  -  I. 

Submarine  Patrol  Areas      -  -  -  -  -  -  IT. 

The  Advance  on  31st  May  1916     ....  -  III. 

Battle  Cruiser  Action  ...--.  IV. 

Movements  of  High  Seas  Fleet — Position  of  British  Fleet  -  V. 

Diagrams  of  important  Phases        .....  VI. 

Return  of  the  Main  Fleet   -...--  VII. 


BATTLE   OF   JUTLAND. 

OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


DESPATCH   FROM   THE   COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 

No.  139fi/H.F.  0022. 

"  Iron  Duke," 
Sir,  18th  June  1916. 

Be   pleased  to  inform   the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the 
Admiralty  that  in  accordance  -v^ith  the    instructions    contained 
in  their  Lordships'  telegram  No.   434  of  30th  May,  Code  time  ' 
1740,  the  Grand  Fleet  proceeded  to  sea  on  30th  May  1916. 

2.  The  instructions  given  to  those  portions  of  the  fleet  that 
were  not  in  company  with  my  flag  at  Scapa  Flow  were  as 
follows  : — 

To  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Thomas  Jerram,  with  Second  Battle 
Squadron  at  Invergordon  :— 

"  Leave  as  soon  as  ready.  Pass  through  Lat.  58°  15'  N., 
Long.  2°  0'  E.,  meet  me  2.0  p.m.  to-morrow  31st,  Lat.  57° 
45'  N.,  Long.  4°  15'  E.  Several  enemy  submarines  known 
to  be  in  North  Sea."  

Acknowledge. 
1930  (Code  time)." 

To  Vice-Admiral  Sir  David  Beatty,  Commanding  the  Battle- 
cruiser  fleet  at  Rosyth,  with  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  Rear 
Admiral  Hugh  Evan-Thomas  in  company  : — 

"  Urgent,  Priority. 
Admiralty  telegram  1740. 

Available  vessels.  Battle-cruiser  Fleet,  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron  and  T.B.D.s  including  Harwich  T.B.D.s  proceed 
to  approximate  position  Lat.  56°  40'  N.,  Long.  5°  0'  E. 
Desirable  to  economise  T.B.D.'s  fuel.  Presume  you  will 
be  there  about  2.0  p.m.  tomorrow  31st.  I  shall  be  in 
about  Lat.  57°  45'  N.,  Long.  4°  15'  E.  by  2.0  p.m.  unless 
delayed  by  fog. 

Third  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  ".Chester  "  and  "  Can- 
terbury "  wdll  leave  with  me.  I  will  send  them  on  to  your 
rendezvous. 

If  no  news  by  2.0  p.m.  stand  towards  me  to  get  in 
visual  touch. 

I  will  steer  for  Horn  Reef  from  position  Lat.  57°  45 'N., 
Long  4°  15'  E. 

Repeat  back  rendezvous. 

1937  (Code  time)." 

3.  I  felt  no  anxiety  in  regard  to  the  advanced  position  of 
.the  force  under  Sir  David  Beatty,  supported  as  it  was  by  four 

X    (49)i2>S-2     Wt  24266— p.  1173     5000*90     12/20     E  <t  S  A 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLA^■D 


ships  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  as  this  force  was  far  superior 
in  gun  power  to  the  First  Scouting  Group  and  the  speed  of  the 
slowest  ships  was  such  as  to  enable  it  to  keep  out  of  range  of 
superior  enemy  forces. 

4.  The  operation,  however,  showed  that  the  ships  of  the 
Third  Squadron  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet  possess  an  unexpected 
turn  of  speed  for  at  any  rate  a  short  period.  The  "  Queen 
Ehzabeth  "  class  are  nominally  2o-knot  vessels.  The  official 
Quarterly  Return  of  British  and  Foreign  War  Vessels  gives  the 
"  Konig  "  and  "  Kaiser  "  classes  a  designed  speed  of  20*5  knots. 
I  have  always  expected  that  they  might  reach  22  knots  for  a 
short  distance,  but  the  fact  that  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was 
unable  to  increase  its  distance  from  the  German  ships  when 
steaming  at  their  utmost  speed  comes  as  an  unpleasant  surprise 
and  will  have  considerable  effect  on  the  conduct  of  future 
operations.  It  is  quite  evident  that  all  German  ships  possess 
a  speed  much  in  excess  of  that  for  which  they  are  nominally 
designed. 

5.  When  Sir  David  Beatty  sighted  the  enem}-  battle-cruisers 
he  adopted  the  correct  and  only  possible  course  in  engaging 
and  endeavouring  to  keep  between  the  enemy  and  his  base. 
Whether  the  First  Scouting  Group  was  supported  or  not,  his 
duty  would  be  to  engage  and  keep  touch  with  the  eneni}'  vessels 
of  similar  class  to  his  own,  so  long  as  he  \vas  not  in  manifestly 
inferior  force.  In  this  case  he  had  a  great  superiority,  and  there 
could  be  no  question  as  to  his  action. 

6.  The  disturbing  feature  of  the  battle-cruiser  action  is  the 
fact  that  five  German  battle-cruisers  engaging  six  British  vessels 
of  this  class,  supported  after  the  first  twenty  minutes,  although 
at  great  range,  by  the  fire  of  four  battleships  of  the  "  Queen 
Elizabeth  "  class,  were  yet  able  to  sink  the  "  Queen  Mary  "  and 
"  Indefatigable."  It  is  true  that  the  enemy  suffered  very  heavily 
later,  and  that  one  vessel,  the  "  Liitzow,"  was  undoubtedly 
destroyed,  but  even  so  the  result  cannot  be  other  than  unpalatable 

The  facts  which  contributed  to  the  British  losses  were,  first, 
the  indifferent  armour  protection  of  our  battle-cruisers,  parti- 
cularly as  regards  turret  armour  and  deck  plating,  and,  second, 
the  disadvantage  under  which  our  vessels  laboured  in  regard  to 
the  light.     Of  this  there  can  be  no  question. 

But  it  is  also  untloubted  that  the  gunnery  of  the  German 
battle-cruisers  in  the  early  stages  was  of  a  very  high  standard. 
They  appeared  to  get  on  to  their  target  and  establish  hitting 
within  two  or  three  minutes  of  opening  fire  in  almost  every  case, 
and  this  at  very  long  ranges  of  18,000  yards.  The  German 
vessels  appear  to  use  some  such  system  of  fire  as  the  Petravic 
method  as  the  guns  do  not  go  off  exactly  together,  and  it 
unquestionably  gives  excellent  results.  The  "  spread  "  for 
both  direction  and  elevation  is  very  small  and  the  rapidity  of 
fire  very  great. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  3 

7.  Once  we  commence  hitting,  the  German  gunnery  falls 
off,  but — as  shown  by  the  rapidity  with  Avhich  the  "  Invincible  " 
was  sunk  at  a  later  stage — their  ships  are  still  able  to  fire  with 
great  accuracy  even  when  they  have  received  severe  punishment. 

8.  The  fact  that  tlie  gunnery  of  the  German  battlefleet  when 
engaged  with  our  battlefleet  did  not  sho\v  the  same  accuracy 
must  not,  I  think,  be  taken  as  shoAving  that  the  standard  is 
not  so  high  as  with  their  battle-cruisers,  as  I  am  inclined  to  the 
opinion  that  we  then  had  some  advantage  in  the  way  of  light, 
although  it  was  very  bad  for  both  sides. 

9.  The  German  organisation  at  night  is  very  good.  Their 
system  of  recognition  signals  is  excellent.  Ours  is  practically 
nil.  Their  searchhghts  are  superior  to  ours  and  they  use  them 
with  great  effect.  Finally,  their  method  of  firing  at  night  gives 
excellent  results.  I  am  reluctantly  compelled  to  the  opinion 
that  under  night  conditions  we  have  a  good  deal  to  learn  from 
them. 

10.  The  German  tactics  during  the  action  were  those  which 
have  alwaj'-s  been  anticipated,  and  for  which  provision  has  been 
made  so  far  as  is  possible  in  my  Battle  Orders.  The  "  turn 
away  "  of  the  enemy  under  cover  of  torpedo  boat  destroyer 
attacks  is  a  move  most  difficult  to  counter,  but  which  has  been 
closely  investigated  on  the  Tactical  Board.  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Doveton.  Sturdee  has  rendered  me  much  assistance  in  the  study  of 
this  particular  movement  and  in  devising  a  counter  to  it.  There 
is  no  real  counter.  Nothing  but  ample  time  and  superior  speed 
can  be  an  answer,  and  this  means  that  unless  the  meeting  of 
the  fleets  takes  place  fairly  early  in  the  day  it  is  most  difficult, 
if  not  impossible,  to  fight  the  action  to  a  finish.  In  this  parti- 
cular case,  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  enemy  did  not,  as  far  as 
can  be  seen,  exjject  to  find  our  whole  fleet  present,  there  was  no 
time  for  him  to  lay  a  prepared  mine  area,  and  not  much  time 
to  place  his  submarines,  although  many  submarines  were  present. 
It  is  unlikely  that  in  future  operations  we  shall  be  so  favoured 
in  this  respect,  and  the  element  of  time  will  therefore  be  still 
more  important.  I  foreshadowed  in  my  letter  of  Oct.  30th, 
1914,  No.  339/HF/0034,  in  which  their  Lordships  expressed 
concurrence,  A.L.  of  November  7th,  1914,  M.03177/14,i  the  possi- 
bihty  of  it  being  actually  necessary  purposely  to  delay  bringing 
the  fleet  to  close  action  for  some  time  on  account  of  the  possi- 
bilities which  the  mine  and  submarine  give  for  preparing  a  trap 
on  a  large  scale,  and  it  should  be  understood  that  this  possibility 
still  exists  and  will  be  increased  as  the  enemy  gets  stronger 
in  submarines. 

11.  It  was  unnecessary  for  me  to  give  anj^  special  orders 
to  the  flag  officers  during  the  action.  Events  followed  the  course 
that  Avas  expected.  All  squadrons  and  flotillas  took  up  their 
stations  as  directed  in  the  Battle  Orders  with  most  commendable 

^  See  Appendix  IV. 

A  2 


4  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  I 

accuracy  under  very  difficult  circumstances.  The  torpedo 
attacks  launched  by  the  enemy  were  countered  in  the  manner 
previously  intended,  and  practised,  during  exercises,  and  the 
fleet  was  manoeuvred  to  close  again  after  these  attacks  by  the 
method  which  had  been  adopted  for  this  purpose.  The  handling 
of  the  large  fleet  was  immensely  facilitated  by  the  close  co- 
operation and  supj)ort  afforded  me  by  the  flag  officers. 

12.  One  of  the  features  of  the  action  was  the  large  number 
of  torpedoes  that  crossed  our  line  without  taking  effect  on  any 
ship  except  the  "  Marlborough."  Sir  Cecil  Burney  estimates  that 
at  least  twenty-one  torpedoes  were  seen  to  cross  the  line  of  his 
squadron.  All  were  avoided  by  skilful  handling,  except  that 
single  one,  and  it  is  notable  that  the  "  Marlborough  "  herself 
evaded  seven.  Similarly  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  in  rear 
of  the  First  Battle  Squadron,  avoided  a  considerable  number 
and  other  squadrons  had  similar  experiences. 

It  is  of  supreme  importance  to  keep  from  the  knowledge 
of  the  enemy  the  fact  that  ships  were  able  to  avoid  torpedoes 
by  seeing  the  track,  as  it  would  not  be  beyond  the  ingenuity 
of  the  Germans  to  devise  a  means  of  preventing  any  track  being 
left. 

13.  The  experience  and  results  of  the  action,  particularly 
the  knowledge  v/e  now  have  of  the  speed  of  the  enemj^'s  Third 
Squadron,  must  exercise  considerable  influence  on  our  future 
dispositions  and  tactics.  It  will,  for  instance,  not  be  advisable 
in  future  to  place  our  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  in  a  position  removed 
from  support.  I  have  these  questions  under  consideration 
and  will  submit  my  conclusions  to  their  Lordships. 

14.  A  narrative  of  the  action  is  enclosed. 

I  am,  Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

J.  R.  JELLICOE, 

Admiral. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty. 


ACTION    WITH   THE    GER^IAN    HIGH   SEA   FLEE.T, 
31   MAY-1   JUNE,    1916. 


Schedule  of  Enclosui-es  in  Home  Fleets,  Letter  No.   1396/H.F.  0022, 
dated  18  June,   1916. 


Enclosure  No.  Subject. 

1.  Narrative  of  the  Action. 

2.  List  of  Sliips  and  Organisations  of  the  Fleet. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  6 

Enclosure  No.  Subject. 

r    (i)  Battle  Plan  showing  position  of  the  respective  Fleets. * 

„  J    (ii)  Plan  of  Battle. 2 

I  (iii)  Track  of  Operations,  ^ 

L(iv)  Tracks  of  Vessels  of  H.M.  Fleet.^ 

4.  List  of  Enemy  Vessels  sunk. 

5.  Extract  from  Captain  (8.'s)report  to  the  Chief  of  the  War 

Staff,  No.  0157  of  7  June,  1916,  relative  to  Explosions  in 
the  Minefield  laid  by  "  Abdiel,"  31  :\Iay-l  June,  1916. 


Enclosure  No.  1  in  H.F.  letter  No.  1,396,  dated  18th  June  1916. 

NARRATIVE. 

31st  May. 

At.  9.30  p.m.,  "  Iron  Duke,"  First  and  Fourth  Battle 
Squadrons,  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron,  Second  Cruiser 
Squadron,  Fourth  Light-Cruiser  Squadron,  Commodore  (F), 
Fourth  and  Twelfth  Flotillas,  and  four  destroyers  of  Eleventh 
Flotilla,   "  Canterbury  "  and  "  Chester  "  left  Scapa. 

At  10  p.m.,  the  Second  Battle  Squadron,  First  Cruiser 
Squadron  and  remainder  of  the  Eleventh  Flotilla  left  Cromarty. 

At  10  j).m.,  ■'  Lion,"  First  and  Second  Battle-Cruiser 
Squadrons,  First,  Second  and  Third  Light-Cruiser  Squadrons, 
'■'  Fearless  "  and  nine  boats  of  First  Flotilla,  "  Champion  "  and 
ten  of  Thirteenth  Flotilla,  eight  destroyers  of  Harmch  force  and 
"  Engadine,"  left  Rosyth. 

At  10.40  p.m.,  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  (four  ships)  left 
Rosyth. 

A  complete  hst  of  the  ships  present  is  given  in  Home  Fleet's 
letter,*  No.  1,395,  of  18th  June  1916,  and  in  Enclosure  No.  2  to 
this  despatch. 

Disposition  of  the  Fleet  during  the  early  portion  of  Z\st  May. 

31st  May. 

Disposition  of  the  Scapa  force  at  6  a.m.  on  31  May  : — 

Battle  fleet  in  divisions,  hne  ahead,  disposed  abeam  to  star- 
board,  in  the  order— 3rd,    4th,    5th,    6th    (Fifth   Organisation), 

1  Plate  1.  2  Plate  la. 

^  Note. — Sub -enclosures  (iii)  and  (iv)  to  Enclosui'e  3  were  amended 
in  October  1916  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  order  to  bring  the  joositions 
at  9  p.m.  shown  thereon  into  conformity  with  those  sliownon  tlie  revision 
of  Sub-Enclosure  (ii)  that  he  submitted  on  the  29th  August,  1916 
(Plate  4a).  The  amended  veisions  are  printed  in  Plates  2a  and  3a. 
They  are  identical  with  the  original  vei-sions  except  that  they  commence 
from  a  shghtly  altered  geographical  position.     See  page  51. 

*  Above  letter  not  printed.  The  despatch  published  in  the  Third 
Supplement,  dated  Thtu-sday,  6th  July  1916,  to  the  "London  Gazette," 
of  Tuesday,  4th  July  1916,  was  substituted  for  it  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Grand  Fleet.     For  list,  however,  see  pp.  43-47. 


6  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

screened   Ijy  the  Fourth  and  Twelfth  Flotillas;    Fourth  Light- 
Cruiser  iSquadron  three  miles  ahead  of  First  and  Fourth  Battle 
Squadrons ;   Second  Cruiser  Squadron  and  four  destroyers  spread 
five  miles  apart  ten  miles  ahead  of  the  battle  squadrons. 
Battlcfleet  and  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  :■ — - 

The  Scapa  and  Cromarty  forces  proceeded  for  the  2  p.m. 
rendezvous  ordered  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  latitude 
57°  45'  N.,  longitude  4°  15'  E.,  but  actually  met  at  11.15  a.m. 
in  latitude  58°'  13'  N.,  longitude  2°  42'  E.  The  Rosyth  force 
proceeded  for  their  2  p.m.  rendezvous  in  latitude  56°  40'  N., 
longitude  5°  E. 

At  2  p.m.  on  31  May,  the  "  Dreadnought  "  battlefleet  was 
in  latitude  57°  57'  N.,  longitude  3°  45'  E.,  in  Organisation  No.  5, 
divisions  in  hne  ahead  disposed  abeam  to  starboard  in  the  order — 
1st,  2nd,  3rd,  4th,  5th,  6th,  divisions  screened  by  the  Fourth 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Flotillas ;  Fourth  Light-Cruiser  Squadron 
three  miles  ahead  of  the  battlefleet ;  cruisers  and  destroyers 
sixteen  miles  ahead  of  the  battlefleet,  sj)read  eight  miles  apart 
on  a  hne  of  direction  N.  40°  E.,  and  S.  40°  W.,  in  the  order  from 
East  to  West  : 

"  Cochrane,"    "  Shannon,"    "  Minotaur,"     (centre  of    "  Defence,"    "  Duke  of        "  Black 
"  Hampshire,"      screen)     "  Warrior,"    Edinburgh,"    Prince." 

attached  cruisers  on  the  flanks ;  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron 
"Chester  "  and  "Canterbury"  about  twenty  miles  ahead; 
the  whole  steering  S.  50°  E.,  zig-zagging,  with  a  speed  of  advance 
of  fourteen  knots. 

Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  and  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  : — 

At  2  p.m.,  in  latitude  56°  46'  N.,  longitude  4°  40'  E.,  course 
N.  by  E.,  speed  19i  knots. 

Order  : — 

"  Lion  "    and   First   Battle-Cruiser   Squadron   in    single   Hne        * 
ahead,  screened  by  "  Chamjjion  "  and  ten  destroyers  of  Thirteenth 
Flotilla    ("  Nestor,"    "  Nomad,"    "  Narborough."    "  Obdurate," 
"  Petard,"     "  PeHcan,"     "  Nerissa,"     "  Onslow,"      "  Moresby," 
"  Nicator,"  "  Turbulent,"  and  "  Termagant  "). 

Second  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  in  single  hne  ahead,  three 
miles  E.N.E.  of  "  Lion,"  screened  by  six  destroyers  of  the  Harwich 
force  ("Lydiard,"  "Liberty,"  "Landrail,"  "Laurel,"  "  Moor- 
som,"  and  "  Morris  "). 

Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  in  single  line  ahead,  five  miles  N.N.W. 
of  "  Lion,"  screened  by  "  Fearless  "  and  nine  destroyers  of 
First  Flotilla  ("Acheron,"  "Aerial,"  "Attack."  "Hydra," 
"Beaver,"  "Goshawk,"  "Defender,"  "Lizard,"  and  "Lap- 
wing "). 

Light-Cruiser  Squadrons  forming  a  screen  astern,  eight  miles 
S.S.E.  from  "  Lion,"  ships  spread  on  a  hne  of  direction  E.N.E. 
and  W.S.W.,  five  miles  apart,  in  the  order  from  West  to  East  : 

•'  Southampton,"  "  Nottingham,"  "  Fahiiouth,"  "  Birkenhead,"  "  Inconstant,"  "  Galatea," 
f '  Birmingham,"     "  Dublin,"  "  Gloucester,"     "  Cordeha,"      "  Phaeton." 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHJfiS.  7 

"  Engadine,"  seaplane  carrier,  was  stationed  between  "  Glou- 
cester "  and    ■  Cordelia." 

"  Yarmouth  "  acted  as  linking  ship  between  "  Lion  "  and 
Light-Cruiser  screen. 

The  following  is  an  extract  froni  a  report  received  from  the 
Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  and  explains 
clearly  the  course  of  the  action  until  they  joined  forces  with  the 
battlefleet  : — 


At  2.20  p.m.  rej)orts  were  received  from  "  Galatea  "  indi- 
cating the  presence  of  enemy  vessels  to  the  E.S.E.,  steering  to 
the  Northward.  The  direction  of  advance  was  immediatelj' 
altered  to  8.S.E.,  the  course  for  Horn  Reef,  so  as  to  place  my 
force  between  the  enemy  and  his  base.  "  Galatea  "  reported 
at  2.35  p.m.,  that  she  had  sighted  a  large  amount  of  smoke 
as  from  a  fleet,  bearing  E.N.E.  This  made  it  clear  that  the  enemy 
was  to  the  Northward  and  Eastward,  and  that  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  him  to  round  the  Horn  Reef  without  being  brought 
to  action.  Course  was  accordingly  altered  to  the  Eastward 
and  North  Eastward,  the  enemy  being  sighted  at  3.31  p.m.  They 
ajjpeared  to  be  the  1st  Scouting  group  of  five  Battle-Cruisers. 

After  the  first  report  of  the  enemy,  the  1st  and  3rcl  Light  Cruiser 
Squadrons  changed  their  direction  and  without  waiting  for  orders 
spread  to  the  East,  thereby  forming  a  screen  in  advance  of  the 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadrons  and  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  by  the  time 
we  had  hauled  up  to  the  course  of  approach.  They  engaged 
enemy  Light  Cruisers  at  long  range.  In  the  meantime  the 
2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  had  come  in  at  high  speed  and  was 
able  to  take  station  ahead  of  the  Battle  Cruisers  by  the  time 
we  turned  to  E.S.E.,  the  course  on  which  we  first  engaged  the 
enemy.  In  this  respect  the  work  of  the  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons 
was  excellent  and  of  great  value. 

From  a  report  from  "  Galatea  "  at  2.25  p.m.,  it  was  evident 
that  the  enemy  force  was  considerable  and  not  merely  an  isolated 
unit  of  Light  Cruisers,  so  at  2.45  p.m.  I  ordered  "  Engadine  " 
to  send  up  a  seaplane  and  scout  to  N.N.E.  This  order  was  carried 
out  very  quickly,  and  by  3.8  p.m.,  a  seaplane  with  FHght  Lieu- 
tenant F.  J.  Rutland,  R.N.,  as  Pilot,  and  Asst.  Paymaster 
G.  S.  TreAvin,  R.N.,  as  Observer,  was  well  under  way;  her  first 
reports  of  the  enemy  were  received  in  "  Engadine  "  about  3.30 
p.m.  Owdng  to  the  clouds  it  was  necessary  to  fly  very  low,  and 
in  order  to  identify  four  enemy  Light  Cruisers  the  seaplane 
had  to  fly  at  a  height  of  900  ft.,  wdthin  3,000  yards  of  them,  the 
Light  Cruisers  opening  fire  on  her  with  every  gun  that  would  bear. 
This  in  no  way  interfered  with  the  clarity  of  their  reports,  and 
both  FHght  Lieutenant  Rutland  and  Asst.  Paymaster  Trewin 
are  to  be  congratulated  on  their  achievement,  which  indicates 
that  seaplanes  under  such  circumstances  are  of  distinct  value. 

At.  3.30  p.m.,  I  increased  speed  to  25  knots  and  formed  line 
of  battle,  the   Second  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  forming  astern 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND: 

of  the  First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  with  destroyers  of  the  13th 
and  9th  Flotillas  taking  station  ahead.  I  turned  to  E.8.E.. 
sUghtly  converging  on  the  enemy,  who  were  now  at  a  range  of 
23,000  yards,  and  formed  the  ships  on  a  hne  of  bearing  to  clear 
the  smoke.  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  who  had  conformed  to 
our  movements,  were  now  bearing  N.N.W.,  10,000  yards.  The 
visibility  at  this  time  was  good,  the  sun  behind  us  and  the  wind 
S.E.  Being  between  the  enemy  and  his  base,  our  situation  was 
both  tactically  and  strategically  good. 

At  3.48  p.m.,  the  action  commenced  at  a  range  of  18,500 
yards,  both  forces  opening  fire  practically  simultaneously. 
Both  appeared  to  straddle  the  target  early,  and  at  3.51  j).m., 
"  Lion  "  received  her  first  liit.  Course  was  altered  to  the  South- 
ward, and  subsequently  at  intervals,  to  confuse  the  enemy's 
fire  control ;  the  mean  direction  was  S.S.E.,  the  enemy  steering 
a  parallel  course  distant  about  18,000  to  14,500  yards.  For  the 
next  ten  minutes  the  firing  of  the  enemy  was  very  rapid  and  effec- 
tive. "  Lion  "  was  hit  repeatedly,  the  roof  of  "  Q  "  turret 
being  blown  off  at  4  p.m.  Immediately  afterwards  "  Indefati- 
gable "  was  hit  by  three  shots  falUng  together.  The  shots 
appeared  to  hit  the  outer  edge  of  the  upper  deck  in  line  with 
the  after  turret.  An  explosion  followed,  and  she  fell  out  of  the 
line  sinking  by  the  stern.  Hit  again  bj'^  another  salvo  near 
"  A  "  turret  she  turned  over  and  disappeared. 

At  4.8.  p.m.  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  came  into  action 
and  opened  fire  at  a  range  of  20,000  yards.  The  enem^^'s  fire 
now  seemed  to  slacken.  It  would  appear  that  at  tliis  time  we 
passed  through  a  screen  of  enemy  submarines.  In  evidence  of 
this  a  torpedo  w^as  sighted  passing  astern  of  "  Lion  "  from  star- 
board to  port.  The  destroyer  "  Landrail  "  of  9th  Flotilla, 
W'ho  was  on  our  Port  beam  trying  to  take  station  ahead,  sighted 
the  periscope  of  a  submarine  on  her  Port  quarter,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  track  of  a  torpedo  which  passed  under  her  and 
crossed  the  line  of  the  Battle  Cruisers  between  "  Tiger  "  and  "  New 
Zealand."  Though  causing  considerable  inconvenience  from 
smoke,  the  presence  of  "  Lydiard  "  and  "  Landrail  "  undoubtedly 
preserved  the  Battle  Cruisers  from  closer  submarine  attack, 
"  Nottingham  "  also  reported  a  submarine  on  the  Starboard 
beam. 

"  Eight  destrovers  of  the  13th  Flotilla,  "  Nestor,"  "  Nomad," 
*'  Nicator,"  "  Narborough,"  "  Pelican,"  "  Petard,"  "  Obdurate," 
"Nerissa,"  with  "  Moorsom  "  and  "Morris"  of  10th  Flotilla, 
"  Turbulent  "  and  "  Termagant  "  of  the  9th  Flotilla,  having 
been  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy  with  torpedoes  when  opportu- 
nity offered,  moved  out  at  4.15  p.m.  simultaneously  with  a  similar 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  The  attack  was  carried 
out  in  a  most  gallant  manner  and  Anth  great  determination. 
Before  ai-riving  at  a  favoiu-able  position  to  fire  torpedoes,  they 
intercepted  an  enemy  force  consisting  of  a  Light  Cruiser  and  15 
Destroyers.     A  fierce  engagement  ensued  at  close  quarters,  \\ith 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  9 

the  result  that  the  enemy  were  forced  to  retire  on  their  Battle 
Cruisers,  having  lost  two  destroyers  sunk,  and  having  their  tor- 
pedo attack  frustrated.  Our  destroyers  sustained  no  loss  in 
this  engagement,  but  their  attack  on  the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers 
was  rendered  less  effective  owing  to  some  of  the  destroyers 
having  dropped  astern  during  the  fight.  Their  position  was 
therefore  unfavourable  for  torpedo  attack. 

"  Nestor,"  "  Nomad  "  and  "  Nicator,"  gallantly  led  by 
Commander  The  Hon.  E.  B.  8.  Bingham,  of  "  Nestor,"  pressed 
home  their  attack  on  the  Battle  Cruisers  and  fired  two  torpedoes 
at  them  at  a  range  of  6,000  and  5,000  yards,  being  subjected  to 
a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's  secondary  armament.  "  Nomad  " 
was  badly  hit,  and  apparently  remained  stojjped  between  the 
lines.  Subsequently  "  Nestor  "  and  "  Nicator  "  altered  course 
to  the  S.E.,  and  in  a  short  time  the  opposing  Battle  Cruisers, 
having  turned  16  points,  found  themselves  A^dthin  close  range 
of  a  number  of  enemy  battleships.  Nothing  daunted,  though 
under  a  terrific  fire,  they  stood  on,  and  their  position  being 
favourable  for  torpedo  attack,  fired  a  torpedo  at  the  second 
ship  of  the  enemy  line  at  a  range  of  3,000  yards.  Before  they 
could  fire  their  fourth  torpedo  "  Nestor  "  Avas  badly  hit,  and 
swung  to  starboard,  "  Nicator  "  altering  course  inside  her  to 
avoid  coUision,  and  thereby  being  prevented  from  firing  the 
last  torpedo.  "  Nicator  "  made  good  her  escape,  and  subse- 
quently rejoined  the  Captain  (D),  13th  Flotilla.  "  Nestor  " 
remained  stopped,  but  was  afloat  when  last  seen.  "  Moorsom  " 
also  carried  out  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  battle  fleet. 

"  Petard,"  "  Nerissa,"  "  Turbulent  "  and  "  Termagant  "  also 
pressed  home  their  attack  on  the  enemy  battle-cruisers,  firing 
torpedoes  at  a  range  of  7,000  yards  after  the  engagement  ^^dth 
enemy  destroyers.  "  Petard "  reports  that  all  her  torpedoes 
must  have  crossed  the  enemy's  hne,  while  "  Nerissa  "  states  that 
one  torpedo  appeared  to  strike  the  rear  ship.  These  destroyer 
attacks  were  indicative  of  the  spirit  pervading  His  ^lajesty's 
Nav}^  and  were  worthy  of  its  highest  traditions.  I  propose  to 
bring  to  your  notice  a  recommendation  of  Commander  Bingham 
for  the  Victoria  Cross,  and  other  officers  for  some  recognition  of 
their  conspicuous  gallantry. 

From  4.15  to  4.43  p.m.,  the  conflict  between  the  opposing 
Battle-Cruisers  was  of  a  very  fierce  and  resolute  character.  The 
Fifth  Battle  Squadi*on  was  engaging  the  enemy's  rear  ships, 
unfortunately  at  very  long  range.  Our  fire  began  to  tell,  the 
accuracy  and  rapidity  of  that  of  the  enemy  depreciating 
considerably.  At  4.18  p.m.,  the  third  enemy  ship  was  seen  to 
be  on  fire.  The  visibility  to  the  North-Eastward  had  become 
considerably  reduced,  and  the  outhne  of  the  ships  very 
indistinct.  This,  no  doubt,  was  largely  due  to  the  constant 
use  of  smoke  balls  or  charges  b}^  the  enemy,  under  cover  of  which 
they  were  continually  altering  course  or  zigzagging. 


.10  BATTLE    OF    JL'TLAXD  : 

At  4.2(i  p.m.,  there  was  a  violent  explosion  in  "  Queen 
Mary " ;  she  was  enveloped  in  clouds  of  grey  smoke,  and 
disappeared.  From  the  evidence  of  Captain  Pelly,  of  "  Tiger," 
who  was  in  station  astern,  corroborated  b}-  Rear-Admiral  Brock 
in  "  Princess  Royal  "  ahead,  a  salvo  jntched  abreast  of  "  Q  " 
turret,  and  almost  instantaneously  there  was  a  terrific  upheaval 
and  a  dense  cloud  of  smoke  through  which  "  Tiger  "  passed 
barely  30  seconds  afterwards.  No  sign  could  be  seen  of  "  Queen 
Mary."  Eighteen  of  her  officers  and  men  were  subsequently 
picked  up  by  "  Laurel." 

At  4.38  p.m.,  "  Southampton  "  reported  the  enemy's  Battle- 
fleet  ahead.  The  destroyers  were  recalled,  and  at  4.42  p.m. 
the  enemy's  battlefieet  was  sighted  S.E.  Course  was  altered 
16  j)oints  in  succession  to  starboard,  and  I  proceeded  on  a 
Northerly  course  to  lead  them  towards  the  Grand  Fleet.  The 
enemy  Battle-cruisers  altered  course  shortly  afterwards,  and 
the  action  continued.  "  Southampton,"  with  the  Second  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron,  held  on  to  the  Southward  to  observe.  Thej^ 
closed  to  within  13,000  yards  of  the  enemy  battlefieet,  and  came 
under  a  very  heavy  but  ineffective  fire.  "  Southampton's  " 
reports  were  most  valuable.  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  were 
now  closing  on  an  opposite  course,  and  engaging  the  enemy 
battle-cruisers  with  all  guns.  The  position  of  the  enemy 
battlefieet  was  communicated  to  them,  and  I  ordered  them  to 
alter  course  16  points.  Led  by  Rear- Admiral  Hugh  Evan 
Thomas,  M.V.O.,  in  "  Barham,"  this  Squadron  supported  us 
brilHantly  and  effectively. 

At  4.57  ]i.m.,  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  turned  up  astern 
of  me  and  came  under  the  fire  of  the  leading  ships  of  the  enemy 
battlefieet.  "  Fearless,"  with  the  destroyers  of  the  First  Flotilla 
joined  the  Battle-cruisers  and,  when  speed  admitted,  took 
station  ahead.  "  Champion  "  with  13th  Flotilla  took  station 
on  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron.  At  5.0  p.m.,  the  First  and  Third 
Light-Cruiser  Squadrons,  which  had  been  following  me  on  the 
Southerly  Course,  took  station  on  my  starboard  bow;  the 
Second  Light-cruiser  Squadron  took  station  on  my  port  quarter. 

The  Aveather  conditions  now  became  unfavoiu*able,  our  ships 
being  silhouetted  against  a  clear  horizon  to  the  westward,  while 
the  enemy  were  for  the  most  part  obscured  by  mist,  only  sho\^dng 
up  clearly  at  intervals.  These  conditions  prevailed  until  AAe 
had  turned  their  van  at  about  6.0  p.m.  Between  5.0  and  6.0  p.m., 
the  action  continued  on  a  Northerly  course,  the  range  being 
about  14,000  yards.  During  this  time  the  enemy  received  very 
severe  punishment,  and  undoubtedly  one  of  their  Battle-cruisers 
quitted  the  line  in  a  considerably  damaged  condition.  This 
came  under  my  personal  observation,  and  was  corroborated  by 
"  Princess  Royal "  and  "  Tiger."  Other  enemy  ships  also 
showed  signs  of  increasing  injury.  At  5.5.  p.m.,  "  Onslow  " 
and  "  Moresby,"  who  had  been  detached  to  assist  "  Engadine," 
with   the   seai)lane,   rejoined   the   Battle-cruiser   Squadrons   and 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  11 

took  station  on  the  starboard  (engaged)  bow  of  "  Lion."  At 
5.10  p.m.,  "  Moresby,"  being  2  points  before  the  beam  of  the 
leading  enemy  ship  at  a  range  of  6,000  to  8,000  yards,  fired  a 
long  range  torpedo  at  the  third  in  their  Hne.  Eight  minutes 
later  she  observed  a  hit  with  a  torpedo  on  what  she  judged  to 
be  the  sixth  ship  in  the  line.  Later  analysis  of  the  director 
setting  indicated  a  probability  of  this  result.  "  Moresby " 
then  passed  between  the  hnes  to  clear  the  range  of  smoke  and 
rejoined  "'  Champion."  In  corroboration  of  this  "  Fearless  " 
reports  having  seen  an  enemy  heavy  ship  heavily  on  fire  at  about 
5.10  p.m.,  and  shortly  afterwards  a  huge  cloud  of  smoke  and 
steam,  similar  to  that  which  accompanied  the  blowing  up  of 
"  Queen  Mary  "  and  "  Indefatigable." 

At  5.35  p.m.  our  course  was  N.N.E.,  and  the  estimated 
position  of  the  Grand  Fleet  was  N.  16  W.,  so  we  gradually  hauled 
to  the  North  Eastward,  keeping  the  range  of  the  enemy  at 
14,000  j'ards.  He  was  gradually  hauling  to  the  Eastward, 
receiving  severe  punishment  at  the  head  of  his  line,  and  probabl}^ 
acting  on  information  received  from  his  Light-Cruisers  which 
had  sighted  and  were  engaged  wdth  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser 
Squadron  {vide  "  Indomitable's  "  report).  Possibly  Zeppelins 
were  present  also.  At  5.50  p.m.,  British  Cruisers  were  sighted 
on  the  port  bow,  and  at  5.56  p.m.,  the  leading  battleships  of 
the  Grand  Fleet  bearing  North  5  miles.  I  thereupon  altered 
course  to  East  and  proceeded  at  utmost  speed.  This  brought 
the  range  of  the  enemy  down  to  12,000  yards.  I  made  a  visual 
report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  the  enemy  Battle-Cruisers 
bore  South  East.  At  this  time  only  three  of  the  enemy  Battle- 
Cruisers  were  visible,  closely  followed  by  battleships  of  the 
"  Konig  "  class. 

At  about  6.5  p.m.,  "  Onslow,"  being  on  the  engaged  bow  of 
'■'  Lion,"  sighted  an  enemy  Light-Cruiser  at  a  distance  of 
6,000  yards  from  us,  apparently  endeavouring  to  attack  with 
torpedoes.  "  Onslow  "  at  once  closed  and  engaged  her,  firing 
58  rounds  at  a  range  of  from  4,000  to  2,000  yards,  scoring  a 
number  of  hits.  "  Onslow  "  then  closed  to  within  8,000  yards 
of  the  enemy  Battle-Cruisers,  and  orders  were  given  for  all 
torpedoes  to  be  fired.  At  this  moment  she  was  truck  amidships 
by  a  heavy  shell,  with  the  result  that  only  one  torpedo  was 
fired.  Thinking  that  all  his  torpedoes  had  gone,  the  Commanding 
Ofificer  proceeded  to  retire  at  slow  speed.  Being  informed  that 
he  still  had  three  torpedoes,  he  closed  the  Light-Cruiser  previously 
engaged  and  torpedoed  her.  The  enemy's  Battle-Fleet  was 
'then  sighted  at  a  distance  of  8,000  yards,  and  the  remaining 
torpedoes  were  fired  at  them  ;  having  started  correctly,  they  must 
have  crossed  the  enemy's  track.  Damage  in  her  feed  tank 
then  caused  "  Onslow  "  to  stop. 


12  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

General  Position. 

At  5  p.m.,  the  position  of  affairs  was  as  follows  :— 

"  Iron  Duke's  "  position  : — 

latitude  57°  24'  N., 
longitude  5°  12'  E., 
course  S.E.  by  S. 
speed  20  knots, 

in  company  with  the  main  battlefleet  force,  cruisers  spread, 
destroyers  screening. 

"  Lion's  "  position  (to  "  Iron  Duke's  "  reckoning)  : — 

lat.  56°  42'  N., 
long.  5°  44'  E., 
course  N.N.W., 
speed  25  knots, 

in  company  with  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  and  First  and  Second 
Battle-Cruiser  Squadrons.  Enemy  battle-cruisers  bearing  from 
"Lion"  approximately  E.S.E.  seven  miles;  enemy  battlefleet 
from  "  Barham  "  about  S.S.E.  nine  miles. 

Weather  Conditions. 

Up  to  6  p.m.  the  weather  conditions  were  wholly  in  favour 
of  the  enemy.  The  horizon  to  the  eastward  was  entirely 
obscured  by  haze,  and  from  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  when 
engaging  enemy  battleships  and  battle-cruisers  only  the  flashes 
of  the  enemy  guns  could  be  made  out.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
strong  light  to  the  westward  enabled  the  British  sliips  to  be 
distinguished  clearly  by  the  enemy. 

This  is  indicated  by  the  photograph^  enclosed,  taken  from 
"  Malaya  "  by  Midshipman  Gerald  W.  Norman.  The  photograph 
was  taken  at  about  5.15  p.m.  towards  the  western  horizon,  the 
enemy  at  the  same  time  being  to  the  eastward.  Our  destroyers 
shown  silhouetted  against  the  bright  horizon  were  at  least  eight 
miles  distant.  The  splashes  seen  in  the  photograph  are  from 
*'  overs  "  fired  at  "  Malaya  "  by  the  enemy's  battlefleet. 

Movements  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 

At  3.30  p.m.,  when  the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  formed  line  of 
battle,  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  consisting  of  "  Barham,'" 
"  Valiant,"  "  Warspite  "  and  "  Malaya,"  in  single  line  in  the 
order  named,  were  five  miles  from  the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet, 
bearing  from  them  N.N.W.  and  conforming  to  their  movements. 

At  3.56  p.m.  fire  was  opened  at  some  enemy  hght-cruisers 
before  the  port  beam  steering  about  S.S.E.  After  two  or  three 
salvoes  these  enemy  hght-cruisers  turned  away  eight  points 
and  disappeared  out  of  sight. 

1  Not  reproduced. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  13 

At  4.02  p.m.  the  British  battle-cruisers  altered  course 
gradually  to  the  south-eastward,  the  enemy  battle-cruisers  also 
turned  to  the  south-eastward.  This  turn  enabled  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron  to  gain,  and  at  4.06  fire  was  opened  by  pairs, 
concentrating  on  the  two  rear  ships  at  a  range  of  approximately 
18,000  yards. 

At  4.21  p.m.  the  enemy  battle-cruisers  opened  fire  on  the 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  "  Barham  "  being  hit  shortly  after. 

At  4.40  p.m.,  by  which  time  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was 
heavily  engaged  with  the  enemy  battle-cruisers,  enemy  destroyers 
were  observed  to  be  attacking,  and  were  driven  off  by  our  light- 
cruisers  and  destroyers  attached  to  the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet. 
The  squadron  was  turned  away  by  Preparative -flag,  and  torpedoes 
were  observed  to  cross  the  line,  one  ahead  and  one  astern  of 
"  Vahant." 

At  4.50  p.m.  our  battle-cruisers,  having  previously  turned 
to  the  northward,  crossed  the  line  of  fire. 

At  4.53  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  turned  sixteen  points  to 
starboard  in  succession  by  signal  from  the  "  Lion  "  (the  enemy 
battle-cruisers  having  also  turned  to  the  northward). 

At  4.55  the  enemy's  battlefleet  was  sighted,  bearing  S.S.E., 
steering  to  the  Northward,  distant  about  17,000  yards. 

"  Barham  "  and  "  Valiant  "  continued  to  engage  the  enemj- 
Battle-Cruisers  while  "  Warspite  and  "  Malaya  "  fired  at  the 
head  of  the  enemy's  battlefleet. 

At  about  5.25  p.m.,  the  squadron  increased  to  full  speed. 
During  this  period  the  light  was  very  much  in  favour  of  the 
enemy  and  firing  from  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  very 
intermittent,  whereas  a  heavy  but  ineffective  fire  was  received 
from  the  leading  enemy  battleships. 

At  6.06  p.m.,  "  Marlborough  "  was  sighted,  and  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron  turned  to  form  astern  of  the  line  at  6.18  p.m. 

Up  to  this  time  "  Barham  "  had  been  hit  six  times  by  battle- 
cruisers,  "  Vahant  "  was  not  hit.  "  Warspite  "  had  been  hit 
twice  by  either  battle-cruisers  or  battleships.  "  Malaya  "  had 
been  hit  seven  times  aU  by  battleshi23s. 

Progress  of  the  Action. 

Continuous  reports  were  received  in  "  Iron  Duke  "  of  the 
above  reported  movements.  The  Fleet  was  informed  that  the 
enemy  battlefleet  was  coming  North,  and  a  wireless  signal  made 
to  the  Admiralty  that  a  fleet  action  was  imminent. 

Movements  of  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron. 

Turning  now  to  the  movements  of  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser 
Squadron.  This  squadron  was  originally  stationed  twenty  miles 
ahead  of  the  battlefleet,  "  Chester  "  (Captain  Robert  N.  Lawson) 
acting  as  linking  ship  between  the  squadron  and  the  cruiser 
line,  "  Canterbury  "  (Captain  Percy  M.  Royds)  being  abreast 
of  the  squadron. 


14  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

At  4..")  p.m..  the  Commander-in-Chief  ordered  the  Rear- 
Adiniral  ( "ouiiiiaiKling.  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron,  to  support 
the  battle-cruiser  fleet  in  action  sixty  miles  to  the  soutlnvard  in 
l)osition  latitude  56°  53'  N.,  longitude  5°  33'  E.,  the  Rear- 
Admiral  being  informed  that  the  enemy's  course  was  reported 
to  ))e  H.  55°  E.,  at  3.50  p.m.  The  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron 
was  at  the  time  to  the  eastward,  having  turned  to  intercept  the 
eneni}^  vessels  reported  by  the  First  Light-Cruiser  Squadron  at 
2.45  p.m.,  as  steering  North  from  position  latitude  56°  52'  N., 
longitude  5°  35'  E.  The  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  altered 
course  to  S.  by  E.  and  worked  u})  to  full  speed. 

At  5.30  p.m.,  "  Chester,"  which  was  five  miles  X.  Hr  W.  of 
the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron,  reported  to  "  Invincible  '*  by 
searchlight  that  she  had  heard  firing  and  seen  flashes  of  gunfire 
to  the  southwestward  and  turned  to  investigate.  At  5. 30  p.m., 
"  Chester  "  observed  a  three-funnelled  enemy  light -cruiser  with 
destroyers.  An  engagement  ensued  at  about  6,000  yards,  the 
enemy  being  reinforced  by  two,  or  possibly  three,  more  light- 
cruisers.  "  Chester "  turned  to  N.E.,  chased  by  the  enemy 
ships,  which  had  obtained  the  range  and  were  inflicting  consider- 
able damage  on  her. 

At  5.40  p.m.,  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron,  which  until 
then  had  been  steering  about  S.  by  E.  sighted  enemy  cruisers  to 
the  westward  and  turned  to  about  W.N.W.  It  is  apparent  that 
the  Rear-xA.dmiral  Commanding,  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron, 
was  misled  by  the  difterence  in  reckoning  between  the  l)attlefleet 
and  battle-cruiser  fleet  and  had  gone  too  far  to  the  eastward, 
actually  crossing  ahead  of  the  two  engaged  battle-cruiser 
squadrons  until  meeting  the  enemy  advanced  cruisers.  At 
5.52  p.m.,  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  and  "  Canterbury  " 
engaged  three  enemy  light-cruisers  which  were  then  administering 
heavy  punishment  to  "  Chester,"  "  Shark  "  (Commander  L.  W. 
Jones),  "  Acasta  "  (Lieutenant-Commander  J.  0.  Barron), 
"  Opheha  "  (Commander  L.  G.  E.  Crabbe)  and  "  Christopher  " 
Lieutenant-Commander  F.  M.  Kerr),  and  at  6  p.m.,  one  of  the 
enemy  light-cruisers  was  observed  by  all  three  ships  of  tlie  Third 
Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  to  blow  up.  During  the  engagement, 
"  Shark  "  was  sunk,  and  "  Acasta  "  severely  damaged. 

At  about  6.10  p.m.,  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron 
sighted  the  battle-cruiser  fleet,  and  at  6.21  p.m.,  took  station 
ahead  of  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle -Cruiser  Fleet, 
in  "  Lion,"  the  "  Chester  "  then  taking  station  astern  of  the 
Second  Cruiser  Squadron  and  remaining  with  that  squadron  for 
the  night. 

On  taking  station  ahead  of  "  Lion,"  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser 
Squadron  engaged  the  enemy's  leading  battle-cruiser,  which 
vessel  returned  the  Are,  and  at  6.36  p.m.  "  Invincible  "*  (Captain 
Arthur  L.  Cay,  flying  the  flag  of  Rear- Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace 
L.  A.  Hood)  blew  up.  The  cause  was  possibly  the  same  as  that 
suggested  in  the  case  of  "  Indefatigable."     "  Lion,"  proceeding 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  15 

at  full  speed,  drew  ahead,  the  Vice-Admiral,  ordering  the  Third 
Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  to  take  station  astern  of  his  line. 

Disposition  and  Movements  of  the  British  Battlefleet  mid 
Cruiser  Squadrons. 

At  5.4  p.m.,  the  attached  cruisers  were  ordered  to  take  up 
approach  stations. 

The  cruiser  line  at  this  time  was  sixteen  miles  aliead  of  the 
battlefleet,  the  ships  being  stationed  from  port  to  star) ward  as 
follows  : — 

Cochrane,"  '•' Shannon,"  "Minotaur,"  "Defence,"  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh,"  "  Black  Prince  " 

"  Warrior," 

"  Hampshire  "  (linking  ship). 

cruisers  in  the  screen  being  eight  miles  ajjart,  centre  of  the  screen 
bearing  S.E.  by  S. 

At  5.40  p.m.,  heavy  firing  was  heard  ahead  by  "  Minotaiu-, 
and  soon  afterwards  ships  were  seen  in  the  mist  and  were 
challenged  by  "  Minotaur."  "  Cochrane  "  and  "  Shannon  "' 
were  recalled  by  the  Rear- Admiral  Commanding,  Second  Cruiser 
Squadron,  and  formed  into  line,  the  signal  being  made  to  engage 
the  enemy.  The  conditions  were  exceedingly  difficult  for  making 
out  ships,  but  the  strange  vessels  on  replying  to  the  cliallenge 
were  ascertained  to  be  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  (Rear- 
Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace  L.  A.  Hood). 

At  5.52  p.m.,  Rear- Admiral  Sir  Robert  Arbuthnot,  in 
"  Defence,"  signalled  that  the  battlefleets  would  shortly  be 
e.igaged.  Rear- Admiral  Herbert  L.  Heath,  in  ''  Minotaur," 
with  the  Second  Cruiser  Squadron,  made  a  sweep  to  the  eastward 
to  ensure  that  no  enemy  minelayers  were  at  work  in  that 
direction,  and  proceeded  to  take  up  deployment  station  two 
points  on  the  engaged  van  of  the  battlefleet,  being  joined  there 
by  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "  at  7.17  p.m. 

At  5.50  p.m.,  the  cruisers  on  the  right  flank  of  the  cruiser 
line  had  come  in  contact  with  the  enemy  cruisers.  A  large 
three-funnelled  enemy  light-cruiser  was  engaged  and  disabled  by 
■'  Defence  "  and  "  Warrior."  She  drifted  down  between  the 
lines,  being  fired  on  by  the  battlefleet,  and  was  subsequently  seen 
to  sink  by  several  independent  observers. 

"  Defence  "  and  "  Warrior  "  of  the  First  Cruiser  Sciuadron, 
which  vessels  had  turned  to  starboard  during  the  engagement 
with  the  hght-cruisers,  passed  between  our  own  and  the  enemy 
battle-cruisers  and  battlefleet,  and  the  two  ships  found  them- 
selves within  comparatively  short  range  of  the  enemy's  heavy 
ships.  At  6.16  p.m.,  "  Defence  "  was  observed  to  be  heavily 
hit  and  blew  up ;  "  Warrior  "  was  badly  hit  and  disabled,  but 
reached  the  rear  of  the  battlefleet  and  was  taken  in  tow  by 
"  Engadine."  It  is  probable  that  Rear- Admiral  Sir  Robert 
Arbuthnot  did  not  realise  the  proximity  of  the  German  battle- 
fleet,  and  coming  across  it  at  short  range  in  the  mist  was  unable 


16  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

to  extricate  his  squadron  before  his  flagship  was  sunk  and  the 
"  Warrior  "  disabled. 

Arrival  of  the  Battlefleet. 

At  5.45  p.m.,  "  Comus  "  (Captain  Alan  G.  Hotham),  of  the 
Fourth  Light-Cruiser  Squadron,  then  three  miles  ahead  of  the 
battlefleet,  reported  that  heavy  gunfiring  was  heard  from  a 
direction  south.  The  flashes  of  guns  were  shortly  afterwards 
observed  S.S.W.,  and  at  5.56  p.m.,  some  vessels,  subsequently 
seen  to  be  the  British  battle-cruisers,  were  seen  bearing  S.S.W. 
from  "  Marlborough,"  steering  E.,  heavily  engaged  with  an 
unseen  enemy. 

At  6.0  p.m.,  "  Iron  Duke's  "  position  was  latitude  57°  11'  N., 
longitude  5°  39'  E.,  course  S.E.  by  S.,  speed  twenty  knots; 
battlefleet  in  divisions  in  line  ahead  disposed  abeam  to 
starboard  (Organisation  No.  5),  columns  eleven  cables  apart. 

It  Avas  apparent  on  meeting  that  the  reckoning  of  the  battle- 
cruiser  fleet  was  about  twelve  miles  to  the  eastward  of  "  Iron 
Duke's  "  reckoning.  In  consequence  of  this  the  enemy  were 
sighted  on  the  starboard  bow  instead  of  ahead,  and  some 
twenty  minutes  earlier  than  was  anticipated. 

At  6  p.m.,  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle-Cruiser 
Fleet,  reported  enemy  battle-cruisers  bearing  S.E.,  and  at 
6.  14  p.m.,  in  reply  to  a  signal,  he  rej)orted  the  enemy  battlefleet 
in  sight,  bearing  S.S.W. 

Owing  to  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  position  of  the  enemy 
battlefleet,  it  had  not  been  possible  to  redispose  the  guides  of 
columns  on  anj'  different  bearing.  Consequently,  the  dej^loyment 
was  carried  out  under  some  disadvantage,  and,  indeed,  it  Avas 
not  easy  to  determine  the  correct  direction  of  deployment  until 
the  battlefleets  were  almost  in  contact. 

At  this  stage  it  was  not  clear  whether  the  enemy  battlefleet 
was  ahead  of  our  Ijattlefleet  or  on  the  starboard  beam,  as  heavy 
firing  was  proceeding  from  ahead  to  the  starboard  beam  and  the 
cruisers  ahead  were  seen  to  be  hotly  engaged.  In  order  to  take 
ground  to  starboard  a  signal  was  made  at  6.2  p.m.,  to  alter 
course  by  9  pendant  to  South,  but  it  was  then  reahsed  that  the 
enemy  battlefleet  must  be  in  close  proximity,  either  ahead  or  on 
the  starboard  side,  and  the  fleet  was  turned  back  by  9  pendant 
to  S.E.  preparatory  to  deployment  to  port. 

The  Flotillas  were  directed  to  take  up  destroyer  disposition 
No.  1  at  6.8  p.m. 

At  6.16  p.m.,  line  of  battle  was  formed  by  the  main  battlefleet 
by  Equal  Speed  pendant  on  the  port  wing  division ;  course 
S.E.  by  E.  Speed  had  been  reduced  at  6.02  p.m.,  to  eighteen 
knots  to  admit  of  shi])s  closing  up,  and  it  was  further  reduced  to 
fourteen  knots  on  deployment  to  allow  the  battle-cruisers,  which 
were  before  the  starboard  beam,  to  pass  ahead. 

The  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  Fifth  Battle  Squadron, 
having  sighted  "  Marlborough  "  at  6.6  p.m.,  and  other  ships  of 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  17 

the  fifth  and  sixth  divisions  at  6.19  p.m.,  turned  his  squadron  to 
port  at  6.20  p.m.,  to  form  astern  of  the  sixth  division.  During 
this  turn  the  ships  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  came  under  a 
heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's  leading  battleships,  but  the  shooting 
was  not  good  and  few  hits  were  made.  At  this  time  "  War- 
spite's  "  helm  unfortunately  jammed,  causing  her  to  continue  to 
turn  towards  the  enemy's  battlefleet.  By  good  handling, 
although  hit  several  times,  "  Warspite "  was  enabled  to  get 
away  to  the  northward.  The  Rear-Admiral  Commanding, 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  subsequently  ordered  her  to  proceed  to 
Rosyth  on  receipt  of  a  report  of  her  damage.  By  6.30  p.m., 
the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  (less  "  Warspite  "),  was  formed  astern 
of  "  Agincourt  "  in  the  battle  Hne. 

At  6.33  p.m.,  speed  was  increased  to  seventeen  knots,  which 
speed  was  maintained  until  the  Fleet  left  the  scene  for  its  bases 
on  1st  June.  Enclosure  No.  III.  shows  the  order  of  the  battlefleet, 
etc.,  at  6.40  p.m. 

Battlefleet  Action. 

The  First  Battle  Squadron,  at  the  rear  of  the  battle  hne 
and  the  furthest  to  the  westward  during  deployment,  came  into 
action  almost  immediately  the  deployment  signal  had  been 
hauled  down.  At  6.15  p.m.,  a  salvo  pitched  short  of  and  over 
the  forecastle  of  "  Hercules,"  deluging  the  bridge  and  conning 
tower  with  water.  The  enemy  at  this  time  were  made  out  by 
our  rear  ships  to  be  in  single  hne,  steering  to  the  eastward,  their 
battle-cruisers  leading,  followed  by  four  "  Konigs,"  four  or  five 
"  Kaisers  "  and  four  "  Helgolands,"  the  remainder  of  the  hne 
being  invisible  owing  to  the  large  overlap  we  had  established, 
and  to  the  converging  course.  "  Marlborough  "  and  her  division 
opened  fire  at  6.17  p.m.  on  one  of  the  "  Kaiser  "  class.  "  Hercules  " 
opened  fire  at  6.20  p.m.  on  the  second  "  Kaiser."  "  Colossus  " 
and  her  division  opened  fire  at  6.30.  The  practice  from  the 
First  Battle  Squadron  was  very  satisfactory  under  the  conditions 
and  severe  punishment  was  administered  to  the  enemy.  "  Marl- 
borough "  continued  her  fire  with  great  success  even  after  the 
ship  had  assumed  a  considerable  hst  after  being  torpedoed; 
"  Agincourt's  "  powerful  armament  was  used  with  good  effect, 
and  other  ships  were  also  observed  to  be  scoring  frequent  hits. 

"  Iron  Duke  "  opened  fire  at  6.23  p.m.  at  a  three-funnelled 
Hght-cruiser  passing  down  the  hne.  This  cruiser  was  engaged 
by  other  ships,  was  heavily  hit,  and  was  observed  to  sink  by 
several  eye-mtnesses  at  the  end  of  the  hne. 

At  6.25  p.m.  "  Falmouth  "  and  "  Yarmouth  "  of  the  Third 
Light-Cruiser  Squadron,  stationed  on  the  starboard  bow  of 
"  Lion "  fired  torpedoes  at  the  leading  enemy  battle-cruiser. 
The  Third  Light-Cruiser  Squadron  then  attacked  the  enemy 
ships  with  gunfire. 

The  battle-cruisers  were  well  ahead  by  6.30  p.m.  and  had 
reduced  to  eighteen  knots,  gradually  closing  the  enemy  van  and 
concentrating  a  heavy  fire  on  the  leading  ship. 

»    12872  B 


18  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

At  6.30  "  Iron  Duke  "  shifted  her  fire  to  the  leading  battle- 
ship (one  of  the  "  Konig  "  class)  bearing  S.W.,  range  11,000  yards, 
and  hit  her  several  times  in  the  third  and  fourth  salvoes  at 
6.33  p.m.  The  remainder  of  the  third  divi.sion  also  opened  fire 
on  the  leading  enemy  battleships  of  ''  Konig  "  class.  "  Ben- 
bow  "  and  the  fourth  division  opened  fire  at  6.30  p.m.,  and 
"  Orion  "  and  certain  ships  of  the  Second  Battle  Squadron  also 
opened  fire  at  this  time  on  the  rear  enemy  l^attle-cruisers  and 
leading  battleships.  At  6.40  p.m.  the  second  "  Konig  "  was 
seen  to  be  heavil}^  hit  and  to  be  ablaze  fore  and  aft,  then  to 
turn  16  points  to  starboard,  the  original  third  ship  passing  her. 
The  ship  then  settled  by  the  stern  and  was  observed  to  blow 
up  by  independent  witnesses  in  "  Thunderer,"  "  Benbow," 
"  Barham,"  "  Marne,"  "  Morning  Star,"  and  "  Magic,"  at 
6.50  p.m. 

At  this  time  the  visibility  was  about  12,000  yards,  and  for 
ranges  about  9,000  yards.  The  light  was,  however,  extremely 
baffling,  partly  due  to  misty  clouds  appearing  and  dissolving, 
and  partly  due  to  layers  of  smoke  from  funnels  and  ships  firing. 
The  direction  of  the  wind  was  W.S.W.,  force  2. 

At  6.55  p.m.  the  course  of  the  Fleet  was  altered  by  divisions 
to  south,  conforming  to  the  movements  of  the  battle-cruiser 
squadrons  and  with  a  view  to  closing  the  enemy. 

Firing  was  general  in  the  battlefleet,  but  the  use  of  distribu- 
tion of  gunfire  signals  was  out  of  the  question,  only  three  or 
four  ships  being  in  sight  at  a  time  from  the  van  and  centre, 
although  more  were  visible  from  the  rear.  Ships  fired  at  what 
they  could  see,  while  they  could  see  it.  Hitting  had  by  this 
time  become  general. 

At  6.54,  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle  Squad- 
ton,  in  "  Marlborough,"  reported  that  his  flagship  had  been 
struck  by  a  torpedo  or  mine.  Later  evidence  pointed  to  it 
being  a  torpedo,  possibly  discharged  from  a  submarine.  This 
is  supported  by  the  report  of  "  Revenge."  Officers  in  the 
transmitting  station,  "  A  "  and  "  Y  "  shell  rooms,  the  director 
tower  and  spotting  tower  all  felt  a  shock  as  if  the  ship  had 
struck  something.  A  few  minutes  after  the  "  Marlborough  "  was 
torpedoed.  A  large  patch  of  oil,  with  an  upheaval  in  the  middle 
and  portions  of  wreckage,  came  to  the  surface.  "  Revenge,"  on 
seeing  "  Marlborough  "  struck,  had  hauled  out  of  the  line  to 
port  about  a  cable  and  probably  struck  and  sank  a  submarine. 

At  this  time  the  destroyer  "  Acasta  "  was  passed  in  a  disabled 
condition.  She  signalled  that  she  was  holed  fore  and  aft  and 
unable  to  move  her  engines.  In  spite  of  her  condition  her 
ship's  company  were  observed  to  be  cheering  as  the  battlefleet 
passed. 

At  6.55  p.m.  "  Iron  Duke  "  passed  the  wreckage  of  "  Invin- 
cible." The  sliip  was  spUt  in  two,  the  bow  and  stern  standing 
out  of  the   water,   the   centre  part   resting  apparently   on   tlic 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  19 

bottom.     The   position   of   the   wreck   was   latitude   57°    6'    N., 
longitude  5°02'  E.     "  Badger  "  was  picking  up  survivors. 

In  order  to  guard  against  the  risk  of  secret  documents  being 
recovered  by  the  enemy  sliould  the  position  of  the  wreck  be 
located  by  remaining  above  water,  a  submarine  was  sent  from 
BIyth  to  search  for  and  if  necessary,  sink  the  wreck.  She  was 
unable  to  find  it,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  vessel  sank. 

At  7.10  p.m.  "  Marlborough  "  and  several  other  ships  were 
firing  at  the  second  of  the  three  of  the  remaining  "  Konig  " 
class  ("Marlborough"  fired  fourteen  salvoes).  At  7.18  a  ship 
turned  out  of  the  line  very  low  in  the  water  aft  and  sinking. 
An  Officer  in  the  torpedo  control  tower  in  '  Colossus  "  saw  this 
ship  sink  at  7.30  p.m.,  his  evidence  being  confirmed  by  "  Benbow," 
"  Superb,"  "  Colossus,"  and  "  Malaya." 

At  7.12  p.m.  enemy  battle-cruisers  also  emerged  from  the 
mist  at  10,000  yards  range  on  the  starboard  beam  of  the 
"  Colossus  "  division,  which  opened  fire  on  them.  A  ship  of 
the  "  Derffiinger  "  class  was  observed  to  be  hit  several  times 
by  "  Colossus  "  and  "  Neptune,"  and  listed  over  and  passed 
out  of  sight  obscured  by  heavy  smoke  and  mist.  "  Colossus  " 
was  hit,  but  only  suffered  triffing  damage.  At  the  same  time  a 
ship  of  the  "  Seydfitz  "  class  was  also  fired  at  and  hit  by 
"  ColHngwood."  "  Revenge  "  also  fired  at  and  hit  a  battle- 
cruiser  supposed  to  be  "  Von  Der  Tann,"  which  then  turned 
away. 

Attacks  by  Enemy  Flotilla  on  Baftlefleet. 

At  about  7.10  p.m.  a  flotilla  of  enemy  destroyers  supported 
by  a  cruiser  was  seen  approaching  "  Iron  Duke,"  bearing  from 
"  Iron  Duke  "  S.  50°  W.  (60°  green).  The  Fleet  was  turned 
away  two  points  by  the  "  Preparative "  and  subsequently 
another  two  points,  fire  being  opened  on  the  flotilla  with 
4-in,,  6-in.,  and  turret  guns  at  a  range  of  about  10,000  to  8,000 
yards.  When  at  about  8,000  yards  range,  the  'destroyers  fired 
their  torpedoes,  turning  towards  the  rear  of  their  line  and  dis- 
appearing in  a  smoke  screen.  No  torpedoes  hit.  One  destroyer 
was  observed  to  sink. 

At  about  7.25  p.m.  another  enemy's  destroyer  attack  was 
observed  approaching  the  rear  of  the  battle  line  from  a  bearing 
about  120°  green,  9,000  yards  from  "  Iron  Duke,"  and  was 
heavily  engaged  by  the  four  rear  divisions  of  the  battlefleet 
and  Fifth  Battle  squadron.  The  Eleventh  Flotilla  and  Fourth 
Light-Cruiser  Squadron  had  advanced  to  counter  the  former 
enemy  destroyer  attack  and  were  in  a  favourable  position  to 
counter  the  second  attack  during  which  at  7.22  p.m.  they  sank 
an  enemy  destroyer.  They  were  recalled  at  7.40  p.m.  In 
addition,  the  third  destroyer  from  the  left  was  observed  to  sink, 
and  the  left-hand  one  to  be  struck  and  turned  bottom  up- 
approximately  at  7.35  p.m.  At  7.45  p.m.  a  division  of  the 
Twelfth  Flotilla,  consisting  of  "  Obedient,"  "  Mindful,"  "  Marvel," 
and    "  Onslaught,"    proceeded   to   attack,    and   sink   an   enemy 

B  2 


20  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  ! 

*'  V  "-class  destroyer  flying  a  Commodore's  pendant  near  the 
rear  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 

Line  had  again  been  formed  at  7.33  p.m.  on  a  S.  by  W.  course 
and  at  7.41  p.m.  course  was  altered  to  the  S.W. 

PAt  7.30  p.m.  the  Second  Light-Cruiser  Squadron,  having 
previously  turned  towards  the  German  line  to  keep  in  touch  with 
the  enemy's  rear,  observed  the  enemy  alter  course  to  S.  by  W. 
At  8.30  "  Southampton  "  and  "  Dublin  "  attacked  an  enemy 
destroyer  and  hit  her  heavily  amidships.  She  was  shortly 
afterwards  seen  to  sink. 

At  8  p.m.  firing  had  practically  ceased  except  towards  the 
rear  of  the  line,  where  some  of  the  ships  of  the  First  and  Fifth 
Battle  Squadrons  were  still  engaged. 

Whilst  the  battlefleet  had  been  turned  away  from  enemy 
torpedo  attacks,  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle-Cruiser 
Fleet,  had  continued  engaging  the  head  of  the  enemy  line, 
gradually  hauling  round  to  S.W.  by  S.  and  then  S.W.  to  keep  in 
touch.  At  7.32  p.m.  "  Lion's  "  course  was  S.W.,  speed  eighteen 
knots,  the  leading  enemy  battleship  bearing  N.W.  by  W.  The 
battle-cruiser  fleet  were  inflicting  considerable  punishment  on 
the  enemy,  so  much  so  that  the  enemy  torpedo-boat  destroyers 
were  called  upon  to  cover  the  capital  ships  by  emitting  volumes 
of  grey  smoke.  Under  cover  of  this  smoke,  the  enemy  were 
lost  sight  of  at  7.45  p.m. 

At  7.58  p.m.  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Battle-Cruiser 
Fleet  ordered  the  First  and  Third  Light-Cruiser  Squadrons  to 
sweep  to  the  westward  and  locate  the  head  of  the  enemy's  line. 
The  British  battlefleet  also  turned  to  the  westward. 

At  8.30  p.m.  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle-Cruiser 
Fleet,  again  sighted  the  enemy  and  engaged  the  leading  enemy 
battle-cruiser  at  a  range  of  10,000  yards — only  two  were  sighted. 
This  battle-cruiser  was  struck  by  two  salvoes  and  burst  into  flames 
and  smoke.  Heavy  explosions  took  place  on  board  and  the 
ship  turned  away  with  a  heavy  list.  "  Princess  Royal  "  set 
fire  to  a  three-funnelled  battleship.  "  New  Zealand  "  and 
"  Indomitable  "  report  that  the  third  ship  of  the  Une  which  they 
engaged  heeled  over  and  was  on  fire.  The  enemy  was  last  seen 
by  "  Falmouth  "  steaming  to  the  westward. 

At  8.40  p.m.  all  battle -cruisers  felt  a  heavy  shock,  as  if 
struck  by  a  mine,  torpedo,  or  sunken  wreckage.  It  seems  probable 
that,  in  view  of  the  condition  in  which  the  enemy  were  last  seen 
the  shock  indicated  the  blowing  up  of  one  of  their  heavy  vessels. 

Night  Disposition. 

Darkness  was  now  rapidly  setting  in,  the  mist  was  increasing 
and  it  became  necessary  to  decide  on  the  future  course  of  action. 
The  British  Fleet  was  between  the  enemy  and  his  base.  Each 
side  possessed  a  considerable  number  of  destroyers,  it  being 
most  probable  that  the  enemy  was  largely  superior  in  this  respect, 
in  numbers,  as  it  was  logical  to  assume  that  every  available 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  21 

torpedo-boat  destroyer  and  torpedo-boat  had  been  ordered  out 
as  soon  as  contact  between  the  fleets  became  probable. 

I  rejected  at  once  the  idea  of  a  night  action  between  the 
heavy  ships,  as  leading  to  possible  disaster  owing,  first,  to  the 
presence  of  torpedo  craft  in  such  large  numbers,  and,  secondly, 
to  the  impossibility  of  distinguishing  between  our  own  and 
enemy  vessels.  Further,  the  result  of  a  night  action  under 
modern  conditions  must  always  be  very  largely  a  matter  of 
jDure  chance.  I  was  loth  to  forego  the  advantage  of  position, 
which  would  have  resulted  from  an  easterly  or  westerly  course, 
and  I  therefore  decided  to  steer  to  the  southw^ard,  where  I  should 
be  in  a  position  to  renew  the  engagement  at  dayhght,  and  should 
also  be  favourably  placed  to  intercept  the  enemy  should  he  make 
for  his  base  by  steering  for  HeHgoland  or  toward^  the  Ems  and 
thence  along  the  north  German  coast. 

Further,  such  a  course  enabled  me  to  drop  my  destroyer 
flotillas  astern,  thus  at  one  and  the  same  time  providing  the 
battlefleet  with  a  screen  against  attack  by  torpedo  craft  at  night, 
and  also  giving  our  flotillas  an  opportunity  for  attacking  the 
enemy's  heavy  ships  should  they  also  be  proceeding  to  the 
southward  vnih  the  object  of  regaining  their  bases. 

Accordingly,  at  9  p.m.,  the  fleet  was  turned  by  divisions  to 
south  (speed  seventeen  knots)  the  second  organisation  being 
assumed,  and  the  fleet  formed  in  divisions  hne  ahead  disposed 
abeam  to  port,  columns  one  mile  apart,  the  object  of  the  close 
formation  being  that  the  divisions  should  remain  clearly  in 
sight  of  each  other  during  the  night,  in  order  to  prevent  ships 
mistaking  each  other  for  enemy  vessels. 

At  9.24  p.m.,  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle-Cruiser 
Fleet,  in  latitude  56°  29'  N.,  longitude  5°  27'  E.,  turned  to  south. 

At  9.27  p.m.,  the  destroyer  flotillas  were  ordered  to  take  station 
five  miles  astern  of  the  battlefleet. 

At  9.32  p.m.,  "  Abdiel  "  was  directed  to  lay  mines  in  wide 
zig-zags  from  a  position  fifteen  miles  215°  from  the  Vyl  hght- 
vessel  in  a  mean  direction  180°,  ten  mines  to  the  mile.  This 
operation  was  successfully  accomplished  without  observation, 
and  "  Abdiel  "  then  proceeded  to  Rosyth  to  replenish  with 
mines. 

At  10  p.m.,  "  Iron  Duke's  "  position  was  : — 

latitude,  56°  22'  N., 
longitude,  5°  47'  E., 
course,  south, 
speed,   17  knots, 

the  order  of  the  fleet  from  west  to  east  being  as  follows  : — 

Battle-Cruiser  Fleet; 
Cruiser  Squadrons ; 

Battlefleet  (in  divisions,  disposed  abeam  to  port,  columns 
one  mile  apart,  in  Organisation  No.  2) ; 


22  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

First  Light-Cruiser  Squadron  four  miles  one  point  before 

the  starboard  beam  of  the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet; 
Second  Light-Cruiser  Squadron  astern  of  the  Fifth  Battle 

Squadron  and  Second  Battle  Squadron ; 
Third  Liglit-Cruisor  Squadron  on  starboard  bow  of  the 

Battle-Cruiser  Fleet: 
Fourtli  Light-Cruiser  Squadron  ahead  of  the  Battlefleet; 
Destroyer  Flotillas — five  miles  astern  of  the  Battlefleet 

in  the  order,  west  to  east — Eleventh,  Fourth,  Twelfth, 

Ninth,!  Tenth,!  Thirteenth. 

At  10.20  p.m.,  the  Second  Light-Cruiser  Squadron  engaged 
five  enemy  ships,  apparentl}^  a  cruiser  and  four  light-cruisers, 
which  concentrated  on  "  Southampton  "  and  "  DubHn  "  and 
severely  damaged  both  of  them.  The  enemy,  however,  were 
beaten  off. 

No  enemy  ship  was  seen  by  the  battlefleet  during  the  night, 
except  by  "  Active  "  astern  of  the  Second  Battle  Squadron. 
Firing  was  heard  astern,  searchlights  were  seen  in  use,  and  a 
fair  number  of  star  shells  were  fired  by  the  enemy,  which  gave 
out  a  brilliant  illumination,  and  it  was  evident  that  our  destroyer 
flotillas  and  light-cruiser  squadrons  were  in  action. 

From  reports  received  subsequently  it  is  fairly  certain  that 
the  German  battlefleet  and  battle-cruisers  crossed  astern  of  the 
British  battlefleet  and  made  for  the  Horn  Reef  channel.  In 
crossing  the  rear  of  the  British  battle  line,  the  enemy  fleet  came 
in  contact  with  the  British  flotillas,  which  seized  the  opportunity 
to  deliver  a  series  of  brilliant  and  gallant  attacks.  The  estimated 
course  of  the  enemy  fleet  was  S.E.  |  E.,  and  the  estimated  time 
of  the  last  battle  squadron  passing  the  Horn  Reef  light-vessel 
abeam,  eighteen  miles  distant,  was  3.45  a.m.  Submarine  E55, 
on  the  bottom  to  the  west  of  the  Horn  Reef  light-vessel,  heard 
eleven  explosions  between  2.15  and  5.30  a.m.  on  the  1st  June. 
The  estimated  time  of  the  last  of  the  enemy's  heavy  ships 
passing  over  "  Abdiel's  "  minefield  is  5  a.m. 


PROCEEDINGS    OF    FLOTILLAS. 

ELEVENTH  FLOTILLA. 

The  Commodore  (F),  in  "  Castor,"  with  the  Eleventh  Flotilla, 
at  10.4  p.m.  was  on  the  right  flank  in  position  five  miles  distant 
a  id  about  seven  points  abaft  the  starboard  beam  of  the  Second 
Battle  Squadron.  The  Fourth  Flotifla  was  in  the  centre  astern 
of  the  Fourth  Battle  Squadron,  and  the  Twelfth  Flotilla  was 
on  the  east  flank  astern  of  the  First  Battle  Squadron. 

"  Castor  "  and  Eleventh  Flotilla  came  in  contact  with  enemy 
battle-cruisers  at   10.5  p.m.,  the  enemy  consisting  of  three  or 

'  Destroyers  detached  from  Harwich  Force. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  23 

more  vessels.  Fire  was  ojjened  on  "  Castor,"  which  vessel 
returned  it  at  a  range  of  2,000  yards,  and  "  Castor  "  "  Magic  " 
and  "  Marne  "  each  fired  a  torpedo  and  turned  to  port.  A  violent 
detonation  was  heard  in  the  engine  rooms  of  three  destroyers. 
The  remaining  destroyers,  with  "  Castor  "  were  uncertain  whether 
the  sliips  firing  at  "  Castor  "  were  really  enemy  vessels  and 
thought  a  mistake  had  been  made.  They,  therefore,  withheld 
their  torpedo  fire.  "  Castor's  "  W/T  and  signaUing  gear  having 
been  disabled  by  the  enemy's  fire,  the  Commodore  (F)  was  unable 
to  signal  to  the  destroyers  to  attack.  The  enemy  disappeared 
and  the  flotilla  proceeded  south. 

At  0.15  a.m.  a  German  torpedo  boat  destroyer  was  sighted 
on  the  starboard  bow  of  "  Castor."  She  received  the  fire  of  all 
"  Castor's  "  guns  at  point  blank  range  and  was  not  seen  again, 
either  by  "  Castor  "  or  the  torpedo  boat  destroyers  folio \\ing. 
It  appears  certain  that  she  was  sunk. 

FOURTH    FLOTILLA. 

'  Tipperary,"  "  Broke "  and  the  Fourth  Flotilla  came  in 
contact  with  enemy  cruisers  at  11.30  p.m.,  the  enemy  being  on 
a  southeasterly  course ;  a  heavy  fire  was  opened  on  the  flotilla 
resulting  in  "  Tipperary  "  being  set  on  fire  forward ;  she  sank 
at  2.0  a.m.  "  Broke  "  was  badly  hit,  and  her  steering  gear  and 
engine  room  telegraphs  disabled,  and  before  she  could  be  got 
under  control  she  rammed  "  Sparrowhawk."  Both  vessels  were 
under  a  very  heavy  fire,  and  "  Sparrowhawk's  "  injuries  were 
such  that  her  crew  were  taken  off  and  she  was  sunk  on  the 
following  morning.     "  Broke  "  reached  the  Tjme. 

One  four  funnelled  enemy  cruiser  was  torpedoed  by  "  Spitfire  " 
(next  astern  of  "  Tipperary  ")  and  took  a  heavy  Ust,  and  appeared 
to  be  in  a  sinking  condition.  "  Spitfire  "  also  rammed  a  fight- 
cruiser  and  carried  off  29  feet  of  her  skin  plating.  She  had  two 
cranes  and  three  funnels,  a  red  band  being  painted  on  each  of 
the  latter. 

The  remainder  of  the  flotilla  altered  course  to  the  eastward 
and  then  southeastward,  and  at  midnight  came  in  contact  with 
an  enemy  battle  squadron  consisting  of  sliips  of  the  Deutschland 
class.  One  enemy  ship  was  torpedoed,  either  by  "  Ardent," 
"  Ambuscade  "  or  "  Garland,"  and  was  observed  to  Ust  over 
considerably.  It  is  probable  that  she  was  sunk.  "  Fortune  " 
was  sunk  during  this  attack.  The  flotilla  was  eventually  driven 
off  by  gunflre  and  obhged  to  retire  to  the  northward. 

Shortly  after  turning  off  "  Ardent  "  sighted  four  more  large 
German  ships  crossing  her  bows  and  steering  N.N.E.  "  Ardent  " 
attacked  and  fired  a  torpedo,  but  could  not  observe  the  result 
as  a  devastating  fire  was  opened  on  her,  and  she  sank  with 
colours  flying  after  a  gallant  fight,  her  commanding  officer 
(Lieutenant-Commander  Arthur  Marsden)  being  picked  up  by 
"  Marksman  "  on  the  following  morning  after  being  five  hours 
in  the  water. 


21  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

TWELFTH    FLOTILLA. 

The  Twelfth  Flotilla  formed  astern  of  the  First  Battle 
Squadron,  which  was  on  the  port  flank  and  somewhat  astern  of 
station  owing  to  "  Marlborough's  "  speed  being  reduced  by 
damage,  although  by  revolutions  she  was  steaming  at  seventeen 
knots. 

At  11.30  p.m.  the  flotilla  was  obhged  to  alter  course  to  clear 
Another  flotilla — probably  the  Fourth  Flotilla — which  was  crossing 
on  a  southeasterly  course,  and  this  alteration  caused  the  Twelfth 
Flotilla  to  be  about  five  miles  to  the  eastward  and  ten  miles  to 
the  northward  of  the  First  Battle  Squadron  by  midnight. 

At  1.45  a.m.  an  enemy  battle  squadron  was  sighted  on  the 
starboard  bow,  steering  S.E.,  consisting  of  six  ships,  the  first  four 
of  which  were  thought  to  be  of  the  Kaiser  class  (it  is  interesting 
to  note  that  this  points  to  there  being  only  six  sliips  of  the 
enemy's  Third  Battle  Squadron  left,  thus  confirming  the  evidence 
already  given  that  two  were  sunk  during  the  day  action). 

The  Captain  (D),  Twelfth  Flotilla,  altered  to  a  parallel  course 
and  increased  to  25  knots,  leading  round  in  order  to  attack  on  a 
northwesterly  com-se.  The  attack  was  carried  out  most  success- 
fully, torpedoes  being  fired  at  2  a.m.,  at  a  range  of  about  3,000 
yards,  at  the  second  and  third  sliips  of  the  fine,  the  latter  vessel 
being  particularly  conspicuous  bj^  a  torjiedo  boat  being  stationed 
close  under  the  quarter.  Torpedoes  took  effect  on  the  third 
ship,  wliich  blew  up,  the  magazine  having  apparently  exploded. 
Enemy  cruisers  astern  of  the  battle  line  attacked  the  flotilla  and 
obliged  the  Captain  (D)  to  alter  course  to  north.  The  cruisers 
were  shaken  off  and  the  flotilla  altered  round  to  south  to  resume 
its  course  after  the  battlefleet. 

The  following  signal  was  made  to  the  Commander-in-Chief 
by  the  Captain  (D)  : — 

Enemy  battlefleet  steering  S.E.,  approximate  bearing 
S.W.  My  position  ten  miles  astern  of  First  Battle  Squadron. 
0152. 

This   signal  w^as  unfortunately  not  received  in   the   battlefleet 
owing  to  telefunken  interference. 

Whilst  the  main  torpedo  attack  by  the  Twelfth  Flotilla  was 
being  made,  "  Maenad  "  (Commander  Jolm  P.  Champion), 
having  anticipated  that  the  attack  on  the  enemy  would  be  made 
with  tubes  bearing  to  starboard,  was  not  ready  when  the  turn 
was  made  and  port  tubes  brought  to  bear.  He,  therefore,  held 
on  the  southeasterly  course  and  turned  later  to  fire  one  torpedo 
from  the  port  side  when  the  tube  was  trained.  He  then  trained 
both  tubes  to  starboard,  turned  and  went  ahead,  closing  in  again 
to  between  4,000  and  5,000  yards  from  the  enemy  and  firing 
two  more  toi-pedoes.  The  second  torpedo  struck  the  fourth  ship 
in  the  line.  There  was  a  heavy  explosion,  the  flames  topping 
the  mast  heads,  and  the  ship  was  not  seen  again,  though  those 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  26 

ahead  and  astern  were  distinctly  visible.  The  time  of  tliis 
attack  was  twenty-five  minutes  later  than  the  main  attack.  It 
seems  therefore  certain  that  two  battleships  were  hit  and  there 
is  considerable  probability  that  both  were  sunk  by  the  Twelfth 
Flotilla.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  six  ships  were  observed  by  the 
Captain  (D)  at  the  commencement  of  the  attack — only  five  were 
seen  by  "  Maenad  "  when  "  Maenad's  "  attack  was  made,  and 
only  four  were  visible  after  "  Maenad's  "  attack.  The  report 
from  '"'  Maenad "  was  sent  to  me  from  Rosytli,  before  her 
commanding  officer  had  seen  the  Captain  (D),  Twelfth  Flotilla, 
or  knew  that  he  had  reported  having  blown  up  one  of  the 
battleships. 

NINTH  AND  TENTH  FLOTILLAS. 

At  7.30  p.m.  the  destroyers  of  the  Ninth  and  Tenth  FlotiUas 
under  the  commanding  officer  of  "  Lydiard,"  took  station  on  the 
port  beam  of  the  "  Champion  "  astern  of  the  battlefleet. 

At  about  11.30  p.m  fire  was  opened  on  them  by  a  line  of 
large  ships,  which  were  at  first  mistaken  to  be  a  British  squadron. 
Shortly  afterwards  the  "  Champion "  went  ahead  and  the 
destroyers  lost  touch  except  "  Obdurate  "  and  "  Moresby." 

At  6.0  a.m.  it  was  discovered  that  the  destroyers  of  the 
Thirteenth  Flotilla  and  "  Morris "  were  astern.  The  com- 
manding ofiicer  of  "  Lydiard  "  detached  "  Narborough  "  with 
the  M-class  destroyers  to  join  the  battle -cruiser  fleet,  and  then 
proceeded  to  Rosyth  mth  the  L-class  destroyers,  which  were  short 
of  fuel. 

FIRST  FLOTILLA. 

"  Fearless,"  not  being  able  to  keep  up  with  the  flotilla,  formed 
astern  of  "  Agincourt  "  at  6  p.m.,  the  destroyers  remaining  with 
the  battle-cruiser  fleet  during  the  night. 

Shortly  after  midnight  "  Fearless  "  observed  what  appeared 
to  be  a  German  battleship  pass  down  the  starboard  side.  Reports 
from  ships  of  the  First  Battle  Squadron  confirm  this.  As  sliips 
ahead  did  not  open  fire  no  action  Avas  taken,  as  her  course  led 
directly  to  the  destroyers  following  astern.  A  heavy  explosion 
was  observed  not  long  after,  which  coincides  Avith  the  Fourth 
Flotilla  attack  on  ships  of  the  "  Deutschland  "  class. 

THIRTEENTH  FLOTILLA. 

The  Thirteenth  Flotilla  took  station  astern  of  the  battlefleet. 
During  the  night  all  except  "  Obdurate  "  and  "  Moresby  "  lost 
touch  with  "  Champion."  At  2.30  a.m.  course  was  altered  to 
north  and  "  Marksman  "  and  "  Nomad  "  joined. 

At  3.25  a.m.  four  enemy  destroyers  were  sighted,  steering  to 
the  southeastward,  and  at  3.30  a.m.  were  engaged  at  a  range  of 
approximately  3,000  yards  The  enemy  passed  and  disappeared 
in  the  mist,  after  firing  torpedoes  at  "  Champion." 


26  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  I 

At  4.30  a.m.  "  Obdurate  "  picked  up  two  survivors  from  the 
"Ardent."    ' 

At  5.0  a.m.  two  rafts  were  sighted  and  "  Moresby  "  rescued 
seven  men  and  "  Maenad  "  eleven  men,  survivors  from  the 
"  Fortune." 

"  Marksman  "  was  detached  to  the  assistance  of  the 
*'  Sparrowhawk  "  at  CO  a.m.  and  the  flotilla  proceeded  to  Rosyth. 

At  0.30  a.m.  the  destroyers  which  had  become  detached  and 
were  then  under  the  orders  of  "  Narborough  "  came  under  heavy 
fire  from  an  enemy  ship,  which  was  at  first  mistaken  for  one  of 
our  hght-cruisers  or  a  ship  of  "  Warrior  "  class.  The  "  Turbu- 
lent "  was  rammed  and  sunk  by  gunfire.  At  daylight  the 
remainder  attached  themselves  to  the  force  under  the  commanding 
officer  of  "  Lydiard." 

At  11.0  p.m.  "Active,"  asteni  of  "  Boadicea,"  astern  of 
Second  Battle  Squadron,  saw  a  German  hght-cruiser  come  up 
astern.  A  ship  on  the  starboard  quarter  of  "  Active  "  switched 
on  searchUghts  and  opened  fire.  The  hght-cruiser  was  heavily 
hit,  stern  cocked  up  in  the  air,  and  it  was  thought  that  the  ship 
went  down.  It  seems  possible  that  "  Active  "  witnessed  the 
sinking  of  a  German  hghtcruiser  by  a  German  battle-cruiser. 

At  11.15  p.m.  "  Active  "  struck  a  submerged  object,  removing 
about  fifteen  feet  of  her  starboard  bilge  keel.  The  position  in' 
which  this  occurred  was  well  clear  of  the  scene  of  the  action, 
and  it  is  possible  that  the  object  in  question  was  an  enemy 
submarine. 

PROCEEDINGS   OF   THE   FLEET   AFTER   MIDNIGHT 
31   MAY-1   JUNE    1916. 

At  2.0  a.m.  a  report  was  received  from  the  Vice-Admiral 
Commanding,  First  Battle  Squadron,  that  "  Marlborough  "  had 
been  obhged  to  ease  to  twelve  knots  on  account  of  stress  on 
bulkheads  at  the  higher  speeds.  The  remainder  of  the  divisions 
continued  at  seventeen  knots.  The  Commander-in-Chief  ordered 
"  Marlborough  "  to  proceed  to  the  Tyne  or  Rosyth  by  "  M  " 
channel.  The  Vicc-Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle  Squadron, 
called  the  "  Fearless  "  alongside  "  Marlborough,"  shifted  to 
"  Revenge  "  in  the  "  Fearless,"  and  detached  "  Fearless  "  to 
escort  the  "  Marlborough." 

The  weather  was  very  misty  at  dayhght,  visibility  being 
only  three  to  four  miles,  and  I  deemed  it  advisable  to  disregard 
the  danger  from  submarines  due  to  a  long  line  of  ships  and  to 
form  line  of  battle  at  once  in  case  of  meeting  the  enemy  battle- 
fleet  before  I  had  been  able  to  get  in  toueli  with  my  cruisers  and 
destroyers.  The  battlefleet  accordingly  altered  course  to  north 
at  2.47  a.m.  and  formed  line  of  battle.  The  Fourth  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron  was  in  company,  but  the  sixth  division  of  the  battle- 
fleet  comprising  the  "  Revenge,"  "  Hercules  "  and  "  Agincourt  " 
had  lost  touch  owing  to  "  Marlborough's  "  reduction  in  speed 
and  was  broad  on  the  eastern  flank  of  the  fleet  during  the  day. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  27 

At  3.44  a.m.  course  was  altered  to  west,  heavy  firing  being 
heard  in  that  direction.  At  4.0  a.m.  a  Zeppelin  was 
bearing  S.E.  She  approached  the  fleet,  but  was  driven  off  by- 
gunfire.  At  4.10  a.m.  the  battlefleet  formed  divisions  in  line 
ahead  disposed  abeam  to  starboard. 

The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle  Cruiser  l^'leet,  in 
accordance  with  orders,  closed  the  Commander-in-Chief  at 
5.40  a.m.  and  was  directed  to  sweep  to  the  northward  and 
eastward,  whilst  the  Commander-in-Chief  swept  with  the  battle- 
fleet  first  to  the  southward  and  eastward  and  then  northward. 

At  3.0  a.m.  the  "  Sparrowhawk "  was  lying  disabled  in 
approximately  lat.  55°  54'  N.,  Long.  5°  59'  E.,  when  a  German 
light-cruiser  with  three  high  straight  funnels  equally  spaced, 
two  masts  and  a  straight  stem  (probably  "  Kolberg  ")  was 
sighted  two  miles  East  steaming  slowly  to  the  northward;  after 
being  in  sight  about  five  minutes  she  gradually  heeled  over  and 
sank  slowly  bows  first. 

The  Commodore  (T)  with  the  Harwich  force  had  been  ordered 
at  3.20  a.m.  by  the  Admiralty  to  proceed  to  join  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  to  replace  vessels  requiring  fuel.  The  Commander-in- 
Chief  gave  directions  for  four  torpedo  boat  destroyers  to  be 
detached  to  screen  "  Marlborough,"  whose  4.30  a.m.  j)osition 
was  Lat.  55°  30'  N.,  Long.  6°  3'  E.,  course  S.W.,  speed 
fourteen  knots. 

At  9.0  a.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  ordered  the  Vice- 
Admiral  Commanding,  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  who  was  to  eastward 
of  the  battlefleet,  on  a  northerly  course,  to  sweep  as  far  as 
Lat.  57°  30'  N.,  Long.  5°  45'  E. 

At  9.36  a.m.  the  Admiralty  directed  the  Third  Battle 
Squadron  and  Third  Cruiser  Squadron  to  return  to  harbour  and 
revert  to  usual  notice. 

At  10.31  a.m.  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  joined  up  with  the 
remainder  of  the  battlefleet. 

At  1.15  p.m.  the  battlefleet,  having  swept  out  the  area  south 
of  the  scene  of  the  action,  proceeded  N.W.  for  Scapa,  the  battle- 
cruiser  fleet  and  "  VaHant  "  proceeding  to  Rosyth. 

At  3.40  p.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  ordered  the  Vice* 
Admiral  Commanding,  Tenth  Cruiser  Squadron,  and  "  Donegal  " 
to  take  up  the  Muckle  Flugga  patrol,  to  look  out  for  "  Moewe  " 
and  another  raider,  which  were  possibly  attempting  to  break  out 
into  the  Atlantic.        * 

At  4.0  p.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  informed  the  Commodore 
(T)  that  the  Admiralty  had  been  told  that  there  was  nothing 
left  for  the  HarAvich  force  to  do.  He  was  ordered  to  strengthen 
"  Marlborough's  "  screen  by  two  destroyers  and  return  to 
Harwich. 

At  10.0  p.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  directed  the  Vice- 
Admiral  Commanding,  Orkneys  and  Shetlands,  to  send  out  at 
dayhght  any  destroyers  available  to  meet  and  screen  the  fleet, 
approaching  on  a  bearing  82°  from  Pentland  Skerries. 


28  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

The  Commodore  (T)  reported  his  8  p.m.  position  on  1st  June 
as  Lat.  56°  7'  N.,  Long.  4°  37'  E.,  course  N.  77°  W.,  speed 
fourteen  knots,  and  that  he  proposed  turning  back  to  intercept 
the  enemy  at  daylight  on  the  meridian  of  Long.  4°  30'  E. 

The  battlefleet,  Fourth  Liglit  Crui.ser  Squadron,  Fourth, 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Flotillas  arrived  at  Scapa  between  10.30  a.m. 
and  noon  on  2nd  June. 

On  arrival  "  Titania  "  was  directed  to  send  a  submarine  as 
soon  as  the  weather  permitted  to  sink  by  torpedo,  gunfire,  or 
explosive  charge,  the  portion  of  wreck  of  "  Invincible  "  in  approxi- 
mately Lat.  57°  06'  N.,  Long,  6°  02'  E.,  if  still  showing  above 
water.  "  G.  10  "  sailed  at  3.0  a.m.  3rd  June,  and  returned  to 
Blyth  at  9.20  p.m.,  6th,  reporting  that  after  searching  for 
forty-eight  hours  nothing  could  be  found. 

At  9.45.  p.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  reported  to  the 
Admiralty  that  the  battlefleet  was  again  ready  for  action  and 
at  four  hours'  notice. 


NARRATIVE   OF   EVENTS   RELATING   TO 
DISABLED   SHIPS. 

"  MARLBOROUGH." 

At  2  a.m.  on  1st  June,  "  Marlborough  "  reported  that  her 
speed  w^as  reduced  to  12  knots  and  at  2.30  a.m.  she  was  directed 
by  Commander-in-Chief  to  proceed  to  Tyne  or  Rosyth  by  "  M  " 
channel. 

At  3.0  a.m.  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle  Squadron 
was  directed  to  send  liis  division  to  join  Commander-in-Chief, 
keeping  one  sliip  as  escort  if  necessary. 

He  reported  that  he  had  transferred  to  "  Revenge  "  and 
that  "  Marlborough "  was  proceeding  with  "  Fearless  "  in 
company. 

At  7.0  a.m.  Commander-in-Cliief  ordered  Commodore  (T) 
to  detach  four  destroyers  to  screen  "  Marlborough,"  her 
4.30  a.m..  position  being  in  latitude  55°  30'  N.,  longitude  6°  3'  E. 
Course  S.W.,  speed  14  knots. 

At  6.50  p.m.  1st  June  "  Marlborough  "  reported — All  com- 
partments between  78  and  111  stations  starboard  from  outer 
bottom  to  middle  or  main  deck  probably  flooded.  AU  double 
bottom  compartments  between  these  stations  on  starboard 
side  vertical  keel  damaged  and  probably  double  bottom  compart- 
ments vertical  to  2nd  longitudinal  on  port  side  also  damaged. 
Boilers,  auxiliary  macliinery  in  "  A  "  boiler  room  not  damaged, 
except  air  blower  and  Diesel  engine  oil  pump.  "  A "  boiler 
room  partially  flooded  but  w^ater  is  being  kept  under. 

At  9.30  p.m.  Admiralty  directed  "  Marlborough  "  to  proceed 
to  Rosyth  for  temporary  repairs. 

At  midnight  lst-2nd  June  "  Marlborough "  reported  her 
position  to  be  in  latitude  54°  40'  N.,  longitude  0°  53'  E.,  and 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  '2U 

that  she  was  making  for  Flamborough  Head.  Owing  to  bad 
weather  the  water  was  gaining. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  requested  the  Senior  Naval  Officer 
Hiimber  to  send  powerful  tugs  to  her  and  also  directed  "  Can- 
terbury," who  was  proceeding  to  Harwich,  to  proceed  to  her 
assistance. 

"  Canterbury  "  sighted  "  Marlborough  "  ofE  the  Humber  at 
7.30  a.m.  2nd  June,  when  she  was  informed  that  her  assistance 
was  not  required. 

At  4.0  a.m.  "  Marlborough  "  reported  her  position  to  be  in 
latitude  54°  10'  N.,  longitude  0°  2'  E.,  course  South,  speed 
11  knots  ;   water  was  being  kept  under -control. 

"  Marlborough  "  arrived  in  the  Humber  at  8.0  a.m.  2nd, 
screened  by  "  Fearless  "  and  8  destroyers  from  Harwich,  having 
been  unsuccessfully  attacked  by  enemy  submarines  whilst 
en  route. 

"  WARSPITEr 

At  9.0  p.m.  31st  May,  "  Warspite  "  reported  that  the  damage 
reduced  her  speed  to  16  knots.  The  Commander-in-Chief  ordered 
her  to  proceed  to  Rosyth. 

At  6.10  a.m.  1st  June,  "  Warspite "  reported  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  that  she  had  many  holes  from  shellfire, 
that  the  ship  was  tight  and  on  an  even  keel.  vSeveral 
compartments  were  full,  but  the  bulkheads  were  shored.  The 
ship  was  being  steered  from  the  engine  room. 

At  9.0  a.m.  1st  June  the  Commander-in-Chief  asked  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Rosyth,  to  send  local  destroyers  to  screen 
"  Warspite." 

She  arrived  at  Rosyth  at  3.0  p.m.  on  1st  June  having  been 
unsuccessfully  attacked  by  enemy  submarines  en  route. 


"  BROKEr 

At  11.24  a.m.  1st  June  the  Commodore  (F)  reported  that 
"  Broke's "  midnight  position  was  in  latitude  57°  49'  N., 
longitude  3°  50'  E.,  course  N.W.  speed  7  knots;  that  she  was 
damaged  forward  and  would  like  escort  if  available. 

At  1.30  a.m.  2nd  June,  "  Active  "  was  dropped  astern  of 
fleet  and  proceeded  to  search  for  "  Broke."  She  was  informed 
that  two  destroj^ers  would  be  sent  as  soon  as  "  Broke  "  had 
been  located. 

At  5.0  a.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  directed  the  Commodore 
Commanding,  Fourth  Light-cruiser  Squadron,  to  detail  one 
Hght  cruiser  to  assist  "  Active  "  in  search  for  "  Broke."  "  Con- 
stance "  proceeded  at  5.30  a.m.  2nd  June. 

At  6.30  a.m.  2nd  June  the  Rear-Admiral  Commanding, 
Second  Cruiser  Squadron  was  ordered  to  abandon  the  search 
for  "  Warrior  "  and  sweep  to  find  "  Broke." 


30  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

At  9.15  p.m.  2nd  June  orders  were  given  for  the  search  to  be 
continued  next  day  to  the  South  and  S.W.  of  the  area  already 
searched. 

At  1.0  a.m.  3rd  June  "  Constance  "  and  "  Active  "  were 
ordered  to  return  to  Scapa. 

At  3.0  a.m.  3rd  June  "  Broke  "  reported  her  position  to  be 
in  latitude  56°  21'  N.,  longitude  0°  12'  E.,  course  West,  speed 
0  knots,  and  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle  Cruiser 
Fleet,  was  ordered  to  send  four  destroyers  to  meet  and  screen 
her.     They  sailed  at  8.0  a.m.  3rd  June. 

The  Second  Cruiser  Squadron  was  ordered  to  return  to  the 
base.     Tliis  squadron  arrived  at  6.30  p.m.  the  same  day. 

The  "  Broke  "  arrived  in  Tyne  at  6.0  p.m.  3rd  June. 

"  WARRIOBr 

At  8.0  p.m.  31st  May  "  Engadine  "  took  "  Warrior  "  in  tow 
in  about  latitude  57°  10'' N.,  longitude  5°  45'  E.,  steering  W.N.W. 

"  Warrior  "  was  abandoned  at  7.45  a.m.  1st  June  in  approxi- 
mately latitude  57°  34'  N.,  longitude  2°  56'  E.,  "  Engachne  " 
proceeding  alongside  to  take  the  crew  off.  The  latter  arrived 
at  Rosyth  at  1.35  a.m.  2nd  June  with  35  officers,  681  men,  25  cot 
cases  and  two  walking  cases  from  "  Warrior." 

At  8.45  a.m.  1st  June  the  Commander-in-Chief,  not  having 
received  information  that  "  Warrior  "  was  abandoned,  informed 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  Rosyth,  that  she  was  in  tow  of 
"  Engadine,"  com.pletely  disabled,  in  latitude  57°  18'  N., 
longitude  3°  54'  E.,  course  W.N.W.,  speed  7  knots,  and  requested 
that  tugs  should  be  sent. 

At  9.55  a.m.  1st  June,  the  Rear- Admiral,  Invergordon, 
informed  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  yacht  "  Albion,"  in  charge 
of  two  tugs,  had  been  ordered  to  leave  Peterhead  and  proceed 
to  the  assistance  of  "  Warrior." 

"  Engadine's  "  11.0  p.m.  position  on  31st  May  was  in  latitude 
57°  10'  N.,  longitude  2°  17'  E. 

At  1.45  p.m.  2nd  June,  the  Rear- Admiral,  "  Cj^clops,"  reported 
that  vacht  "  Albion  III."  with  three  tugs  had  been  unable  to 
find  "  Warrior." 

At  4.30  p.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  informed  the  Rear- 
Admiral  Commanding,  Second  Cruiser  Squadron,  of  the  state 
of  affairs  about  "  Warrior  "  and  directed  Mm  to  search  for  her 
and  if  impossible  to  salve,  to  sink  her.  If  the  tugs  sent  out 
from  Peterhead  were  not  required  for  "  Warrior  "  they  were  to 
be  sent  to  tow  "  Acasta,"  who  was  in  tow  of  "Nonsuch,"  a  httle 
to  the  Eastward  of  "  Warrior's  "  position. 

At  2.30  p.m.  the  Commander-in-Chief  directed  Unit  42  from 
Peterhead  to  be  diverted  to  search  for  "  Warrior." 

At  3.0  p.m.,  the  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  Second  Cruiser 
Squadron,  reported  no  sign  of  "  Warrior  "  in  area  17  miles  south 
of  and  40  miles  north,  west  and  east  of  her  last  position  given 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  31 

Good  visibility.  Wind,  N.W.,  6  to  7.  Somewhat  heavy  sea. 
Second  Cruiser  Squadron's  jDosition  at  3.0  a.m.,  57°  N.,  2°  45'  E. 

At  8.0  p.m.,  2nd  June,  Third  Light-Cruiser  Squadron  and 
three  destroyers  sailed  from  Rosyth  to  join  in  the  search  for 
"  Warrior." 

At  11.30  p.m.  Commander-in-Chief  informed  the  Vice-Admiral 
Commanding,  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  that  the  Second  Cruiser 
Squadron  had  searched  area  North  of  57°  10'  N.  and  west  of 
longitude  4°  10'  E.,  and  was  now  searching  N.W.  of  this  area  for 
"  Broke."  He  suggested  that  hght-cruisers  from  Rosyth  should 
search  area  south  of  this  latitude  and  east  of  longitude  3°  50'  E. 

At  9.30  a.m.,  4th  June,  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  Third 
Light-Cruiser  Squadron,  reported  his  position  in  56°  15'  N., 
longitude  3°  0'  E.,  and  proposed  abandoning  search  at  8.0  p.m. 
and  return  to  harbour.  This  was  approved  and  squadron  arrived 
at  Rosyth  6.0  a.m.,  5th  June. 

Captain  of  "  Warrior  "  reported  by  telegraph  that  cypher 
and  signal  books  in  use  were  thrown  overboard  when  ship  was 
abandoned. 

14:  iff  4:  ^  4: 

When  abandoned,  the  stern  of  the  ship  was  two  or  three 
feet  above  water.  Stem  about  normal  draught,  every  sea 
washing  over  upper  deck.  At  least  two  feet  of  water  on  main 
deck.  Decks  and  bulkheads  terribly  shattered  by  shell  fire  and 
no  longer  watertight ;  ship  settling  down  and  stability  gone. 
No  chance  of  ship  remaining  afloat  in  increasingly  heavy  weather 
prevailing. 


"  CHESTER." 

Ordered  by  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  Second  Cruiser 
Squadron,  at  dayhght,  1st  to  proceed  to  Humber. 

She  arrived  at  the  Humber  at  5.0  p.m.,  1st,  and  reported  her 
damage. 

Three  guns  out  of  action,  much  damage  to  upper  works 
and  holed  four  places  above  water  line.  Engines,  boilers  and 
all  machinery  almost  intact.  No  serious  damage  below  water- 
line. 

"  sparrowhawk:' 

"At  7.30  a.m.,  "  Marksman  "  reported  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  that  he  was  endeavouring  to  tow  "  Sparrowhawk  " 
stern  first. 

At  8.5  a.m.  "  Marksman  "  reported  that  hawser  had  parted, 
and   on   receipt   of  approval  from   Vice-Admiral   Commanding, 
First  Battle  Squadron,  "  Sparrowhawk  "  was  sunk  in  56°  8'  N. 
6°  10'  E. 

^  The  deletion  refers  to  disposal  of  .secret  documents  only. 


32  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

"NONSUCH"  AND   "  ACASTA." 

(•'  Acasta  "  was  with  "  Shark,"  "  Opheha  "  and  "  Christopher  " 
screening  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron.) 

At  9.45  a.m.,  "  Nonsuch  "  reported  to  Commodore  (F)  that 
he  was  escorting  "  Acasta  "  to  Aberdeen  at  10  knots,  the  latter 
being  badly  damaged. 

"  Nonsuch  "  reported  later  that  she  had  taken  "  Acasta  " 
in  tow  about  noon  in  position  57°  16'  N.,  longitude  4°  8'  E., 
course  W,  ^  N.,  speed  about  6  knots. 

"  Nonsuch  "  reported  her  7.0  p.m.  position  on  1st,  in  57°  8'  N., 
2°  33'  E.,  speed  about  7  •  5  knots,  all  well. 

At  8.40  p.m.,  1st,  Rear-Admiral,  Peterhead,  was  requested 
to  send  a  trawler  unit  to  screen  "  Nonsuch  "  and  "  Acasta  "  to 
Aberdeen,  and  at  C.30  a.m.  2nd,  he  was  requested  to  direct 
"  Albion  "  and  tugs  which  were  searching  for  "  Warrior,"  to 
proceed  to  assist  "  Acasta  "  in  tow  of  "  Nonsuch." 

"  Nonsuch's  "  position  at  5.0.  p.m.,  20  miles  East  of  Aberdeen, 
gpeed  8  knots,  all  well. 

"  Nonsuch  "  arrived  Aberdeen  at  8.0  p.m.,  and  "  Acasta  " 
at  9.15  p.m. 

"ONSLOW"   AND   "DEFENDER." 

"  Defender  "  took  "  Onslow  "  in  tow  between  7.15  and  8.0  p.m., 
31st  May,  "  Defender's  "  maximum  speed  being  10  knots. 
They  arrived  at  Aberdeen  at  1.0  p.m.  on  2nd  June. 

Flotillas. 

At  7.33  a.m.,  1st  June,  Commodore  (F)  reported  that  all 
destroyers  of  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Flotillas  and  "  Sparrowhawk  " 
were  in  company. 

The  wreckage  of  "  Ardent  "  was  passed  at  8.20  a.m.,  1st, 
in  latitude  55°  58'  N.,  6°  8'  E. 

At  9.45  a.m..  Commodore  (F)  reported  having  passed  some 
bodies  and  lifebuoy  marked  "  Turbulent  "  at  8.0  a.m.,  1st. 

At  8.58  a.m.,  lat.  56°  3'  N.,  long.  6°  4'  E.,  "  Orion  "  reported 
she  had  passed  considerable  wreckage  and  floating  bodies, 
apparently  foreigners. 

"  DubUn,"  which  was  with  the  Battlefleet  until  10.0  a.m., 
reported  that  at  6.0  a.m.,  in  Lat.  55°  51'  N.,  long.  5°  53'  E., 
she  picked  up  a  stoker  from  "  Tipperary." 

J.  R.  JELLICOE, 

Admiral, 
19  June  1916. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES. 


33 


Enclosure  No.  2  in  H.F.  letter  Xo.  1396  0022,  dated  18th  June  1916. 

LIST     OF     SHIPS     AND     ORGANISATIONS     OF     FLEET. 

DREADNOUGHT   BATTLE   FLEET. 

fKING  GEORGE  V. 
1st  Division  J  AJAX. 

Organisation  No.  5.   1  CEXTURIOX. 
1  ERIX. 
f  ORION. 
2nd  Division.  J  MONARCH. 

Organisation  No.  5.     ]  CONQUEROR. 
[THUNDERER. 


1st  Division 

Organisation  No.  2. 

2nd  Battle  Squadron. 


2nd  Division 

Organisation  No.  2. 

4th  Battle  Squadron. 


3rd  Division 
Organisation  No.  2 
1st  Battle  Squadron. 


Attached  cruisex's 


fIRON   DUKE. 
3rd  Division  J  ROYAL    OAK. 

Organisation  No.  5.     ]  SUPERB. 
(CANADA. 
(BENBOW. 
4th  Division  J  BELLEROPHON. 

Organisation  No.  5.      ]  TEMERAIRE. 
(^  VANGUARD. 

f  MARLBOROUGH. 

6th  Division  J  REVENGE. 

Organisation  No.  5.     ]  HERCULES. 
[  AGINCOURT 
f  COLOSSUS, 
oth  Division.  J  COLLINGWOOD. 

Organisation  No.  5.     ]  NEPTUNE 
(_.  [_ST.    VINCENT 

fBOADICEA. 

J  BLANCHE.   .,,  ,  ,/OAK. 
i  BELLONA.   ^"^^^^®^\ABDIEL. 

INACTIVE. 


5TH   BATTLE   SQUADRON. 

BARHAM. 
VALIANT. 
WARSPITE 
MALAYA. 


1st  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron. 

LION. 

PRINCESS    ROYAL. 
QUEEN    MARY. 
TIGER. 


BATTLE   CRUISERS. 

2nd  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron. 

NEW    ZEALAND. 
INDEFATIGABLE. 


3rd  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron. 

INVINCIBLE. 

INFLEXIBLE. 

IXDOMITABLE. 


Isi  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron. 

GALATEA. 
PHAETON. 
INCONSTANT. 
CORDELIA. 


LIGHT   CRUISERS 

2nd  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron. 

SOUTHAMPTON. 
BIRMINGHAM. 
NOTTINGHAM. 
DUBLIN. 


Zrd  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron. 

FALMOUTH. 

YARMOUTH 

BIRKENHEAD. 

GLOUCESTER. 

CHESTER. 


12872 


34 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

CRUISER   SQUADRONS. 


1st  Cruiser  Squadron. 

DEFEN'CE. 

WARRIOR. 

DUKE    OF   EDINBURGH. 

BLACK    PRINCE. 


2nd  Cruiser  Squadron. 

MINOTAUR. 
HAMPSHIRE. 
COCHRANE. 
SHANNON. 


LIOHT   CRUISER   SQUADRON. 

4:th  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

CALLIOPE. 

CONSTANCE. 

COMUS. 

CAROLINE. 

ROYALIST. 

LIGHT   CRUISER.  CANTERBURY. 


DESTROYER   FLOTILLAS. 


I2th  Flotilla. 

FAULKNOR. 
MARKSMAN. 

OBEDIENT. 

MAENAD. 

OPAL. 

MARY   ROSE. 

MARVEL. 

MENACE. 

NESSUS. 

NARWHAL. 

MINDFUL. 

ONSLAUGHT. 

MUNSTER. 

NONSUCH. 

NOBLE. 

MISCHIEF. 


llth  Flotilla. 

CASTOR. 
KEMPENFELT. 

OSSORY. 

MYSTIC. 

MOON. 

MORNING   STAR. 

MAGIC. 

MOUNSEY. 

MANDATE. 

MARNE. 

MINION. 

MANNERS. 

MICHAEL. 

MONS. 

MARTIAL. 

MILBROOK. 


ith  Flotilla. 

TIPPERARY. 
BROKE. 

ACHATES. 

PORPOISE. 

SPITFIRE 

UNITY. 

GARLAND. 

AMBUSCADE. 

ARDENT. 

FORTUNE. 

SPARROWHA^^'K. 

CONTEST. 

SHARK. 

ACASTA. 

OPHELIA. 

CHRISTOPHER. 

OWL. 

HARDY. 

MIDGE. 


1st  Flotilla. 

FEARLESS. 

ACHERON 

ARIEL. 

ATTACK 

HYDRA. 

BADGER 

GOSHAW  K 

DEFENDKl'v 

LIZARD 

LAPWINC; 


Uth  Flotilla. 

CHAMPION. 

NESTOR. 

NOMAD. 

NARBOROUGH. 

OBDURATE. 

PETARD. 

PELICAN. 

NERISSA. 

ONSLOW. 

MORESBY. 

NICATOR. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  ."i"» 

Harwich  Destroyers. 

LYDIARD. 

LIBERTY. 

LANDRAIL. 

LAUREL. 

MOORSOM. 

MORRI8. 

TURBULENT. 

TERMAGANT. 


SEAPLANE   CARRIER, 
ENGADINEc 


Enclosure  No.  4  in  H.F.  Letter  No.  1396,  dated  18th  June  1916. 

SINKING  OF  ENEMY  SHIPS. 

Battleships  or  Battle  Cruisers. 

6.50  p.m.  1  Battleship  Chief    Witness    Mate    Arthur 

31  Ma}-, '16.  of    "KONIG"  G.    Boyce,    "  Benbow  "    Station 

class.  G.C.T. — 8  power  glasses. 

At  6.40  p.m.,  3  "  KONIGS  " 
then  being  in  sight  the  second 
"  KONIG  "  was  seen  to  be 
heavily  hit,  then  to  turn  16 
points  to  starboard,  the  original 
CERTAIN.  third  ship  passing  her.     He  saw 

this  ship  settle  bj'  the  stern,  his 
attention  being  called  to  the 
angle  her  mainmast  was  making 
to  the  horizon. 

Witness  then  gave  a  very 
good  description  of  a  ship  sink- 
ing first  by  the  stern  and  then 
capsizing  to  port,  a  large  amount 
of  smoke  and  steam  coming  from 
foremost  funnel.  (When  las< 
seen  she  had  not  actually  dis- 
appeared.) 

Confirmed  by  6.33  p.m.,  report  of  "THUNDERER,"  (shii)  in  this 
case  designated  as  a  "KAISER").  Hit  by  "THUNDERER"  very 
heavily.  Ship  ablaze  fore  and  aft.  Talks  of  two  ships  overlapping 
each  other, 

Copy  of   "  THUNDERER'S  "   report  :— 

Two  "  KAISER  "  class  were 
now     overlapping     each     other. 
Fire  was  opened,  2nd  salvo  seen 
CERTAIN.  to    hit,    ditto    3rd.     Enemy   was 

blazing  for  whole  length  of 
quarter  deck.  Enemy  firing  sal- 
voes at  first  came  down  to  slow 
fire  with  one  turret. 

C  2 


30 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND 


6.50  p.m.  1  enemy  ship  Lieutenant-Commander 

(approx.)  in  line  blown  up.         George     B.      Hartford,      H.M.S 

"  MARNE." 

An    enemy    ship    of    the    line 
was  seen  to  blow  up  at  6  50  p.m., 
(20      minutes      after    "  INVIN- 
CIBLE "  blew  up).     Flame  was 
CERTAIN.  of  a  purple  colour,  otherwise  ex- 

plosion was  similar  to  "  INVIN- 
CIBLE." He  had  no  doubt 
whatever  that  ship  sank 

Confirmed  by  Lieutenant  Charles  C.  D<  Lees,  H.M.S.  "  MORNING 
STAR,"  and  Sub-Lieutenant  Francis  D.  Butt,  H.M.S.  "  .MAGIC."  Also 
by  report  from  H.M.S.  "  BARHAM." 

Probably  all  above  are  the  same  ship. 

7.;jOpm.  I  enemy  Battleship  At        7.10,         "  MARLBOR- 

31  Maj', '16.  or  Battle  Cruiser,        OUGH  "    opened   fire   on  a  ship 

class    of    three, 
salvos.     Distinct, 


PROBABLE. 


of  "KONIG 
and  fired  14 
hits  were  seen. 

At  7.19,  ship  tiu-ned  out  of 
the  line  very  low  in  the  water 
aft  and  sinking  and  object  was 
shifted  to  the  left  hand  ship. 

Mr.  Charles  Trenchard,  Boatswain,   "  COLOSSUS." 

1  enemy  Battle  This    Officer   was   in    torpedo 

Crui.«er.  control  tower  and  was  watching 

action    carefully.     At    7.36    p.m. 

he  saw  the  second  Battle  Cruiser, 

PROBABLE.  apparently  "  DERFFLINGER  " 

from  silhoviette,  on  fire  after  being 
hit  bj^  a  salvo.  Water  came  up 
to  quarter  deck,  then  over  fun- 
nels, and  he  saw  the  water  close 
%ver  her.  The  after  turret  was 
the  last  to  fire. 

Confirmed  by  Lieutenant  Douglas  G.  W.  Curry,  "  SUPERB." 

"  BENBOW  "  confirms  this  to  a  certain  extent  by  talking  of  a  ship 
with  two  masts  and  two  finmels  showing  above  water  at  7.35  p.m. 
Also  reported  by  2nd  Battle  Squadron,  rear  division. 


7.20  p.m. 
31  May. 


1  enemy  ship. 


"  MALAYA."  One  enemy 
ship  very  low  in  the  water 
drojDped  astern  and,  according 
to  two  Officers,  she  suddenly 
disajjpeared  without  an  explo- 
sion. 

The  three  foregoing  reports  possibly  all  refer  to  the  same  ship. 


0  15  a.m.  1  ship  of 

1  June.  "  DEUTSCHLAND 

Class. 


At  midnight,  "  GARLAND  " 
in  companv  with  "  ARDENT," 
"  FORTUNE  "  and  "  AMBUS- 
CADE "  sighted  a  line  of  German 
Battleships  on  starboard  bow. 
Leading  Battleship  (one  of 
"  DEUTSCHLAND  "  class) 

opened  fire.  "  GARLAND  " 
tui-ned  to  port  and  fired  a 
torpedo  at  this  ship.  Range  about 
800  yards.    Torpedo  hit  and  was 


OFFICIAL    I)E.srATCHl'>  37 

("EHTArX.  seen    to    explode  abreast  of    the 

two  foremost  funnels.     Ship  took 
up  a  heavy  hst  to  port. 

Confirmed  by  "  ARDENT  " 
as  to  time,  enemy  leachng  ship 
switching  on  hghts,  etc.,  Com 
manding  Ofliicer  states  he  fired 
a  torpedo  at  leading  enemy  ship 
from  a  very  favourable  position 
2,000  j-ards  on  her  port  beam 
Torpedo  hit,explosion  seen,  ship's 
foremost  searchlights  went  out 
and  she  turned  to  starboard. 

"  AMBUSCADE  "  fired  at 
centre  ship  and  observed  led 
flash  and  searchlights  go  out. 

"  MALAYA  "  confirms  this 
and  felt  3  explosions  betweeii 
0. 15  and  0.47  a.m.  and  at  end 
of  last  attack  a  brilliant  flare  lit 
up  the  whole  sky. 

2.0  am.  Battleship  of  At      1.45     a.m.,      "  FAULK - 

'KAISER"  Class.  NOR,"  in  company  with  12th 
Flotilla,  sighted  enemy  Battle- 
ships on  starboard  bow  steering 
South  East.  Altered  coiu'se 
parallel  to  enemy  and  increased 
to  25  knots,  and,  when  ahead, 
led  first  division  ("  OBEDI- 
'  ENT,"    "MINDFUL,"    "MAR- 

VEL," "  0NSLAUC4HT  ")  round 
to  a  North  Westerly   course   to 
attack.     Sighted     eneniy     again 
immediately 
(  KRTAIN.  At  2.0  a.m.  fired  two  torpe- 

does from  port  tvibes,  one  at 
second  and  one  at  third  ship. 
When  third  ship  was  two  pointfy 
abaft  beam  a  very  heavy  explo- 
sion took  place  and  ship  seen  to 
blow  up.  Flames  and  debris 
went  vip  to  a  great  height.  On 
firing,  altered  course  to  North 
North  West,  and  proceeded  down 
enemy  line,  six  ships  in  all,  first 
four  being  "  KAISERS."  Thinks 
last  two  were  "  KAISERS  "  also 
(but  probably  "  KONIGS.") 

One  Destroyer  close  under 
port  quarter  of  third  enemy 
Battleship. 

Confirmed  bv  "  ON- 

SLAUGHT "  —  fired  four  tor- 
pedoes, hit  .second  "  KAISER  " 
—flames  to  400  ft. 

Confirmed  bv  "  OBEDI- 
ENT," "MARVEL,"  "MIND- 
FUL." '     . 

Explosion  was  so  great  that 
magazine  probably  blew  up ; 
flames     went     up     liigher     than 


38 


BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 


2.28  a.m. 
1  June. 


Battleship 
of    "  KAISER  " 

class. 


PROBABLE. 


mast.     It  is  considered  that  ship 
undoubtedlj'  blew  up  and  sank. 

H.M.S.  "  MAENAD  "  re- 
ports : — 

After  sighting  enem\''s  Battle- 
ships at  2.0  a. in.,  with  others  of 
12th  Flotilla,  he  did  not  turn 
with  remainder,  as  tubes  were 
not  trained  to  port  but  held  on, 
turned  some  time  later  and 
carried  out  two  attacks,  one  to 
port  and  second  to  starboard. 
At  the  second  attack  the  fourth 
ship  was  hit  amidships,  which 
caused  a  terrific  explosion — 
apparently  of  her  magazine — 
the  flames  topping  her  mast- 
heads. 

Though  the  shijD  ahead  and 
that  astern  were  seen  after  this, 
the  shijD  hit  was  not  seen. 
The  Captain  of  "  MAENAD  "  is 
certain  there  were  five  Battle- 
ships when  he  fired  and  only 
four  afterwards.  He  is  certain 
of  the  time  (taken  by  deck- 
watch),  and  that  there  were  no 
other  British  ships  visible  at  the 
time. 


LIGHT   CRUISERS, 


6.40  p.m. 
31  Mav 


One  enemy 

Light 

Cruiser. 


CERTAIN. 


5  52  p  m. 
(approx.) 
31  I\fay 


10.1.5  p.m. 


One  enemy 

Light 

Cruiser. 


CERTAIN. 


One  enemy 

3  funnelled 

Ci'uiser 


CERTAIN. 


5.50  p.m.  "  DEFENCE  "  and 
"  WARRIOR  "  fired  on  Light 
Cruiser  of  Russian  type.  Ship 
disabled  drifted  down  between 
the  lines,  was  fired  upon  by  the 
Battle  Fleet  and  seen  to  sink 
at  6.40  p.m.  b}- Lieutenant  Dou- 
glas G.  W.  Curry  of  "  SUPERB." 

Fired  on  by  3rd  Battle 
CruLser  Squadron  and  "  CAN- 
TERBURY "  at  5.52  p.m.  All 
ships  of  3rd  Battle  Cruisei 
Squadron  speak  of  this  Light 
Cruiser  as  having  blown  up  and 
sunk. 

"CASTOR"  and  11th  Flo- 
tilla  sighted  three  enemy  Cruisers 
at   10.15  p.m.  "  CASTOR  " 

attacked  with  guns  and  torpe- 
does. "  MARNE  "  with  torpe- 
does. Torpedo  hit  one  of  the 
Cruisers.     Detonation  occiu-red. 


Confirmed  by  Lieutenant  Charles  C.  D.  Lees,    ' 
Sub-Lieutenant  Francis  D.  Butt, 
11.40  p.m.        -  An  enemy 

31  May.*  ship  3  or  4 

funnels. 


MORNING  STAR  "  and 

'  MAGIC." 
At  11.40  p.m.  "  SPITFIRE  " 
in  company  with  "  TIP- 
PERARY  "  and  1st  half  of  4th 
Flotilla,  torpedoed  and  sank  an 
enemy  large  ship  3  or  4  funnels 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  39 

Following  evidence  from 
Captain  of  "  MALAYA  "  : 
At  11.40  3  points  abaft  star- 
board beam,  observed  an  attack 
by  our  Destroyers  on  some 
enemy  big  ships,  steering  the 
same  way  as  us,  two  of 
which  used  searchlights.  One  of 
our  Destroyers  ("  TIPPE- 
RARY")  was  on  fire,  but  not 
befoi'e  they  had  hit  the  second 
ship  in  sight.  This  was  seen 
by  the  column  of  smoke  and  also 
the  explosion  was  distinctly 
CERTAIN,  heard     and     felt.     The     leading 

ship  of  the  enemy,  which  was 
seen  by  the  flash  of  the  explo- 
sion and  glare  from  the  burning 
"  TIPPERARY,"  had  two  masts, 
two  funnels  and  a  conspicuous 
crane  and  was  without  doubt  one 
of  the  "  NASSAU  "  class. 

It      appears      very      possible 

that     the     ship     "SPITFIRE" 

sank    was    a    Battleship    of    the 

"  HELGOLAND  "        Class      (in 

the      same      Squadron      as      the 

"  NASSAU  "    Class)    and   not   a 

Light    Cruiser    as    first    reports 

appeared  to  indicate. 

Heavy  ship  Shortly    afterwards,    "  SPIT- 

or  Light  FIRE  "     rammed     and     carried 

Cruiser,  away  20  feet  of  the  side  plating 

of     an     enemy     three-funnelled 

Cruiser.     Latter     had     one     red 

band    on    each    funnel  and    two 

deri'icks. 

3.  .5  a.m.  One  enemy  At    3.0    a.m.     "  SPARROW- 

1  June.  Light  HAWK "     was     lying     disabled 

Cruiser.  in  approximately  Lat.  55°  54'  N., 

Long.  5°  59'  E.,  when  a  German 

Light  Cruiser,  three  high  straight 

funnels  equally  spaced,  two  masts 

CERTAIN.  and   a  straight   stem,    (probably 

"KOLBERG")     was       sighted 

about  two  miles  East,  steaming 

slowly  to  the  Northward;    after 

being  in  sight  about  five  minutes 

she    gradually    heeled    over    and 

sank  slowly,  bows  first. 


DESTROYERS. 

4.30  p.m.  2  enemy  T.B.D.s  These     two     enemy    T.B.D.s 

31  May.  "  were    simk    by   Destroyers   from 

CERTAIN.  the  13th,  9th  and  10th  Flotillas. 

7.15  p.m.  1  enemy  T.B.D.  Midshipman  Arthur  B.  Shep- 

31  May.  herd-Cross    of    H.M.S.     "  NEP- 

TUNE "    4"    control    Officer,    in 
fore    superstructure,    was    firing 


40 


BATTLE    OF    JCTLAND 


at   7.10  p.m.   vvitli  4"  at  second 
CERTAIN.  from    left    of   enemy    Destroyers 

attacking.  Hit  with  4"  vvhicli 
appeared  to  do  no  damage,  but 
shortly  after  hit  by  a  larger 
shell,  after  which  there  was  a 
large  flame  and  when  splash  had 
subsided  the  Destroj^er  had  sunk. 

Confirmed    by    "  IRON    DUKE  "  and    Commander    Edward    O.B.S 
Osborne,  H.M.S.  "  CONQUEROR." 

Midshipman  Robert  T.  Young,  H.M.S.  "  BENBOW.", 
Lieutenant  Christopher  M.  Merewether,  H.M.S.  "  CONQUEROR." 
Lieutenant  Oliver  R.  Wace,  of  H.M.S.  "  CONSTANCE." 
Lieutenant  Henry  C   Phillips,  H.M.S.  "  CALLIOPE." 


7.22  p.m. 
31  xMav. 


7.26  p.m. 
31  Mav. 


7.35  p.m. 
31  May. 


7  50  p.m. 
31  May 


,30  p.m. 
31  Mav. 


One  enemy  H.M.S.    "  CALLIOPE  "    and 

T.B  D.  4tli      Light      Cruiser      Squadron 

ordered    out    to    attack    enemy 

CERTAIN.  T.B.D.s.     Opened  fire  at  leading 

Destroyer  and  sank  her. 

One  enemy  Lieutenant      Russel      R.      J. 

T  B  D.  Pound     and     Lieutenant     Law- 

rence B.Hill  of  H.M.S.  ••  BELLE- 
ROPHON  "      saw      an      enemy 
Destroyer    hit    bv,     apparenth'. 
CERTAIN  a   12"  shell.     This  was  the  third 

Destroyer  from  the  left  of  those 
attacking  and  was  quite  clear, 
as  none  of  them  had  started  to 
make  a  smoke  screen.  There 
was  a  large  flash  when  shell 
exploded  and  the  Destroyer  was 
seen  to  sink. 

One  enemy  At    7.35,    the   left   hand   De- 

T.B.D.  'Stroyer   of   those    attacking   was 

hit  apparently  by  '"  CANADA," 
and  after  spray  had  cleai'ed,  was 
CERTAIN.  seen  to  have  tvirned  over  and  to 

be  bilge  up,  finally  sinking 
10  minutes  or  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  later. 

This  was  confirmed  hv  about 
half  the  Fleet. 

One  enemy  At     7.43     p.m      Captain     D. 

T.B.D,  12th    Flotilla,    ordered     "  OBE- 

DIENT,"  "MINDFUL," 
"MARVEL"  and  "ON- 
SLAUGHT" to  attack  an 
enemy  Destroyer  bearing  West, 
CERTAIN.  The   "    enemy  "     destroyer       was 

attacked  and  sunk  at  7.50  p.m. 
She  was  of  the  "  V  "  class,  the 
letter  being  seen,  but  the  number 
liaA'ing  been  shot  away.  She  was 
flying  a  Commodore's  pendant. 

H.M.S.     "  VALIANT  "     con- 
firms. 

One  enemy  Fired  on  by  "  SOUTHAMP- 

T.BD.  TON"    and    "DUBLIN,"    who 

hit  her  heavily  amidships.     She 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


41 


PROBABLE. 


0.15  a.m. 
1  June. 


One  enemy 
T.B.D.  " 


PROBABLE. 


was  afterwards  sunk  by  a  division 
of  our  Destroyers. 

At  0.15  a.m.  "CASTOR" 
sighted  a  Torpedo  Boat  on  the 
starboard  bow.  As  soon  as  it  was 
distinguished  as  an  enemy  craft, 
"  CASTOR  "  turned  to  ram  her 
and  opened  fire.  The  Torpedo 
Boat  was  too  quick  on  the  helm 
and  just  avoided  being  rammed, 
but  received  the  fire  of  all  guns 
at  point  blank  range  and  was 
not  seen  again.  There  would 
appear  to  be  no  doubt  that  she 
was  sunk,  as  she  was  not  seen 
by  any  of  the  Destroyers  who 
passed  the  spot  where  she  was 
fired  on  by  "  CASTOR." 


SUBMARINES. 

6.50  p  m  One  enemy  A  fe  w  minutes  after  "  jMARL- 

31  May.  Submarine.  BOROUGH  "  had  been  struck  by 

a  torpedo,  Officers  in  Trans- 
mitting Room,  A  and  Y  Shell 
RoomS;  Director  Tower  and 
Spotting  Top  of  H.M.S.  "  RE- 
VENGE "  felt  a  shock  as  if  the 
ship  had  hit  something.  The 
CERTAIN  Officer  of  "  Y  "  Turret,  Captain 

Evan  Jukes  Hughes,  R.M.L.I., 
and  the  Torpedo  Officer,  Lieut. - 
Commander  Walter  K.  E.  Con- 
lon,  R.N  ,  looked  over  the  side 
and  observed  a  large  patch  of 
oil  with  an  vipheaval  in  the 
middle  with  portions  of  wreck- 
age coming  to  the  svu-face. 

Reports  of  H.M.  Ships  running  over  submerged  objects  that  may 
possibly  have  been  Submarines  and  could  not  have  been  wreckage  from 
any  vessel  sunk  during  the  action,  by  reason  of  the  position  of  the  ship 
at  the  time, 


1 1.15  p.m. 
31  May. 


11.30  p.m. 
31  Mav. 


POSSIBLE. 


POSSIBLE. 


"  ACTIVE  "  was  felt  to  bump 
something  heavilj^.  Subsequent 
investigation  showed  that  some 
15  feet  of  the  starboard  bilge 
keel  had  been  torn  back. 

"  COLOSSUS."  The  ship  un 
mistakably  passed  over  some 
object.  The  noise  as  of  some- 
thing scraping  along  the  bottom 
was  heard  and  felt  by  officers  in 
the  Foi'e  Transmitting  Station, 
Ward  Room,  and  Engine  Room. 
On  examination  the  following 
damage  was  found  : — 

Starboard  outer  propeller — 
A  piece  16"  by  6"  broken  off 
one  blade;  another  blade  frac- 
tured and  twisted  6"  by  6". 


42 


BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 


4  0am. 
1  June 


POSSIBLE. 


Starboard  Inner  Propeller — 
One  blade  tip  broken  off  2"  by 
12";  another  blade  tip  bent 
forward  12"  by  3";  remaining 
blade  edge  jagged. 

"  MALAYA "  reports  that 
Officers  in  armoured  director 
tower  and  engine  room  state  that 
the  ship  struck  some  object  sub- 
merged on  the  starboard  side 
which  scraped  along  under  the 
bottom.  Ship  has  been  damaged 
under  water  between  38-48  sta- 
tions and  the  Chief  Constructor 
at  Invergordon  reports  that  the 
damagt3  cannot  j^ossibly  have 
been  caused  by  shell  fire. 

The  enclosed  barograph  re- 
cord^ from  Commander  Stanley 
T.  H.  Wilton,  R.N.,  of  "  MALA- 
YA," shows  the  shock  caused  by 
explosions  (presumably  from  the 
torpedoes  fi^red  by  oiu-  flotillas 
at  enemy  ships)  during  the  night 
of  31st  May-lst  June.  It  will 
be  seen  that  there  are  four  or 
five  distinct  separate  explosions. 
The  "  MALAYA  "  was  in  a  good 
position  for  recording  tliese  explo- 
sions. 


J.  R. 


Jelltcoe, 

ADMIRAL. 
19th  June,  1916. 


Enclosure  Xo.  5  in  H.F.  letter  Xo.  1396  0022,  dated  18  June,  1916. 

Extract  from  Captain  (S.)  report  to  The  Chief  of  the  War  Staff,  X'^o.  0157 
of  7  June  1916  re  explosions  on  minefield  laid  byH.M.S.  "  ABDIEL," 
31  May-1  June  1916. 

Vide  Narrative,  page  22. 

Submarines  E.  55,  E.  26  and  D.  1  left  Hai-wich  at  7  p.m.  (G.M.T.)  on 
the  30th  May,  and  spread  on  a  line  270"^  from-  Vyl  Light  Vessel,  E.  55 
4  miles,  E.  2is  12  miles,  and  D.  1  20  miles  from  it. 

2.  E.  55  sighted  Horn's  reef  at  0.5  a.m.  on  the  1st  June.  At  0.20  a.m., 
a  Zeppelin,  flying  low,  approached  and  E.  55  went  to  the  bottom  to  the 
West  of  Horn's  Reef.  At  0.45  a.m.  n  noise  was  heard  as  of  a  sweep  passing 
very  close  to  the  Submarine. 

Between  2.15  and  5.30  a.m.,  11  explosions  of  varying  intensity  were 
heard. 

Nothing  was  seen  throughout  the  day,  except  a  destroyer  at  8.25  a.m., 
steering  X.W'.     It  turned  back  to  the  S.E.  before  coming  into  range. 


*  Xot  reproduced. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


43 


LIST    OF   SHIPS    AND    NAMES    OF   COMMANDING 
OFFICERS. 


In  company 
Iron  Duke  " 

Marlborough  " 


Colossus  "  - 


Hercules  " 
Neptune  " 
Colling  wood  " 
Revenge  " 
Agincourt  " 
St.  Vincent  " 
Bellona  "   - 
King  George  V 


Orion  " 


Centurion  " 
Conqueror  " 
Erin  " 

Thunderer  " 
Monarch  " 
Ajax  " 
Boadicea  " 
Benbow  "  - 


Superb 


Canada  "  - 
Bellerophon  " 
Temeraire  " 
Vanguard  " 
Royal  Oak  " 
Blanche  "  - 
Minotaur  " 


A. 

witli  the  Commander-in-Chief  : — 

-     Captain    Frederic    C.   Dreyer,  C.B.  (Flying 

the  Flag  of  the  Commander-in-Chief). 
Captain  George  P.  Ross  (Flying  the  Flag  of 

Vice-Admiral    Sir   Cecil    Burney,   K.C.B. 

K.C.M.G. ;   Captain  E.  Percy  F.'^G.  Grant, 

Chief  of  the  Staff). 
Captain  Alfred  D.  P.  R.  Pound  (Flying  the 

Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Ernest  F.  A.  Gaunt, 

C.M.G.). 
Captain  Lewis  Chnton-Baker. 
Captain  Vivian  H.  G.  Bernard. 
Captain  James  C.  Ley. 
Captain  Edward  B.  Kiddle; 
Captain  Henry  M.  Doughty. 
Captain  Wilham  W.  Fisher,  M.V.O. 
Captain  Arthur  B.  S.  Dutton. 
Captain  Frederick  L.  Field  (Flying  the  Flag 

of    Vice-Admiral     Sir    Thomas     Jerrani, 

K.C.B.). 
Captain  Oliver  Backhouse,  C.B.  (Flying  the 

Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Arthur  C.  Leveson, 

C.B.). 
Captain  ]\Iichael  Culme-Seymour,  M.V.O. 
Captain  Hugh  H.  D.  Tothill. 
Captain  The  Hon.  Victor  A.  Stanlev,  M.V.O., 

A.D.C. 
Captain  James  A.  Fergusson. 
Captam  George  H.  Borrett. 
Captain  George  H.  Baird. 
Captain  Louis  C.  S.  Woollcombe,  M.V.O. 
Captain  Henry  Wise  Parker  (Flying  the  Flag 

of  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Doveton  Sturdee,  Bt., 

K.C.B.,  C.V.O.,  C.M.G.). 
Captain  Edmond  Hyde  Parker  (Flying  the 

Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Alexander  L.  Duff, 

C.B.). 
Captain  William  C.  M.  Nicholson. 
Captain  Edward  F.  Bruen. 
Captain  Edwin  V.  Underbill. 
Captain  James  D.  Dick. 
Captain  Crawford  Maclachlan. 
Captain  John  M.  Casement. 
Captain  Arthur  C.  S.  H.  D'Aeth  (Flying  the 

Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Herbert  L.  Heath, 

M.V.O.). 


44 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 


Hampshire  " 
Cochrane  " 
Shannon  " 
Defence  "  - 


Duke    of    Edin- 
burgh." 
Black  Prince  "    ■ 
Warrior  "  - 
Invincible  " 


Indomitable  " 
Inflexible  " 
Calliope  "  - 
Caroline  "  - 
Comus  "     - 
Constance  " 
RoyaHst  " 
Canterbury  " 
Chester"    - 
Active "     - 
Castor "     - 

Tipperary  " 
Broke  "  '  - 
Shark  "  - 
Acasta  "  - 
Spitfire  "    - 

Sparrowhawk 
Achates  "  - 

Ambuscade  " 
Ardent  "    - 
Fortune  "  - 
Porpoise  " 
Unity  " 
Garland  "  - 
Christopher  " 
Contest  "    - 

Owl  " 
Hardy  "     - 

Midge "      - 

Ophelia  "  - 
Kempenfelt  " 
Ossory  "     - 


Captain  Herbert  J.  Savill. 
Captain  Eustace  La  T.  Leatham. 
Captain  John  S.  Dumaresq,  M.V.O. 
Captain  Stanley  V.  Ellis  (Flying  the  Flag  of 

Rear-Admiral  Sir  Robert  Arbuthnot.  Bt., 

M.V.O. ). 
Captain  Henry  Blackett, 

Captain  Thomas  P.  Bonham. 
Captain  Vincent  B.  Molteno. 
Captain  Arthur  L.  Cay  (Flying  the  Flag  of 

Rear-Admiral    The    Hon.    Horace    L.    A. 

Hood,  C.B.,  M.V.O.,  D.S.O.). 
Captain  Francis  W.  Kennedy. 
Captain  Edward  H.  F.  Heaton-Ellis.  M.V.O. 
Commodore  Charles  E.  Le  Mesurier. 
Captain  H.  Ralph  Crooke. 
Captain  Alan  G.  Hotham. 
Captain  Cyril  S.  Townsend. 
Captain  The  Hon.  Herbert  Meade,  D.S.O. 
Captain  Percy  M.  R.  Royds. 
Captain  Robert  N.  Lawson. 
Captain  Percy  Withers. 
Commodore     (F)    James   R.    P.    Hawksley, 

M.V.O. 
Captain  (D)  Charles  J.  Wintour. 
Commander  Walter  L.  Allen. 
Commander  Loftus  W.  Jones. 
Lieutenant -Commander  John  0.  Barron. 
Lieutenant-Commander     Clarence     W.     E. 

Trelawny. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Sydney  Hopkins. 
Commander    Reginald    B.    C.    Hutchinson, 

D.S.C. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Gordon  A.  Coles. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Arthur  Marsden. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Frank  G.  Terry. 
Commander  Hugii  D.  Colville. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Arthur  M.  Lecky. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Reginald  S.  Goff. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Fairfax  M.  Kerr. 
Lieutenant-Commander      Ernald      G.       H. 

Master. 
Commander  Roliert  G.  Hamond. 
Commander  Richard  A.  A.  Plowden. 
Lieutenant-Commander       James       R.       C. 

Cavendish. 
Commander  Lewis  G.  E.  Crabbe. 
Commander  Harold  E.  Sulivan. 
Commander  Harold  V.  Dundas. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


45 


"Martiar'  - 
"  Magic  "  - 
"Minion"  - 
"  Mystic  "  - 
'•  Mons  " 
"  Mandate  " 

"  Michael  *'  - 
"  Marne  "      - 

"  Milbrook  " 
"  Manners  " 
"  Moon  ■'       - 
"  Moiinsey  " 
"  Morning  Star  " 
"  Faulknor  " 
"  Marksman  " 
"  Obedient  " 
"Mindful"  - 
"Marvel"     - 
"  Onslaught  " 

"Maenad"  - 
"  Narwhal  " 
"  Nessus  "     - 
"  Noble  "      - 
"  Opal  " 
"  Nonsuch  " 
"  Menace  "    - 
"  Munster  "  - 
"  Mary  Rose  " 
"  Mischief  "  - 

"  Oak  " 

"  Abdiel  "     - 


Lieutenant-Commander  Julian  Harrison. 

Lieutenant-Oomniander  Gerald  C.  Wynter. 

Lieutenant -Commander  Henry  C.  Rawlings. 

Commander  Claud  F.  Allsup. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Robert  Makin. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Edward  McC.  W. 
Lawrie. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Claude  L.  Bate. 

Lieutenant-Commander  George  B.  Hart- 
ford. 

Lieutenant  Charles  G.  Naylor. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Gerald  C.  Harrison, 

Commander  (Acting)  William  D.  Irvin. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Raljih  Y.  Eyre. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Hugh  U.  Fletcher. 

Captain  (D)  Anselan  J.  B.  Stirling. 

Commander  Norton  A.  Sulivan. 

Commander  George  W.  McO.  Campbell. 

Lieutenant-Commander  John  J.  C.  Ridley, 

Lieutenant-Commander  Reginald  W.  Grubb. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Arthur  G.  Onslow, 
D.S.C. 

Commander  John  P.  Champion. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Henry  V.  Hudson. 

Lieutenant -C'ommander  Eric  Q.  Carter. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Henry  P.  Boxer. 

Commander  Charles  G.  C.  Sumner. 

lieutenant-Commander  Herbert  I.  N.  Lyon. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Charles  A.  Poignand. 

Lieutenant -Commander  Spencer  F.  Russell. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Edwin  A.  Homan. 

Lieutenant-Commander  The  Hon.  Cyril  A. 
Ward,  M.V.O. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Douglas  Faviell, 
M.V.O. 

Commander  Berwick  Curtis. 


B. 

In  company  with   Vice-Admiral   Sir  David  Beatty,   K.C.B., 
M.V.O.,  D.S.O.  :— 

"  Lion  "         -         -     Captain    Alfred    E.    M.    Chatfield,    C.V.O. 

(Flying    the    Flag    of    Vice-Admiral    Sir 

David   Beatty,   K.C.B.,    M.V.O.,   D.S.O.; 

Captain  Rudolf  W.  Bentinck,  Chief  of  the 

Staff). 
"  Princess  Royal  "     Captain  Walter  H.  Cowan,  M.V.O.,  D.S.O, 

(Flying  the  Flag  of  Rear- Admiral  Osmond 

de  B.  Brock,  C.B.). 
"  Tiger  "        -         -     Captain  Henry  B.  Pelly,  M.V.O. 
"  Queen  Mary  "     -     Captain  Cecil  I.  Prowse, 


46 

"  New  Zealand 


Indefatigable  " 
Southampton  " 

Nottingham  " 
Birmingham  " 
DubUn"    - 
Galatea  "  - 

Inconstant  " 
Phaeton  "  - 
CordeUa  "  - 
Falmouth  " 


Birkenhead  ' 
Gloucester  " 
Yarmouth  " 
Barham  " 


Warspite  " 
Vahant "  - 
Malaya  "   - 

Champion  " 
Nestor "     - 

Nomad"    - 
Narborough  " 
Obdurate  " 
Petard  "     - 

PeUcan"    - 
Nerissa  "    - 

Onslow  "    - 
Moresby  "  - 
Nicator  "    - 
Fearless  "  - 
Acheron  "  - 
'  Ariel  " 
•  Attack  "    - 
'  Hydra  "     - 
'Badger"    - 
'  Goshawk  " 
'  Defender  " 
'  Lizard  "     - 


BATTLE    OF    JLTLAND  : 

Captain  John  F.  E.  Green  (Flying  the  Flag 

of   Rear-Admiarl   William   C.   Pakenham, 

C.B.,  M.V.O.). 
Captain  Charles  F.  .Sowerby. 
Commodore  William  E.  Goodenough,  M.V.O. , 

A.D.C. 
Captain  Charles  B.  Miller. 
Captain  Arthur  A.  M.  Duff. 
Captain  Albert  C.  >Scott. 
Commodore    Edx^yn   H.    Alexander-Sinclair, 

M.V.O. 
Captain  Bertram  S.  Thesiger,  C.M.G. 
Captain  John  E.  Cameron,  M.V.O. 
Captain  Tufton  P.  H.  Beamish. 
Captain  John  D.  Edwards  (Fljdng  the  Flag 

of  Rear-Admiral  Trevylyan  D.  W.  Naper, 

M.V.O.). 
Caj)tain  Edward  Reeves. 
Captain  Wilham  F.  Blunt,  D.S.O. 
Captain  Thomas  D.  Pratt. 
Captain  Arthur  W.  Craig  (Flying  the  Flag 

of     Rear-Admiral     Hugh     Evan-Thomas, 

M.V.O.). 
Captain  Edward  M.  Phillpotts. 
Captain  Maurice  Woollcombe. 
Captain  The  Hon.  Algernon  D.  E.  H.  Boyle, 

C.B.,  M.V.O. 
Captain  (D)  James  U.  Farie. 
Commander     The     Hon.     Edward     B.     S. 

Bingham. 
Lieutenant -Commander  Paul  Whitfield. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Geoffrey  Corlett. 
Lieutenant -Commander  Cecil  H.  H.  Sams. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Evelyn  C.  0.  Thom- 
son. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Kenneth  A.  Beattie. 
Lieutenant-Commander     Montague     G.    B. 

Legge. 
Lieutenant-Commander  John  C.  Tovey. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Roger  V.  Ahson. 
Lieutenant  Jack  E.  A.  Mocatta. 
Captain  (D)  Charles  D.  Roper. 
Commander  Charles  G.  Ramsey. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Arthur  G.  Tippet. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Charles  H.  N.  -James. 
Lieutenant  Francis  G.  Glossop. 
Commander  C.  A.  Fremantle. 
Commander  Dashwood  F.  Moir. 
Lieutenant -Commander  Lawrence  R.  Palmer. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Edward  Brooke. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  47 

Lapwing  "  -  Lieutenant-Commander  Alexander  H.  Gye. 

Lydiard  "  -  -  Commander  Malcolm  L.  Goldsmith. 

Liberty  "   -  -  Lieutenant-Commander  Philip  W.  S.  King. 

Landrail  "  -  -  Lieutenant-Commander  Francis   E.   H.   G. 

Hobart. 

Laurel  "     -  -  Lieutenant  Henry  D.  C.  Stanistreet. 

Moorsom  "  -  Commander  John  C.  Hodgson. 

Morris  "      -  -  Lieutenant-Commander  Edward  S.  Graham. 

Turbulent  "  '  -  Lieutenant-Commander  Dudley  Stuart. 

Termagant  "'  -  Lieutenant-Commander  Cuthbert  P.  Blake. 

Engadine  "  -  Lieutenant-Commander  Charles  G.  Robinson. 


LETTER   FORWARDING   REPORTS   FROM  FLAG 
OFFICERS. 

No.  H15/H.F.0022. 

"  Iron  Duke," 
Sir,  20  June  1916. 

With  reference  to  my  letter  No.  1396/H.F.  0022  of  18  June 
1916,  relative  to  the  action  with  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet 
on  31  May — 1  June  1916,  be  pleased  to  lay  before  the  Lords 
Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty  the  enclosed  reports  which  have 
been  received  from  Flag  and  Commanding  Officers  who  took 
part  in  the  action. 

I  am.  Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

C.  E.  MADDEN, 
The  Secretary  for  ADMIRAL. 

of  the  Admiralty. 


[Schedule  of  inclosures  in  letter  from  ComLmander-in-Chief, 
Home  Fleets,  No.   1415/H.F.  0022,  of  20  June,   1916. 

Number. 

1.  "  IRON  DUKE,"  3  June,  1916,  No.  153. 

2.  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle  Squadron,  10  June,  1916, 

No.  021. 

Sub-inclosures.— (1)  Track  of  "  MARLBOROUGH  "  and  enemy's- 
vessels  engaged.^ 

(2)  "  MARLBOROUGH  "—Gunnery  report. 

(3)  "HERCULES,"  4  June,  1916,  No.  197. 

3.  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle  Squadron,  11  June,  1916, 

No.  021. 

Sub-inclosures.— (1)  R.A.  1st  B.S.,  10  June,  W.16. 

(2)  "  COLOSSUS,"  10  June,  No.  658. 

(3)  "REVENGE,"  2  Jime,  B.  11 1/2. 

(4)  "BELLONA,"  2  June,  1916. 

(5)  "  NEPTUNE,"  10  June,  No.  08. 

1  Plates  3  and  7a. 


48  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

Number. 

(6)  "AOINCOURT,"  10  June,  171/1)2. 

(7)  "ST.    VINCENT,"  10  June,  E.  106. 

(8)  "  rOLLINCJWOOD,"  10  June. 

(9)  "  ROYAL  OAK."  10  June. 

4.  Vice-Adniiral  ('oiimuuKling,  First  Battle  Squadron,  13  June,  1916, 

No.  457.1 
Sub-inclosure.— "  MARLBOROUGH  "  9  June,  1916. 

5.  Vice-Aflmiral  Cominandiiip,  Second  Battle  Squadron,  5  June,  1916, 

No.  149/47.  D. 

6.  Viee-Adniiral  Commanding,  Fourth  Battle  Squadron,  4  Jinie,  1916, 

No.    0131,    t'oiwarding    sinamary    of    p-omtli    Battle    S(juadron 

I'eport.s. 

7.  Vice-Adniiral  Commanding,  Fourth  Battle  Squadron,  5  June,  1916, 

No.  0131. 
Sub-inclosure. — Rear-Admiral,     4th     Battle    Scjuadron,     1st     and 
4th  June,  No.  017. 

8.  Vice-Admiral   Commanding,   Fourth   Battle   Squathon,    10  June, 

1916,  No.  94. 
Sub-inclosme.— "  BENBOW,"  8  June,  C.85. 

9.  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet,   12  June,   1916, 

B.C.F.Ol. 
Sub-inclosures  : — 

(1)  "  LION,"  4  June,  1916,  No.  115. 

(2)  Rear-Admiral,  1st  B.C.S.,  3  June,  No.  Oil. 

(3)  Rear-Admiral,    1st  B.C.S.,   3  June,  No.   Oil,  forwarding 

report  bv  senior  unwounded  sui-viving  officer  of 
"  QUEEN  MARY." 

(4)  "PRINCESS  ROYAL,"  8  June,  No.  1/125. 

(5)  "  TIGER,"  6  June,  F.61/5. 

(6)  Rear-Admiral,  2nd  B.C.S.,  3  June,  No.  513. 

(7)  Rear-Admiral,  2nd  B.C.S.,  6  June,  No.  513a,  forwarding 

report  of  "  NEW  ZP]ALAND,"  2  June,  No.  96/ A. 4. 

(8)  '' INDOMITAl^LE,"  2  June,  No.  363/16. 

(9)  "INDOMITABLE,"  3  June,  No.  20.S,  forwarding  report 

from  "INFLEXIBLE,"  2  June,  1916,  No.  199. W, 
and  report  from  senior  surviving  officer  of  "  INVINCI- 
BLE," dated  2  June. 

(10)  Commodore,  1st  L.C.S.,  2  June,  No.  30,  forwarding  rejjort 

from  "INCONSTANT,"  2  June,  C.141/46. 

(11)  Commodore,  2nd  L.C.S.,  2  June,  No.  037/5. 

(12)  Commodore,  2nd  L.C.S.,  5  June,  No.  037/7. 

(13)  Connnodore,  2nd  L.C.S.,   6  June,  No.   037/8,  forwarding 

reports  from  "NOTTINGHAM,"  2  June,  No.  66; 
"  BIRMINGHAM."  2  June,  No.  309/10;  "  DUBLIN," 
2  June,  1916. 

(14)  Rear-Admiral,  3rd  L.C.S.,  5  June.  No.  0447. 

(15)  "CHESTER,"  2  June,  1916. 

(16)  Rear-Admiral,    5th    B  S.,    9    June,    No.    024. A,    inclosing 

reports  from  "  BARHAM."  6  June.  No.  181  ;  "  WAR- 
SPITE,"  4  June;  "VALIANT,"  3  June  and  5  June; 
"MALAYA,"  6  June.  Nos.  88  14  and  89  14. 

(17)  Captain  (D.),  13th  Flo.,  3  June,  No.  60,  inclosing  report 

from  "NARBOROUGH."  2  June.  1916.2 


1  Not  printed,   as   referring  solely   to   jiersonnel,   in   no   \say   bearing 
on  covirse  of  action. 

2  This  report  from  "  Narborough  "  will  be  found  in  Enclosine  (19); 
it  was  not  forwarded  in  Enclosin-e  (17). 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  49 

(18)  Captain  (D.),  13th  Flo.,  7  June,  No.  60. 

(19)  Captain  (D.),  13th  Flo.,  9  June,  No.  60,  inclosing  reports 

from  "  NICATOR,"  4  June;  "  PETARD,"  2nd  June; 
"NARBOROUGH,"  2  June;  "  OBDURATP:;'  3 
June;  •  MORESBY,"  3  June;  "  NERISSA,"  5  June; 
"  PELICAN,"  4  June;    "  ONSLOW,"  2  June. 

(20)  Captain  (D.),  1st  Flo.,  2  June,  No.  013. 

(21)  Captain  (D.),    1st  Flo.,  No.   013,   inclosing  reports  from 

"ATTACK,"  3  June;  "DEFENDER,"  3Jmie;J 
extracts  from  reports  of  proceedings  of  "  ACHERON," 
"ARIEL,"  "BADGER";  report  from  "LIZARD," 
2  June,  1916. 

(22)  Captain  (D.),  1st  Flo.,  No.  013.B. 

(23)  Commodore  (T.),  10  June,  No.  00101,  forwarding  reports 

from  "LYDIARD,"  3  Jime;    "LAUREL,"  9  June; 

"LANDRAIL,"     9    June;      "LIBERTY,"    9    June; 

"MOORSOM,"     6     June;       "MORRIS,"      1     June; 

"  TERMAGANT  "11  June. 
^24)  "  ENGADINE,"  2  June,  1916. 
(25)  "  CANTERBURY,"  2  Jime,  1916. 

10.  Rear- Admiral    Commanding,    Second   Cruiser   Squadron,    4  June 

1916,  No.  110  001/13. 

Sub-inclosures  : — 

(1)  "  MINOTAUR,"  3  June,  No.  274/14. 

(2)  "  HA:MPSHIRE,"  3  June,  No.  7.B/83. 

(3)  "  COCHRANE,"  2  Jime,  No.  143/B.W. 

(4)  "  SHANNON,"  4  Jime,  M.6/1. 

(5)  ■•  MINOTAUR  "—Extracts  from  log. 

(6)  ••  MINOTAUR  "—Track  chart. 2 

11.  Rear- Admiral   Commanding,   Second   Cruiser   Squadron,   5  June, 

1916,    No.     111/001/13,    forwarding    report    of     "DUKE     OF 
EDINBURGH,"  4  June,  No.   1/32. 

12.  Captain  V.  B.  Molteno,  late  of  "  WARRIOR,"  31  May,  16. 

13.  Captain  V.  B.  Molteno,  late  of  "  WARRIOR,"  7  Jime,  16. 

14.  Captain  V.  B.  Molteno,  late  of  "  WARRIOR,"  8  Jime,  16. 

1.5.     Commodore  Commanding,  Fourth  Light-Cruiser  Squadron,  3  June 
1916,  C.14. 

16.  Commodore  Commanding,  Fourth  Light-Cruiser  Squadron,  8  June, 

1916,  C.17/1,  forwarding  report  from  "  ABDTEL,"  7  June,  1916. 

17.  "IRON    DUKE,"    10  June,  No.   013,    forwarding  report   from 

"  OAK,"  9  June,  1916. 

18.  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle  Squadron,  9  .June,  1916, 

forwarding  report  from  "  ACTTV^E,"  9  June,  1916. 

19.  "ACTIVE,"  10  June,  1916. 

20.  Commodore  (F.),  3  June,  1916,  No.  0017/2. 

21.  Commodore  (F.),  6  June,  1916,  No.  0017/2. 

Sub-inclosiu-es  : — 

(1)  "  SPITFIRE,"  3  June. 

(2)  Copy    of    telegi-am    2240    of    4    June,    S.N.O.,    Tyne,    to 

•'^  CYCLOPS." 

(3)  Copy  of  telegi-am    1630  of  3  June,   S.N.O.   Aberdeen  to 

R.A.   Longhope. 

(4)  "  ACASTA,"  3  June. 

(5)  Copy    of    telegram    ir)20    of    4    June,    S.N.O.    Tyne    to 

"  CYCLOPS." 

^  Not  printed.     See  note  page  244.  -  Plates  24  and  2.5. 

X     12872  D 


50  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 


(6)  "  ACHATES,"  3  June. 

(7)  "  AMBUSCADE,"  3  June. 

(8)  Report    of    Lieut-Commr.    Marsden,    3   June,    of    loss    of 

"  ARDENT." 

(9)  "  PORPOISE,"   3  June. 

(10)  "UNITY,"  3  Jimo. 

(11)  "  CHRISTOPHER,"  2  June. 

(12)  "GARLAND,"  2  June. 

(13)  "OPHELIA,"  3  June. 

(14)  "OWL,"  2  June. 

(15)  Rear-Admiral,    East    Coast    of    England,    3    June,    No. 

696/W.962  (Narrative  of  survivors  of  "SHARK"). 

(16)  Report    from     iMeut-Commr.     S.     Hopkins     of     loss     of 

"  SPARROWHAWK." 

(17)  "BROKE,"  3  June. 

(18)  "BROKE,"  8  June. 

22,  Commodore  (F.),  14th  June.  1916,  No.  0017/2. 

Sub-inclosures  : — 

(1)  Report    of     Act.-Sub-Lt.    N.    J.     W.     VVilliam-Powlett,. 

8  June,  of  loss  of  "  TIPPERARY." 

(2)  "  SPITFIRE,"  4  June. 

(3)  "  PORPOISE,"  6  June. 

(4)  Lt.-Commr.  Hopkins  of  "  SPARROWHAWK,"  5  June. 

23.  Commodore  (F.),  4  June,  1916,  No.  0017/2A. 

Sub-inclosures  : — 

(1)  "FAULKNOR,"  3  Jime,  No.  0017/2. 

(2)  "  MAENAD,"  5  June. 

(3)  "  ONSLAUGHT,"  3  June. 

"  IRON  DUKE,"  1  track,  30  May-2  Jmie.i 
"  IRON  DUKE,"  1  track,  6-9  p.m.,  31  May.^ 
"  KING  GEORGE  V,"  1  track,  6-9  p.m.,  31  May.3 
"  ORION,"  1  track,  6-10  p.m.,  31  May.* 
"THUNDERER,"  1  track,  6-8.30  p.m.,  31  May^. 
"DUKE    OF    EDINBURGH,"     1    track,    5.30-8    p.m., 
31  May.  6 

30.  Fourth  Light-Cruiser  Squadi'on,  1  track,  4  p.m.,  31  May-1.30  p.m. 

1  June.'' 

31.  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet,  1  track,  9.24  p.m.,  31  May-1.30  p.m.,  1  June.* 

32.  Battle -Cruiser  Fleet,  1  track,  2  p.m.-9.24  p.m.,  31  :May.« 

1  Plate  6a.  -  Plate  2.  ^  pi^te  8. 

*  Plate  29.  ^  pj^te  30.  "  Plate  1  la. 

'  Plate  12a.  «  pj^te  11.  »  Plate  10. 


24. 

H.M.S. 

25. 

H.M.S. 

26. 

H.M.S 

27. 

H.M.S. 

28. 

H.M.S 

29. 

H.M.S 

ENCLOSURE      N9  ID        BATTLE       PLAN 


SH 

ow 

ng 

th 

3 

Approxirr 

ate 

positi 

ons 

of  the 

Gra 

nd 

n 

eet 

a 

nd 

Ger 

man 

H 

qh 

Sea 

Fie 

et 

at 

6. 

40 

.P.M. 

on 

31 

5t 

May 

1916 

''^'^ik. '" 


&% 


4   ^ing  George 

\     Centurion       '  " 
I    Er,n 

I    Or, on 
A   Moni^rch 

I     Conrjueror 
^    Thunderer 

%tron  Duke 
I   Royal  Oeh 
4   Superb 
4    Canada 

I    Benbo'^, 

^    Bellerophon 

I    Vanguard 

I    Colling^ood 
4    Naptune 
%    St  Vincent 

%    Marlborough 
%   Revenge 
4  Hercules 
4   Agincourb 

4  Valiant     1^^ 
4  Malaya 

0  Hottir.jhBm 
0  DoW.V. 


Scouting 


High  Sea 
Fleet 


Scale 


../f..^. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  51 


LETTER    FROM   COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF   FORWARDING 

TRACINGS. 

No.  1985/H.F.0022. 

"  Iron  Duke," 

Sir,  29  August  1916. 

With  reference  to  Admiralty  letter  M.  05697  of  8  July 
1916,  enclosing  a  proof  of  the  Narrative  of  the  action  with  the 
German  High  Sea  Fleet  on  31  May-1  June  1916,  be  pleased  to 
inform  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty  that  the  proof 
has  been  corrected  and  is  returned  herewith. 

2.  The  plan  of  the  battle  was  found  to  require  amendment 
and  a  revised  tracing  ^  is  therefore  enclosed,  together  with  an 
additional  tracing  showing  the  order  of  the  Battlefleet.^ 

I  am,  Sir, 

Your  obedient  Servant, 
J.  R.  JELLICOE, 
The  Secretary  of  the  Admiral. 

Admiralty. 

Note. — Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Viscount  Jellicoe  is  of  opinion 
from  later  consideration  of  all  the  evidence  that  the  original 
Plan  (Plate  la),  forwarded  with  his  Despatch  of  18th  June  1916, 
is  more  correct  than  the  revised  Plan  referred  to  in  the  above 
letter  of  the  29th  August  1916  (Plate  4a). 

1  Plate  4a.  2  p]ate  5a. 


D  2 


PCcUel 


E  NCLC 


Showing      i 
Fleet 


Phaeton       (j 
Cordelia        Q 


Galatea    (j 


ea 


Champion  (^ 

Nerissa    I 

Moresby  1 


QBellons 


Lydiard  i 
Liberty  k 
Landrail  1 
Laurel  1 
Moor so m  t 
Morris  i 
Turbulent  I 
Termaganti 
Nicator      I 


(  Narborough 
\  Obdurate 
I  Petard 
1  Pelican 


Q  Fearless 


Co 
Co 
Nd 


• 


Ms. 
FU 


Wurspite 


• 

0 
0 
0 
0 


\ 


4  I  ■  .  ■  I  ■   ■  I  I  I 


Cables 


ioore-i^?66Jii/3  (Is)  530.;.  12  20 


MalbviSonsAith 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  51 


LETTER    FROM   COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF   FORWARDING 

TRACINGS. 

No.  198o/H.F.0022. 

"  Iron  Duke," 

Sir,  29  August  1916. 

With  reference  to  Admiralty  letter  M.  05697  of  8  July 
1916,  enclosing  a  proof  of  the  Narrative  of  the  action  with  the 
German  High  Sea  Fleet  on  31  May-1  June  1916,  be  pleased  to 
inform  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty  that  the  proof 
has  been  corrected  and  is  returned  herewith. 

2.  The  plan  of  the  battle  was  found  to  require  amendment 
and  a  revised  tracing  ^  is  therefore  enclosed,  together  with  an 
additional  tracing  showing  the  order  of  the  Battlefleet.^ 

I  am,  Sir, 

Your  obedient  Servant, 
J.  R.  JELLICOE, 
The  Secretary  of  the  Admiral. 

Admiralty, 

Note. — Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Viscount  Jellicoe  is  of  opinion 
from  later  consideration  of  all  the  evidence  that  the  original 
Plan  (Plate  1«),  forwarded  with  his  Despatch  of  18th  June  1916, 
is  more  correct  than  the  revised  Plan  referred  to  in  the  above 
letter  of  the  29th  August  1916  (Plate  4a). 

1  Plate  4a.  ''  Plate  .5a. 


D  2 


52  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

CAPTAIN'S    REPORT— H.M.S.    "IRON    DUKE." 

Enclosure  No.   1  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 

C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 
No.   lo:i 

H.M.S.  "  Iron  Duke," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

T  HAVE  the  honour  to  submit  the  attached  brief  report 
of  the  part  taken  by  your  Flagship.  H.M.S.  "  Iron  Duke " 
during  the  Action  with  tl;ie  German  High  Sea  Fleet  off  the 
Coast  of  Jutland  on  the  31st  May  1916. 

2.  As  no  casualties  occurred  on  board  "  Iron  Duke,"  which 

was  not  hit  by  the  Enemy's  fire,  no  strain  was  thrown  on  the 

Ship's   personnel  or  organization   and,   consequently,   I   am  not 

specially  mentioning  the  services  of  particular  Officers  and  Men. 

The  bearing  of  all  was  in  every  way  admirable.^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

FRED.   C.   DREYER, 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Captain. 

H.M.  Ships  and  Vessels, 
Home  Fleets. 


BRIEF   ACCOUNT   OF   THE   ACTION   OFF   JUTLAND 
OF   31sT   MAY    1916. 

The  attached  Notes  on  the  Action  by  the  following  Officers 
are  forwarded  as  they  are  of  interest,  not  only  in  describing 
events,  but  also  any  difficulties  they  had  to  cope  with. 

Commander  (G)  Geoffrey  Blake,  R.N.  -    In   Gun   Control   Tower. 

— Principal  Control 

Officer. 
Lieut. -Commander      Thomas     F.     P.    In  "  B  "  Turret. 

Calvert,  R.N. 
Lieut.  Richard  Shelley,  R.N.        -         -    In  13-o-in.  Transmitting 

Station — In  Charge. 
Mr.  Herbert  D.  Jehan,  Gunner  R.N.     -    In    6-in.     Control    Top, 

aloft.        6-in.     (^ontrol 
Officer. 
Mr.  Francis  W.  Potter,  Gunner,  R.N.       In       13-o-in.       Director 

Tower  Aloft— 13- 5-in. 
Director-Gunner. 
All  times  given  are  G.M.T.     All  Courses  Magnetic. 
I  was  in  the  Conning  Tower  with  Captain  Oliver  E.  Leggett, 
Master  of  the  Fleet,  and  Lieutenant  Commander  (T)  Edward  W. 

»  Plates  2  and  6a. 


Plate  2, 


Plot  or  the  brack  of  H.f^nd  900 p.m 
31^^  May  1316.  All  course^.  T. 


Scale -=  I  Inc^  to  A-  Miles 


6  51 


<rr 


7  0S 
07 


7-33 


7S9 


Plot  of  the  track  of  H.  MS.  Iron  Duke  between  600p.m. and  9  OOp.m 
31^^  May  1316.  All  courses  are  maqnetic^   and  all  times  G.M.T. 


Scale-  I  Inch  to  4-  M.les 


^^S-f/f  "  9^-«"""  600  to  300  Made  qood  S  IZ  //  w(m,^)  33 


^^cJtr 


Course  South  17  Knots 


Mai  by  A.  Sons. Lnh 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  53 

MacKichan,  R.N.,  throughout  the  Action,  and  had  a  very  good 
view  of  the  whole  situation. 

The  Communications  worked  very  well. 

The  Navy  phones  were  noticeably  better  than  Voicepipes,  the 
former  requiring  no  shouting,  but  it  is  fully  realised  that  Voicepipes 
possess  the  great  advantage  of  reliability — in  fact,  they  have  to 
be  blown  away  before  being  out  of  action. 

The  Light  was  bad,  the  weather  being  misty,  the  visibihty 
varying  during  the  actual  firing  from  10,000  to  about  16,000  yards. 
At  4.0  p.m. — "  Action  "  was  sounded,  the  Hands  having  had  Tea, 
and  the  Decks  having  been  cleared  up. 

All  preparations  for  Immediate  Action  were  then  made. 

At  6.0.  p.m. — Course  was  S.E. — ^20  knots. 

At  6.2  p.m. — Altered  Course  by  9  Pendant  to  S. — 18  knots. 

At  6.5  p.m. — Altered  Course  by  9  Pendant  to  S.E. 

At  6.14  p.m. — Formed  Line  of  Battle  to  Port  by  Equal  Speed 
Pendant.  Co.  S.E.  by  E.  "  Iron  Duke  "  being 
"  straddled  "  at  this  time  by  two  Enemy's  Heavy 
Projectiles,  with  large  "  spread." 

Our  Battle  Cruisers,  which  had  shortly  before  come  in  sight 
on  a  Southerly  bearing,  firing  to  South  Westward,  rapidly  cleared 
the  Battle  Line,  disclosing  a  German  3-funnelled  Cruiser  some- 
what Uke  the  "  Kolberg  "  Class,  but  with  larger  Funnels,  she  was 
apparently  stopped  and  on  fire. 

6.23  p.m.  —Opened   Fire   with    the   Turrets   on    the    3-funnelled 
Cruiser.     Bearing  about  80  Green.     Range,  11,000. 
Fall  of  Shot  very  easy  to  observe. 
The  3rd  Salvo  Straddled. 
After  the  4th  Salvo — Ceased  Fire. 
6.25  p.m. — Speed  15  knots. 
6.30|  p.m. — Opened  Fire  on  a  Battleship  of  "  Konig  "  Class. 

Bearing    70   Green— Range,   12,000.     The  2nd,  3rd, 
and   4th    Salvoes  hitting  her,  with    a   total  of    at 
least  6  Hits. 
Enemy  Steaming  in   the   same  direction   as    "  Iron 
Duke  "  on  a  slightly  converging  course. 
6.33  p.m.— Course  S.  71°  E.     17  knots. 

The  Bearing  of  the  Enemy  was  now  S.  14°  W. 
The  Bearing  of  the  Sun  was  N.  54°  W. 
The  Enemy  was  fit  up  by  the  Sun,  whereas  ''  Iron 
Duke  "  was  probably  invisible  to  them  in  the  mist. 
.However  that  may  be,  the    "  Konig  "    Battleship  did 
not  return  "  Iron  Duke's  "  Fire,  although  heavily 
hit. 
9  Salvoes,  comprising  a  total  of  43  rounds,  were  fired 
at  her  in  4  minutes  50  seconds. 
At  6.40  p.m.— Course  S.  56°  E. 
At  6.44  p.m.— Course  S.  46°  E. 
At  6.51  p.m.— Course  S.  8°  E. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  53 

MacKichan,  R.N.,  throughout  the  Action,  and  had  a  very  good 
view  of  the  whole  situation. 

The  Communications  worked  very  well. 

The  Navyphones  were  noticeably  better  than  Voicepipes,  the 
former  requiring  no  shouting,  but  it  is  fully  realised  that  Voicepipes 
possess  the  great  advantage  of  reliability — in  fact,  they  have  to 
be  blown  away  before  being  out  of  action. 

The  Light  was  bad,  the  weather  being  misty,  the  visibihty 
varying  durhig  the  actual  firing  from  10,000  to  about  16,000  yards. 

At  4.0  p.m. — "  Action  "  was  sounded,  the  Hands  having  had  Tea, 
and  the  Decks  having  been  cleared  up. 

All  preparations  for  Immediate  Action  were  then  made. 

At  6.0.  p.m. — Course  was  S.E. — 20  knots. 

At  6.2  p.m. — Altered  Course  by  9  Pendant  to  S. — 18  knots. 

At  6.5  p.m. — Altered  Course  by  9  Pendant  to  S.E. 

At  6.14  p.m. — Formed  Line  of  Battle  to  Port  by  Equal  Speed 
Pendant.  Co.  S.E.  by  E.  "  Iron  Duke  "  being 
"  straddled  "  at  this  time  by  two  Enemy's  Heavy 
Projectiles,  with  large  "  spread." 

Our  Battle  Cruisers,  which  had  shortly  before  come  in  sight 
on  a  Southerly  bearing,  firing  to  South  Westward,  rapidly  cleared 
the  Battle  Line,  disclosing  a  German  3-funnelled  Cruiser  some- 
what Uke  the  "  Kolberg  "  Class,  but  with  larger  Funnels,  she  was 
apparently  stopped  and  on  fire. 

6.23  p.m.  —Opened    Fire   with    the   Turrets   on    the    3-funnelled 
Cruiser.     Bearing  about  80  Green.     Range,  11,000. 
FaU  of  Shot  very  easy  to  observe. 
The  3rd  Salvo  Straddled. 
After  the  4th  Salvo — Ceased  Fire. 
6.25  p.m. — Speed  15  knots. 
6.30|  p.m. — Opened  Fire  on  a  Battleship  of  "  Konig  "  Class. 

Bearing    70    Green— Range,   12,000.     The  2nd,  3rd, 
and   4th    Salvoes  hitting  her,  with    a   total  of    at 
least  6  Hits. 
Enemy  Steaming  in   the  same  direction  as   "  Iron 
Duke  ■■  on  a  slightly  converging  course. 
6.33  p.m.— Course  S.  71°  E.     17  knots. 

The  Bearing  of  the  Enemj'^  was  now  S.  14°  W. 
The  Bearing  of  the  Sun  was  N.  54°  W. 
The  Enemy  was  lit  up  by  the  Sun,  whereas  "  Iron 
Duke  "  was  probably  invisible  to  them  in  the  mist. 
However  that  may  be,  the   "  Konig  "   Battleship  did 
not  return  "  Iron  Duke's  "  Fire,  although  heavily 
hit. 
9  Salvoes,  comprising  a  total  of  43  rounds,  were  fired 
at  her  in  4  minutes  50  seconds. 
At  6.40  p.m.— Course  S.  56°  E. 
At  6.44  p.m.— Course  S.  46°  E. 
At  6.51  p.m.— Course  S.  8°  E. 


54  BATTLE    OF    .ITTLAND  : 

At  7. or)  p.m. — Course  S.W.  by  S. 
At  7.07  ]).m.^ — Course  South. 

7.11  p.m. — Gin.  ()j)ene(l  Fire  on  p]nemy  T.B.D.'s  attacking  the 

Battle    Fleet.      Green,    (h".      About    10,000  yds., 

and  sank  one  Enemy  T.B.D.,  and  fired  on  another. 

7,13  p.m. — Opened   Fire    with    Turrets    on    Enemy   Battleship, 

Green,  74.     Range  15,400  yards.     Enemy  .^teaming 

nearly  directly  away. 

4  Salvoes  Fired,  no  hits  were  observed. 

7.18  p.m. — Ceased  Fire,  as   Enemy  was   hidden  by  a  very   good 

Smoke  Screen  made  by  his  Destroyers. 
7.20  p.m.- — Trained   Turrets    on    Enemy   Battle   Cruiser   bearing 
99  Green,  but    before  Fire   could   be   opened    she 
also  was  hidden  by  a  Smoke    Screen    made    by 
attending  Enemy's  T.B.D.'s. 
At  7.23  p.m.— Course  S.  19°  E. 
At  7.24  p.m. —  6-in.  Opened  Fire  on  Enemy's  T.B.D.'s  attacking 

Battle  Fleet.     Green  115."     Range,  10,000. 
At  7.27  p.m. — Turrets    opened    fire,    Green     110,     Range    9,600 
yards,     on      Enemy's     T.B.D.'s     Avhich      were 
attacking  the  Battle  Fleet. 
One  Salvo  fired,  which  the  Director  Gunner  states 
blew  up  an  Enem^^  T.B.D. 
At  7.31  p.m.— Ceased  Firing. 

Total  ammunition  fired — 13-5-in. — 90  rounds. 

6-in. — 50  rounds. 

H.M.S.  "  Oak  "  reports  that  "  at  abrmt  7.35  p.m.  the  track 
of  a  Torpedo  w^as  observed  to  cross  the  track  of  our  ships,  about 
200  yards  ahead  of  '  Iron  Duke,'  Torpedo  was  travelling  slowly. 
Track  finished  about  2,000  yards  on  the  Port  side  of  the  Line, 
and  the  Torpedo  sank.     Direction  of  the  track  was  S.E." 

Another  Torpedo  was  also  reported  by  "  Benbow  "  which 
was  4th  ship  astern  of  "  Iron  Duke,"  at  8.31  p.m.  "  It  is 
believed  that  the  Torpedo  passed  ahead  of  '  Iron  Duke,'  "  but 
this  was  not  seen  by  "  Iron  Duke,"  although  two  signalmen 
were  specially  stationed  under  a  Signal  Officer  aloft,  to  look  out 
for  Torpedoes. 

It  is  quite  possible  that  this  is  due  to  the  difficult  light 
conditions  rendering  the  track  invisible  from  "  Iron  Duke." 

During  the  night,  in  view  of  the  proximity  of  Heavy  Enemy's 
Ships,  the  Hands  remained  at  Action  Stations,  the  Gun«'  Crews 
at  their  Guns,  but  being  allowed  to  sleep  in  turn. 

The  Corned  Beef  and  Biscuits  provided  at  the  Quarters  were 
served  out.  Cocoa  was  provided  from  9.30  p.m.  onwards,  and 
Breakfast  brought  to  the  Quarters  at  7.30  a.m. 

1    ^  sj:  9|:  ^  ^ 

^  Pai't  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations 
i.e.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  55 

The  Turrets  were  fired  throughout  by  Director,  Avhich  system 
possesses  enormous  advantages  over  any  other  in  Action. 

The  close  study  which  has  been  made  of  the  Silhouettes  of 
German  ships  enabled  those  sighted  to  be  recognised,  except  a 
Battle  Cruiser  with  very  large  square  Funnels,  which  might  have 
been  the  "  Lutzow." 

The  Rangefinders  obtained  very  good  results,  notwithstanding 
the  bad  hght,  and  were  of  the  greatest  assistance  in  keeping  the 
range. 

The  Rangetakers  reported  that  the  Enemy's  Pole  Masts  were 
easier  to  Range  on  than  those  of  our  own  ships. 

No  Torpedoes  were  fired  as  the  large  number  of    our  own 

ships  which  from  time  to  time  crossed  the  space  between  the 

Battle    Fleets    rendered    it   inadvisable    to    fire    the    slow    E.R. 

Torpedoes,  and  the  Enemy  were  out  of  Range  for  the  30  knot 

■  Setting. 

The  Engine  Room  Department  experienced  no  difficulties 
during  the  action. 

FRED.   C.   DREYER, 

Captain. 

NOTES   MADE   BY   LIEUTENANT    RICHARD 
SHELLEY,    R.N.,    ON   "IRON   DUKES  "    13-5-IN. 
TRANSMITTING   STATION. 
G.M.T. 

P.M. 

5.55.  Heavy  firing  on  the  Starboard  bow. 

Stand  by  to  load. 
Director  firing. 

B.C.F.   are   heavily   engaged   on   the   Starboard  bow 
bearing  about  65  Green. 
5.59.  Load. 

6.  4.  Green  40.  • 

6.23.  All  left  Guns  to  the  "Ready." 

6.25.  Straddle. 

6.251.        Check  fire. 

6.29|.         70  Green  IncHnation   100  to  the  left. 
6.30|-.        Open      fire.       Spotting     corrections,      *     *     *^     No 
correction ;     Straddle    no    correction  ;     Enemy    on 
fire  •     *     *     *  1 
6.37.10.     No  spotting  correction. 
6.37.40.     Check  Fire.     90  Green. 

For  information  Enemy  was  straddled  and  badly  hit 
twice,    a    fire    broke    out    under    "  A  "    and    "  B " 
Turrets.      Enemy  a/c  14  points  and  disappeared  in 
the  mist. 
Passed  sunken  ship  on  starboard  side. 
Train  60  Green  follow  the  Director. 

^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


56  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

7.  6.  Target    28    green.     "  Q  ",    "  X  "    and    "  Y  "    train 
40  Green  and  stand  by  to  pick  up  the  target. 
Ship  altering  course  to  Port. 

7.14.  "Ready." 

7.14.20.  Open  fire. 

7.17.30.  Fired       *     *     *i 

7.19.10.  Five  guns     *     *     *^     No  correction  for  range. 

7.21.20.  Target  shifted  train  99  green.     Range  14,000. 

7.23.  Check  Fire. 

7.24.45.  6-in.  oj^ened  fire. 

7.26.  Destroyer,  train  136  green.     Check  bearing  110  green. 

7.27.50.  Open  fire  5  guns. 

7.26.50.  Check  Fire  (Director  reports  target  has  gone). 

7.40.  All  Turrets  train  90  Green. 
7.42.  Ammunition  expended  : — 

"  A  "   18  rds.  Common 

"  B  "   17  rds.  Common 

"  Q  "   18  rds.  Common  VNo  breakdowns. 

"  X  "   19  rds.  Common 

"  Y."   18  rds.  Common  J 
8.10.  Turrets  load  cages  with  Lyddite  A. P.  Shell. 

8.20.30.     Battle  Fleet  is  deploying  into  line  of  Battle  again, 
8.23.  Heavy  firing  ahead. 

8.30.  Train  60  Green. 

8.32.50.     70  Green. 

8.41,  Enemy's  Battle  Fleet  is  somewhere  on  the  Starboard 

beam,  a  Hght  cruiser  has  just  been  engaging  them. 
9.  9.  Heavy  firing  on  starboard  beam.      All  turrets  train 

90  Green. 
11.55,  Train  90  Red,  follow  the  Director,  stand  fast   "B'" 

turret. 

1st  June,   1916. 

A.M. 

1,  4.  Light  on  Port  beam  (From  Director). 

2.30.  Train  40  Green. 

2.35.  Alter  course  to  Starboard. 

2.37.  Alter  course  to  Port,  to  original  course  (166  Gyro), 

2.45.  Lined  up  for  training.     Read  ofif  elevation  receivers. 

Put  range  on  range  transmitter. 

2.46.  Make    certain    that    all    rangefinders    and    periscopes 

are  clean. 

2.55.  Cages  are  to  be  kept  loaded  with  Common.     Train 

fore  and  aft. 
3.22,  For  information,  Firing  right  ahead. 

3.52.  Firing  on  Port  beam.     Stand  by  to  open  fire. 

3.56.  96  Green  a  Zeppelin. 

1  See  note  on  p.  381. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  57 

G.M.T. 
A.M. 

4.    l.\.  Zeppelin  altered  course  to  Starboard,  rate  900  opening. 

4.  3.  Do  not  load  cages  with  shrapnel.      Zeppelin  is  ai)pa- 
rently  retiring. 

4.15.  All  Turrets  are  to  be  ready  to  load  with  Common. 

5.48.  Turrets  train  60  Green. 

6.  7.  Turrets  train  80  Red  follow^  the  Director. 

10.46.  Cook-i  of  Messes  fallen  out  to  prepare  dinner. 

12.  0.  "  A    ,  "  Q  ■'  and  "  Y  "  Turrets  Crews  to  Dinner. 

P.M. 

1.  0.  "B  "  and  "X"  to  Dinner. 

2.23.  Secure. 

NOTES  MADE  BY  SHORTHAND  IN  "  B  "  TURRET  OF 

H.M.S.     'IRON    DUKE"    AT     THE     DICTATION     OF 

LIEUTENANT  COMI^IANDER  T.  F.  P.  CALVERT,  R.N.. 

DURING    THE   ACTION   OF   31st   MAY    1916. 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

5.55.  Stand  By  to  load. 

5.58.  Ship   19  knots. 

6.  0.  Battle    Cruiser,    Starboard    Bow,    64  Green.    Turrets 

load — Bela3^ 

6.  2.  Turrets  load."^ 

6.  3.  Both  Gun^  loaded. 

6.  5.  Stand  by  to  train  40  Green. 

6.  6.  White  smoke  on  Upper  Deck  of  "  Lion  "  Port  side. 

6.  8.  Ship   18  knots. 

6.10.  Turrets  train  90  Green.     "Lion"  still  on  fire. 

6.12.  Big  shot  just  short  of  a  destroyer  bearing  50  Green. 

Firing   with   flashes    this   way   beiaring   also   about 
50  Green. 

6.13.  Shot  fell  about  4,000  yds.  over  on  our  beam. 

6.14.  Fleet  deployed  to  port. 

6.15.  11,000. 

6.16.30.     Enemy  shij),  very  much  on  fire,  only  white  smoke, 

apparently  stopped. 
6.16.50.     "  Lion  "  "  A  "  and  "  B  "  fire  2  gun  salvo. 
6.17.10.     Next  ship  to  "  Lion  "  fired  a  salvo. 

6.18.  More  enemy  ships  about. 

6.18.25.     They  are  right  on  our  beam,  10""  right  of  where  we  are. 
6.18.45.     Two    enemy   shots    fell    between    "Lion"    and     4 
funnelled  cruiser  on  her  port  beam. 

6.19.  4.     Battle  Cruiser,  "Inflexible"  class,  fired  salvo. 
6.19.30.     Ship  alter  course  to  starboard. 

6.19.50.     Enemy  ship  apparently  blown  up.     (This  must  have 
been  "  Defence.") 

6.20.  Speed  of  ship  15  knots. 
6.20.22.     Ship  steady  bearing  83  Green. 


58  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

G.20.35.     Sliip  alter  course. 

6.20.50.     We  are  9th  ship  of  Hne  bearing  88  Green. 

(>.21.  5.     Another  enemy  ship — right  on  her  now — 3  funnels.  2 

masts. 
(5.22. 10.     Speed  of  .^lip   17. 

6.23.30.     Opened   fire.     1st   .salvo,  3  shots  spotted   short ;  2nd 
salvo,  Straddle ;  3rd  Salvo,  over ;     4th  salvo,  Not 
spotted. 
6.25.40.     Check  fire. 
6.25.50.     Ship  ahead  opened  fire. 
6.26.10.     Steam  escaping  amidships. 
6.26.15.     British   Destroyer    passing,  2   black    balls    up,     Not 

under  control,  2  men  on  forecastle. 
6.26.20.     Target  70  Green. 

6.30.25.     Opened  fire,  1st  Salvo  shots  fell  right  and  short. 
6.31.  2nd  Salvo,  all  over.     Not  sighted  at  all. 

6.31.40.     3rd  salvo  not  spotted. 
6.32.10.     Ship  alter  course  to  port. 
6.32.30.     4th  salvo  straddle  over. 
6.33.  Rapid  salvoes.     5th  salvo  not  spotted. 

6.33.25.     6th  salvo  enemy  on  fire. 
6.33.48.     7th  salvo  short. 
6.34.25.     8th  salvo  not  spotted. 
6.35.13.     9th  salvo  not  spotted. 
6.35.55.     10th  salvo  not  spotted. 

6.36.  Enemy  alter  course  to  starboard  300  opening. 

6.36.15.     Check  fire. 
6.39.10.     Ship   15. 

6.40.10.     Ship  alter  course  to  Starboard. 
6.42.50.     Passed  another  British  destroyer  not    under  contro 

with  "  39  "  on  her  stern. 
6.43.30,     Destroyer  has  collision  mat  over  port  bow  and    fire 
abaft  after  funnel. 

Very  misty,  cannot  see  any  enemy  ships. 

All  turrets  train  90  Green. 

Ship  on  starboard  bow,  broken  in  half. 

Wing   Battleship   has  just   opened  fire  with  a  salvo 
and  the  second  ship. 

9,300  Turned,  went  ofl^  the  target. 

Target  28  Green. 

11,400. 

Ship  alter  course  to  port.     Target  is  the  left-hand  ship. 

11,000. 

10,600. 

12,000. 

11,900. 

13,500. 

14,100. 

14,800. 


6.45.10. 

6.48.45. 

6.50. 

7. 

0.30. 

7. 

4.10. 

7. 

5.35. 

7. 

6.10. 

7. 

6.50. 

7. 

7.48. 

7. 

8.10. 

7. 

8.40. 

7. 

9. 

7.10. 

7.10.40. 

7.11. 

OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES. 


59 


O.M.T. 

P.M. 

7.11.20.  Our  0-in.  fired. 

7.11.45.  15,300  One  Destroyer  on  this   bearing  stopped,   and 

one  turning  in  circles. 

7.12.10.  Our  (i-in.  fired. 

7.12.30.  Enemy   18. 

7.12.35.  15,500. 

7.12.50.  Our  6-in.  opened  heavy  fire  on  enemy  destroyers. 

7.13.  15,400—400  closing. 

7.13.10.  All  left  guns  ready. 

7.13.40.  1st  salvo,  shots  fell  right. 

7.14.25.  15,500. 

7.14.40.  15,000. 

7.14.45.  2nd  salvo,  still  right. 

7.15.5.  15,700. 

7.15.50.  Enemy  reduced  to  10  knots.     Range  14,900. 

7.16.  Inclination  40  to  the  left. 
7.16.18.  15,500. 

7.16.40.  15,600. 

7.16.50.  Ship  alter  course  to  starboard  slowly. 

7.16.55.  3rd  salvo.     20  Starboard. 

7.17.  5.  15,300. 
7.17.30.  125  opening. 

7.17.45.  Enemy  destroyers  making  a  smoke  screen. 

7.18.30.  4th  salvo.     One  of  enemy  ships  got  hit  all  right. 

7.18.25.  16,200. 

7.20.32.  Target  shifted  99  Green. 

7.20.45.  Enemy   17,   11,300. 

7.21.  12.200. 

7.21.10.  11.900. 

7.21.25.  12,000. 

7.21.35.  12,200. 

7.21.50.  12,500. 

7.22.10.  Ship  alter  course  to  port. 

7.22.15.  Two  enemy  destroyers  about  9,000. 

7.23.15.  Check  fire. 

7.23.50.  Six  enemy  destroyers  within  range. 

7.24.  6-in.  opened  fire  on  enemy  destroyers  short,   *     *     *  i 

7.24.50.  6-in.  fired  on  destroyers  135  Green. 

7.25.25.  8,900. 

7.25.30.  Bring  left  guns  to  ready. 

7.25.40.  8,700. 

7.25.48.  Enemy  17. 

7.26.  5.  9,000. 

7.26.20.  Ship  altering  course  to  portg 

7.26.30.  9,000. 

7.27.  3.  1st  salvo,  short. 
7.28.13.  Check  fire. 


^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


60  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

7.30.40.  Four   Light   Cruisers   and   llotilla   going   after  enemy 
destroyers,  one  has  stopped. 

7.32.10.  Passed  something  floating  in  water. 

8.25.30.  Nine  heavy  ships  ahead. 

8.20.40.  Ship   15. 

8.29.50.  Turrets  train  80  Green. 

8.31.  5.  Ship  16. 

8.31.50.  Train  70  Green. 

8.33.30.  Ship   17. 

9.07.00.  Train  90  Green. 

9.14.00.  Star  shell  burst  on  starboard  beam. 


NOTES  MADE  IN  THE  13-5-in.  GUN  CONTROL  TOWER 
TO  THE  DICTATION  OF  COMMANDER  (G)  G.  BLAKE, 
R.N..    IMMEDIATELY     AFTER    THE    ACTION    OF    31st 

MAY  1916. 

Heavy  Firing  first  heard  about  70  Green. 

Shortly  after.  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  were  made  out  steering 
across  Bow,  firing  well  on  an  extreme  forward  starboard  bearing. 

The  Ships  seen  were  "  Lion,"  "  Princess  Royal,"  "  Tiger," 
and  "  New  Zealand." 

Afterwards  4  Ships  of  the  5th  B.S.  were  sighted,  coming 
obliquely  towards  Battle  jfleet  from  Starboard  Wing,  they  joined 
Battle  Fleet. 

Battle  Fleet  deployed  to  Port,  into  Line  of  Battle. 

About  this  time,  a  German  three-funnelled  Cruiser  was 
observed  badly  damaged  and  in  a  sinking  condition. 

"  Iron  Duke  "  to  clear  bores  of  Guns,  fired  four  Salvoes. 

No  hits  were  observed,  although  straddled. 

All  other  ships  within  Range  were  firing  at  her,  especially  a 
Cruiser  ("  Shannon  "  Class)  which  got  in  front  of  Battle  Line, 
made  a  large  quantity  of  smoke  and  obscured  everything  on 
firing  side,  eventually  drawing  off  towards  the  rear  of  the  hne. 

After  Battle  Cruisers  had  passed,  3  or  4  German 
Battlesliips  of  "  Konig  "  Class  appeared  in  the  mist,  about 
70  Green. 

*     *     *     *i    .Range,  ILOOO.     *     *     *i 

First  Salvo  Short. 

Second  Salvo  Straddle — 3  Hits. 

Third  Salvo,  1  Hit — Straddle  over. 

Fourth  Salvo,  2  Hits. 

Then  enemy  altered  course  about  12  Points,  and  was  lost 
in  the  mist  and  smoke,  two  more  salvoes  were  fired  and  appeared 
to  be  falling  short. 

Check  fire. 

^  See  note  on  p.  .381. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  61 

An  enormous  explosion  occurred  on  the  starboard  quarter, 
sending  up  a  column  of  white  smoke  about  1,000  ft.  high. 

Passed  sunken  Ship,  which  proved  to  be  "  Invincible." 

We  then  sighted  what  appeared  to  be  a  Battleship  very  much 
like  the  "  Queen  Ehzabeth  "  Class,  but  with  two  thin  pole  masts, 
evidently  an  enemy  ship ;  several  of  our  own  ships  were  firing 
at  her. 

We  opened  fire  at  her,   at  a  range  of  about    16,000  yards, 
*     *     *  ^     shots  fell     *     *     *  ^     to  the  right,  and  by  the  time 
the  deflection  was  corrected,  and    about  four  salvoes  fired,  she 
had  disappeared  in  the  mist. 

She  apparently  had  a  number  of  l^estroyers  around  her. 

Fire  was  checked,  and  shortly  afterwards  another  Battleship 
came  into  sight,  but  before  fire  could  be  opened  on  her,  she  was 
obscured  by  smoke,  her  l>earing  was  about  93  Green.  She  was 
probably  the  "  Liitzovv'." 

Nothing  happened  for  some  time,  but  eventually  a  Destroyer 
attack  developed,  and  the  6-in.  were  firing  continuously  for 
about  ten  minutes  to  a  quarter  of  an  hour. 

The  results  Avere  not  seen. 

Shortly  after  Turrets  were  directed  on  to  Destroyer  bearing 
110  Green,  and  one  Salvo  was  fired. 

The  Director  Gunner  states  Destroj^er  fired  at  disappeared. 

No  more  firing  was  (-arried  out. 

This  was  the  last  occasion  of  engaging  the  Enemy. 

Heavy  firing  was  observed  on  the  Starboard  Bow,  and 
*'  Calliope  "  was  seen  to  be  hit  amidships;  the  flash  lit  up  the 
whole  of  the  Main  Deck.     She,  however,  continued  to  proceed. 

When  it  got  dark.  Course  was  altered  to  South,  and  we 
appeared  to  have  got  well  ahead  of  High  Sea  Fleet,  which  have 
been  firing  at  intervals  right  aft  on  the  Starboard  Quarter. 

The    turrets    fired    IS    rounds    per  turret,    Capped    Powder, 
Common  Shell. 


NOTES  MADE  IN  THE  13-5-in.  GUN  DIRECTOR   TOWER 

ALOFT,    AT   THE    DICTATION    OF   Mr.    F.    W.    POTTER, 

GUNNER,  R.N.,  OF  H.M.S.  "  IRON  DUKE,"  DURING  THE 

ACTION  OF  31st  MAY  1916. 

(Times  and  Bearings,  Approximate.) 

At  4  p.m.,  Action  being  sounded,  I  repaired  to  the  l3-5-in. 
Director  Tower,  and  Tested  all  Circuits.  I  then  received  informa- 
tion from  T.S.  that  our  Destroyers  were  engaging  the  Enemy's 
Battle  Cruisers,  and  that  we  should  probably  be  in  action  in 
about  one  hour's  time. 

Also  that  4  ships  of  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  were 
engaging  the  enemy,  and  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  Avere 
standing  North. 


See  note  on  p.  381. 


02  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

At  about  5.25,  I  observed  flashes  from  Guns,  bearing  about 
Green  60,  and  about  6  p.m.  the  Battle  Cruisers  could  be  seen 
heavily  engaged  with  the  enemy. 

6.25  we  opened  fire  at  a  three  funnelled  Cruiser,  which  looke<l 
like  the  "  Augsburg  "  Class,  Range  11,500. 

The  first  was  short,  the  second  over,  and  the  third  straddled. 

After  this  the  shooting  a})i)eared  t:j  be  good,  but  unfortunately 
the  enemy  got  obscured  by  smoke. 

About  this  time  three  Battleships  of  the  "  Konig  "  Class 
appeared  bearing  Green  70. 

1  then  received  the  order  to  train  Green  70,  Battleship  of  the 
"  Koenig  "  Class,  and  fire  was  opened  on  her. 

About  six  hits  ivere  obtahied  in  the  vicinity  of  'A  "  a7id  "  B  " 
Turrets,  one  salvo  causiny  a  big  fire  on  the  fore  part  of  the  ship. 
The  last  salvo  fired  was  a  straddle  short,  as  I  distinctly  saw 
one  shot  hit  the  ship's  side  and  explode. 

The  enemy  nov/  turned  awa}^  and  were  obscured  by  the 
mist,  and  the  order  "  check  fire  "  was  given. 

One  of  our  Destroyers  was  observed,  badly  damaged,  and  a 
little  later  we  passed  a  sunken  ship  which  afterward^  was 
reported  to  be  the  "  Invincible."  There  were  a  good  many 
men  in  the  water,  and  a  Destroyer  was  standing  by,  picking 
them  up. 

After  this  we  passed  what  appeared  to  be  a  ship  bottom 
upwards,  which  I  reported  to  the  Commander. 

I  was  then  shifted  to  another  ship,  which  disappeared  in  the 
mist  after  a  few  salvoes  had  been  fired  at  her. 

A.  large  Cruiser  of  the  "  Moltke  "  Class  came  into  view, 
accompanied  by  about  seven  Destroyers. 

I  was  put  on  to  the  Criiiser,  which  made  a  splendid  Target, 
but  she  was  very  soon  screened  b}-  the  Destroyer's  smoke,  so 
I  reported  the  Enemy  obscured.  It  seemed  that  as  soon  as  she 
saw  the  Fleet  she  turned  about  and  disappeared. 

I  then  received  the  order  to  Train  Green  110  a  Destroyer, 
foUoAved  by  the  order  "  Green  120,  a  Destroj^er."'  After  Ranging 
for  a  few  moments,  the  order  ''''  Open  Fire  "  was  given. 

The  only  Salvo  was  a  straddle  short. 

When  the  splash  cleared,  the  Destroijer  had  disappeared 
altogether. 

The  order  "  Check  Fire  "  was  given  at  about  7.:^v). 

Several  bearings  were  given  to  me  during  this  time,  but  no 
further  firing  took  place. 

After  the  Fleet  turned  to  port,  heavy  firing  was  heard,  and 
gun  flashes  were  seen  well  off  the  starboard  quarter. 

At  about  8.45  p.m.  a  star  light  Avas  seen  falling  off  the 
starboard  beam.  Avhich  lit  up  the  rear  end  of  the  Second  Battle 
Squadron. 

At  9.5  p.m..  and  at  A^arious  intervals,  lieaA^y  firing  Avas  heard 
astern. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  r  63 

Nothing  more  transpired  until  the  following  morning, 
l.st  June,  when  at  4.  a.m.  I  reported  a  Zeppelin  well  off  the 
port  quarter. 

The  Fleet  now  deployed  to  starboard,  and  I  received  orders 
to  stand  by  to  fire  at  the  Zeppelin. 

The  director  was  trained  and  layed  on  to  the  Zeppelin,  but 
unfortunately  the  smoke  from  our  own  funnels  continually 
obscured  her.  Also  a  hoist  of  flags  blew  right  across  the 
telescope. 

All  firing  was   carried   out  with   the   main   director  circuit. 

The  crew  of  the  director  tower  carried  out  their  work  in  a 
very  cool  manner. 

NOTES    ON    THE    FIRING    OF    THE    "IRON    DUKE'S" 

6-iN.     GUNS      DURING     THE     ACTION     OF     31st     MAY 

1916,     BY     THE     6-in.     CONTROL     OFFICER     ALOFT— 

Mr.  HERBERT  D.  JEHAN,   GUNNER,  R.N. 

A  Destroyer  attack  was  observed  coming  towards  the  Fleet, 
starboard  bow. 

The  order  was  given  by  the  Captain  from  Conning  Tower 
"  Destroyer  63  Green,  Open  fire  when  ready." 

The  Guns  were  given  the  Bearing  of  the  Leading  Destroyer 
at  an  estimated  range  of  10,000  yards,  and  600  closing,  fire  was 
opened  by  salvoes,  first  salvo  was  over  and  out  for  line.  This 
was  corrected    ^     *  *  *  the  next  salvo  being 

short,  and  the  third  salvo  straddled,  the  fourth  hit  the  Destroyer 
which  appeared  to  stagger  and  Iiulependeyit  was  ordered.  No  less 
than  four  hits  were  observed  and  the  Destroyer  sank. 

The  6-in.  were  ordered  to  Check  Fire  and  shift  to  another 
Destroyer  bearing'  84  Green,  Range  9,000.  This  Destroyer 
appeared  to  be  hit  once  by  the  6-in.,  but  not  disabled,  and 
turned  away.  Range  increased  rapidly  to  extreme  Gun  Range, 
and  the  6-in.  were  ordered  to  Check  Fire. 

The  second  attack  came  from  aft,  the  order  given  by  the 
Captain  from  Conning  Tower  was  "  Destroyers  135  Green,  Open 
Fire  when  ready."  This  was  passed  to  Battery,  and  10,000 
put  on  the  Sights.  "  Salvoes  Commence  "  being  ordered.  The 
guns  appeared  to  be  a  long  time  before  opening  fire.  One  Gun 
fired,  and  I  could  not  see  the  Fall  of  Shot. 

A  Check  Bearing  was  given  115  Green,  and  it  appeared  to 
me  as  if  the  after  guns  were  on  the  second  DestroJ^er,  and  the 
foremost  guns  on  the  leading  Destroyer. 

I  did  not  check  fire,  as  I  thought  it  would  be  waste  of  time. 

It  was  most  difficult  to  spot  through  the  firing  of  the  ships. 
1  *  *  *  *  * 

There  seemed  to  be  one  Destroyer  put_^out  of  action,  but 
not  by  the  6-in. 

^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


64  ^  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

When,  eventually,  the  remaining  Destroyers  turned  away  and 
formed  a  smoke  screen,  range  was  increased  the  same  way,  and 
check  fire  was  ordered  when  extreme  gun  range  was  reached. 

Transmitting  Station  reported  that  range  went  as  low  as 
7,600  to  exti-eme  12,000. 

During  the  first  attack  spotting  was  fairly  easy,  but  during 
the  second  it  was  most  difficult. 

1*  *  *  *  * 

No  Submarines  were  sighted,  although  on  several  occasions 
the  wash  from  the  Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers  looked  like  the 
feather  of  a  Submarine. 

VICE-ADMIRAL'S    REPORT,    1st    BATTLE    SQUADRON.^ 

Enclosure  No.  2  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 
C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

No.  021. 

"  Royal  Oak," 
Sir,  10th  June,  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  the  First  Battle 
Squadron  and  "  Bellona  "  left  the  Northern  Base  in  accordance 
with  your  orders  at  9.30  p.m.  30th  May,  1916,  my  Flag  being 
in  ''  Marlborough,"  and  proceeded  in  company  witK  your  Flag  to 
the  Southeastward. 

2.  The  first  intimation  of  the  enemy  being  at  sea  was 
received  in  "  Marlborough  "  about  2.30  p.m.  31st  May,  a  signal 
being  intercepted  from  "  Galatea  "  to  Senior  Officer,  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet,  reporting  enemy  cruisers  bearing  E.S.E. 

Further  enemy  reports  were  received  from  various  units  of 
the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  and  at  3.55  a  signal  was  made  by  Senior 
Officer,  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  that  he  was  engaging  the  enemy. 

At  4.0  p.m.,  Senior  Officer.  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
reported  enemy  battle-fleet  in  sight  steering  East,  and  at  5.0  p.m. 
that  they  had  altered  course  to  North. 

The  situation  as  it  developed  was  reported  by  visual  signal 
from  time  to  time  to  the  ships  under  my  command. 

About  5.30  p.m.  heavy  gun  firing  was  heard  on  the  starboard 
bow  and  a  little  later  flashes  were  clearly  seen. 

At  5.45  p.m.,  "  Lion,"  "  Princess  Royal,"  "  Tiger  "  and 
"  New  Zealand  "  were  sighted  on  starboard  bow  heavily  engaged 
with  the  enemy,  whose  flashes  could  now  be  seen  to  the  South- 
ward, this  being  reported  to  Flag  at  6.0  p.m.,  at  which  time  our 
battle-cruisers  were  bearing  S.S.W.  3  to  4  miles,  steering  East, 
'*  Lion,"  the  leading  ship.  The  5th  Battle  Squadron  then  came 
in  sight  bearing  S.W.,  also  heavily  engaged. 

3.  At  6.2  p.m.,  "  Marlborough's  "  position  was  Lat.  57.04  N., 
Long.  5.29  E.,  course  being  altered  by  9  pendant  to  South,  speed 

^  See  note  on  p.  381.        -  Plates  3  and  7a. 


PlvLte  3 


T  RACK    CHART    OF 


"m 

H.  M.  SHIP 
A  RLBOROUGH" 

M  AY    30"  TO  JUNE  2".° 

1916. 
CHART    Z339. 

POSJTIO 

NS  or  Enemy  Sn.ps  smevvh  by  Heaw  Lines. 

All  T.mes  G.MT. 

(Uj-.t^^-W?»V.  CommanderCn) 

C^f^UU.^  HMS.MABieoB 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  65 

18  knots,  and  at  6.6  p.m.  course  was  again  altered  to  S.E.  by 
9  pendant. 

6.15  p.m.,  Signal  Avas  received  to  form  line  of  battle  S.E.  by  E. 
by  equal  speed  pendant,  enemy  bearing  E.S.E.  from  "  Barham." 

4.  About  this  time  the  Battle-cruisers,  who  appeared  to  be 
ahead  of  the  leading  division,  turned  to  starboard  as  if  to  cross 
the  enemy's  T. 

5.  One  of  our  armoured  cruisers,  probably  "  Warrior,"  was 
observed  passing  down  the  engaged  side,  making  for  her  position 
in  rear  of  the  hne.  When  near  the  end  of  the  hne  she  turned  up 
parallel  to  it  and  engaged  the  enemy  at  short  range.  Heavy 
enemy  salvoes  were  observed  to  fall  all  round  her;  she  then 
turned  about  14  points  to  port,  a  salvo  struck  her  and  a  large 
flame  was  seen  to  burst  from  her  quarter  deck  and  she  then 
passed  astern. 

6.  A  salvo  of  5  shots  fell  ahead  of  the  "  Hercules  "  about 
6.15  p.m.  As  the  Battle-cruisers  drew  ahead  and  their  smoke 
cleared,  the  German  hne  could  be  more  easily  seen  and  4  Kaisers 
and  4  Helgolands  could  be  dimly  made  out.  "  Marlborough  " 
opened  fire  at  6.17  p.m.  at  a  battleship  of  the  Kaiser  class — 
range  13,000  yards,  about  Green  110. 

"  Marlborough  "  fired  7  salvoes  and  hits  were  observed  in 
5th  and  7th  salvoes,  the  remainder  of  the  squadron  opening  fire 
as  a  target  became  visible. 

7.  At  6.20  p.m.,  speed  of  14  knots  was  ordered  by  general 
signal.  Shortly  after  this  there  was  much  bunching  up  of  ships 
in  the  rear  of  the  hne,  "  Marlborough  "  and  other  ships  had  to 
reduce  to  8  laiots  and  "  St.  Vincent  "  had  to  stop  for  a  short 
time.  Owing  to  haze  and  the  enemy's  smoke,  organised  distri- 
bution of  fire  was  out  of  the  question ;  individual  ships  selected 
their  own  targets. 

8.  As  the  action  developed  and  disabled  ships  of  both  sides 
passed  down  between  the  fines,  great  difficulty  was  experienced 
in  distinguishing  the  enemy's  from  our  own  ships. 

9.  "  Marlborough  "  now  shifted  fire  to  a  three  funnelled 
ship,  and  at  6.34  p.m.  formed  up  astern  of  the  fine  and  opened 
fire  on  a  battle  ship  of  the  Kaiser  class. 

10.  At  6.45  p.m.  "  Marlborough  "  altered  course  to  avoid  a 
torpedo.  At  6.54  p.m.  a  heavy  explosion  was  experienced 
under  the  Fore  bridge,  the  ship  taking  up  a  list  of  8  degrees  to 
starboard.  The  torpedo  had  struck  the  ship  abreast  of  No.  1 
dynamo  room  and  hydraufic  room,  both  of  which  were  flooded, 
the  2  men  stationed  in  the  former  being  killed.  Water  was  also 
reported  up  to  the  floor  plates  in  "  A  "  boiler  room  and  it  was 
considered  necessary  to  draw  the  fires  in  that  boiler  room,  but 
as  a  speed  of  17  knots  could  be  maintained  I  decided  that 
"  Marlborough  "  should  maintain  her  position  in  the  hne  and 
continue  to  lead  her  division.     The  list  remained  steady  and  it 

X     12872  E 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  65 

18  knots,  and  at  6.6  p.m.  course  was  again  altered  to  S.E.  by 
9  pendant. 

6.15  p.m.,  Signal  was  received  to  form  line  of  battle  S.E.  by  E. 
by  equal  speed  pendant,  enemy  bearing  E.S.E.  from  "  Barham." 

4.  About  this  time  the  Battle-cruisers,  who  appeared  to  be 
ahead  of  the  leading  division,  turned  to  starboard  as  if  to  cross 
the  enemy's  T. 

5.  One  of  our  armoured  cruisers,  probably  "  Warrior,"  was 
observed  passing  down  the  engaged  side,  making  for  her  position 
in  rear  of  the  hne.  When  near  the  end  of  the  Une  she  turned  up 
parallel  to  it  and  engaged  the  enemy  at  short  range.  Heavy 
enemy  salvoes  were  observed  to  fall  all  round  her;  she  then 
turned  about  14  points  to  port,  a  salvo  struck  her  and  a  large 
flame  was  seen  to  burst  from  her  quarter  deck  and  she  then 
passed  astern. 

6.  A  salvo  of  5  shots  fell  ahead  of  the  "  Hercules  "  about 
6.15  p.m.  As  the  Battle-cruisers  drew  ahead  and  their  smoke 
cleared,  the  German  Hne  could  be  more  easily  seen  and  4  Kaisers 
and  4  Helgolands  could  be  dimly  made  out.  "  Marlborough  " 
opened  fire  at  6.17  p.m.  at  a  battleship  of  the  Kaiser  class — 
range  13,000  yards,  about  Green  110. 

"  Marlborough  "  fired  7  salvoes  and  hits  were  observed  in 
5th  and  7th  salvoes,  the  remainder  of  the  squadron  opening  fire 
as  a  target  became  visible. 

7.  At  6.20  p.m.,  speed  of  14  knots  was  ordered  by  general 
signal.  Shortly  after  this  there  was  much  bunching  up  of  ships 
in  the  rear  of  the  hne,  "  Marlborough  "  and  other  ships  had  to 
reduce  to  8  knots  and  "  St.  Vincent  "  had  to  stop  for  a  short 
time.  Owing  to  haze  and  the  enemy's  smoke,  organised  distri- 
bution of  fire  was  out  of  the  question ;  individual  ships  selected 
their  own  targets. 

8.  As  the  action  developed  and  disabled  ships  of  both  sides 
passed  down  between  the  lines,  great  difficulty  was  experienced 
in  distinguisliing  the  enemy's  from  our  own  ships. 

9.  "  Marlborough  "  now  shifted  fire  to  a  three  funnelled 
ship,  and  at  6.34  p.m.  formed  up  astern  of  the  hne  and  opened 
fire  on  a  battle  ship  of  the  Kaiser  class. 

10.  At  6.45  p.m.  "  Marlborough  "  altered  course  to  avoid  a 
torpedo.  At  6.54  p.m.  a  heavy  explosion  was  experienced 
under  the  Fore  bridge,  the  ship  taking  up  a  fist  of  8  degrees  to 
starboard.  The  torpedo  had  struck  the  ship  abreast  of  No.  1 
dynamo  room  and  hydrauhc  room,  both  of  which  were  flooded, 
the  2  men  stationed  in  the  former  being  killed.  Water  was  also 
reported  up  to  the  floor  plates  in  "  A  "  boiler  room  and  it  was 
considered  necessary  to  draw  the  fires  in  that  boiler  room,  but 
as  a  speed  of  17  knots  could  be  maintained  I  decided  that 
"  Marlborough  "  should  maintain  her  position  in  the  fine  and 
continue  to  lead  her  division.     The  list  remained  steady  and  it 

X     12872  E 


06  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

was  reported  in  less  than  an  hour  that  the  water  wa«  being  kept 
under. 

11.  Shortly  after  being  struck,  "Marlborough"  opened  fire 
on  an  enemy  cruiser  passing  down  the  Une  which  was  suspected 
of  having  fired  the  torpedo.  The  3rd  and  4th  salvoes  both  hit 
and  appeared  to  open  up  her  side,  as  a  deep  red  flame  could  be 
seen  inside  her  hull.  A  torpedo  was  fired  at  her  at  7.10  p.m. 
During  this  time  the  "  Acasta  "  was  passed  disabled  on  the  port 
side,  and  "  Marlborough  "  avoided  3  more  torpedoes  by  the  use 
of  the  helm. 

12.  "  Marlborough  "  then  engaged  a  ship  of  the  Konig  class, 
firing  14  salvoes.  Distinct  hits  were  seen  in  four  salvoes.  (The 
gunnery  difficulties  experienced  by  the  ship  after  she  was 
torpedoed  are  reported  in  the  ship's  gunnery  report.)  This  ship 
finally  turned  out  of  the  line,  very  low  in  the  water  aft,  and  was 
apparently  sinking.  A  destroyer  was  observed  to  place  herself 
on  her  engaged  side,  and  make  a  dense  smoke  in  order  to 
screen  her. 

13.  Shortly  after  this  a  heavy  smoke  screen  was"observed  at 
what  appeared  to  be  the  head  of  the  enemy  battlefleet,  and  it 
was  soon  apparent  that  the  destroyers  were  attacking  under  its 
cover. 

I  immediately  hoisted  the  signal  "  KM,"  informing  our 
flotillas  astern  that  the  enemy  flotillas  were  making  an  attack. 
At  the  same  time  the  preparative  was  hoisted,  and  I  turned  my 
division  away. 

As  far  as  I  could  judge  the  whole  squadron  opened  fire  on 
the  attacking  destroyers  with  the  whole  of  the  secondary  and 
some  of  the  main  armament,  and  the  attack  was  checked,  and 
they  turned  away,  but  not  before  they  were  able  to  fire  some  of 
their  torpedoes,  which,  however,  were  avoided. 

Two  of  the  enemy's  destroyers  were  observed  to  be  hit  by 
"  Marlborough's  "  6-inch  gun  fire  alone,  and  there  must  have  been 
others  as  the  fire  was  so  intense. 

14.  As  the  destroyer  attack  developed  the  enemy  battlefleet 
in  sight  were  observed  to  turn  at  least  8  points  until  their  sterns 
were  towards  our  line.  They  ceased  fire,  dechned  further  action, 
and  disappeared  into  Ihe  mist. 

Our  destroj'^ers  in  rear  of  the  line  proceeded  out  to  attack  the 
enemy  destroyers  and  sink  any  disabled  craft. 

15.  During  the  action  at  one  period  the  enemy  appeared  to 
be  firing  steady,  well  drilled  salvoes,  by  some  form  of  director 
such  as  the  Petravic  system,  but  their  rangefinding  and  range 
keeping  appear  to  have  been  at  fault  when  they  were  hit, 
although  the  firing  on  our  armoured  cruisers  was  remarkable  for 
its  accuracy. 

Many  of  their  salvoes  were  seen  to  fall  over  and  it  was  not 
till  late  in  the  action  that  they  apparently'  found  the  range  when 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  67 

the  "  Colossus  "  was  straddled  by  4  successive  salvoes,  correct  for 
elevation. 

16.  As  the  action  progressed  their  fire  became  more  feeble. 
A  certain  number  of  shell  of  4-in.  or  6-in.  calibre  were  seen  to 
burst  on  the  water  just  short  of  "  Marlborough  "  and  other  ships 
of  the  First  Battle  Squadron,  some  leaving  a  cloud  of  Hght  green 
vapour,  and  others  a  heavy  grey  vapour  which  spread  over  the 
surface  of  the  water. 

17.  During  the  action  many  reports  of  submarines  were 
made,  some  being  undoubtedly  authentic,  and  course  was  altered 
to  attack  them  and  avoid  their  torpedoes. 

Shortly  before  "  Marlborough  "  was  torpedoed,  a  heavy 
shock  was  felt  on  board  "  Revenge  "  in  the  transmitting  room 
and  other  places,  and  two  independent  officer  witnesses  saw 
quantities  of  oil  float  to  the  surface  and  wreckage  come  up 
astern. 

18.  The  tracks  of  torpedoes  approaching  the  ship  were 
clearly  seen  from  the  top  and  reported  in  good  time  so  that  they 
were  avoided,  with  the  exception  of  the  one  which  struck  the 
ship,  and  therefore  it  is  considered  to  be  probable  that  it  came 
from  a  submarine. 

19.  It  is  estimated  that  at  least  21  torpedoes  passed  through 
the  First  Battle  Squadron,  only  one  taking  effect. 

20.  Before,  during,  and  after  the  action  the  wireless  tele- 
graphy communication  throughout  the  squadron  were  entirely 
satisfactory  and  invaluable  for  manoeuvring  and  action  signals, 
especially  in  the  case  of  the  repeating  ship  ("  Bellona  "),  who 
was  often  unable  to  distinguish  the  flag  signals.  No  damage  to 
aerials  or  instruments  was  sustained  except  in  "  Marlborough," 
whose  auxihary  aerial  was  partially  shot  away,  and  an  inter- 
mittent earth  on  the  main  aerial  feeder,  which  could  not  be  traced 
for  three  quarters  of  an  hour,  interrupted  the  reception  of  distant 
signals.  In  "  Colossus  "  the  internal  buzzer  communication 
between  Main  office  and  signal  tower  was  shot  av/aJ^ 

No  enemy  signalling  was  heard  on  auxiliary,  and  though  the}' 
continually  attempted  to  jamb  the  main  installation  signals  from 
ships  in  company  were  easily  overread. 

21.  After  the  enemy  disappeared  in  the  haze  the  First  Battle 
Squadron  conformed  to  the  movements  of  your  flag,  but  though 
"  Marlborough  "  went  the  revolutions  for  17  knots  I  estimate 
the  speed  over  the  ground  was  only  approximately  15-8  owing 
to  the  damage.  Consequently  the  6th  division  fell  some  way 
astern  during  the  night. 

22.  Four  night  attacks  were  observed  during  the  night,  the 
first  on  the  starboard  beam,  the  others  taldng  place  in 
succession  towards  the  stem.  Several  explosions  were  heard  and 
2  very  large  ones  with  flames  shooting  up  into  the  sky  were 
seen ;   star  shell  were  seen. 

E  2 


68  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

23.  About  midnight,  smoke  was  observed  ahead  of  "  Marl- 
borough," which  crossed  from  starboard  to  port  and  back  again 
from  port  to  starboard,  and  then  came  down  the  starboard  side. 

It  ai)peared  to  be  a  large  ship  and  was  challengd  by 
"  Revenge,"  who  was  answered  by  2  letters,  though  they  were 
not  the  correct  ones.     She  then  disappeared. 

24.  At  2.30  a.m.,  1st  June,  it  was  reported  to  me  that  the 
bulkhead  in  "  A  "  boiler  room  of  "  Marlborough  "  would  not 
stand  the  speed,  namely,  revolutions  for  17  knots,  and  that  it 
was  advisable  to  reduce  to  10  or  12  knots. 

In  consequence  of  this  "  Marlborough  "  was  hauled  out  of 
Une  and  the  remainder  of  the  division  continued.  I  signalled 
"  Fearless,"  who  was  observed  to  be  astern  of  "  Agincourt,"  to 
come  alongside  "  Marlborough,"  and  I  and  my  Staff  transferred 
to  "  Revenge "  in  her,  and  then  sent  her  back  to  escort 
"  Marlborough,"  who  was  subsequently  ordered  to  Rosyth  via 
"  M  "  Channel. 

25.  Shortly  after  arriving  in  "  Revenge  "  a  Zeppelin  was 
sighted,  evidently  scouting.  Fire  was  opened  on  her  which 
caused  her  to  dip  and  she  quicldy  disappeared.  She  looked  a 
remarkably  easy  target  if  shrapnel  had  been  available. 

26.  At  dayhght,  owing  to  the  very  low  visibility  and  to  the 
fact  that  the  Division  had  dropj^ed  so  far  astern  during  the 
night  (as  explained  above)  and  also  to  the  transfer  of  my  Flag 
to  "  Revenge,"  the  remainder  of  the  Fleet  was  out  of  sight. 

I  shaped  course  as  necessary  to  affect  a  junction. 

At  3.40  a.m.,  "  Faulknor  "  with  "  Obedient  "  and  "  Marvel  " 
joined  my  Flag  and  reported  the  12th  Flotilla  had  attacked  a 
Division  of  the  German  Battlefleet  during  the  night,  and  that 
one  battleship  had  been  blown  up. 

27.  At  5.15  a.m.,  "Revenge"  passed  through  the  wreckage 
of  a  German  battleship  or  battle-cruiser,  judging  from  the  size 
of  the  floating  powder  cases. 

At  6.30  a.m.,  what  appeared  to  be  the  wreckage  of  the 
"  Black  Prince  "  was  passed  through,  and  a  httle  later  2  rafts 
were  observed  with  three  men  on  them.  I  ordered  "  Obedient  " 
to  take  them  off,  but  she  reported  on  rejoining  that  before  she 
got  there  they  had  been  taken  off  by  a  Dutch  steamer,  whose 
Captain  protested  against  their  being  taken  off  his  steamer,  and 
so  the  Captain  of  "  Obedient  "  left  them.  • 

At  8.35  a.m.,  passed  "  Sparrowhawk "  abandoned  with 
"  Marksman  "  close  to.  "  Marksman  "  reported  she  was  unable 
to  tow  her.  She  had  attempted  to  do  so,  but  the  hawsers  had 
parted.  I,  therefore,  ordered  her  to  sink  her.  She  did  so  and 
then  joined  my  Flag. 

Nothing  else  of  interest  occurred  and  I  rejoined  your  Flag 
that  evening. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES. 


69 


29.  The  following  ammunition  was  fired  by  the  First  Battle 
Squadron  : — 


Main 
Armament. 

Secondary 
Armament. 

Torpedoes. 

"  Marlborough  "      - 
"  Revenge  "    - 
"  Hercules  "    - 
"  Agincourt  " 
"  Colossus  "     - 
"  Col]ing%vood  "        - 
"  Neptune  "    - 
"  St.  Vincent  " 

162 
102 
98 
144 
93 
84 
48 
98 

60 

87 

111 
16 
35 

48 

2 

1 

829 

357 

ii 

30.  I  would  Uke  to  bring  to  your  notice  the  conduct  of  the 
crew  of  the  "  Acasta,"  as  mentioned  in  the  report  from  the 
Captain  of  "  Hercules  "  ;  although  badly  damaged  and  apparently 
ill  a  hopeless  state,  they  cheered  the  "  Hercules  "  as  the  latter 
passed. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

CECIL   BURNEY, 
Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  First  Battle  Squadron. 

Grand  Fleet. 


GUNNERY   REPORT,  H.M.S.  "  Mi^RLBOROUGH." 

H.M.S.  "  Marlborough," 

4th  June  1916. 
Gunnery  Report. 
Number  of  Rounds  fired. 


Gun. 

No.  of  Rds.  fired. 

A.  P.  Lyddite. 

Common. 

13-5 

6-in. 

162 
60 

138 

Lyddite  Comm. 
55 

24 
5 

Brealidowns,  Accidents,  <fcc. 

(1)  Right  gun  of  "A"  turret  had  inner  "A"  tube  and 
jacket  cracked,  a  large  portion  of  jacket  being  broken  off.  This 
occurred  about  the  5th  round  fired  by  this  gun,  and  it  is 
considered  that  a  premature  must  have  occurred,  although  the 
damage  to  the  rifling  is  comparatively  small.  A. P.  lyddite 
was  being  fired. 


70  BATTLE   OF   JUTLAND  : 

(2)  After  the  ship  was  struck  by  a  mine  or  a  torpedo,  it  took 
up  a  Hst  of  about  7°  to  starboard.  Due  to  this  hst,  difficulty 
was  experienced  in  all  turrets  due  to  shell  shpping  forward  as 
it  rolled  out  of  main  cage  into  waiting  position  and  fouling 
driving  band  with  shell  brake.  Four  turrets  had  to  unship 
brake. 

(3)  Due  to  heavy  list,  all  firing  generators  in  turrets  flooded, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  disconnect  pipe  and  allow  water  to 
drain  away. 

1  *  *  *  *  * 

Missfires. — Nil. 

Control  and  method  of  fire. 

Controlled  from  fore  top ;  firing  by  director.  No  difficulty 
was  experienced  in  distinguishing  own  shots  or  in  spotting  overs 
or  shorts,  and  hits  could  be  easily  distinguished  by  a  deep  red 
flame  and  clouds  of  grey  and  white  smoke ;  occasionally  when 
shell  burst  well  inside  ship  no  flame  could  be  seen,  but  only  a 
large  amount  of  greyish  smoke. 

Without  the  director,  it  would  have  been  almost  impossible 
to  keep  gunlayers  on  correct  object ;  there  was  so  much  confusion 
amongst  enemy's  ships,  one  ship  was  passing  another;  smoke 
from  cruisers  on  fire  often  obliterated  the  object;  own  ship  was 
continually  altering  course  small  amounts ;  the  above  made  it 
difficult  to  keep  on  the  same  object  for  any  length  of  time. 

Description  of  firing. 

With  objects  fired  at.  All  times  are  Greenwich  mean  times. 
Only  hits  that  were  actually  seen  and  confirmed  by  two  or  more 
persons  are  given. 

Time. 

6.10  p.m.    Sighted  British  battle  cruisers  engaging  enemy's  ships. 

6.12  Red  7,  cruiser,  four  funnels,  one  mast  (disappeared 

in  smoke  and  mist  before  fire  could  be  opened). 
6.15  After    deploying    to    port.     Battleship,    two    funnels 

widely  separated,  two  masts  (probably  "  Kaiser  " 

class)    estimated   range    10,000   yards,    rangefinders 

could  not  get  a  range. 
6.17  Opened  fire.     Seven  salvoes  were  fired  in  4  minutes; 

6th  and  7th  were  clearly  seen  to  hit.     In  the  5th 

salvo  a  deep  red  flame  could  be  seen  and  salvo  struck, 

in   the   7tli   salvo   a  large  volume  of  grey  smoke 

appeared. 
6.21.  Ceased   firing,   as   enemy  was   hidden  by   cruiser  on 

fire  (Roon  class). 
6.24.  Green    98,    a   cruiser,    3    funnels    (Roon,    one   funnel 

gone)    ?  range  by  rangefinder  10,500  yards. 

^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  71 

p.m. 

6.25.  Opened  fire.     5  salvoes  were  fired.     Hits  could  not 

be  distinguished  for  certain,  as  two  or  three  ships 
were  firing  at  same  object. 

6.27.  6-in.  guns  opened  fire  at  same  object.     It  was  during 

this  firing  that  right  gun  of  "  A  "  turret  was 
severely  damaged  and  put  out  of  action,  cause  not 
known  for  certain,  but  probably  due  to  premature. 
It  was  about  the  fifth  round  fired  by  the  gun, 
A. P.  Lyddite  was  used.  Inner  ".  A  "  tube  is 
cracked  all  round  about  haM  way  along  gun.  A 
large  portion  of  jacket  is  broken  off,  and  a  crack 
extends  15  ft.  along  jacket. 

6.29.  Checked  fire.     There   was   a  pause   of   ten   minutes, 

during  wliich  the  ship  was  altering  course,  and 
enemy  were  hidden  by  smoke. 

6.39.  Object  a  battleship   of  Kaiser  class.     Range    13,000 

yards ;  one  salvo  was  fired,  and  enemy  turned 
away  and  disappeared. 

6.42  to    \Sfiip    was   altering   course,    and   enemy's   movements 

6.54.        J      were  very  difficult  to  foUow. 

6.54.  "  Marlborough  "   was   hit  by   a  torpedo   or   mine  in 

Diesel  engine  room.  The  shock  was  sufficient  to 
shake  off  switches  on  lever  power  board,  and  some 
fuses  in  telephone  circuits.  These  were  very  quickly 
replaced,  and  all  control  instruments  were  found 
to  be  in  step. 

7.0.  Passed  destroyer  "  Acasta  "  on  port  hand  flying  6  flag 

and  with  colhsion  mat  over  starboard  quarter. 
Green  90  a  cruiser  of  Roon  class,  stopped,  range  by 
rangefinder  9,800  yards. 

7.3.  Opened  fire.     Fired  four  salvoes  in  two  minutes,  the 

3rd  and  4th  both  hit  and  appeared  to  open  up  her 
side,  as  a  deep  red  flame  could  be  seen  inside  her 
huU. 

7.5.  Ceased  fire,  as  she  appeared  completely  disabled  and 

sinldng  fast. 

7.6.  Object    shifted,    a    battleship,    two    funnels    widely 

separated,  left  hand  ship  of  three  (Markgraf  class). 
Range  by  R.F.   10,750. 
7.12.  Opened  fire.     Fired   14  salvoes  in  6  mins.,  the  6th, 

12th,  13th  and  14th  were  all  distinct  hits.  In  the 
6th  salvo,  a  large  cloud  of  grey  and  white  smoke 
appeared  near  the  foremast.  In  the  12th  salvo  two 
hits  could  be  clearly  seen  under  bridge  and  rather 
low. 

7.18.  Checked  fire. 

7.19.  Enemy  hauled  out  of  fine  and  turned  away,  lost  in 

smoke ;  object  shifted,  one  ship  to  the  left  that  was 
not  fired  at. 


72  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

7.20.  Enemy  destroyer  attack  took  place  between  the  lines. 

7.22.  6-in.  guns  opened  fire.     Turrets  fired  one  salvo  into 

the  brown.  After  this,  no  more  was  seen  of  the 
enemy.  During  the  night  a  lot  of  firing  could  be 
heard  astern. 

At  about  4.0  a.m.  a  lot  of  firing  could  be  heard  to  the 
southward,  and  shortly  after  a  Zeppehn  was  sighted  crossing 
astern  and  steering  approximately  east.  Three-in.  H.  A.  gun 
open  fire  and  fired  12  rounds.  "  X  "  and  "  Y  "  turrets  opened 
fire  with  A. P.  shell,  which  was  already  in  the  guns,  and  two  rounds 
of  common  which  was  in  G.L.  cage.  Four  rounds  were  fired 
The  nose  of  the  Zeppelin  was  observed  to  dip  very  suddenly  at 
one  period,  but  it  could  not  be  ascertained  for  certain  whether 
she  was  hit.     Range  varied  between  5,000  and  10,000  yards. 

If  ship  had  not  been  disabled,  rendering  it  undesirable  to 
"  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets,  it  would  have  been  worth  while  turning 
so  as  to  get  full  broadside  bearing. 

CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,    H.M.S.    "HERCULES." 

No.   197. 

H.M.S.  "Hercules," 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  the  following  circumstances 
with  regard  to  the  action  on  Wednesday,  31st  May  1916. 

2.  The  Ship's  company,  having  fallen  out  from  Action 
Stations  to  get  tea,  closed  up  again  on  hearing  gun-firing  on  the 
starboard  bow — 5.50  p.m. 

3.  The  Battle  Fleet,  less  5th  Battle  Squadron,  were  then  in 
divisions  ahead  disposed  abeam  to  starboard,  10  cables.  Course — 
S.E.  by  S. ;    Speed— 19  knots. 

4.  At  5.55  p.m.,  our  Battle  Cruisers  were  sighted  on  starboard 
bow,  through  the  mist,  in  action.  P»,ange  of  "Tiger" — 11,000 
j^'ards.  Enemy's  shots  were  falling  occasionally  between  our 
Battle  Cruisers  and  our  Battle  Fleet  and  shortly  afterwards 
appeared  to  hit  "  Tiger." 

At  6.0  p.m.,  our  Battle  Cruisers  began  to  draw  across  our 
bows  from  starboard  to  port,  the  "  Lion  "  being  slightly  on  fire 
on  her  forecastle,  port  side. 

6.5  p.m. — Turned  in  succession  to  South  by  "  9  "  pendant. 

6.13  p.m.— Formed  fine  of  Battle  S.E.  by  E. 

6.15  p.m. — As  "  Hercules  "  started  to  deploy  a  salvo,  with  a 
small  spread,  of  some  five  shots  straddled  our  forecastle  and 
deluged  the  Fore  Bridge,  Conning  Tower  and  Fore  Top — a  mass 
of  heavy  water  falling  on  board. 

From  a  fragment  of  shell  picked  up  on  the  forecastle  the 
projectile  would  appear  to  be  an  A. P.,  nearly  15-in. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  73 

After  this  deluge  I  wondered  where  this  salvo  had  come  from 
as  only  the  flashes  of  some  four  or  five  of  the  enemy's  ships 
beyond  our  Battle  Cruisers  could  be  seen  from  the  Bridge.  I  then 
noticed  that  the  rear  of  our  Battle  line  must  have  afforded  a  fine 
silhouette  for  the  enemy,  as  some  of  our  ships  on  the  reverse 
side  of  us  were  clearly  visible  against  the  bright  sunlit  sky. 
I  remarked  to  Captain  Schoultz  ^  at  the  time — "  What  a  fine  target 
our  ship  must  be  for  the  enemy  as  we  can  see  nothing  of  him." 

G.20  p.m. — "  Hercules  "  fired  her  first  salvo  at  an  enemy  ship 
— four  funnels — ^apparently  of  "  Roon  "  class.  She  was  noticed 
to  be  already  disabled  and  stopped. 

About  this  time  the  "  Barham  "  and  her  ships  were  edging 
across  and  forming  astern  of  "  Agincourt,"  firing  continuously. 

At  about  0.30  p.m.,  three  of  enemy's  Battleships  of  "  Kaiser  " 
class  were  seen  indistinctly  through  the  mist,  and  seven  or  eight 
salvoes  were  fired  at  that  ship  which  appeared  most  visible. 
Fire  was  continually  checked  owing  to  the  haze. 

About  this  time,  one  of  our  four-funnelled  cruisers  to  the 
Southward  was  being  heavily  hit.  The  after  magazine  exploded, 
the  flame  reaching  above  her  mast ;  then,  after  a  short  interval, 
her  foremost  magazine  blew  up,  and  no  more  was  seen  of  her. 

6.40  p.m.— Ship  of  "  Warrior  "  class,  bearing  S.E.,  3-4,000 
yards,  was  observed  attempting  to  escape  from  the  enemy's  fire, 
a  great  many  shots  falUng  all  around  her.  She  was  steaming  at 
full  speed  and  zigzagging  all  the  time. 

6.45  p.m. — Deployment  finished  as  far  as  "  Hercules  "  was 
concerned.     Course,  S.E.  by  divisions. 

6.47  p.m. — One  of  enemy's  ships  ("  Roon  "  ?)  on  our  starboard 
side  badly  on  fire.     {Vide  6.20  p.m.) 

6.-55  p.m. — "  Marlborough  "  struck  by  a  mine  or  torpedo  on 
starboard  side.  She  hsted  quickly  to  starboard  but  continued 
firing.  From  this  time  a  speed  of  16  knots  was  never  exceeded 
by  our  6th  Division. 

6.56  p.m. — "  Acasta,"  with  "  6  "  flag  flying  and  "  not  under 
control  "  signal  up,  was  passed;  she  cheered  "  Hercules  "  while 
drifting  past. 

7.  5  p.m. — Altered  course  together  3  points  to  starboard, 
7.  9  p.m. — Altered  course  back  3  points  to  port. 

7.10  p.m. — Several  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  to  left  of  the 
*'  Kaiser  "  class  ships  were  now  clearly  visible.  The  lefthand 
Battle  Cruiser  observed  was  a  "  Derfflinger  "  or  a  "  Liitzow  " ; 
the  second  was  "  SeydHtz  "  or  "  Moltke  "  ;  the  third  appeared 
to  be  also  a  Battle  Cruiser,  but  was  obscured  by  smoke.  Approx- 
imate course  of  these  ships — S.E. 

7.12  p.m. — Turned  together  to  South  and  opened  fire  at 
second  Battle  Cruiser  from  the  left ;  hits  were  made  with  Lyddite 
Common  at  the  fifth  and  sixth  salvoes.    Range  about  9,000  yards. 

^  Russian  Navy. 


74  BATTLE    OF    JUTLA.ND  : 

First  hit — abaft  the  foremost  funnel ;  second  hit — abreast  main- 
mast. The  enemy  did  not  reply  to  our  fire  until  after  the  third 
salvo  and  then  appeared  to  be  firing  "  individual."  They  usually 
fired  about  five  seconds  after  "  Hercules." 

Lieutenant  Commander  (T)  observed  the  leading  ship  also  hit 
during  this  time  and  that  two  or  three  of  the  enemy's  shots  fell 
100  yards  short  between  "  Hercules  "  and  '"  Agincourt,"  and  one 
near  "  Revenge's  "  starboard  quarter.    This  one  burst. 

The  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  then  disappeared  from  view. 

7,20  p.m. — Passed  on  port  side  at  a  distance  of  about  two 
miles  a  ship  with  a  broken  back  and  bow  and  stern  portions  out 
of  water  to  a  height  of  about  50  ft.  Undoubtedly  a  man-of-war, 
painted  red  bottom  colour  and  grey  topsides.  Men  were  observed 
on  the  after  portion  of  the  wreck  and  one  of  our  three-funneUed 
light  cruisers  passed  within  100  yards  of  her. 

7.24  p.m. — Turned  away  2  points — S.S.E. — by  Sub -divisions. 

7.31  p.m. — Observed  much  smoke  made  by  enemy.  Received 
signal  "  Enemy  torpedo  craft  are  approaching."  A  few  salvoes 
with  12-in.  guns  were  fired  at  attacking  destroyers,  which  fell 
among  them — Range,  6,000  yards ;  they  then  withdrew. 
"  Agincourt  "  certainly  made  one  direct  hit. 

7.35  p.m. — Altered  course  by  Sub-divisions  to  S.  by  W. 

Shortly  after  this  turn  two  tracks  of  torpedoes  were  observed 
from  the  Fore  Top  approaching  from  starboard.  Turned 
"  Hercules  "  6  points  away  and  two  torpedoes  passed  ship — one 
along  starboard  side  and  40  yards  across  bow ;  the  other  under 
the  stern,  very  close. 

7.40  p.m. — Squadron  formed  line  ahead  by  signal.  Course, 
S.W. 

During  the  next  half  hour  ships  in  "  Marlborough's  "  division 
signalled  sighting  submarines  and  ships  altered  course  as  neces- 
sary. "  Hercules  "  saw  none,  but  conformed  to  movements  of 
the  other  ships. 

By  about  8.30  p.m.,  "  Marlborough's  "  division  had  dropped 
considerably  astern  of  the  5th  Division. 

9.5  p.m. — Squadron  now  proceeded  to  Southward  at  17  knots 
— 6th  Division,  15|  knots — for  the  night.  Weather  misty; 
visibihty,  2  to  5  miles. 

From  10.15  p.m.  to  12.30  a.m.,  1st  June,  five  separate  engage- 
ments appear  to  have  occurred.  Each  lasted  about  5-10  minutes. 
On  the  first  occasion  searchlights  were  observed  and  attack  bore 
N.W.  by  W.  The  attacks  gradually  worked  round  the  stern  to 
N.  by  E.,  and  in  the  third  a  star  shell  was  fired.  During  the  third 
or  fourth,  a  big  explosion  took  place  in  the  middle  of  the  gun 
flashes.  Very  apjjroximate  position  of  explosion  Lat.  56°  13'  N., 
Long.  6°  5'  E. 

2.20  a.m. — "  Marlborough  "  hauled  out  of  the  Hne,  and  fell 
astern. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  75 

2.55  a.m. — Altered  course  to  North. 

3.  8.  a.m. — 12  knots.     Flag  transferred  to  "  Revenge." 

3.30  a.m. — 17  knots  astern  of  "  Revenge." 

3.37  a.m. — Altered  course  to  205°. 

3.45  a.m. — Heard  firing  ahead. 

3.50  a.m. — Zeppehn  on  starboard  bow.  Fired  4-in.  and  3-pdr, 
without  effect.  Course,  345°.  Zeppelin  disappeared  2  points 
abaft  starboard  beam. 

3.53  a.m.— Course  205°,  19  knots. 

4.45  a.m. — Passed  floating  mine. 

4.57  a.m. — Passed  one  of  the  5th  Battle  Squadron,  and  one 
Cruiser,  Green  105°,  Course  347°. 

5.20  a.m. — Passed  wreckage;  drums,  Hfe-buoys,  &c,,  to  port 
(German?).    Lat.  55°  52'  N.,  Long.  6°  5'  E. 

6.30  a.m. — Passed  wreckage,  including  two  6-in.  ammunition 
cases  (British).    Lat.  56°  15'  N.,  Long.  5°  561'  e. 

6.40  a.m. — Altered  course  to  S.S.E. 

7.34  a.m. — Altered  course  to  N.N.W. 

7.44  a.m. — Sighted  destroyer,  bearing  S.E.  by  S.,  and  two 
four -funnelled  cruisers. 

7.45  a.m. — 21  knots. 

8.35  a.m.— Passed  large  triangular  object,  apparently  portion 
of  ship,  on  port  side,  5-6,000  yards  distant,  also  a  capsized  boat 
near  by,  and  other  wreckage  together  with  oil.  Lat.  56°  11'  N.. 
Long.  6°  3'  E.,  22  fathoms  (possibly  same  place  as  explosion 
occurred  during  third  or  fourth  night  attack). 

8.42  a.m. — Sighted  a  flotilla  leader  N.  by  E.,  and  challenged. 

8.44  a.m. — Sighted  destroyer  in  crippled  condition  ("  Sparrow- 
hawk  ").  ♦ 

9.7  a.m. — Altered  course  to  N.W.  to  clear  "  Texel." 

9.9.  a.m. — Passed  four  Dutch  Merchant  vessels  round  two 
men  clinging  to  wreckage.  S.S.  "  Texel,"  "  Thames  Tug," 
"  Kangean  "'  and  "  Zuiderdilk."  "  Texel  "  signalled  "  All's  well." 
I. at.  56°  21'  N.,  Long.  5°  50'  E. 

5.  Ammunition  expended  : — 

12  Common  Filled  Powder. 
4  A.P.  Filled  Lyddite. 
82  Common  Filled  Lyddite. 

6.  Torpedoes  were  not  fired  as  no  opportunities  occurred. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

L.  CLINTON  BAKER, 

Captain . 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding 

First  Battle  Squadron. 


76  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

Enclosure  No.  4  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 
C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

From — The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle 
Squadron. 

To — The  Commander-in-Chief,  Grand  Fleet. 

Date—\\t\\  June  1916. 

No.  021. 
In  compliance  with  your  signal    1132  of  to-day's  date, 
I  have  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  reports  from  the  Rear- 
Admiral,   1st  Battle  Squadron,  and  the  following  Ships  on  the 
action  of  31st  May  : — 

"  Colossus." 
"  Revenge." 
"  BeUona." 
"  Neptune." 
"  Agincourt." 
"  St.  Vincent." 
"  Collingwood." 
"Royal  Oak." 
"  Active." 

CECIL  BURNEY, 

Vice-Admiral. 


REAR-ADMIRAL'S  REPORT,  FIRST  BATTLE  SQUADRON. 

From — The  Rear  Admiral,  First  Battle  Squadron. 

To — The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding  the  First  Battle  Squadron. 

No.—'W.  16. 

Da^e— 10th  June  1916. 

The  accompanying  report  of  Flag  Captain  A.  D.  Pound. 
Royal  Navy,  records  the  action  of  my  Flagship. 

Her  movements  were  followed  by  the  Fifth  Division  excejot 
for  occasional  turns  away  to  avoid  torpedoes. 

The  Ships  of  the  Fifth  Division  were  weU  handled  and  signals, 
which  there  was  no  difficulty  in  transmitting  by  either  visual  or 
wireless,  were  promptly  obeyed. 

That  the  "  Colossus  "  received  a  larger  proportion  of  the 
enemy's  fire  than  the  remainder  of  the  Division  appears  to  be 
due  to  the  enemy  emerging  from  the  mist  opposite  to  her  and 
possibly  to  her  being  recognised  as  a  Flagship. 

2.  The  diary  section  of  the  attached  report  is  compiled  from 
the  notes  of  times  and  occurrences  suiDphed  by  my  Secretary, 
Mr.  Harold  Foot,  who  was  stationed  on  the  Fore  Bridge  with 
a  watch  and  note  book.  As  he  is  an  observant  Officer  unhkely 
to  be  disturbed  by  any  occurrence  they  may  be  taken  as  being 
correct. 

3.  Whatever  circumstances  ma}^  have  constrained  the  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet  to  fall  back  upon  the  Battle  Fleet  in  the  manner  it 


OFFICL\L,    DESPATCHES.  <  i 

did,  the  result  was  unfortunate.  The  Fifth  Division  was  unable 
to  open  fire  upon  the  enemy  owing  to  the  Battle  Cruisers  being 
in  between,  and  when  they  cleared  from  the  Battleships  it  made 
it  extremely  difficult  to  ascertain  whether  Ships  coming  into 
view  through  the  mist  were  friend  or  foe. 

4.  The  Division's  firing  was  well  carried  out.  There  was 
probably  wastage  of  ammunition  o^ving  to  many  Ships  firing  at 
the  one  nearest  object,  but  there  was  no  time  to  correct  this  by 
signal,  and  if  ships  commenced  leaving  her  to  other  ones  she 
might  have  been  left  unfired  at  by  any.  -, 

5.  The  visibiUty  was  extremely  baffling,  partly  due  to  mist3^ 
clouds  appearing  and  dissolving  and  partly  to  the  layers  of 
smoke  from  funnels  and  Ships  firing. 

E.  F.  A.  GAUNT, 

Rear  Admiral. 


CAPTAINS    REPORT,  H.M.S.    "COLOSSUS." 

No.  658. 

H.M.S.  "Colossus," 

1st  Battle  Squadron, 
Sm,  10th  June  1916. 

The  report  of  the  action  of  31st  ]\Iay.  as  far  as  it  affected 
H.M.  Ship  under  my  command,  has  been  divided  up  as  follows  : — 

(a)  Diary  of  events. 

(6)  Tracing,    showing    rough    relative    positions    of    targets 
engaged.^ 

(c)  Appendix  I,  giving  details  of  action  with  a  Battle  Cruiser 

(either  "  Liitzow  '"  or  "  Derfflinger  "). 

(d)  Appendix  II,  giving  details  of  damage  to  propeUors  through 

passing  over  wreckage  or  a  submarine. 

(e)  Copy  of  report  of  Officers  and  ]\Ien  commended.* 
(/  )  List  of  Casualties. 2 

Generally  speaking,  the  action  from  the  point  of  view  of  this 
ship  was  a  most  tantalising  one,  as  the  presence  of  the  enemy  was 
obvious  from  the  flashes  of  his  guns,  but  only  for  a  short  period 
did  an  opportunity  occur  of  getting  into  action  with  any  C'f  the 
enemy's  capital  ships. 

The  conduct  of  the  Officers  and  Men  was  excellent,  and  such 
as  one  had  always  hoped  it  would  be. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  D.  POL'ND, 
.  The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

1st  Battle  Squadron 

(through  R.A.  1st  B.S.). 

^  Plate  4.  -  Not  printed. 


78  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

CHRONOLOGICAL   ORDER   OF   EVENTS,   31st  MAY- 
IST  JUNE    1916,   AS   OBSERVED   FROM   "COLOSSUS." 

5.40  p.m. — Conditions  :  VisibiKty,  6  miles,  overcast. 

Sea,  calm. 
Wind,  S.W.,  Hght. 
Heavy  firing  heard  4  points  on  Starboard  Bow. 
5.48  p.m. — Passed  Norwegian  Barque  on  Starboard  Hand. 
5.50  p.m. — 1    Cruiser   and    4    Light    Cruisers    closing    in   from 
Starboard  Bow. 

5.50  p.m. — Our  Battle  Cruisers  in  sight  Starboard  Bow,  firing. 

5.51  p.m. — Enemj'^    Battleships     ("  Helgoland  "     and    others) 

reported,  in  sight  on  Starboard  Bow.     They  only 

showed  up  for  about  half  a  minute. 
5.54  p.m. — Light  Cruiser  on  Port  Bow  of  Battle  Cruisers,  firing. 
5.57  p.m. — Reported    that    Enemy    Battle    Fleet    had    altered 

course  to  North. 
5.59  p.m.— Speed  of  Battle  Fleet,  18  knots. 
6.   1  p.m. — Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  1  point  on  our  Starboard  Bow 

firing  intermittently. 
6.  2  p.m. — Enemy  Battle  Fleet  is  sight  indistinctly. 
6.  4  p.m. — First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  right  ahead — 2  miles 

— firing.     Destroyers  take  up  screening  positions. 
6.  5  p.m. — First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  altered  course  4  points 

to  Starboard. 
6.  6  p.m. — "  Lion  " — steam    coming  from    abreast   fore  turret, 

port  side. 
6.  7  p.m. — Sun  coming  out.     Visibility  ahead  and  on  Starboard 

Bow  bad  owing  to  smoke  and  mist. 
6.  8  p.m. — Enemy  in  sight  to  S.S.E.      (Flashes  of  guns  only 

visible.) 
6.  9  p.m. — First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  altering.     Resultant 

course  1  point  to  Starboard  of  ours. 

6.10  p.m. — Fifth  Battle  Squadron  on  Starboard  Beam.     "  Bar- 

ham  "  opened  fire.     First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron 
altering  to  Port. 

6.11  p.m. — Enemy's  salvoes  falling  round  First  Battle  Cruiser 

Squadron. 

6.12  p.m. — Battle  Fleet  deployed  by  equal  speed  pendant  to 

S.E.  by  E. 

6.13  p.m. — Large  projectile  ricochetted  over. 

6.15  p.m. — 5th  Battle  Squadron  astern  and  under  fire.  1st 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  on  Starboard  Bow. 

6.16p.m. — One  Cruiser  ("Defence"  class)  starboard  quarter, 
on  fire  and  partially  blown  up.  Fire  right  fore 
and  aft,  result  of  hit  by  salvo. 

6.18  p.m.— Salvo  200  short  and  left  of  "  Colossus." 

6.19  p.m. — A  second  Cruiser  of  "  Defence  "  class  hit  and  blown 

up — major  part  of  explosion  aft.     "  Marlborough  " 
opened  fire. 


Plate  4. 


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OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  7!) 

6.20  p.m. — 5th  Battle  Squadron  Starboard  Quarter. 

6.21  p.m. — Heavy  Shell  just  over. 

6.22  p.m. — Enemy   vessel   (4   funnels)   on  fire   and   apparently 

disabled  on  Starboard  Beam,  12,000. 
Enemy  Battle  Line  apparently  Starboard  Quarter. 

0.25  p.m. — 1  ship  ahead  and  3  astern  firing. 

6.30  p.m. — "  Colossus  "  fired  3  deliberate  salvoes  at  enemy 
Battle  Fleet,  which  was  difficult  to  see. 

6.32  p.m. — Shifted  fire  on  to  enemj'-  4-funnelled  cruiser  Star- 
board Beam  opposite  course  ( ?  stopped). 
4  salvoes  fired  at  minute  interval, 
one  of  our  Destroyers  (G.  09)  on  fire  on  Starboard 
Bow. 

6.37  p.m. — Nothing  clearly  in  sight. 

Intermittent  firing  from  Battle  Fleet  at  one  enemy 
vessel,  apparently  broken  down,  10,000  yards 
(4  funnels). 

6.45  p.m. — Firing  practically  ceased.  Altered  course  to  S.E., 
15  knots.     Nothing  clearly  in  sight. 

6.48  p.m. — Passed  "  Acasta  "  on  Starboard  Hand,  disabled 

6.50  p.m. — Course  S. 

6.53  p.m. — "  Revenge  "  hauling  out  of  hne  to  port. 

7.  0  p.m. — Opened  fire  on  enemy  3-funnelled  cruiser  {ex  "Greek'*) 
steaming  opposite  course  on  Starboard  Beam, 
9,700.  Other  ships  of  Battle  Fleet  also  firing. 
Fired  3  salvoes. 

7.  2  p.m. — Passed  wreck  of  "  Invincible  "  port  hand.  Broken 
in  two  pieces.  "  Oak  "  standing  by.  Two  sur- 
vivors in  sight  near  propellers. 

7.  3  p.m. — "  Beubow  "  firing  6-in.  on  enemy  Destroyer  Star- 
board Bow. 
3  points  to  Starboard  together. 

7.  5  p.m. — Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  opened  fire  Starboard  Bow. 
Ships  not  actually  in  sight. 
Ojiened  fire  12-in.  and  4-in.  on  enemj?^  Destroyer 
coming  down  on  Starboard  Bow,  4,000  yards. 
Hit  Destroyer,  which  disappeared  apparently  sunk. 
"  A "  turret  also  fired  on  several  Destroyers 
further  off. 

7.10  p.m. — Altered  course  3  points  to  Port  together. 

7.12  p.m. — Suddenly  observed  "  Derfflinger  "  class  ship  emerge 
from   mist  10,000  yards   Starboard  Beam   accom- 
panied by  two  (possibly  more)  Battle  Cruisers. 
Attention  of  ships  generally  concentrated  on  enemy 

Destroyer. 
Immediately  shifted  to  leading  Battle  Cruiser  and 
opened     fire    at    9,000    yards    range,    closing    at 
7.16  p.m.  to  8,400. 

7.16  p.m. — "  Colossus  "  hit  in  superstructure  just  abaft  funnel 
(foremost)    by    12-in.    shell   which   exploded   and 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  71) 

6.20  p.m. — 5th  Battle  Squadron  Starboard  Quarter. 

6.21  p.m. — Heavy  Shell  just  over. 

6.22  p.m. — Enemy   vessel   (4   funnels)   on  fire   and   apparently 

disabled  on  Starboard  Beam,  12,000. 
Enemy  Battle  Line  apparently  Starboard  Quarter. 

0.25  p.m. — 1  ship  ahead  and  3  astern  firing. 

6.30  p.m. — "  Colossus  "'  fired  3  deliberate  salvoes  at  enemy 
Battle  Fleet,  which  was  difficult  to  see. 

6.32  p.m. — Shifted  fire  on  to  eneni}'^  4-funnelled  cruiser  Star- 
board Beam  opposite  course  ( ?  stopped). 
4  salvoes  fired  at  minute  interval, 
one  of  our  Destroyers  (G.  09)  on  fire  on  Starboard 
Bow. 

6.37  p.m. — Nothing  clearly  in  sight. 

Intermittent  firing  from  Battle  Fleet  at  one  enemy 
vessel,  apparently  broken  down,  10,000  yards 
(4  funnels). 

6.45  p.m. — Firing  practically  ceased.  Altered  course  to  S.E., 
15  knots.     Nothing  clearly  in  sight. 

6.48  p.m. — Passed  "  Acasta  "  on  Starboard  Hand,  disabled 

6.50  p.m. — Course  S. 

6.53  p.m. — "  Revenge  "  hauling  out  of  hne  to  port. 

7.  0  p.m. — Opened  fire  on  enemy  3-funnelled  cruiser  (ex  "Greek") 
steaming  opposite  course  on  Starboard  Beam, 
9,700.  Other  ships  of  Battle  Fleet  also  firing. 
Fired  3  salvoes. 

7.  2  p.m. — Passed  wreck  of  "  Invincible  "  port  hand.  Broken 
in  two  pieces.  "  Oak  "  standing  by.  Two  sur- 
vivors in  sight  near  propellers. 

7.  3  p.m. — "  Beubow  "  firing  6-in.  on  enemy  Destroyer  Star- 
board Bow. 
3  points  to  Starboard  together. 

7.  5  p.m. — Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  opened  fire  Starboard  Bow. 
Ships  not  actually  in  sight. 
Opened  fire  12-in.  and  4-in.  on  enemy  Destroyer 
coming  down  on  Starboard  Bow,  4,000  yards. 
Hit  Destroyer,  which  disappeared  apparently  sunk. 
"  A  "  turret  also  fired  on  several  Destroyers 
further  off. 

7.10  p.m. — Altered  course  3  points  to  Port  together. 

7.12  p.m. — Suddenly  observed  "  Derffiinger  "  class  ship  emerge 
from   mist  10,000  yards  Starboard  Beam  accom- 
panied bj'  two  (possibly  more)  Battle  Cruisers. 
Attention  of  ships  generally  concentrated  on  enemy 

Destroyer. 
Immediately  shifted  to  leading  Battle  Cruiser  and 
opened     fire    at    9,000    yards    range,    closing    at 
7.16  p.m.  to  8,400. 

7.16  p.m. — "  Colossus  "  hit  in  superstructure  just  abaft  funnel 
(foremost)    by    12-in.    shell   which   exploded   and 


80  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

caused  fire  in  port  gun  decks  and  signal  deck. 
Cordite  chief  cause  of  fire,  extinguished  in  a  few 
minutes.  Another  12-in.  shell  hit  sounding  plat- 
form on  Port  Signal  Deck,  but  apparently  passed 
overboard  without  bursting. 
7.17p.m. — Heavy  shell  burst  30  yards  short  abreast  "A" 
turret.  SpHnters  penetrated  foremost  funnel  and 
unarmoured  parts  of  ship  in  about  20  places  and 
wrecked  S.  1  Searchlight,  burst  fire  main  in 
Captain's  Cabin  Flat  and  caused  unimportant 
damage.  Rangetaker  fore  Upper  Bridge  severely 
wounded,  one  Marine  look-out  same  position 
shghtly  wounded.  Leading  Signalman  in  Fore 
Top  severely  wounded. 

(For  details  of  this  action,  see  Apf)endix  I.) 

7.18  p.m. — Hit  in  Fore  part  of  ship  by  splinters  from  heavy  shell, 
which  burst  short. 

7.15  p.m.~]  Fired  5  salvoes  at  "  Derfflinger  "  (or  "  Liitzow  ")  on 
to       y     beam,    steering    same    course,    8,000-9,000    yards 

7.20  p.m.  J  range.  Observed  at  least  4  direct  hits  (4th  and 
5th  salvoes)  (2  hits  on  water  line).  Enemy  vessel 
obscured  by  heavy  smoke  and  mist,  but  just 
previously  observed  to  have  fisted. 

7.25  p.m.— Firing  ceased. 

7.35  p.m. — "  Colossus  "  turned  to  port  to  avoid  torpedo  coming 
from  Starboard,  hoisted  Black  Pendant, 

7.40  p.m. — Speed,  20  knots. 

7.42  p.m. — Battle  Fleet  Line  ahead,  course  S.W.,  formed  on 
"  Iron  Duke." 

8.  0  p.m. — Divisions  line  ahead  disposed  quarterly  to  Starboard. 

Course,  W. ;  speed,  14. 
8.15  p.m. — Firing  taking  place  right  ahead.     Altered  course  to 
W.S.W. 

8.23  p.m. — Passed  a  lot  of  dead  fish. 

8.24  p.m. — Altered  course  to  S.W.   by   9  pdt.     3  ships  of  5th 

Battle  Squadron   in  company  5   miles  Starboard 
Quarter. 

8.32  p.m. — Altered  course  to  W.  by  9  pdt. 

8.55  p.m. — Our  Light  Cruisers  in  action  on  Starboard  Beam 
presumably  engaging  enemy  Destroyers.  "  Ben- 
bow  "  also  opened  fire  (6-in.). 

8.58  p.m. — Altered  course  to  S. 

Light  cruisers  still  firing. 

9.  5  p.m. — Light  now  bad.     Range  for  the  night,  3,000. 

Firing  heard  and  seen  Starboard  Bow\ 
9.20  p.m. — Observed  large  star  signal. 
9.48  p.m. — Commander-in-Chief's   reference   position,    36.26   N. 

5.57  E.,  course  S.,  17  knots. 
10.35  p.m. — Firing  Starboard  Quarter  lasting  about  10  minutes. 
One  of  our  Destroyers  apparently  on  fire. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  81 

10.10  p.m. — Firing  on  Starboard  Beam  lasting  4  minutes. 
11.30  p.m. — Passed  over  wreckage  or  submarine. 

(For  damage  to  propellers,  see  Appendix  II.) 

11.40  p.m. — Rapid  and  continuous  firing  for    15  minutes  right 
astern. 

\st  June  1916. 

2.15  a.m. — General  Quarters. 

"  Marlborough's  "  Division  \  i  ,     . 

"  King  George's  "  Division  J  '    ' 

Conditions :     Visibility,    2    miles,    misty,    overcast ; 
sea  calm  ;  wind  light,  S.W. 
2.28  a.m. — "  I^ng  George's  "  Division  in  sight  Starboard  Beam. 
2.30  a.m.— Course,  N.     1  pdt.  A.     BD  5. 
2.48  a.m. — "  King  George  "  take  guide  of  Fleet. 

3  ships  of  5th  Battle  Squadron  in  company. 

3.17  a.m. — 2  heavy  salvoes  heard  just  abaft  Port  Beam. 
3.30  a.m. — More  heavy  firing  port  quarter. 

3.38  a.m. — Altering  course  by  Divisions  to  W. 

3.40  a.m. — Speed,  15  knots. 

3.43  a.m. — ZeppeUn   sighted   Port   Quarter  steering  N.,   range^ 

16,000  yards. 
3.47  a.m. — Speed,  17  knots. 
3.50  a.m. — Line  ahead,  course  N. 
3.55  a.m. — Two  or  three  shots  (12-in.)  from  Fleet  at  Zeppelin. 

Zeppelin  rising  turned  away. 
4.  0  a.m. — "  King  George  "  take  guide  of  Fleet. 

4.  8  a.m. — Formed  Divisions  in  hne  ahead  disposed  to  Star- 

board. 
4.30  a.m. — Visibihty,  2\  miles. 

4.40  a.m. — "  Lvitzow  "  reported  (by  signal)  ahead  damaged. 
4.50  a.m. — Commander-in-Chief  guide  of  Fleet. 

5.  8  a.m. — 3    ships    of    5th    Battle    Squadron    taking    station 

Starboard  Beam,  11  cables. 
5.15  a.m. — 5  Armoured  Cruisers  Starboard  Bow. 
5.30  a.m. — 2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  coming  up  astern. 

6.  7  a.m. — Course,  S.E. 

7.15  a.m. — Course,  N.     Visibility,  4  miles. 

8.18  a.m. — Passed  a  lot  of  wreckage  with  large  Carley  raft  and 

lifebuoy  with  "  EN."  on  it. 
8.40  a.m. — Course,  S.S.W.     Speed,  17  knots. 
9.30  a.m. — Submarine  reported  by  "  Barham." 
9.43  a.m. — Sighted  "  Lion  "  and  Battle  Cruisers  Port  Quarter. 
9.40  a.m. — ^Destroyers  taking  up  screening  positions. 
9.50  a.m. — Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  forming  on  Port  Wing. 
9.57  a.m. — Course,  N.  by  W. 
10.30  a.m.— BJ  1. 


X     12872 


82  BATTLE    OK    JUTLAND  : 


APPENDIX    I. 


Action  with  Battle  Cruiser  (either  "  Lutzow  "  ok  "  Derffmnger  "). 

At  7.15  p.m.,  "  Colossus  "  was  engaged  (with  both  Main  and  Secondary 
Armainont)  in  driving  off  a  destroyer  attack  on  the  Starboard  Bow,  when 
an  enemy  l)attle  cruiser  appeared  on  the  Starboard  Beam,  at  a  range  of 
between  10,000  and  9,000  yards. 

This  enemy's  ship  was  immediately  engaged. 

It  was  not  possible  to  obtain  any  range  before  opening  fire. 

Five  salvoes  in  all  were  fired — 2  short,  1  over,  and  2  straddled.  Out 
of  the  last  two  salvoes,  four  direct  hits  were  obtained  with  armour- 
|)iercing  lyddite.  Two  of  these  hits  were  on  the  water-line,  whilst  the 
other  two  were  on  the  fore  part,  where  they  caused  a  fire. 

After  the  first  salv'o,  which  straddled,  the  enemy  turned  away,  and 
was  observed  with  a  considerable  list  in  the  smoke  screen  formed  by  their 
destroyed. 

The  leading  enemy  battle  cruiser  (either  "  Liitzow  "  or  "  Dei-fflinger  ") 
did  not  engage  "  Colossus." 

The  second  ship  in  the  enemy's  line  engaged  "  Colossus,"  and  four 
salvoes  dropped  close  to  the  ship ;  two  direct  hits  only  were  received,  but 
a  certain  amount  of  damage  was  received  from  shell  bursting  short.  Of 
the  shell  which  hit  short,  some  burst  on  impact  with  the  water,  whilst 
others  jicochetted  over  the  ship  without  bursting. 

Of  the  direct  hits,  one  entered  the  foremost  superstructure  on  the 
starboard  side,  and  bui"st  on  the  port  side  of  the  lower  gim  deck,  at  a 
distance  of  about  24  ft.  from  the  point  at  which  it  entered.  Two  Starboard 
4-in.  guns  were  manned  at  the  time. 

This  shell  was  a  12-in.  H.E.  Shell,  detonation  ajipears  to  have  been 
complete,  but  its  action  was  very  local.   (See  photographs  marked  "  A."*) 

The  whole  of  No.  5  gun's  crew  were  knocked  down  by  the  blast,  and 
two  men  were  wounded  by  splinters  from  the  superstructure. 

2  *  *  *  *  * 

No.  5  4-in.  port  gun  was  temporarily  put  out  of  action,  two  pieces  o^ 
the  di'iving  band  of  the  12-in.  shell  having  caused  the  sight  to  jamb. 
The  cam  of  the  sight  was  untouched.  A  hole  was  made  in  the  oil  bath 
casing  covering  the  training  rack,  and  small  pieces  of  metal  falling  in 
rendered  the  training  stiff. 

A  splinter  entered  the  left  slit  in  the  O.L.O.  hood  of  "  P  "  turret,  and 
fractui-ed  tlie  left  front  window  of  the  rangefinder.  Apparently  the  prisms 
are  uninjured,  and  a  test,  using  the  "  internal  adjustment,"  showed  the 
rangefinder  to  be  in  good  adjustment.  Dainp,  howe^'er,  entered  from  the 
broken  window. 

The  down-take  to  "  A  "  Boiler  room  was  just  imder  where  the  shell 
burst,  and  the  fumes  were  sucked  down  by  the  fans,  which  caused 
inconvenience  until  the  fans  were  stopped. 

These  gases  were  not  poisonous. 

The  blast  which  jjenetrated  to  the  stokehold  through  the  downtake, 
temporai-ily  put  the  fire  engine  out  of  action. 

The  second  direct  hit  was  on  the  sounding  machine  ]ilatform,  on  the 
port  signal  deck,  but  the  shell  did  not  burst  in  the  ship,  ('^ee  photograph 
marked   "  B."i) 

The  shells  which  burst  short  caused  damage  as  follows  : — 

About  20  holes  in  the  side  plating  in  the  fore  part  of  the  shi]). 
Small  hole  in  funnel. 

^  Not  reproduced.  -  See  note  on  p.  381. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  83 

Severed  fire-inain  in  Captains  Cabin  Flat. 
Besides  other  minor  damage. 
As  a  rule,  the  flying  splinters  could  be  seen  and  avoided  in  the  fore-top, 
but,  as  a  rule,  the  personnel  will  he  too  occupied  to  notice  them. 

A  shell,  bursting  short,  wounded  two  men  in  the  top,  and  a  further 
splinter  made  a  hole  about  3  in.  in  diameter  in  the  su[)port  for  the  roof. 
The  1-in.  side  plates  were  hardly  dented  when  struck  by  splinters. 

A.  D.  POUND, 

Captain. 


APPENDIX    11. 


Striking  of  Wreckage  or  Submarine. 

At  11.30  p.m.,  on  31st  May,  the  ship  unmistakably  passed  over 
something.  The  noise  as  of  something  scraping  along  the  bottom  was 
heard  and  felt  by  Officers  in  the  Fore  Transmitting  Station,  Ward  Room, 
and  Engine  Room.  On  examination  of  the  ship's  bottom  and  pro2)ellers 
by  divers,  the  following  damage  was  found  : — 

Ship's  Bottom. — ^Nil. 

Starboard  Outer  Propeller. — One  blade—  a  piece  broken  off  to  a 
depth  of  21  to  3  in.  for  a  length  of  16  in.  Another  blade — fi"actured 
and  t\\isted  to  a  depth  of  6  in.  for  a  length  of  6  in. 

Starboard  Inner  Propeller. — One  blade — Tip  broken  off  to  a 
depth  of  2  in.  and  length  of  12  in.  Another  blade — Tip  bent  forward 
to  a  depth  of  3  in.  for  a  length  of  12  in.  Remaining  blade — edge 
jagged. 

A.  D.  POUND. 

Captain. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,  H.M.S.    "  REVENGE." 

From.~The  Commanding  Officer,  H.M.S.  "  Revenge." 
To. — Vice  Admiral  Commanding,  First  Battle  Squadron, 
Date.~2nd  June  1916.     No.  B.   111/2. 
Subject. — Action  of  31st  May  and  1st  June  1916. 
Former. — 

H.M.S.    "Revenge," 

2nd  June  1916. 
Sir, 

In  accordance  with  your  signal  1603  of    to-day,  Friday, 
2nd  June    1916,   I   have   the   honour   to   forward  the  following 
general  account  of  the  action   of  31st  May  and  1st  June  1916 
as  observed  from  "  Revenge." 
6,  5  p.m. — Fleet  in  2nd  Organisation.     Course,  South.     Speed 
18  knots.     Observed  British  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet 
of  4  ships  in  Hne  ahead,   engaged  with  enemy 
battle  cruisers ;   latter  could  not  be  distinguished. 
6.  8  p.m. — Observed  flashes  of  enemy's  guns. 
6.  9p.m. — Observed   "Lion"    hit    on   forecastle   and   on   fire; 
soon  extinguished. 


84  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

6.10  i).iu. — Reports  of  enemy  Battle  Fleet  S.S.E. 

6.15  p.m. — ;)th  Battle  Squadron  observed  firing  on  enemy 
Battle  Fleet. 

6. 1 7  p.m. — Shots  falling  round  ship.  Deployed  to  port,  S.E. 
by  E. 

6.25  p.m. — Cruisers  who  had  deferred  taking  up  battle  stations 
till  too  late  now  found  themselves  under  heavy 
fire  from  enemy  Battle  Fleet.  "  Black  Prince  "( ?) 
observed  to  be  struck  aft  and  then  forward; 
magazines  evidently  exploded  and  she  dis- 
appeared. 

At  the  same  time  "  Warrior  "  was  very  badly  damaged,  and 
"  Minotaur "  or  "  Shannon  "  had  miraculous  escape,  being 
straddled  frequently. 

6.30  p.m. — Reduced  to  14  knots. 

6.42  p.m. — Increased  to  17  knots. 

During  this  time,  fire  was  maintained  b}^  Director  method 
against  enemy's  battleships,  which  were  very  indistinct.  (No 
ranges  being  obtainable.)  Also  on  a  four  funnelled  cruiser 
between  the  lines,  apparently  damaged  and  stopped. 

6.48  p.m. — Divisions  separately  altered  course  to  S.E. 

About  this  time  "  Marlborough  "  was  struck  by  a  torpedo. 

With  regard  to  this  at — 

6.50  p.m. — Officers  in  Transmitting  Room,  "  A  "  and  "  Y  " 
Shell  Rooms,  Director  Tower  and  Spotting  Top 
all  felt  a  shock  as  if  the  ship  had  struck  something. 
The  Officer  of  "  Y  "  Turret,  Captain  Evan  Jukes- 
Hughes,  Royal  Marine  Light  Infajitry,  and  the 
Torpedo  Officer,  Lieutenant- Commander  Walter 
K.  Conlon,  Royal  Navy,  looked  over  the  side  and 
observed  a  large  patch  of  oil,  mth  an  upheaval 
in  the  middle,  mth  portions  of  \ATeckage  coming 
to  the  surface.  A  few  minutes  prexdous  to  this 
I  had  myself  observed  "  Marlborough  "  struck 
by  mine  or  torpedo.  At  the  time  I  thought  the 
former,  but  since  I  think  she  was  torpedoed  b}^  a 
submarine,  who  then  dived  and  attempted  to  go 
under  the  battleship  line.  "  Revenge  "  on  seeing 
"  Marlborough  "  struck,  hauled  out  to  port  about 
a  cable,  and  my  behef  is,  struck  and  sunk  the 
submarine. 
About  6.55  p.m. — A  light  cruiser  passed  down  between  the  Hnes, 
apparently  making  a  torpedo  attack.  She  was 
not  fired  at  for  some  time,  being  possibly  mistaken 
for  British.  Eventually  'Marlborough"  with 
13-5-in.  and  '"Revenge"  and  sliips  astern  with 
6-in.,  opened  fire  on  her,  and  she  was  soon  appar- 
ently a  wreck,  stopped,  with  2  funnels  gone  and  on 
fire.     She  was  not  observed  to  sink. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  85 

6.56  p.m. — Passed  "  Acasta,"  disabled,  ^he  signalled  "  holed 
fore  and  aft.     Unable  to  move  engines." 

6.59  p.m. — .Squadron  turned,  leading  ships  together  and  re- 
mainder in  succession  to  South. 

7.  9  p.m. — 3  points  to  starboard  together. 

About  7.15  p.m.  a  torpedo  was  fired  at  the  "  Von  dcr  Tann." 
Range,  9,000  yards.  The  torpedo  was  observed 
to  run  true. 

On  the  Fleet  first  deploying,  fire  was  opened  on  the  leading 
ship  of  the  Second  Squadron.  Some  salvoes  were  fired, 
unspotted.  Fire  was  then  checked  as  the  enemy  was  too 
indistinct.  Subsequently,  as  our  line  turned  to  the  southward, 
converging  on  the  enemy,  the  leading  division,  consisting  of 
5  battle  cruisers,  came  clearly  into  sight.  Fire  was  opened  on 
the  leading  ship.  Hits  were  obtained  'with  the  second  salvo, 
and  bursts  of  flame  \vere  observed  on  the  quarterdeck.  Hitting 
was  continued  for  2  salvoes.  As  it  was  evident  that  several 
ships  ahead  were  firing  at  this  target,  and  that  this  enemy's 
ship  was  seriously  damaged,  fire  was  shifted  to  the  4th  ship  in 
the  fine,  apparently  the  ■  Von  der  Tann,"  and  hits  were  obtained 
and  burst  of  flame  noticed  aft. 

Two  Turret  Officers  are  of  the  opinion  that  she  was  sunk  by 
the  second  of  two  salvoes,  of  which  three  shots  are  beheved  to 
have  struck  and  caused  the  ship  to  blow  up.  Fire  was  continued 
until  a  flotilla  of  destroyers,  passing  through  the  Battle  Cruiser 
line,  made  a  most  efficient  smoke  screen,  entirely  obscuring  the 
target.  At  tliis  period  the  enemy  fleet  turned  8  points  to  star- 
board and  rapidly  di'ew  out  of  sight. 

7.22  p.m. — The  destroyers  made  a  determined  torpedo  attack, 
but  were  stopped  by  the  6-in.  guns  of  our  ships. 

At  the  same  time  om-  owti  Hght  cruisers  and  destroyers  from 
the  van  and  rear  were  observed  attacking  them. 

It  w^as  observed  that  the  destroj^ers  flew  a  long,  red  pendant, 
as  mentioned  in  the  "  AX  "  papers.  One  destroyer  was  observed 
disabled,  and  they  all  disappeared  after  the  enemy  fleet,  using  a 
smoke  screen. 

7.10  p.m. — Fleet  turned  back  3  points  to  port  together. 
7.16  p.m. — Turned  together  to  South. 

About  7.17  p.m.  observed  the  two  ends  of  a  German  hght 
cruiser  sticking  up  out  of  the  water.  Apparently- 
had  been  blo^vn  in  two  parts. 

7.28  p.m. — Turned  away  2  points  from  the  enemy,  by  sub- 
divisions, to  avoid  torpedo  attack. 

7.35  p.m. — "  Revenge  "  altered  course  to  port  to  avoid  two 
torpedoes.  One  passed  about  10  yards  ahead 
and  one  about  20  yards  astern. 

7.37  p.m. — Leading  ships  together  and  remainder  in  succession 
to  South- West. 


86  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

7.43  p.m. — "  Revenge  "  altered  course  to  port  to  avoid  torpedoes, 

two  passing  astern. 
7.54  p.m. — Single  line  ahead,  course  S.W. 
8.  4  p.m. — Divisions   separately  alter   course  in   succession   to 

West,  speed   17  knots. 
0.  0  to   9.15  ]3.m. — Heard  and   observed  heavy   firing  to   the 

Eastward,  appaiently  a  destroyer  attack. 
10.40  p.m. — Observed   flashes   of   heavy   firing   and   two   heavy 

explosions  lighting  up  the  sky  in  that  direction. 
At  the  time  my  impression  was  that  some  ship  had  blown  up. 

About  12.30.,  what  w^as  at  first  taken  for  destroyers  approaching 
was  observed  and  6-in.  guns  turned  on  them 
and  the  ordei-  had  been  given  to  open  fire,  when 
it  was  seen  that  the  object  was  a  large  ship.  She 
was  challenged  and  made  reply  "  PL  "  and 
rapidly  disajjpeared  astern.  She  had  the  appear- 
ance of  a  Battle  Cruiser  and  resembled  our  own. 

1  a.m.,  1st  June. — 

Firing  and  an  explosion  Avas  heard  right  astern. 

Nothing  more  of  interest  occurred  during  the  night,  until 

2.45  a.m.,  June  2nd.^ — -Vice  Admiral  Sir  Cecil  Burney,  Royal 
Navy,  hoisted  his  flag  in  "  Revenge." 

3.35  a.m. — A  Zeppelin  was  observed  about  4,000  to  5,000  yards 
off,  and  2  rounds  of  15-in.  were  fired,  besides 
fire  from  3-in.  H.A.  gun.  The  tail  was  observed 
to  dip,  as  if  the  15-in.  shell  had  passed  fairly 
close,  and  it  had  the  effect  of  driving  the  Zeppehn 
off  at  once. 

5.15  a.m. — Passed  through  the  wreckage  of  a  German  battleship 
or  battle  cruiser  judging  from  the  size  of  the 
floating  i^owder  cases. 

6.30  a.m. — Passed  wreckage  of  H. M.S.  "  Black  Prince,"  including 
Carley  raft  and  Ufe  buoy  with  name  of  ship. 

Observed  2  rafts  with  3  men.  Destroyer 
"  Obedient  "  found  them  being  picked  up  by  a 
Dutch  steamer.  They  were  German  seamen,  very 
exhausted ;  ship  not  known,  but  from  size  of 
rafts,  "  Obedient  "  estimated  at  least  a  light 
cruiser. 

8.35  a.m. — Passed  "  Sparrowhawk  "  abandoned.  (Later  sunk 
by  "'  Marksman  ") 

Rough  diagrams  of  the  various  phases  are  attached. ^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 

E    B.    KIDDLE, 

Captain . 

1  Plates  5  and  6. 


Plates. 


6.5   P.M.      MAY    31 . 

Position    of  British    Fleet     when    we    'iighted  our  Battle    Cruisers 
firing   at    an    enemy    on  their    Starboard   Boiv. 


Armoured  Cruisers. 
''111! 

y^Line  of  Fire  Line  of  Fire 

pe^^i    \     \     \    \''^o 2-    _    - 

'  '  ^0^   R.R.  liozr  N.Z.  S^^B.S. 


I 
I  i 

I  /  I  /  (  I 
I  )  I  /  (  I 
I      I     I     I     I     I 

I      /      I     /     I     I 


6.20.    P.M. 

Position    of   Both    Fleets    during    Deployment. 


Armoured  Cruisers  ^^^ 


—  —  —  —  under  t^ery  hea^y  fire  5    B.C.S. 

B.C.S.  trying  to  take  up  position 

astern. 

^-  -  ~~  Britirh  Battle   Fleet 


Visibility     about     IZ.OOO  yards,  and 
for   Ranges  about  9,500  yards. 


mc72    Z4-2ee    P1173.  (S^  SOOOfZSO  MaJSyA.3oni.Lilh. 


FloJUi  G. 


POSITION      AT      AB0yX__6^^_^ii^- 


< 


Enemy  Cruiser 

under      ^ 
very  heavy/ fire . 


f  ^ 


Qur  Armoured  Cruisers 

\   \      0 

Black  Prince 
blowing  up. 


-  5^'^  B.S. 


POSJTION    AT     FROM     6 .55_J1IILLJ7J^_P:M. 


These   ships  hea\/ily  engaged 

S  on  fire '.  '^    ^^  ^  • 

yCdattletrijisers 

Seydlitz  \  I    \       ,       _. 

^^  I         /  Von  der  Tann 


1  ; 

1  A 

I  ' 


Disabled 
Enemy 
Ship . 


"^  — — 


Revenge 


/ocTz-  ■-*j:ee-  pi'7S  ^^  scoo/2.  20 


Mal-Jv  A  Son;-.  Litli. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATHCES.  87 

H.M.S.   "  Revenge," 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  j'our  signal  0900  of  4th  June,  I  have 
the  honour  to  report  that  the  wreckage  Avas  sujiposed  to  be  tliat 
of  H.M.S,  "  Black  Prince  "'  from  the  lifebuoy  with  name  of  shi]) 
on  it,  2  Carley  Rafts,  Cordite  Cases,  Seamen's  Life  Saving  Jackets, 
Gratings,  and  Wooden  debris.  The  position  was  Latitude 
56°  2'  North,  Longitude  5°  57'  East,  worked  from  "  Iron  Duke's  " 
positions. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

E.    B.    KIDDLE, 

Captain. 

The  Commander-in-Chief, 
Grand  Fleet 
(through  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
1st  Battle  Squadron). 


CAPTAINS    REPORT,    H.M.S.    "  BELLONA." 

H.M.S.   "Bellona," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1910. 

With  reference  to  your  signal  No.  1550  of  to-day  I  have 
the  honour  to  report  as  foUows :  though  I  fear  my  remarks  will 
be  of  httle  value,  as  I  felt  at  the  end  of  the  action  that  owing 
to  the  length  of  the  hne  and  the  low  visibility,  I  had  gathered 
but  httle  of  what  had  happened. 

2.  As  regards  H.M.S.  "  Bellona's  "  special  duty  of  repeating 
signals  :  The  signals  appeared  to  me  to  be  comparatively  few, 
simple,  and  such  as  might  be  expected,  and  I  imagine  they  got 
through  with  rapidity  and  accuracy. 

3.  H.M.S.  "  Bellona  "  lay  from  f  of  a  mile  to  a  mile  on  the 
ofE  side  of  the  5th  Division,  in  this  position  I  had  expected  to 
get  a  fair  share  of  "  overs  "  round  about  me ;  but  as  a  matter 
of  fact  only  one  large  shell  fell  close  (about  50  yards  over),  and 
it  seemed  to  me  that  the  enemy  was  firing  mostly  short.  There 
was,  of  course,  never  any  great  volume  of  fire. 

4.  His  salvoes  seemed  to  cover  an  extraordinarily  small  area, 
a  thing  which  has  struck  me  before. 

5.  It  seemed  to  me  that  we  had  the  better  visibility,  and  I 
expect  the  enemy  was  hampered  by  smoke. 

6.  I  was  not  able  to  get  much  idea  of  what  our  own  shooting 
was  hke.  During  the  whole  action  I  only  saw  two  of  the  enemy's 
big  ships.  I  did  see  our  shots  hit;  the  enemy  twice,  but  beyond 
that  it  seemed  to  me  that  we  also  were  shooting  short. 

7.  I  saw  no  Zeppelin  or  air  craft  of  any  description ;  I  did 
not  expect  a  Zeppehn  attack,  but  I  certainly  thought  they 
would  have  them  there  for  rej)orting  our  movements,  &c. 


88  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

8.  I  only  obsen^ed  one  effort  by  hostile  torpedo  craft,  and 
that  only  seemed  to  be  made  by  three  boats. 

!>.  I  could  not  understand  the  action  of  certain  of  our  4 
funnelled  cruisers.  They  seemed  to  me  to  be  not  only  uselessly 
exposing  themselves  to  the  enemy's  heavy  ships,  but  also  getting 
in  the  way  of  our  torpedoes,  and  hampering  our  line  with  their 
smoke.  I  naturally  know  nothing  of  the  reason  for  their  action, 
and  merely  give  this  as  an  impression. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

ARTHUR    B.    S.    BUTTON, 
Captain. 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
First  Battle  Squadron, 
H.M.S.   "Revenge." 


H.M.S.    "  NEPTUNE."— CAPTAIN'S   REPORT   OF  ACTION 
WITH    GERMAN    FLEET    ON    31st    MAY    1916. 

No.  08. 

H.M.S.   "Neptune," 
Sir,  10th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  on 
the  action  with  the  German  fleet  on  31st  ultimo. 

At  5.46  p.m.,  when  steering  S.  50°  E.  in  columns  of   divisions 
line    ahead,    disposed    abeam,    one    mile    apart, 
(Organisation  No.  5)  flashes   from  gun-fire  were 
observed  on  Starboard  bow. 
5.51  p.m. — Gun-fire  heard  on  Starboard  bow. 
5.56  p.m. — One  of  our  cruiser  squadrons,  either  First  or  Second, 
was  observed  on  Port  bow,  engaging  enemy,  the 
latter  being  out  of  sight  of  "  Neptune." 
6.   1  p.m.— Signal  "  9  Pdt.  E— G.18  "  was  hauled  down. 
6.  6  p.m.— -The  inspiring  signal — 

"  Remember  the  traditions  of  the  glorious  First  of 
June — avenge  Belgium  " 

was  received  and  transmitted  to  all  on  board. 

About  this  time  the  First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  (3  in 
number)  and  one  "  New  Zealand  "  were  observed  steering  to  the 
Eastward  across  our  bow.  They  were  engaging  an  enemy 
invisible  to  "  Neptune."  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  appeared 
some  distance  astern  of  them. 

The  signal  "  Equal  speed  Pdt.  C.L."  (S.E.  by  S.)  was  hoisted. 

6.16  p.m. — Signal  hauled  dow*u.     Formed  into  hne. 

About  this  time  the  flashes  of  enemy's  guns  were  seen  on 
Starboard  beam  and  quarter,  and  the  splashes  of  his  projectiles 
were  observed  on  Starboard  side. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  89 

Enemy  appeared  to  be  firing  on  our  cruisers,  some  of  which 
appeared  out  of  the  mist.  One  of  "  Warrior  "  class  was  seen 
to  be  badly  hit  and  set  on  fire ;  she  passed  across  to  Port  quarter. 
Another  cruiser,  appearently  "  Defence,"  was  observed  to  be 
hit,  and  was  reported  to  have  blown  up. 

A  third  cruiser  of  same  type,  though  surrounded  with  shells, 
managed  to  make  her  escape. 

6.32  p.m. — "  Colhngwood  "    opened   fire.     About   this   time    5th 
division  got  somew  hat  bunched  up,  and  "  St.  Vincent  " 
came  up  on   "  Neptune's  "  beam,  masking  her  fire 
and    interfering    with    view    of    enemy.     "  St.    Vin- 
cent "    opened    fire,  which  now  became  general  in 
our  line. 
6.40  p.m. — "  St.  Vincent  "  having  dropped  astern,  "  Neptune  " 
opened  fire  on  one  of  enemy's  battleships,  which 
appeared  to  be  unfired  on.     Owing  to  the  mist, 
enemy  could  only  be  indistinctly  seen.     Fire  was 
opened   at    11,000   yards,    but   after   two   salvoes, 
both  of  which  appeared  to  be  short ;  owing  to  the 
impossibility  of  spotting  and  gradual  disappearance 
of   the    target    firing   was    discontinued.      Enemy 
appeared  to  fire  one  or  two  salvoes  in  our  direction 
and  then  to  discontinue. 
6.44  p.m. — Course  altered  to  S.E. 

6.50  p.m. — Passed  "  Acasta  "  hove  to  and  putting  colhsion  mats 
over  two  holes,  one  on  StarboarcT  quarter  and  one 
on  Port  bow. 
6.55  p.m.—"  9  Pdt.  E.— G.  17  "  hauled  down. 

About  this  time  a  three-funnel  cruiser  ("  Moraves  "  class), 
apparently  disabled,  was  observed  to  come  out  of  the  mist  on 
Starboard  beam.  She  possibly  fired  the  torpedo  which  hit 
"  Marlborough." 

First  Battle  Squadron  opened  fire  on  her.     "  Neptune  "  fired 

one  salvo  at  her,  but  as  so  many  other  ships  were  firing  at  this 

cruiser,  I  ceased  fire.     She  was  observed  to  be  hit  several  times, 

and  was  lost  sight  of  astern.     She  did  not  return  the  fire. 

About    7.4   p.m. — "  Neptune  "    opened   fire    on    the   leading   of 

two   battle   cruisers,    "  Ltitzow  "   class.     The  first 

salvo  was  fired  at  a  range   of    10,200  yards   and 

fell  over.     *     *     *     i — fire."     Salvo  short.     "Up 

*     *     *    1 ".  Straddle  and  hit.     "Up  *     *     *  ^  " 

and  hit  again      They  then  turned  away,  the  leader 

on  fire  aft,  and  rapidly  disappeared  in  a  cloud  of 

smoke. 

An  enemy  light  cruiser  was  now  seen  steering  to  Northward. 

She  was  soon  hit,  while  turning  to  Port,  by  a  salvo  from  one  of 

our  ships.     She  appeared  to  stop  and  to  settle  down  in  the  water. 

Believed  to  have  sunk. 

^  See  note  on  p    381 


^♦0  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

7.10  p.m. — About  six  or  eight  German  destroyers  commenced  an 
attack  on  our  line  from  a  position  about  2  points 
before  the  Starboard  beam.  A  salvo  from  12-in. 
was  fired  at  them  while  4-in.  guns  were  being 
manned.  "  Neptune  "  opened  fire  with  4-in.  guns 
on  one  destroyer,  which  was  not  being  fired  at, 
and  hit  her  three  times,  then  opened  fire  on  another 
(the  second  in  the  fine)  and  she  was  hit  too,  believed 
by  "  Neptune,"  but  might  have  been  b}'  another 
ship.  Both  are  believed  to  have  sunk.  The 
remaining  destroyers  were  driven  off,  but  not 
without  torpedoes  being  fired  at  our  Kne.  The 
tracks  of  three  torpedoes  were  clearly  seen  from 
the  fore-top,  one  of  which  passed  very  close  to 
"  Neptune,"  and  was  avoided  by  use  of  helm. 

Two  submarines — one  on  the  surface  about  three  miles  on 
Starboard  quarter,  and  the  other  in  diving  trim  about  two  miles 
a  point  before  the  Starboard  beam — are  believed  to  have  been 
seen  from  fore-top  about  this  time. 

About  7.5  p.m.  a  badly  damaged  vessel,  apparently  a  German 
light  cruiser,  was  passed  about  a  mile  on  Port  beam.  She  was 
very  badly  crumpled  up,  Avith  waist  below  water,  and  bow  and 
stern  above  the  surface.  She  seemed  to  have  been  abandoned. 
From  subsequent  information  this  appears  to  have  been 
"  Invincible." 

About  10.40  p.m.  heavy  firing,  apparently  from  an  engagement 
between  light  cruisers  and  destroyers,  was  observed  to  the  North- 
West,  about  four  or  five  miles  off.  One  ship  appeared  to  be  set 
on  fire. 

Flashes  were  observed  to  the  Northward  at  intervals  during 
the  night. 

About  3.45  a.m.  on  1st  instant  a  Zeppehn  was  observed  on 
Port  quarter.  She  passed  over  to  Starboard  beam.  A  round 
was  fired  at  her  from  "  X  "  turret,  after  which  she  turned  away 
and  made  off. 

The  white  ensign  flown  by  our  ships  did  not  seem  to  stand 
out  clearly  at  a  distance  in  the  white  misty  weather,  nor  the 
union  jack  either. 

It  is  not  known  why  the  red  ensign  was  abandoned,  but  it  is 
considered  that  red  shows  up  better  than  any  other  colour  against 
any  background  likely  to  be  met  with,  and  a  large  red  flag, 
flown  in  a  conspicuous  position,  such  as  the  foretopmast  head, 
is  recommended. 

In  the  case  of  most  of  the  Officers  and  men  of  "  Neptune," 
this  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  they  had  been  in  any  kind 
of  an  action.  It  had  an  exhilarating  and  beneficial  effect,  the 
opportunity  of  coming  in  contact  with  the  enemy  being  much 
appreciated. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  91 

The  behaviour  of  all  during  the  short  and  disappointing 
engagement  was  most  creditable,  all  orders  being  rapidly  and 
accurately  carried  out  \Aithout  undue  excitement. 

Separate  reports  giving  names  of  Officers  and  men  recom- 
mended are  being  forwarded. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

V.    H.    G.    BERNARD. 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

First  Battle  Squadron. 

H.M.S.  "  AGINCOURT/'  CAPTAIN'S  REPORT  OF  ACTION. 

No.   171/02.  H.M.S.  "Agincourt," 

Sir,  10th  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  signal,  I  have  the  honour  to 
submit  the  follomng  report  on  the  action  of  31st  Maj',  as  far  as 
H.M.S,  "  Agincourt  "  was  concerned. 

At  ().  0  p.m. — The   ship's  position   was   Lat.    57°    7'   N.,   Long. 
5°  41'  E. ;  course,  134°;  speed,  20  knots. 
6.  8.  Altered  course  to  122°. 

6.17.  Altered    course    to    45° — thereb}^    dejDioying    into 

line  :  "  Agincourt  "  now  being  rear  ship  of  the 
line. 

At  6.12  p.m. — Our  Battle  Cruisers  and  flashes  of  enemy's  guns 
came  into  sight  from  just  on  the  port  bow  to 
the  starboard  bow,  crossing  from  right  to  left. 
Shortly  after  tliis,  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  was 
seen  following  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadi-on  and 
firing  at  the  enemy,  but  the  flashes  of  these 
enemy  ships'  guns  only  came  into  sight  through 
the  mist  one  at  a  time. 

The  "  Lion  "  was  noted  to  have  a  fire  on  board,  which  was 
apparently  put  out. 

Our  Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers  appeared  to  hang  about 
just  in  front  of  the  6th  Division,  and  thus  came  in  for  some  of 
the  enemy's  projectiles  not  apj^arently  intended  for  them. 

A  clear  view  of  the  enemy  could  not  be  obtained,  but  from 
general  opinion  the  enemy  ships  first  fired  on  were  Battle 
Cruisers. 

6.14.  Enemy  shots  falhng  near  the  ship. 

6.16.  Salvo  straddled  "  Hercules  "  while  deploying. 

6.17.  Turned  into  Hne  after  "  Hercules." 

6.18.  "Marlborough"  opened  fire;    but  the  range  was 

not  yet  clear  of  our  own  ships  for  "  Agincourt." 
6.24.  Opened    fire    on    enemy    Battle    Cruiser;     range, 

10,000  yards.  Target  could  just  be  made  out, 
but  her  number  in  their  hne  could  not  be  stated 
vrith  accuracy.     Hits  had  been  obtained  on  this 


92  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

ship  when  the  smoke  from  our  own  Armoured 

Cruisers  blotted  out  the  enenw  vessels,  one  of 

which  was  very  heavily  hit. 
6.25.  Speed  by  signal — 14  knots. 

6.32.  0])ened  fire  again  on  same  ship.     Another  hit  was 

ol)served,    l)ut  mist   made  it   impossible  to  be 

certain  of  fall  of  shot. 

Our  own  line  of  fire  was  now  blocked  by  our  own  Destroyers. 
Fore  Control  observed  a  Battle  Cruiser,  apparently  crippled, 
heading  in  the  opposite  direction  and  flashing  FU  by  searchlight. 
Fire  was  then  opened  on  enemy  four-funnelled  Cruiser,  thought 
to  be  the  "  Roon." 

6.34.  Lost  sight  of  enem5\ 
6.36.  Course,  111°. 

6.48.  Course,  104°. 

6.55.  Observed  "  Marlborough  "  struck  by  torpedo  or 

mine  on  the  starboard  side.  A  few  minutes 
after,  the  periscope  of  a  submarine  was  seen 
passing  the  ship  on  starboard  side.  This  could 
be  seen  from  the  Control  Top  and  not  from  the 
Bridge  or  Conning-tower. 

7.  0.  Course,  168°;  speed,  18  knots. 

7,  4.  Turrets  opened  fire  again  on  enemy  three-funnelled 

Cruiser.  "  Marlborough  "  was  firing  at  her. 
She  was  apparently  already  disabled  and  on  fire, 
but  was  floating  when  she  passed  cut  of  sight. 

7.  6.  Four    enemy    Battleships,    apparently    their    5th 

Division,  appeared  out  of  the  mist,  two  of  wliich 
showed  clearly  against  the  mist.  Opened  fu'e  on 
one  of  these:  range,  11,000  yards;  at  least 
four  straddles  were  obtained  and  eflfective  hits 
seen. 

7.  8.  Enemy  torpedo  just  missed  astern.     It  had  been 

re])orted  from  aloft,  and  course  was  altei-ed. 
This  w^as  probably  fired  by  a  submarine. 

7.17.  Enemj'   fire   straddled   sliip.      Enemy    destroyers 

were  now  observed  approaching  from  enemy's 
lines. 

7.18.  6-in.  guns  opened  on  them.     When  five  hits  had 

been  observed  on  the  first  one  fire  was  shifted 
to  another;  tw^o  hits  were  observed  on  her 
before  she  was  lost  in  the  mist.  Enemy 
destroyers  made  a  smoke  screen  w-hich  hampered 
the  turrets  firing  during  the  time  enemy  ships 
turned  away. 

7.35.  Track  of  two  torjjedoes  i-unning  parallel  observed 

approaching.    Course  altered  to  avoid  torpedoes  ; 
passed  ahead. 
7.41.  Submarine  reported  starboard  side ;    turned  away 

to  avoid. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  93 

7.45.  Course,  185°;  speed,  15  to  17  knots. 

7.50.  Passed  a  wreck  on  port  hand. 

8.  3.  Course,  258°  ;   17  knots. 

8.25.  Torpedo  track  on  starboard  side ;    turned  at  full 

speed;    torpedo  broke  surface  about  150  yards 

on  starboard  bow. 

During  the  night  three  distinct  sets  of  firing  occurred  :    the 

first   being   on   starboard   quarter;     the   second   two   points   on 

quarter;  the  third  right  astern. 

A  ship  or  Destroyer  closed  "  Agincourt  "  at  high  speed  during 
the  night,  her  track  very  visible.  I  did  not  challenge  her,  so  as 
not  to  give  our  Division's  position  awa3^  She  altered  course  and 
steamed  away. 

2.30.  Vice-Admiral  shifted  his  Flag  to  "  Revenge." 

3.52.  Zeppehn  in  sight.     Opened  with   6-in.  guns  and 

3-in.    anti-aircraft.      Apparentlj''    no    hits    were 
obtained  on  Zeppehn ;    she  went  away  toAvards 
the  East. 
T.N.T.  common  were  used  throughout  the  action. 
Rounds  fired  : — 

12-in.  guns  -  -         -     144  rounds. 

6-in.  guns    -         -         -         -         -111,, 
Anti-aircraft  guns         -         -         -         7       ,, 
T  have  much  pleasure  in  reporting  the  smooth  working  of 
everything  on  board  and  the  happy  alacrity  and  discipline  of  all 
hands.     No  direct  hits  were  made  on  "  Agincourt,"  but  several 
splinters  came  on  board,  doing  very  minor  damage. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servajit. 

H.  M.  DOUGHTY, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

First  Battle  Squadron. 

H.M.S.  "  Royal  Oak." 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,    H.M.S.    "ST.    VINCENT." 

E.106. 

H.M.S.  "  St.  Vincent," 
Sir,  10th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  of  the 
action  of  31st  May  1916,  as  far  as  it  concerned  "  St.  Vincent." 

In  the  approach  "  St.  Vincent  "  was  rear  ship  of  the  5th 
Division,  i.e.,  the  next  division  to  port  of  the  starboard  wing 
Division  led  by  "  Marlborough." 

On  forming  line  of  battle  to  port,  "  St.  Vincent,"  therefore, 
became  the  fifth  ship  from  the  rear.  The  weather  was  very 
misty — visibiUty  extreme  about  5|  miles.     Sea  smooth. 

The  first  enemy  seen,  at  which  fire  could  be  opened,  was  a 
three-funnelled  cruiser  two  points  before  the  starboard  beam. 


94  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

heading  the  opposite  way  to  our  line,  and  apparently  stopped. 
Range,  11,000  yards.  "St.  Vincent"  gave  her  a  few  salvoes, 
as  tlitl  every  other  ship  of  the  squadron  apparently,  but  she 
making  no  reply,  and  being  evidently  in  a  sinking  condition, 
cease  fire  was  ordered. 

Ten  minutes  later  (about  G.54  p.m.)  three  large  ships  came 
into  view  near  the  starl)oard  beam,  steering  a  roughly  similar 
course.  (At  times  a  fourth  was  seen,  and  also  another  Division, 
very  faint  indeed,  beyond  these  ships.) 

The  leading  ship  that  I  looked  at  carefully,  I  took  to  be  a 
"  Kaiser  "  class  battleship,  but  her  funnels  were  short,  neat  and 
square.  Arrangement  of  them  with  regard  to  masts  was  similar 
to  "  Kaiser  "  class.  Also  their  distance  apart  was  great.  It  is 
possible  that  this  ship  may  have  been  "  Liitzow,"  but  was  not 
thought  to  be  so  at  the  time.  The  German  ships  opened  fire 
with  quick  ripples  almost  simultaneously  with  "  St.  Vincent's  " 
first  broadside,  which  was  directed  against  their  third  ship 
considered  to  be  a  "  Kaiser."  The  third  ship  was  chosen  as 
there  were  many  ships  ahead  of  "  St.  Vincent  "  who  could  attack 
the  two  leading  ships.  And  this  was  clearly  done,  all  ships  being 
continuously  surrounded  by  splashes. 

Rangefinders  on  "  St.  Vincent's  "  target  agreed  closely,  gun 
range  varying  from  10,000  yards  at  start  to  9,500  yards  at  the 
end.  Rate  very  small,  about  50  closing.  Only  small  spotting 
corrections  of  up  or  down  50  occasionally  necessary  to  change 
from  1  short  to  2  short.  German  fire,  which  was  brisk  and  regular 
at  the  start,  very  soon  declined  in  rate  and  accuracy. 

"  St.  Vincent's  "  fire  was  by  Director,  and  the  target  was 
held  closely  till  7.26  p.m.  (32  minutes  in  all),  when  the  enemy 
had  turned  8  or  10  points  away,  disappearing  into  the  mist  and 
with  a  smoke  screen  made  by  Destroyers  to  cover  them  as  well. 

Total  rounds  fired,  96  (88  A.P.*^  Lyddite  and  8  Common 
Lyddite). 

To  avoid  enemy  torpedoes  crossing  the  track  of  the  First 
Battle  Squadron  all  ships  were  frequently  under  helm,  and  this 
led  to  a  little  bunching,  but  mutual  understanding  and  con- 
sideration prevented  embarrassment — e.g.,  "  Neptune  "  turns 
sharply  to  avoid  torpedo — "  St.  Vincent,"  next  astern,  wishes  to 
keep  steady  for  gunfire  and  is  not  threatened  by  that  torpedo — 
"  St.  Vincent  "  must  overlap  "  Neptune  "  for  a  short  time. 

The  Director  was,  of  course,  invaluable  under  the  conditions 
obtaining. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

W.  W.  FLSHER, 

Captain. 

The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding 
First  Battle  Squadron, 
H.M.S.  "Royal  Oak." 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  95 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,    H.M.S.    "  COLLINGWOOD."i 

H.M.S.  "  ColUngwood," 
Sir,  10th  June  1916. 

I^  accordance  with  your  signal  0600  of  to-day,  I  have  the 
honour  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the  action  of  31st  May 
1916. 

2.  At  3.15  p.m.,  enemy  reports  between  the  Light  Cruiser 
Squadrons  and  Battle  Cruisers  and  the  Commander-in-Chief 
began  to  be  received.  The  Grand  Fleet  was  steering  S.E.  by  S. 
in  columns  of  divisions,  line  ahead  to  starboard,  19  knots, 
"  ColHngwood  "  being  second  ship  of  "  Colossus  "  division 
(No.  5). 

3.  At  4.50  p.m.,  the  Flag  signalled  that  the  enemy's  Battle 
Fleet  were  coming  North. 

Our  Battle-Cruisers  pass  to  Eastward. 

4.  At  about  6.15  p.m.,  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  consisting 
of  two  "  Lions,"  "  Tiger,"  and  "  New  Zealand,"  appeared  to  the 
Southward,  steering  about  E.N.E.,  and  engaging  with  starboard 
guns.  The  weather  was  thick,  visibility  about  4  miles,  and 
nothing  was  at  first  seen  of  the  enemy,  but  soon  afterwards  the 
flashes  of  their  guns  was  observed. 

Grand  Fleet  Deploys. 

5.  At  6.23  p.m.,  deploj^ed  to  S.E.  by  E.,  by  equal  speed 
method,  and  speed  of  fleet  reduced  to  14  knots. 

6.  At  6.28  p.m.,  "  Colossus  "  signalled  for  fire  to  be  opened 
at  the  enemy  as  soon  as  seen,  and  soon  afterwards  a  cruiser  was 
observed  to  the  southward  apparently  stopped,  and  fire  was 
opened  on  her,  at  a  range  of  about  9,000  yards.  The  bearing 
was  approximately  abeam. 

Gun  Flashes  only  visible. 

7.  From  time  to  time  after  this,  the  flashes  of  the  guns  of  the 
enemy's  ships  beyond  the  cruiser  were  observed,  but  insufficiently 
clearly  to  lay  the  director  or  guns  on,  and  at  no  time  could  the 
enemy's  hulls  be  seen  from  the  fore  conning  tower  or  director 
tower. 

Enemy  Searchlight  Signals  observed. 

8.  An  Officer  in  the  after  director  tower.  Lieutenant  J.  V.  P. 
Fitzgerald,  Royal  Navy,  informed  me  afterwards  that,  on  one 
occasion  for  a  few  moments,  he  was  able  to  make  out  dimly  the 
hulls  of  three  or  four  ships — he  thought  of  the  "  Helgoland  " 
and  "  Nassau  "  classes — and  later  that  he  saw  the  enemy's  fine, 
or  some  ships  of  them,  turn  away  apparently  together.  He  saw 
a  signal  "  FL"'^  "  made  by  searchlight  by  some  ships  in  the  enemy's 
line,  several  times  just  before  they  appeared  to  turn  away.     The 

J  Plate  7. 


96  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

signalman  in  ''  Collingwood's  "  forctop  also  saw  this,  and,  about 
five  minutes  earlier,  our  "  Compass  sign  "  made  about  five  times. 
It  struck  him  that  these  signals  were  being  made  to  the  enemy 
cruiser  at  which  heavy  fire  was  at  the  time  being  directed. 

i>.  The  hull  of  one  ship,  thought  to  Ik-  "  Kaiser  "  class,  was 
seen  once  in  the  foret(^p  for  a  few  moments,  but  disappeared 
before  the  guns  could  be  laid  on  her. 

10.  It  is  to  be  noted  here  that  the  times  of  the  various 
prominent  incidents  of  the  battle  observed  were  not  specially 
noted,  and  those  given  in  this  report  (other  than  alterations  of 
course  taken  from  the  signal  book)  are  not  reliable. 

11.  The  "  Defence"  and  "Warrior"  (or  "  Black  Prince") 
were  observed,  it  is  thought,  about  6.40  p.m.,  between  our  line 
and  the  enemy's,  steering  towards  our  rear,  firing  vigorously, 
and  themselves  on  fire  and  repeatedly  struck,  and  the  former 
ship  was  observed  to  be  blown  up. 

Fir.'it  Destroyer  attack  on  our  Line. 

12.  A  torpedo  attack  by  an  unknown  but  small  number  of 
destroyers  was  directed  on  our  rear  from  the  beam  direction 
soon  after  fire  was  opened,  and  the  5th  Division  turned  away 
two  points  by  "  Preparative."  Fire  was  opened  wdth  4-in.  guns 
at  a  destroyer  which  approached  more  nearly  than  the  others. 
It  is  believed  that  this  attack  accounted  for  the  torpedo  which 
struck  "  Marlborough." 

13.  Speed  was  increased  by  signal  to  17  knots. 

14.  At  6.57  p.m.,  course  was  altered  to  south. 

'y  Colossus  '  struck  by  heavy  shell. 

15.  "  Colossus  "  was  observed  to  be  struck  forward,  it  is 
thought  about  7.10  p.m.;  but,  with  this  exception,  the  splashes 
of  enemy  shot  about  our  line  appeared  to  be  infrequent.  One  or 
two  salvoes  were  observed  to  fall  over  "  CoUingwood,"  and  a 
spent  heavy  yelloAV-coloured  projectile,  striking  short,  ricochetted 
and  burst  on  striking  the  water  between  us  and  "  Colossus." 
(Some  apparently  medium  calibre  projectiles  were  falling  short 
at  the  beginning  of  the  action,  but  "  ColHngwood "  was  not 
struck.) 

Ariother  (?)  Enemy  Cruiser  observed. 

16.  Soon  after  this,  another  damaged  enemy  cruiser  of 
"  Rostock  "  class  was  observed  about  abeam,  and  fire  was 
opened  on  her  with  lyddite  common  shell.  I  am,  myseK,  in  some 
doubt  as  to  whether  this  was,  in  fact,  another  ship,  or  the  same 
one  as  was  being  fired  at  j^reviously,  the  fleet  having,  perhaps, 
brought  her  again  into  view  by  alteration  of  course  to  starboard. 
An  Officer  in  the  after  conning  tower  considers  that  the  first 
cruiser  was  sunk,  and  that  this  was  certainly  a  different  and 
larger  one. 

17.  At  7.22  p.m.,  speed  was  reduced  by  signal  to  15  knots. 


PIxxjAi  7. 


H  .  M  .5.   COLLINGWOOD. 


TRACK      CHART     OF     NAVAL    ACTION     3|stmay. 


Ut   57 UN 
Posicion    Lony5''2QE. 


^BCF 


Light  Cruiser 
-   ^(6  30) 


<?^    :^<y. 


"J-i 


^X-^o. 


\  Liqht  Cruiser 
17. 'O) 

\   BaCtleC'-aissrs 
»        (7.Z0) 
,'   Destroyers 
'-'        (7-20) 


Scale  8  Miles -I  Inch, 


9  0pm 


10073. ZA-zee/p  1173%  iooo.iz.zo. 


/o.  6'/^ 


Malbvci.Sons.Lith 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  97 

Enemy's  Battle-Cruisers  and  Destroyers  appear. 

18.  About  7.20  p.m.  (?),  an  enemy's  battle  cruiser,  taken  by 
me  to  be  "  Seydlitz,"  appeared  on  starboard  beam  (turned  to 
same  direction  as  our  fleet),  shortly  followed  by  another.  Other 
officers  considered  she  was  a  "  Derfflinger,"  and  the  question 
remains  in  doubt,  though  my  impression  of  the  central  funnel  is 
a  fairly  clear  one.  She  presented  a  clear  target,  range  about 
8,000  yards,  and  fire  was  shifted  to  hei'.  Unfortunately,  the 
guns  were  loaded  with  lyddite  common  shell.  She  was  struck  at 
once  by  two  salvoes  which  started  fires  and  silenced  all  but  her 
fore  turret  guns.     She  very  shortly  (and  before  A. P.  shell  could 

;  arrive  at  the  guns)  disappeared  in  dense  smoke  which  was  being 
made  by  a  number  of  destroyers  (not  more  than  six)  which  were 
attacking  from  about  2  points  before  our  beam.  The  general 
impression  is  that  these  destroyers  turned  round  to  starboard 
{i.e.,  towards  course  of  our  fleet)  to  fire  their  torpedoes  at  a  range 
of  about  9,000  yards. 

While  approaching,  and  after  turning,  they  made  dense 
clouds  of  smoke  into  which  the  battle  cruisers  disappeared.  It 
occurs  to  me  that  the  latter  were  accompanying  the  flotilla, 
probably  fired  torpedoes  themselves,  and  then  took  cover  in  the 
smoke  of  the  destroyers. 

19.  At  7.26  p.m.,  a  general  signal  to  turn  away  2  points  was 
made. 

Torpedoes  cross  our  Line. 

20.  "  Colossus  "  now  signalled  the  approach  of  a  torpedo  and 
turned  away.  Immediately  afterwards  a  torpedo  track  was 
seen  about  20°  abaft  "  ColHngwood's  "  beam,  coming  straight 
at  the  ship.  I  am  under  the  impression  that  the  ship  was  at 
the  time  already  under  helm.  Large  helm  was  put  on  and  the 
torpedo  passed  very  close  astern.  At  the  same  time,  another 
was  observed  to  pass  about  30  yards  ahead.  It  is  thought  that 
the  ship  had  turned  about  4  or  5  points  when  these  torpedoes 
crossed  the  fine. 

21.  Fire  was  continued  at  a  damaged  destroyer  on  the  quarter 
with  12-in.  guns  for  a  few  minutes  and  then  ceased,  no  hostile 
craft  being  seen  afterwards. 

General  Remarks. 

22.  On  one  or  two  occasions,  fires  were  distinguished  on 
board  enemy's  ships.  It  is  to  me  remarkable  that,  notwith- 
standing the  very  weak  attacks  of  the  German  destroyers  (for 
whose  operations  the  weather  conditions  were  admirable)  and 
the  great  range  (about  9,000  yards)  at  which  their  torpedoes 
were  fired,  so  large  a  number  of  their  torpedoes  passed  through 
the  rear  of  our  fine.  The  smooth  water  helped  my  foretop  look- 
outs to  distinguish  the  tracks  of  the  torpedoes. 

It  is  obvious  to  me  that  the  fact  that  all  but  one  missed  is 
principally  providential.     The  loss  suffered  by  these  destroyers 

z     12872  G 


98  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

appeared  to  be  small ;  only  one  was  observed  by  "  Collingwood  " 
to  be  put  out  of  action.  The  great  value  of  this  form  of  attack 
on  a  line  of  ships  is,  to  me,  an  outstanding  feature  of  the  battle 
fleet  action. 

The  apparently  concerted  torpedo  attack  by  battle  cruisers 
and  destroyers  covered  by  dense  smoke,  and  the  remarkably 
close  range  to  which  the  battle  cruisers  approached,  is  noteworthy. 

Conduct  of  Officers  and  Men. 

23.  All  ranks  and  ratings  performed  their  duties  to  my 
complete  satisfaction.  There  was  a  complete  absence  of  excite- 
ment in  all  departments,  and  I  am  convinced  that,  had 
"  ColUngwood  "  suffered  damage,  the  behaviour  of  Officers  and 
Men  would  have  proved  to  be  entirely  in  accordance  with  the 
best  traditions  of  His  Majesty's  Navy. 

T  have  the  honour  to  be, 
fSir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

JAMES   LEY, 

Captain. 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding, 
First  Battle  Squadron. 

CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,   H.M.S.    "ROYAL    OAK." 

H.M.S.  "  Royal  Oak," 
Sir,  10th  June  1916.":^ 

With  reference  to  your  signal  of  to-day,  I  have  the 
honour  to  submit  the  following  report  on  the  action  of  31st  May 
— 1st  June. 

P.M. 

5.47.     Firing  first  heard. 

5.49.     Flashes  distinctly  visible.     Green  65  to  S.  Westward. 
6.12.     Formed  hne  of  Battle. 
6.15.     Heavy  firing  observed  to  the  Southward. 
6.25.     "  Iron  Duke  "  oj)ened  fire  on  3  funnelled  cruiser. 
6.29.     "  Royal  Oak  "  opened  fire  with  15-in.  guns  on  the  same 
3  funnelled  cruiser.     Fired  4  salvoes,  the  first  salvo  fired 

was  seen  to  have  straddled  the  target.     The  hit  was 

observed  on  after  part  of  the  ship  with  the  3rd  salvo. 

Range  about  10900  yards  from  the  plot. 
6.33.     "  Royal    Oak  "    opened    fire    with    6-in.    guns.     Two    or 

3  salvoes  fired  on  above  target,  all  ajDparently  straddhng* 

"  Royal  Oak  "  was  straddled  once. 
6.35.     "  Royal    Oak  "    checked    fire,    enemy    cruiser    being    no 

longer  visible.     When  last  seen   was   burning  fiercely. 

There  was  a  large  amount  of  spray  from  shots  in  front 

of  her  at  this  time. 
1  *  *  *  *  * 


^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  99 


P.M. 


Observed  cruisers  heavily  engaged  on  the  starboard 

bow,  two  of  our  cruisers  seemed  to  be  badly  damaged. 
6.45.     Enemy  Battle  fleet  faintly  visible  on  the  starboard  beam. 

Order  passed  to  "  open  fire  "  but  could  not  be  carried 

out  owing  to  mist  enveloping  them.     From  spotting  top 

the    four    engaged    ships    looked    like    "  Konigs  "    or 

"  Kaisers." 
6.50.     Passed  wreck  of  ship  on  starboard  beam,  broken  in  two 

pieces,    believed    to    be    "  Invincible."     Speed    varied 

from  15  to  18  knots. 
7.9.       "  Royal   Oak  "   and   "  Benbow  "   opened  fire,   with   6-in. 

guns  on  enemy  destroyers.     Bearing  Green  65  to  the 

Westward. 
7.11.     "  Marlborough  "  reported  she  had  been  struck  by  a  mine 

or  a  torpedo. 

7.15.  Observed  3  enemy  battle  cruisers  to  Westward  on  star- 

board beam.  Opened  fire  with  15-in.  guns  on  leading 
enemy's  battle  cruiser  "  Derfflinger "  class.  Atmos- 
sphere  much  clearer  for  a  few  moments. 

7.16.  Enemy  ship  fire  at  was  observed  to  be  hit  several  times 

aft.  Opening  range  14,000  yards.  Speed  of  own  ship 
15  knots.  Enemy  turned  away  into  mist.  Fire  was 
shifted  to  the  next  ship,  a  few  rounds  only  could  be 
fired  as  she  was  soon  lost  in  the  mist.  All  6-in.  guns 
•  were   meanwhile   firing   on   the   enemy   Destroyers    on 

starboard  beam,  who  were  zigzagging  frequently. 

7.28.  Eenmy  destroyers,  making  a  very  effective  smoke  screen, 
turned  away  to  starboard,  our  own  destroyers  coming 
down  from  ahead  and  chasing  them  off. 

7.30.  Altered  course,  leading  ships  together,  rest  in  succession 
to  S.  by  W.  "  Royal  Oak  "  was  not  in  action  again. 
The  total  expenditure  of  ammunition  being  15-in. — 39; 
6-in.— 84. 

7.44.  Heavy  firing  heard  from  rear  of  British  line,  enemy  ships 
very  faintly  visible  on  starboard  quarter.  Shots  seen 
falHng  fairly  close  to  "  Benbow." 

7.50.  Speed  15  knots. 

7.51.  Heavy  firing  observed  on  green  125. 
7.55.     Increased  speed. 

8.17.  Firing  observed  on  port  bow. 

8.20.  3  hght  cruisers  of  "  CalHope  "  class  under  heavy  fire; 
observed  a  hit  on  starboard  quarter  of  rear  cruiser 
abreast  2nd  gun  from  aft.  Apparently  did  not  affect 
the  ship. 

8.55.  Observed  firing  apparently  a  heavy  destroyer  engage- 
ment on  starboard  quarter.  A  big  flare  was  seen 
lasting  quite  15  seconds. 

G  2 


100  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

-P.M. 

At  10.12  and  10.45  firing  again  broke  out  in  this  direction,  in 
the  latter  of  these  a  battleship  division  was  apparently 
engaged,  ships  being  occasionally  silhouetted  against 
searchlights. 

A.M. 

2.20.  "  Iron  Duke  "  fired  a  gun  at  cruiser  on  starboard  bow, 
who  did  not  answer  challenge. 

3.20.     Heard  heavy  firing. 

3.45.     Altered  course  to  port.     Speed  15  knots. 

3.52.  Rear  battle  ship  of  division  fired  at  a  Zeppelin,  red  150, 
Got  ranges  of  Zeppehn  as  19,000-20,000  yards.  "  Iron 
Duke"  fired  13*5-in.  at  her,  she  turned  away  and 
disappeared,  behind  a  cloud,  and  was  not  again  sighted. 

There  were  no  mishaps  with  the  exception  of  one  missfire 
with  a  15-in.  gun,  and  this  was  immediately  rectified. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

C.   MACLACHLAN, 
The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

3rd  Battle  Squadron. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,    H.M.S.    "MARLBOROUGH."    . 

Sub-Enclosure  to  Enclosure  No.  4  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022 
of  20/6/16  from  C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

H.M.S.  "  Marlborough," 

9th  June  1916. 
Sir, 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  at  6.54  p.m.  on  the 
31st  May,  the  ship  was  struck  by  a  torpedo  in  the  Diesel  engine 
room.  At  the  same  time  a  periscope  was  observed  by  witnesses 
about  1,000  yards  on  the  starboard  beam.  No  track  of  this 
torpedo  was  observed,  though  looked  for  by  several  observers 
immediately  after  the  explosion. 

The  explosion  caused  a  list  to  starboard  of  seven  degrees, 
and  flooded  the  Diesel  Engine  Room,  Hydraulic  Engine  Room, 
and  water  was  reported  to  be  entering  "  A  "  boiler  room,  the 
biggest  leak  being  between  the  framing  of  the  watertight  door 
to  the  lower  bunker  100-111,  and  the  bulkhead  to  which  it  is 
secured,  which  had  parted.  I  then  telephoned  orders  to  draw 
fires  in  "  A  "  boiler  room.     Speed  was  now  reduced  to  17  knots. 

"  Marlborough  "  continued  in  the  line,  and  at  7.0  p.m.  three 
torpedoes  were  reported  on  the  starboard  beam  and  bow. 
Course  was  immediately  altered  to  starboard  and  then  to  port ; 
two  torpedoes  passed  ahead  and  one  astern  of  the  ship. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  101 

The  T.B.D.  "Acasta,"  lying  disabled,  was  then  passed  one 
cable  on  the  port  beam.  At  7.0  p.m.  fire  was  reopened  on  a 
disabled  enemy  ship,  range  9,800  yards,  four  salvoes  were  fired, 
and  the  third  and  fourth  were  observed  to  hit.  Ceased  fire 
at  7.07  p.m. 

At  7.10  p.m.  fired  a  torpedo  at  a  disabled  German  ship  with 
three  funnels.  This  may  have  been  the  same  ship.  At  7.12  p.m. 
opened  fire  on  battleship  of  "  Markgraf  "  class,  one  point  before 
the  start)oard  beam,  distant  10,200  yards,  steering  south. 
Fourteen  salvoes  in  six  minutes  were  fired  at  this  ship,  and  the 
sixth,  twelfth,  thirteenth,  and  fourteenth  were  observed  to  hit. 
The  speed  was  now  15  knots      Ceased  firing  at  7.18  p.m. 

At  7.19  a  T.B.D.  flotilla  was  sighted  attacking  on  the  star- 
board bow,  opened  fire  at  them  with  range  11,000  yards. 
Course  was  altered  away  two  points  to  S.S.E.,  and  at  7.22  the 
flotilla  scattered  in  a  dense  cloud  of  funnel  smoke,  two  boats 
being  hit.  At  7.24,  altered  course  to  S.E.  by  S.,  and  fired  a 
torpedo  at  a  battleship  of  the  "  Markgraf  *'  class.  At  7.33 
three  torpedoes  were  observed  on  starboard  beam  and  bow, 
course  was  immediately  altered  to  starboard  and  then  to  port, 
one  passed  ahead,  one  astern,  and  the  other  very  close  astern 
or  under  the  ship. 

Ship  was  steadied  on  course  S.  by  W.,  and  at  7.52  to  S.S.W. 
At  8.0  p.m.  course  was  altered  to  West  and  speed  to  17  knots, 
a  report  also  was  made  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  that 
"  Marlborough's  "  maximum  speed  was  reduced  to  17  knots. 

At  8.20,  altered  course  to  S.W.,  9.0  to  S.  4  E.,  and  9.15 
to  S.  7  W.  At  10.5  p.m.  there  was  gunfire  on  the  starboard 
beam  and  again  at  10.40,  abaft  the  starboard  beam,  distant 
about  8  miles. 

At  11.44  p.m.  gunfire  heavy  on  starboard  quarter,  and  again 
at  00.10  a.m.  about  7  points  abaft  starboard  beam.  A  very 
heavy  explosion  was  observed,  evidently  a  ship  blowing  up. 

At  about  2  a.m.  1st  June,  Commander  Currey  reported  to 
me  that  the  water  Avas  gaining,  and  that  he  and  Engineer 
Commander  Toop  considered  that  it  was  dangerous  for  the  ship 
to  steam  any  longer  at  a  speed  of  17  knots,  so  with  great  regret 
I  immediately  informed  you  that  speed  must  be  reduced. 
Speed  was  then  reduced  to  15  knots,  and  "  Marlborough  "  hauled 
out  of  fine,  the  "  Revenge,"  "  Hercules,"  and  "  Agincourt  " 
proceeding  at  17  knots. 

At  2.15  a.m.  speed  was  reduced  to  13  knots  and  "  Fearless  " 
ordered  alongside  port  side.  Engines  were  stopped  at  2.30  a.m. 
"  Fearless  "  came  alongside,  embarking  you  and  your  staff. 

At  3.0  a.m.  I  proceeded  N.  4  E.,  and  later  on  the  "  Fearless  " 
joined  as  escort.  A  Zeppelin  was  sighted  at  4.0  a.m.  passing 
astern  and  steering  to  the  Eastward.  Two  common  and  two 
A. P.  shells  from  13'5-in.  guns  and  twelve  H.E.  shell  from  H.A. 
gun  were  fired,  and  the  Zeppelin  was  observed  to  dip  suddenly, 
but  proceeded  on  its  course. 


102  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

Orders  were  now  received  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  to 
proceed  to  T3'ne  or  Rosyth  via  M  channel,  so  at  4.30  a.m.  course 
was  altered  to  S.  38  W.,  14  knots.  Owing  to  the  deep  draught 
of  the  shij>  I  decided  to  proceed  to  Rosyth. 

At  i).3()  a.m.  two  submarines  were  observed,  bearing  west 
about  8  miles  off  and  steering  towards  "  Marlborough  "  with 
conning  towers  siiowing.  Five  minutes  later  they  dived,  so 
course  was  altered  away  from  them,  course  being  resumed  at 
10.50  a.m.  to  S.  56  W.  At  10.52  a.m.  an  oily  patch  was 
observed  about  2  miles  astern,  and  the  track  of  a  torpedo  over- 
hauling the  ship,  the  torpedo  passed  along  the  port  side,  two 
cables  off.  At  11.10  a.m.  course  was  altered  to  westward,  and 
at  1.45  p.m.  Commodore  (T)  with  Harwich  Flotillas  was  sighted 
bearing  S.E.  T.B.D.'s  "  Lark,"  "  Lance,"  "  Lysander,"  and 
"  Lassoo,"  and  shortly  afterwards  "  Laforey,"  "  Lookout," 
"  Lawford,"  and  "  Laverock  "  joined  as  escort.  At  4.0  p.m. 
T.B.D.s  "  Ness  "  and  "  Albatross  "  joined. 

At  8.0  p.m.  the  wind  was  freshening  from  the  S.W.,  force  5, 
and  by  10.0  p.m.  W.S.W.,  force  6,  with  a  rising  sea. 

About  10.0  p.m.  the  water  was  rising  in  "  A  "  boiler  room 
through  the  suction  of  the  ash  expeller  pump  and  submersible 
pump  continually  choking  and  the  canvas  hose  of  the  ejector 
bursting.  At  midnight  the  water  was  still  gaining,  and  was  now 
about  4  feet  below  the  grating  around  the  top  of  the  boilers. 
Commander  Currey  reported  that  matters  were  serious  below, 
and  asked  that  a  salvage  tug  might  be  signalled  for.  I  then 
altered  course  to  S.W.  by  W.  reduced,  to  10  knots,  and  steered 
for  the  lee  of  Flamborough  Head,  which  was  distant  about 
50  miles,  stationed  the  "  Fearless  "  one  and  a  half  cables  to 
windward  of  the, fore  bridge  as  the  sea  was  breaking  over  the 
starboard  side  of  the  upper  deck.  At  the  same  time  I  informed 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  state  of  affairs,  and  asked  the 
S.N.O.,  Tyne,  to  send  tugs  to  meet  me  off  Flamborough  Head. 

1  also  warned  destroyers  to  be  prepared  to  come  alongside 
lee  side. 

The  "  Laforey  "  and  "  Lookout  "  then  asked  if  they  could  be 
of   use   in   laying   an    oil   track   ahead   of    "  Marlborough."     At 

2  a.m.  "  Lance's  "  division  was  ordered  to  lay  oil  track  ahead, 
and  to  windward  of  "  Marlborough."  This  proved  most  success- 
ful, and  I  was  very  grateful  to  the  destroyers  for  the  suggestion. 
My  wireless  messages  were  interce]ited  by  the  Admiralty  and  a 
signal  was  received  from  the  Admiralty  to  proceed  to  the 
Humber.  In  the  meantime  in  "  A  "  boiler  room.  Stoker  Petty 
Officer  Ackerman  was  sent  down  in  a  diving  dress  and  cleared 
the  suctions  of  the  pumps,  and  at  1  a.m.  the  water  was  stopped 
from  rising.     Speed  was  increased  to  12  knots  at  3  a.m. 

At  about  4.30  a.m.  the  steam  ejector  was  repaired  and  the 
boiler  room  was  cleared  of  water  well  below  the  floor  plates  at 
about  5.15  a.m.  As  the  land  was  closed  the  Meather  improved, 
and  at  5.30  a.m.  the  destroyers  stopped  making  oil  track. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  103 

"  Marlborough  "  passed  Spurn  Light  Vessel  at  7.35  a.m., 
and  secured  to  No.  3  buoy  off  Immingham  at  10  a.m. 

^^llen    the    ship    was    torpedoed,    Stoker    Wilham    Rustage, 

Official  Number  K.  20,877,  and  Stoker  Edgar  G.  Monk,  Official 

Number  K.  4,266,  A^iio  were  on  duty  in  the  Diesel  room,  were 

instantly   killed. 

1      *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

GEORGE    P.    ROSS, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

First  Battle  Squadi'on. 

Engineering  Report. 

H.M.S.  "  Marlborough  "  in  Action, 

31st  Mmj  1916. 

The  explosion  distorted  the  bulkhead  on  starboard  side  of 
"  A  "  Boiler  Room  between  Boiler  Room  and  Lower  Bunkers 
90-111.  The  forward  athwartships  bulkhead  at  92  station  was 
also  distorted.  The  firebars  and  fire  of  No.  1  Boiler  Room  fell 
into  Ash  Pans.  The  Boilers  and  steam  pipes  remained  intact 
and  there  was  no  escape  of  steam.  Water  came  into  the  Boiler 
Room,  the  biggest  leak  being  between  the  framing  of  the  water- 
tight door  to  lower  bunker  100-111,  and  the  bulkhead  to  which 
it  is  secured.  Electric  and  secondary  fighting  was  not  interfered 
vdth.  in  "  A  "  Boiler  Room. 

The  fire  and  bilge  pump,  steam  ejector,  and  ash  expeller 
pump  were  put  on  the  bilge  in  a  most  expeditious  manner,  but 
water  continued  to  rise  and  put  out  fires  in  Nos.  1  and  6  boilers 
within  a  few  minutes  of  the  explosion,  ten  minutes  after  the 
explosion  the  water  put  the  fires  out  in  Nos.  2  and  5  boilers — as 
fires  were  put  out  boilers  were  shut  off ;  water  continued  to 
rise,  when  fires  were  drawn  in  Nos.  3  and  4  boilers,  and  the 
main  steam  system  in  "  A  "  Boiler  Room  was  then  isolated. 
All  efforts  were  directed  to  clear  the  boiler  room  of  water,  special 
attention  being  given  to  keeping  suctions  clear  of  ashes  and  dirt. 
This  was  successful  and  at  about  7.30  the  water  was  at  the  level 
of  the  fioor  plates  and  was  kept  there  until  the  following  day. 

All  coal  and  oil  fuel  necessary  for  "  B  "  and  "  C  "  Boiler 
Rooms  was  taken  from  the  Starboard  side  and  coal  was  trimmed 
from  starboard  upper  outer  bunkers  to  lower  and  oil  fuel  pumped 
from  starboard  tanks  to  Port  emergency  tanks  ;  no  compartments 
were  flooded  for  trimming  purpose. 

From  the  time  the  explosion  on  the  31st  May  until  arrival  of 
the  vessel  in  the  Humber  about  8.30  a.m.  on  2nd  June  the  heel 
of  vessel  to  starboard  at  no  time  exceeded  7|  degrees. 


1  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  actioii. 


1u4  battle  of  jutland  : 

Report   of   Work   done   after   Explosion   of  Torpedo   in 
Diesel  Engine  Room,  31st  May,  6.64  G.M.T. 

During  the  afternoon  enemy  vessels  were  reported,  and 
gieat  excitement  prevailed  amongst  the  ship's  company  at  the 
chance  of  getting  a  shot  at  the  enemy.  Signal  was  made  by 
Flag  to  prepare  for  immediate  action.  Shortly  after  this  was 
completed,  distant  firing  was  heard  and  signals  were  coming  in 
from  various  ships  engaging  the  enemy. 

At  4.15  sounded  off  action  stations.  I  then  ordered  the 
forward  wreckage  party  and  Canteen  Assistants  to  throw  over- 
board all  bacon  and  Canteen  gear  stowed  in  the  boat-deck 
storeroom  and  the  men  returned  to  their  stations. 

At  6.18  opened  fire,  I  went  round  the  main  deck  and  saw 
all  the  men  at  their  stations.  All  went  smoothly  until  at  6.54, 
ship  was  struck  by  a  torpedo.  I  was  just  stepping  out  of  lower 
conning  tower  door  when  the  torpedo  exploded,  and  it  felt 
uncomfortably  close.  I  saw  the  oil  fuel  come  out  between  angle 
iron  and  the  deck,  and  then  it  closed  up  and  stopped  completely. 
No  one  in  the  lower  conning  tower  was  even  shghtly  damaged, 
or  in  the  switchboard  room.  I  got  no  answer  from  upper  conning 
tower  for  about  |  minute  after  challenging,  and  they  then 
challenged  "  correct."  I  then  went  out  of  the  conning  tower 
and  found  thick  fumes  of  oil  fuel  on  the  main  deck.  The  hghts 
were  all  out  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  explosion,  and 
they  came  on  again  about  |  minute  after  I  got  up  there.  I  saw 
a  man  come  out  of  the  HydrauUc  Room,  Forrard  starboard  side, 
and  I  saw  the  oil  fuel  on  the  main  deck,  and  oil  fuel  in  the  Diesel 
room  escape.  I  ordered  the  sliding  shutters  to  be  closed,  also 
the  vent  doors  to  escapes,  and  the  sliding  shutters  and  ventilating 
valves.  I  ascertained  that  two  men  were  in  Diesel  room,  but  as 
trunk  was  full  there  was  no  doubt  they  were  killed  by  explosion. 

I  then  ordered  the  Medical  Distributing  Station  to  be  shored  u)), 
and  the  6-in.  magazine  (this  magazine  was  reported  badly  dented). 

I  received  a  message  that  "  A  "  boiler  room  was  flooding, 
and  could  not  keep  the  water  under.  I  reported  to  upper 
conning  tower  and  then  went  down  in  "  A  "  boiler  room  myself, 
but  found  the  bullchead  on  fore  end  and  bunker  bulkhead, 
starboard  side,  badly  dented  and  a  lot  of  water  coming  out  of 
starboard  after  bunker  door.  I  found  the  men  in  the  stokehold 
working  in  splendid  style.  The  water  had  put  out  the  fires  in 
the  four  starboard  boilers,  and  they  were  stoking  four  port 
boilers  with  water  almost  up  to  their  knees  as  if  nothing  was 
going  on.     Their  coolness  and  courage  is  deserving  of  great  praise. 

I  left  the  boiler  room  and,  went  down  to  6-in.  magazine  and 
"  B  "  space  to  see  the  damage  there.  I  found  6-in.  magazine 
very  sHght  leakage,  but  there  was  a  large  dent  in  the  side  plating. 
There  was  also  a  sUght  leak  in  starboard  aft  corner  of  6-in.  shell 
room.  There  was  no  leakage  in  "  B  "  space,  magazine,  or  shell 
room.  -  Water  was  gaining  in  fore  medical  distributing  station, 
and  I  had  the  deck  shored  up,  which  was  showing  signs  of 
weakness,  and  I  took  the  forward  medical  party  and  kept  the 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  105 

small  hand  fire  pump  going.  I  then  went  down  to  my  station, 
and  the  report  came  through  that  the  water  in  "  A  "  boiler  room 
was  under  control,  and  that  fires  were  being  primed  and  topped. 
The  ship  now  had  a  list  to  starboard  of  about  8  degrees. 
The  ship  was  still  steaming  as  fast  as  possible  with  "  B  "  and 
"  C  "  boiler  rooms,  about  17  knots.  At  about  8  p.m.  I  again 
went  round  the  damage  in  "  A  "  boiler  room,  water  the  starboard 
side  was  just  up  to  floor  plates.  There  was  a  heavy  stream 
coming  through  between  the  starboard  after  bunker  door  framing 
and  bulkhead.  A  moderate  stream  from  both  ends  of  electric 
lead  passage,  a  smaller  stream  through  the  Diesel  engine  exhaust, 
but  the  ash  expeller  was  keeping  the  water  under.  I  then  went  up 
on  the  main  deck,  starboard  side,  between  90  and  111  bulkheads, 
and  found  oil  fuel  coming  out  of  the  deck  and  gaining  slowly. 
I  could  find  no  puncture  anywhere,  so  assumed  the  deck  was 
leaking  at  the  angle  iron.  I  then  ordered  the  pump  keeping 
the  medical  distributing  station  clear  to  shift  to  the  main 
deck  and  pump  out,  and  to  alternate  between  the  two.  At 
about  midnight  I  got  up  the  five-ton  portable  electric  pump 
from  "  Y  "  space,  which  worked  well,  and  was  sufficient  to  keep 
the  water  under  in  the  medical  distributing  station  and  the  main 
deck.  The  glands  for  the  electric  leads  on  the  starboard  bulkhead 
of  the  lower  conning  tower  flat  now  began  to  give  trouble.  I  got 
a  small  punch  and  caulked  with  white  lead  and  yarn.  I  cut  off 
some  leads  and  carefully  screwed  on  a  blank  flange,  and  in  cases 
of  leakage  between  bulkhead  and  glands  shored  up  with  small 
shores.  This  enabled  two  hands  to  keep  the  flat  dry  with  buckets. 
I  next  opened  electricians'  workshop  (66-78)  and  found  water 
coming  up  slowly  through  the  deck,  showing  comj)artments 
below  were  flooded.  I  set  up  the  door  with  shores  which  had 
been  shaken,  and  this  almost  stoi3ped  the  leakage.  There  were 
no  signs  of  water  leaking  in  any  other  compartments  I  examined. 

At  about  1  a.m.  I  went  below  to  "  A  "  boiler  room  again, 
and  I  consider  that  the  fore  and  aft  starboard  bulkhead  and 
starboard  forward  corner  of  athwartship  bulkhead  was  gradually 
coming  in,  so  I  ordered  the  carpenter  to  put  up  some  more  shores 
on  the  weakening  parts,  and  I  went  aft  to  see  the  Engineer- 
Commander  and  discuss  the  situation.  I  told  him  I  considered 
it  unsafe  to  continue  with  this  high  speed.  He  said  he  was 
using  fuel  entirely  from  the  starboard  side ;  this  was  not  bringing 
the  ship  upright,  but  it  prevented  the  list  getting  worse.  This 
made  me  assume  that  water  was  gaining  on  us  in  other  compart- 
ments we  could  not  see,  and  he  agreed  with  me  that  he  did  not 
consider  it  safe  to  continue.  He  also  stated  he  thought  the 
fire  of  "  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets  would  probably  bring  down  the 
shores.  If  this  happened,  I  did  not  consider  the  bulkheads 
would  hold,  so  I  came  on  the  bridge  and  reported  the  matter 
to  the  Captain.  At  about  2  a.m.  H.M.8.  "  Fearless  "  came 
alongside  the  ship  and  took  the  Vice -Admiral  and  Staff  away. 
The  ship  proceeded  at  11  knots.  I  then  went  round  and  found 
that  at  this  speed  the  flow  of  water  had  not  increased,  and  the 


106  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

bulkhead  did  not  get  any  worse.  I  reported  to  the  Captain, 
and  speed  was  gradually  increased  to  13  knots.  I  then  went 
aft  and  discussed  the  subject  of  flooding  port  side  aft  abreast 
wing  engine  room  with  tiie  Engineer-CJommander  to  bring  the 
ship  back  to  nearly  upright,  Ijut  we  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
it  would  be  better  to  keep  the  ship  with  8  degrees  list  than  to 
make  her  heavy,  as  in  the  event  of  being  hit  with  another 
torpedo  she  would  have  plenty  of  reserve  buoyancy,  an  8  degrees' 
list  being  no  danger  to  the  ship.  The  flooding  could  be  done 
quickly  if  necessary  to  put  her  on  an  even  keel  for  gunfire,  so 
I  did  not  submit  the  question  to  the  Captain  to  flood  the  port 
wings.  The  electric  lead  glands  were  getting  worse,  but  by 
taking  them  in  hand  at  once  the  water  was  kept  from  gaining. 
In  the  compartments  inside  the  damage  I  had  a  hand  stationed 
at  all  bulkheads  to  report  any  increase  of  water  through  leaky 
glands  or  rivets.  About  6  a.m.  I  took  Chief  Stoker  Bond  down 
to  "  D  "  pump,  and  we  tried  the  2nd-4th  longitudinal  as  far 
aft  as  78,  and  it  was  tight,  no  water  being  in  the  compartment. 
Abaft  78  it  was  open  to  the  sea.  The  starboard  bath-rooms  were 
all  practically  empty.  A  rivet  hole  was  found  on  the  boundarj'^ 
angle  of  the  war  signal  station,  through  which  the  oil  fuel  was 
leaking  on  to  the  main  deck.  This  was  plugged  with  a  wooden 
plug,  and  in  about  half  an  hour's  time  the  main  deck  between 
90  and  111  bulkheads,  starboard  side,  began  to  buckle  upwards 
in  large  blisters.     I  shored  it  down  with  mess  tables  and  stools. 

The  bunker  plate  on  the  mess  deck  was  also  leaking  badly, 
so  I  shored  one  of  the  small  collision  mats  over  this  and  stopped 
it,  At  about  11  a.m.  the  submersible  pump  (100  tons),  supplied 
for  trial,  was  placed  down  the  starboard  aft  of  "  A  "  boiler  room, 
and  started  about  noon.  This  pump  was  of  great  value  and 
worked  very  well,  and  throws  a  good  head  of  water.  It  works 
better  under  water  than  pulling  and  heaving,  as  it  keeps  cooler. 

The  afternoon  and  early  evening  passed  quietly,  then  the 
wind  and  sea  arose.  This  was  a  most  anxious  time,  as  the  ship 
began  to  work,  and  I  did  not  know  what  might  happen.  I  placed 
two  extra  shores  inside  by  the  centre  of  the  boilers  half  way  along 
each  boiler.  At  about  10.45  the  carpenter  reported  water 
gaining  in  "  A  "  stokehold.  I  went  down  to  see  what  could  be 
done.  I  found  Engr.  Lieut. -Commr.  Cunninghame  down  below 
assisting  with  the  pumps.  The  working  of  the  ship  had 
disturbed  the  dirt  in  the  bottom,  and  the  suction  of  the  ash 
expeller  and  submersible  pump  were  continually  choking.  The 
ejector  was  tried,  but  the  canvas  hose  burst,  a  spare  hose  was 
shipped  and  blew  away  from  the  joint.  The  Engineer-Com- 
mander gave  orders  for  three  bands  to  be  made  to  secure  the 
end  connection  (the  ejector  was  completed  at  4.30  a.m.).  About 
11.30  the  submersible  was  shifted  to  clear  its  suction,  and  in  so 
doing  the  roll  of  the  ship  took  it  against  the  shores  of  the  door 
and  knocked  them  away.  This  increased  the  flow  of  water, 
as  they  could  not  be  replaced  owing  to  the  depth  of  water  in 
the  boiler  room.     At  midnight  the  water  was  still  gaining,  and 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  107 

was  now  about  4  ft.  below  the  grating  around  the  tops  of  the 
boilers.  I  considered  the  situation  serious,  and  reported  the 
matter  to  the  Captain,  I  also  informed  him  I  considered  salvage 
tugs  should  be  asked  for,  as  in  the  event  of  "  A  "  boiler  room 
flooding,  it  was  impossible  to  say  where  such  a  large  volume  of 
water  may  find  its  way,  and  it  was  quite  possible  it  might  be 
necessary  to  stop  the  engines.  I  came  down  from  the  bridge 
and  got  up  the  diving  gear.  Stoker  Petty  Officer  Ackerman 
went  down  in  the  diving  dress  and  kept  the  suctions  clear,  and 
at  1  a.m.  the  water  was  stopped  from  rising.  At  about  4.30  a.m. 
the  steam  ejector  was  repaired  and  the  boiler  room  was  cleared 
of  water  well  below  the  floor  plates  about  5.15,  and  the  situation 
became  in  hand. 

On  arrival  in  the  Humber,  Commander  Ward  came  on  board 
to  ascertain  the  damage  and  what  was  required.  One  6-in. 
and  two  3-in.  petrol  motor  salvage  pumps  were  sent  on  board 
in  the  afternoon,  and  the  tug  "  Englishman  "  with  a  large  pump 
was  sent  alongside  on  arrival.  During  the  afternoon  a  large 
number  of  shores  and  planks  were  sent  off  to  the  ship.  Captain 
Pomeroy  of  the  Liverpool  Salvage  Association  came  on  board 
about  noon,  and  his  professional  advice  about  shores  and  stopping 
leaks  was  very  valuable.  He  advised  about  placing  additional 
shores,  and  what  he  considered  the  ship  could  stand.  The  ship 
was  brought  to  an  even  keel  by  flooding  the  wing  compartments 
abreast  port  wing  engine  room  and  pumping  more  oil  over  to  the 
port  side.  The  Boatswain's  Stores  forward,  the  Paint  Store, 
sand,  and  all  heavy  weights  from  forward  were  brought  aft, 
and  placed  on  the  quarter  deck  and  in  the  Admiral's  lobby. 
"  A  "  and  "  B  "  and  6-in.  magazines  and  shell  rooms  were  cleared 
into  lighters,  sheet  anchor  and  cables  were  landed.  Starboard 
provision  and  flour  rooms  were  cleared  and  placed  over  the 
port  side.  There  was  2  ins.  of  water  in  the  flour  room,  due  to 
leaky  electric  glands.  On  Saturday  evening,  about  6.45,  the 
starboard  fore  and  aft  bulkhead  in  "  A  "  boiler  room  began  to 
give  slightly.  More  additional  shores  were  then  placed,  and  the 
bulkhead  was  made  quite  safe  about  midnight  Saturday-Sunday. 
The  salvage  vessel  "  Linnet  "  came  alongside  at  8  a.m.  Sunday, 
and  placed  an  8-in.  submersible  pump  in  "  A  "  boiler  room. 
Sunday  evening  the  ship  was  on  an  even  keel,  drawing  33  ft. 
6  ins.  forward  and  31  ft.  6  ins.  aft.  The  ship  did  not  proceed 
to  sea  on  Monday  owing  to  weather.  Tuesday  ship  proceeded 
to  sea  and  made  good  10  knots.  Rounding  Flamborough  Head 
at  noon  the  ship  ran  into  a  heav}^  swell,  which  continued  until 
5  p.m.,  but  no  shores  gave  way,  and  the  ship  stood  it  well. 


H.  SCHOMBERG  CURREY, 

Commander. 


^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


108  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 


VICE-ADMIRAL'S   REPORT,   2nd  BATTLE   SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  5  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 
C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

No.  149/47  D. 

"  King  George  V.," 
Sir,  5th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  a  summary  of  the 
events  occurring  during  the  recent  action,  compiled  from  reports 
made  by  ships  of  the  Second  Battle  Squadron,  accompanied  by 
plans  sent  in  by  "  King  George  V.,"i  "  Erin,"^  "  Orion,"' 
"  Monarch,"^  and  "  Thunderer,"*  and  a  diary  of  events  before, 
during,  and  after  the  action,  kept  on  board  "  King  Geogre  V." 

2.  I  am  unable  to  supply  much  detail  from  personal 
observation,  as  it  was  mipossible  to  gather  any  general  idea  of 
the  action,  only  momentary  gUmpses  of  the  enemy  being 
obtained. 

As  leading  ship,  in  addition  to  the  hazy  atmosphere,  I  was 
much  hampered  by  what  I  imagine  to  have  been  cordite  fumes 
from  the  battle-cruisers  after  they  passed  us,  and  from  other 
cruisers  engaged  on  the  bow ;  also  by  funnel  gases  from  small 
craft  ahead,  and,  for  a  considerable  time,  by  dense  smoke  from 
"  Duke  of  Edinburgh,"  who  was  unable  to  draw  clear. 

3.  There  is  some  evidence  that  submarines  were  close ; 
"  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "  three  times  made  the  signal  of  their 
presence,  and  my  Flag  Lieutenant-Commander  is  certain  that 
he  saw  the  two  periscopes  of  one  vessel. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  obvious  to  me  that  a  good  deal  of 
"  Duke  of  Edinburgh's  "  fire  was  directed  not  at  a  submarine 
but  at  the  wake  of  vessels  ahead. 

The  right  gunlayer  and  trainer  of  '"  Y  "  turret  in  "  King 
George  V.  "  state  that  they  saw  a  torpedo  break  surface 
400  yards  short  of  "King  George  V." 

4.  I  should  like  to  mention  specially  that  about  9  p.m. 
I  negatived  an  attack  with  Whitehead  torpedoes  ordered  by 
"  CaroHne,"  as  I  was  certain  that  the  vessels  seen  on  our 
starboard  beam  were  our  own  battle-cruisers.  The  Navigating 
Officer  of  my  Flagship,  who  has  just  come  from  the  battle-cruiser 
fleet,  was  also  certain  that  they  were  ours,  and  saw  them 
sufficiently  clearly  to  give  their  approximate  course,  which  I 
reported  to  you. 

Shortly  afterwards,  I  told  "  Carohne  "  to  attack  if  he  was 
quite  certain  they  were  enemy  ships,  as  he  was  in  a  better  position 

'  Plate  8. 

-  No  trace  of  receipt  at  Admiralty  of  plans  bv  "  Erin  "  or  "  Monarch  " 

3  Plate  29.  '         "Plate '30. 


VUiU-^  8. 


Plan    showing  Track  of  H. M.S.  George V. 
VIpm  loKptn.May3'".''l9l6 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


109 


to  see  them  than  I  was,  but  I  do  not  know  whether  an  attack 
was  made. 

If  they  were  enemy  ships  and  ho  attack  was  made,  the  fault 
is  mine,  and  not  that  of  "  CaroHne." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

T.  H.  M.  JERRAM, 

Vice- Admiral, 
Commanding  Second  Battle  Squadron. 

The  Commander-in-Chief, 
H.M.  Ships  and  Vessels, 
Grand  Fleet. 

ACTION  OF  31ST  MAY,  1916. 
Summary  of  Reports  from  Second  Battle  Squadron. 


Time. 


Ship 
Reporting. 


Observations. 


Remarks. 


oAO  p.m. 
6.15  p.m. 


6. 15  p.m. 


G.17  p.m. 


'King  George 
V." 

•'  Orion  "      - 


"  Monaich  " 


"Thunderer' 


0)3served  battle  cruisers  in 
action,  probably  about  30° 
green. 

Trained  on  an  enemy 
cruiser,  apparently  of 
"  Kolberg  ""  class  already 
on  fire  aft  and  stopped, 
steam  escaping  from 
funnels,  foremast  shot 
away.  Range,  12,400  yards. 
Did  not  open  fire,  as 
blanked  by  a  ship  of  1st 
Cruiser  Squadron. 

Enemy  hidden  from  us  by 
our  battle  cruisers.  Two 
four  -  funnelled  British 
cruisers  retiring  towards 
rear  end  of  our  battle  fleet. 
One  disappeared  in  a  cloud 
of  steam.  One  surroimded 
by  splashes  but  appeared 
to  emerge  undamaged. 
1st  Cruiser  Squadron  under 
heavy  fire,  being  straddled 
frequently.  They  were  seen 
to  damage  a  German 
cruiser  severely,  setting  her 
on  fire  aft.  This  was 
thought  to  be  either  "Prinz 
Adalbert  "  or  "  Friedrich 
Karl." 


As  these  vessels 
are  believed  to 
have  been  sunk 
some  time  ago, 
probably  it  was 
"Kolberg  "class. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


109 


to  see  them  than  I  was,  but  I  do  not  know  whether  an  attack 
was  made. 

If  they  were  enemy  ships  and  ho  attack  was  made,  the  fault 
is  mine,  and  not  that  of  "  CaroHne." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

T.  H.  M.  JERRAM, 
Vice-Admiral, 
Commanding  Second  Battle  Squadron. 

The  Commander-in-Chief, 
H.M.  Ships  and  Vessels, 
Grand  Fleet. 

ACTION  OF  3  1st  MAY,  1916. 
Summary  of  Reports  from  Second  Battle  Squadron. 


Time. 


Ship 
Reporting. 


Observations. 


Remarks. 


5.4:0  p.m. 
6.15  p.m. 


6. 15  p.m. 


6.17  p.m. 


'King  George 
V." 

"  Orion  " 


"  Monaich  " 


'  'Thunderer' 


Observed  battle  cruisers  in 
action,  probably  about  30° 
green. 

Trained  on  an  enemy 
cruiser,  apparently  of 
"  Kolberg  "  class  already 
on  fire  aft  and  stopped, 
steam  escaping  from 
funnels,  foremast  shot 
away.  Range,  12,400  yards. 
Did  not  open  fire,  as 
blanked  by  a  ship  of  1st 
Cruiser  Scpiadron. 

Enemy  hidden  from  us  by 
our  battle  cruisers.  Two 
four  -  funnelled  British 
cruisers  retiring  towards 
rear  end  of  our  battle  fleet. 
One  disappeared  in  a  cloud 
of  steam.  One  surrounded 
by  splashes  but  appeared 
to  emerge  undamaged. 
1st  Cruiser  Squadron  under 
heavy  fire,  being  straddled 
frequently.  They  were  seen 
to  damage  a  German 
cruiser  severely,  setting  her 
on  fire  aft.  This  was 
thought  to  be  either  "Prinz 
Adalbert"  or  "  Friedrich 
Karl." 


As  these  vessels 
are  believed  to 
have  been  simk 
some  time  ago, 
probably  it  was 
"Koibfrg  "class. 


110 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND 


Time. 


Ship 
Reporting 


Remarks. 


6.20  p.m. 


6.25  p.m. 


"  Orion  " 


'Tliunclerer" 


6.25  p.m. 


Thunderer'' 


6.30  p.m. 
(appi'ox.) 


<  !?'„;.,  " 


Erin 


6.30  p.m. 


"  Monarch  " 


6.31  p.m. 


'Conqueror" 


6.32  p.m. 


'  King  George 

v." 


Observed  one  of  our  battle 
cruisers  heavily  engaged 
before  starboard  beam.  Ri- 
cochets falling  near  us. 

"  Iron  Duke  "  opened  fire  on 
damaged  cruiser.  "  Thun- 
deior  "  also  opened  fire, 
followed  by  "  Conqueror." 


Foui-  enemy  ships — "  Kaiser ' 
class  and  battle  ciuisers — 
hove  in  sight.  Gims  were 
laid  on  one  of  these,  but  we 
were  masked  by  "  Con- 
queror "  before  we  could 
fire.  Ranges  of  22,000 
were  obtained  in  the  fore 
top. 

2nd  Battle  Squadron's  view 
of  enemy  obscured  by 
smoke  of  "  Duke  of  Edin- 
burgh," Enemy's  battle 
fleet  must  then  have  tiu-ned 
16  points,  om"  battle  cruiser 
fleet  about  this  time  passing 
between  us  and  them  and 
being  joined  by  the  3rd 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 

Opened  fire  on  enemy  light 
crmser  of  "  Kolberg  "  class 
stopped.  Range,  10,400. 
Fired  three  salvoes ;  first 
missed  right,  second  missed 
right,  third  appeared  to 
straddle. 

Opened  fire  on  "  Markgraf  " 
class;  rough  range,  12,000 
yards.  This  ship  quickly 
disappeared  in  the  haze, 
and  fire  was  shifted  to  a 
three-funnelled  cruiser  (pro- 
bably the  late  "  Maravev 
Amurski,"  vide  Sheet  "  D," 
959 — -War  Vessels);  rough 
range,  10,000  yards. 

Ship  bearing  S.E.  blew  up ; 
it  is  not  known  what  this 
vessel  was,  but  it  was 
thought  to  be  an  enemy 
light  cruiser. 

Also  passed  shortly  after 
this  "  Acasta  "  badly  dam- 
aged placing  collision  mat, 
and     another     British     de- 


This  was  proba- 
bly same  ship 
of  "  Kolberg  " 
class  referred  to 
previously  by 
"Thunderer" 
and  "Orion." 


Probably  same 
ship  previously 
referred  to  by 
"  Orion  '  and 
"  Thunderer." 


It  seems  probable 
that  this  also 
refers  to  "  Kol- 
berg "  class  ves- 
sel under  fire 
from  several 
ships. 


One  was  observed 
there  shortly  be- 
fore heavily  on 
fire,  probably 
"  Stettin  "  class. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES. 


Ill 


Time. 


Ship 
Reporting. 


Remarks. 


6.32  p.m. 


"  Orion  " 


6.33  p.m. 


Monarch 


About 
6.33  p.m. 


■  Thunderer ' 


6.37  p.m. 
6.51  p.m. 


■'  Orion  " 

' '  King  George 
V." 


stroyer  apparently  with 
disabled  engines. 

Sighted  ship  of  "  Kaiser  " 
class,  105  green,  range, 
11,100  yards;  fired  four 
salvoes  by  director,  first 
two  short,  third  over, 
fom-th  hit  with  13,300  on 
sights.  Large  fiames  ob- 
served near  enemy's  after 
turret  when  foui'th  salvo 
fell.  Enemy  then  obscured. 

Sighted  five  battleships,  95 
green,  three  "  Konigs  " 
and  two  "  Kaisers,"  range 
12,000  yards.  Opened  fire 
on  leading  "  Konig,"  two 
salvoes,  first  right  and  over, 
second  appeared  to  straddle 
quarter  deck.  These  ships 
disappeared  from  view,  but 
we  fii'ed  one  salvo  at  one  of 
"  Kaisers,"  the  result  not 
being  seen. 

Two  "  Kaiser  "  class  (appa- 
rently) were  now  overlap- 
ping each  other  showing 
between  "  Iron  Duke  "  and 
"  Royal  Oak,"  and  fire  was 
o^^ened  through  the  inter- 
val ;  first  salvo  was  over, 
second  salvo  straddled 
in  line  with  foremast,  and 
two  or  three  large  bursts 
with  black  smoke  were  ob- 
served ("  Thunderer  "  was 
iLsing  powder  filled  com- 
mon). A  third  salvo  was 
filled  with  no  correction, 
and  a  similar  result  ob- 
tained. The  enemy  was 
blazuag  for  the  whole  length 
of  her  quaiter  deck.  A. P. 
shell  was  then  ordered,  but 
"  Iron  Duke  "  masked  the 
fire.  Enemy  was  firing 
rapidly  by  salvoes  at  first, 
but  shortly  caine  down  to 
slowish  fire  from  one  turret. 

"  Orion  "  ceased  fire,  enemy 
out  of  sight. 

"  King  George  V."  had  to 
alter  course  to  starboard 
to  avoid  collision  with  4th 
Light  Cruiser  Squadron  in 
the  van. 


R.A.  "  Orion  " 
personally  ob- 
served the  hits. 


Apparently  same 
ships  as  those 
observed  by 

"  Monarch." 


112 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 


Tiine. 


Ship 
Reporting. 


Observations. 


Remarks. 


7.09  p.m. 


"  Orion 


7.10  p.m. 
(approx.) 


7.12  p.m. 


7.14  p.m. 


7.15  13. m. 


7.15  p.m. 

7.16  p.m\ 


7.17  p.m. 


"  Ajax  " 


Conqueror ' 


"  Monarch 


"  Orion  " 


"  Erin  " 
"Centurion' 


King  George 
V." 


Sighted  sliip  apparently 
battle  cruiser  of  "  Derf- 
flinger "  class,  60°  green, 
accompanied  by  a  large 
number  of  destroyers,  ap- 
proaching and  then  tin-ning 
on  ai^proximately  parallel 
course. 

Fired  one  salvo  which  fell 
short  at  an  enemy  battle- 
cruiser,  range  19,000  yards. 
4th  Light  Cruiser  Squadron 
then  crosse<  1  line  of  fire  and 
obscured  the  view. 

A  destroyer  attack  developed 
from  starboard  beam.  Fire 
was  opened  at  1 0,000  yards. 
Destroyers  turned  away 
obscuring  themselves  with 
smoke  screen. 

Opened  fire  at  "  Konig  " 
class  escorted  by  de- 
stroyers, 76°  green.  Fired 
five  salvoes,  the  last  two 
appearing  to  straddle. 
Range  17,350-18,450  yards. 
Fnemy  commenced  zig- 
zagging after  third  salvo. 

Opened  fire  on  battle  cruiser 
of  "  Derfflinger "  class. 
Fired  six  salvoes,  the  last 
two  straddling.  Enemy 
turned  away  about  the 
fourth  salvo.  Range, 
19,000  yards. 

A  three-funnelled  enemy  ship 
was  observed  to  be  heavily 
on  fire  just  abaft  the  beam 

Fire  opened  on  apparently  a 
"  Kaiser  "  class  vessel,  go- 
ing very  slowly  or  stopped, 
and  surrounded  by  de- 
stroyers. Range,  17,500 
yards.     Shots  did  not  hit. 


"  King  George  V."  opened 
fire  on  leading  enemy  ship. 
Range  on  sights,  'l  2,800 
yards;  salvo  fell  short. 
Target  was  either  leading 
German  battleship  or 
"  Liitzow  "  class  with  three 


Probably  same 
ship  as  observed 
by  "  Orion." 


Same  ship  as  that 
seen  at  7.09  p.m. 


Seems  likely  to 
have  been  same 
ship  as  observed 
by  "  Monarch  " 
at  7.14  p.m., 
though  one  re- 
ported as  being 
"  Konig  "  class, 
and  the  other 
as  "  Kaiser." 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


113 


Time. 

Ship 
Reporting. 

Observations. 

Remarks. 

destroyers  on  engaged  side 

making  a  smoke  screen. 

7.17  jj.m. 

"  Monarch  " 

Ship  observed  heavily  on  fire. 
95°  green. 

7.19  p.m. 

~"  Monarch  " 

Sighted  battle  cruiser  "  Derf- 
flinger  "  class.      110  green. 
Range,  16,000  yards.     Also 
battle  cruiser  ("  Seydlitz  " 
or  "  Moltke  ")  behind  and 
beyond    her.     Trained    on 
enemy  but  director  miss- 
fired  and  then  shijjs  disap- 
peared in  haze. 

7.20  p.m. 

"  Monarch  " 

Three  enemy  destroyers,  95° 
green  (approx.)  being  fired 
at  by  4th  Battle  Squadron. 

7.21  p.m. 

"  Orion  "      - 

Sighted    enemy    battleship 

See  King  George 

("  Markgraf  "  or  "  Kaiser  '" 

V's     report     at 

class).     98°  green,  on  ap- 

7.17 p.m. 

proximately  parallel  covu-se, 

apparently  the  leading  shi]) 

of  a  column,  as  others  could 

be     seen     astern     of     her. 

Range,    14,800  yards. 

"  Orion  "  then  altered  course 

by  signal,  which  prevented 

fire  being  opened. 

7.25  p.m. 

"Centnrion'n 
"Conqueror"  ^ 

Several  ships  report  destroy- 

ers approaching  to  attack 

"Orion"         / 

and  "  Conqueror  "  opened 

"Monarch"  ' 

fire.     Range,  11,000  yards. 

"Conqueror" 

Shortly       afterwards       one 
enemy  destroyersten  to  be 
floating  bottom  up. 

7.27  p.m. 

"King  George 

"  King  George  V."  had  to 

V." 

alter   course   to   starboard 
to  avert  collision  with  light 
craft  in  the  van.      "  Duke 
of  Edinburgh  "  much  in  the 
way  and  making  a  lot  of 
smoke. 

8.20  p.m. 

"  Erin  " 

A  sharp  action  observed  on 
starboard    beam    between 
the      3rd      Light      Cruiser 
Squadron  and  some  enemy 
cruisers. 

8.30  p.m. 

"King  George] 

V." 

Saw  flashes  of  enemy  guns  on 

starboard  bow  and  flashes 

"  Monarch  "  ; 

from    our    battle    cruisers 
ahead. 

8.40  p.m. 

"  Monarch  " 

"  Calhope  "  hit,  1,000  yards 

(approx.) 

on  starboard  beam. 

9.00  p.m. 

"King  George 

Sighted  British  battle  cruis- 

V." 

ers  W.N.W.  steering  S.W. 

9.07  p.m. 

"King  George 

"  Caroline  "      made     signal 

V." 

"Attack  with  Whitehead 

12872 


114 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND 


Time. 


Ship 
Reporting. 


Observations. 


Remarks. 


9. 15  p.m. 

9.20  p.m. 
(very 
api)rox.) 
9.30  p.m. 


10.30  p.m. 
(approx.) 


"King  George 

V." 
"King  George 

V." 

"  Erin  " 


"Thunderer 


10.30  p.m. 


10.50  p.m. 


1.9/  June. 
4.00  a.m. 


"  Boadicea 


"  Boadicea 


King  George 
V.  " 


<^orpedoes  "    V.A.  II.  B.S. 
made,    "  Negative  attack,  [ 
those  ships  are  our  battle  [ 
cruisers."  "  Caroline  "  | 

then  made,  "  These  appear 
to  be  enemy  ships."  V.A. 
II.  B.S.  replied,  "  If  you  arc 
quite  sure  attack.  "  Caro- 
line "  was  about  six  points 
on  starboard  bow,  about 
1-2  miles  distant,  but  was 
not  seen  to  attack. 

Heavy  firing  on  starboard 
quarter. 

Saw  a  white  fire  ball,  very 
brilliant,  110  green. 

Firing  seen  astern  and  one 
German  three  -  funnelled 
vessel  was  seen  to  be  on  fire 
fore  and  aft. 

An  enemy  cruiser  challenged 
three  times,  switching  on 
and  off  four  red  lights  hori- 
zontal above  four  green 
horizontal.  Fire  was  not 
opened  as  it  was  considered 
inadvisable  to  show  up 
battle  fleet  unless  obvious 
attack  was  intended.  Our 
destroyers  shortly  after 
attacked  this  cruiser  and  a 
hot  engagement  followed. 
She  was  seen  to  be  hit  manj' 
times ;  she  eventually 
tixrned  to  port. 

After  taking  vip  night  station 
astern  of  "  Thunderer,"  a 
large  cruiser  challenged 
with  four  red  lights  hori- 
zontal, and  four  green 
horizontal  immediately  af- 
terwards. After  challenging 
she  sheered  off  to  starboard. 

Two  or  three  enemy  cruisers 
engaged  a  ship  about  4,000 
yards  astern.  A  fire  started 
on  oiu-  ship,  and  a  hit  or 
explosion  was  seen  on 
enemy  cruiser.  This  action 
lasted  about  4  minutes. 


Sighted  Zeppelin  about  80° 
green.  "  Thunderer  "  fired 
one  salvo. 


Same       ship      as 
reported  by 

"  Thunderer." 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


115 


Time. 


Ship 
Reporting. 


Observations. 


Remarks. 


7.00  a.m. 


8.45  a.m. 


King  George 
V." 


King  George 
V." 


Pa.ssed  wreckage  of  foreign 
origin,  apparently  a  num- 
ber of  large  German  cordite 
cases. 
Passed  wreckage  and  dead 
bodies,  undoubtedlyBritish. 


GENERAL   REMARKS. 

"  Ajax  "  -  -  It  appeared  that  each  enemy  ship  was  accom- 
panied by  a  destroyer  which  emitted  dense 
volumes  of  smoke  with  the  idea  of  obscuring 
the  target. 

"  Centurion  "  -  Submarines  were  reported  on  several  occasions, 
and  Lieutenant  Peet  has  no  doubt  that  he 
sighted  a  submarine  with  double  periscope  at 
7.40  p.m.,  bearing  60°  green,  2,000  yards. 

"  Orion  "  -     Firing  was  by  chrector,  which  was  invaluable. 

"  Thunderer  "       Just  before  opening  fire  there  was  a  very  large 

explosion   on   starboard   quarter,   apparently 

bej^ond  Fifth  Battle  Squadron ;    a  column  of 

water  and  debris  was  thrown  up'. 

No   enemy   shots   fell   nearer   than   400   yards 

(short). 
Objects  came  into  view  and  disappeared  again 
in  about  3  minutes,  a  quick  R.F.  reading, 
used  immediately,  was  the  only  practicable 
method.  Most  of  the  ranges  taken  were 
about  11,000  yards,  but  for  a  short  period 
ranges  22,000  to  18,000  were  obtained  in 
the  fore  top. 
Powder  filled  common  excellent  to  commence 
with,  i.e.,  till  straddhng  is  well  estabHshed, 
the  bursts  being  easy  to  distinguish. 

NOTES   MADE   ON   BOARD   "KING   GEORGE   V." 
Battle-fleet  was  in  divisions  in  Une  ahead  columns  disposed 
abeam  to  starboard,  8  cables  apart,  steering  S.  50  E. 

31st  May,  p.m. 

(1)  2.24.  Signal  received  form  "  Galatea  "  2  cruisers  probably 
hostile,  in  sight  (56  —  48  N.,  5—26  E.),  bearing 
E.S.E.  stopped,  later  report  course  of  enemy  S.S.E. 
chased  at  2.38  p.m.     (1420  and  1422.) 

H  2 


116  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 

31st  May,  p.m. 


(2)  2.40.     "  Galatea "    reported    a    large    quantity    of    smoke 

bearing   E.N.E.    (56.50   N.,    5.27    E.).     Speed   of 

fleet,  17  knots.     (1435.) 
2.45.     Guides  of  columns  ordered  to  bear  N.E.  by  N. 
2.52.     18  knots. 

(3)  3.00.     Altered  course,  leaders  together,  to  S.E.  by  S. 

"  Galatea  "  reported  smoke  appeared  to  be  from 
7  vessels — Destroyers  and  cruisers  steering  North 
56.52  N.,  5.38  E.     (1450.) 

(4)  3.07.     S.O.    3rd    L.C.S.    reported    3    cruisers    bearing    E. 

steering  N.  56,-59  N.,  5.33  E.     (1500.) 
3.08.     Cruisers  took  up  cruising  disposition  No.  1. 
3.13.     S.O.    1st  L.C.S.   reported  enemy  altered  course  to 

N.W.     Columns  opened  to  1°.     (1507.) 
3.17.     19  knots. 

(5)  3.25.     "  Nottingham  "    reported    sighting    5    columns    of 

smoke  bearing  E.N.E.,  56.46  N.,  5.20  E.     (1522.) 

(6)  3.40.     S.O.   B.C.F.   reported   5  Battle  Cruisers  and  large 

number  of  destroyers  bearing  N.E.,  56.53  N., 
5.35  E.     Course  of  enemy,  S.E.     (1535.) 

3.50.     S.O.  B.C.F.  reported  course  of  enemy  S.  55  E. 

3.55.     20  knots. 

(7)  3.57.     S.O.    B.C.F.    reported   that    he   was   engaging    the 

enemy  (56.53  N.,  5.40  E.) ;  it  was  later  ascertained 
that  5th  B.S.  were  also  engaging  the  enemy. 
(1550.) 

(8)  4.40.     S.O.    2nd    L.C.S.    reported    having    sighted    enemy 

battle-fleet  bearing  S.E.  course  North,  56.34  N., 

6.26  E.     (1636.) 
4.46.     Enemy  Battle-fleet  course  reported  to  be  E.N.E 

(Single  line  ahead.)     (1630.) 
4.55.     Enemy  battle  fleet  course  reported  to  be  North. 

(9)  5.16.     S.O.  B.C.F.  reported  sighting  enemy's  battle  fleet 

bearing  S.E.  (56.36  N.,  6,9  E.)     (1645.) 

5.40.     Observed  cruisers  in  action. 

5.45.  2nd  L.C.S.  reported  enemy's  battle  fleet  altered 
course  N.N.W.     (1740.) 

5.54.  2nd  L.C.S.  reported  enemy's  battle  fleet  altered 
course  N.     (1750.) 

6.02.  Altered  course  leaders  together,  remainder  in  succes- 
sion to  South,  19  knots. 

6.06.  Altered  course  leaders  together  rest  in  succession 
to  S.E. 

6.13.     Equal  speed  S.E.  by  E. 

6.20.     Reduced  to  14  knots. 

6.26.     Altered  course  to  port. 

6.32.  Increased  to  17  knots,  battleships  in  rear  opened 
fire. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  117 

31st  May,  p.m. 

6.32.  Ship  bearing  S.E.  blew  up ;  it  is  not  known  what 
this  vessel  was,  but  it  was  thought  to  be  an 
enemy  hght  cruiser;  also  passed  shortly  after 
this  "  Acasta  "  badly  damaged,  placing  colhsion 
mat,  and  another  destroyer  apparently  with 
disabled  engines. 
One  of  our  four-funnelled  cruisers  observed  to  be 
heavily  hit. 

6.51.  "  King  George  V."  had  to  alter  course  to  starboard 
to  avoid  colhsion  with  4th  L.C.S.  in  the  van. 

6.56.  Altered  course  to  South.  This  was  done  just 
previous  to  a  signal  being  made. 

7.02.  "  Marlborough  "  reported  being  hit  by  a  torpedo. 

Altered  course  3  points  to  starboard. 

7.09.     Course  South. 

7.12.     2nd  B.S.  ordered  to  take  station  ahead. 

7.17.  "  King  George  V."  opened  fire  on  leading  enemy 
ship;  range  on  sights  12,800  yards,  salvo  fell 
short.  Remainder  of  2nd  B.S.  had  opened  fire 
shortly  before.  Target  ship  was  either  leading 
German  battleship  or  "  Liitzow  "  class  battle 
cruiser  mth  three  destroyers  on  engaged  side 
making  a  heavy  smoke  screen. 

7.20.     Altered  course  4  points  to  port  together  by  signal. 

7.22.  Target  obscured  by  smoke  screen  and  haze;  ceased 
fire. 

7.27.  "  King  George  V."  had  to  alter  course  to  starboard 
to  avert  collision  with  hght  craft  in  the  van. 
"  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "  much  in  the  way  and 
making  a  lot  of  smoke. 

7.42.     Formed  single  Une  ahead  on  "  Iron  Duke." 

(10)  8.26.     2nd    L.C.S.    reported    they    were    engaging    enemy 

cruisers,  56.47  N.,  5.56  E.     (2020.) 

(11)  8.52.     3rd  L.C.S.  reported  Battle  Cruisers  probably  hostile 

bearing  N.   steering  W.S.W.,   56.42  N.,   5.41   E. 

(2045.) 
8.56,     "  Warrior  "  reported  both  engines  disabled  and  in 

tow  of  "  Engadine,"  56.10  N.,  5.50  E.     (2103.) 
0.03.     Course  South. 

9.03.  2nd    L.C.S.    reported    being    attacked    by    enemy 

destroyers  from  the  West;  these  were  driven  off 
to  N.W.  (2055.) 
9.07.  "  CaroUne  "  made  signal  "  Attack  with  Whitehead 
torpedoes."  V.A.  II  made  "  Negative  attack, 
these  ships  are  our  battle  cruisers."  "  Carohne  " 
then  made  "  These  appear  to  be  enemy  ships." 
V.A.  II  replied  "  If  you  are  quite  sure,  attack." 
"  CaroUne  "  was  about  six  points  on  the  starboard 


118  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 

31st  May,  p.m. 


bow,  about   1-2  miles  distant,  but  was  not  seen 

to  attack. 
9.11.     Sighted  our  l)attle  cruisers  bearing  W.N.W.  steering 

S.W. 
!).30.     Assumed    second    organisation,     divisions    in     line 

ahead,    course    South,    columns     1     mile    apart, 

destroyers  astern  of  battle  fleet  5  miles. 
10.45.     Eleventh  flotilla  reported  having  been  engaged  with 

enemy  cruisers.     (2240.) 
11.36.     "  Birmingham  "  reported  battle  cruisers,  probably 

hostile,   bearing  N.E.   steering   South,   56.26  N., 

5.46  E. 
11.40.     2nd  L.C.S.  reported  engaged  with  enemy  cruisers, 

10.15  p.m.     (2240.) 
June,  a.m. 


3.47.     3rd  L.C.S.  reported  engaging  Zeppelin  (0335.) 

3.57.     Battle  fleet  opened  fire  on  Zeppelin. 

4.30.     "  Dublin  "  reported  one  cruiser  and  two  destroyers, 

probably    hostile,    bearing    East,    course    South. 

(0430.) 
4.47.     Ordered    to    look    out    for     "  Liitzow,"     damaged 

(ahead). 
8.55.     "  Castor  "  and  eleventh  flotilla  joined  up. 
9.  0.     Informed  C.-in-C.  we  had  passed  wreckage  of  foreign 

origin  at  7  a.m.  and  of  obviously  English  origin  at 

8.45  a.m. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


119 


VICE-ADMIRAL'S    REPORTS,   4th    BATTLE    SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  6  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 
C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

From  :  The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Fourth  Battle  Squadron. 
H.M.S.  "  Benbow." 


Iron 


To :       The   Commander-in-Chief,    Grand   Fleet,    H.M.S. 
Duke." 

Date  :    4th  June  1916. 

No.  :      0131. 

The  attached  summary  of  the  reports  from  the  Fourth  Battle 
Squadron  on  the  action  of  the  31st  May  is  submitted  in 
continuation  of  the  rough  personal  reports  already  forwarded. 

A  more  detailed  report  will  be  submitted  separately. 

F.  C.  D.  STURDEE, 

Vice-Admiral. 


ACTION  ON  3  1st  MAY.— SUMMARY  OF  REPORTS  FROM 
SHIPS    OF   FOURTH   BATTLE    SQUADRON. 


Time. 


"  Benbow." 


Canada." 


"  Bellero- 
phon." 


"  Teme- 
raire." 


"  Vanguard. 


P.M. 
5.55 

6.10 


6.14 


6.15 


6.20 


6.22 


0.25 


6.28 


Range       of 
enemy's  ship 
in     damaged 
condition, 
13,000-14,000 


Director        on 
German  ship, 
"  Llitzow  " 
class,     16,000 
yards. 


Two  salvoes 
at  German 
ship  which 
had  suf- 
fered hea- 
vily. 


Sighted  some 
grey  misty 
objects. 


British  Ar- 
moured Crui 
ser  blew  up. 


Opened  fire. 
Control  Offi- 
cer given  free 
hand.  Im- 
possible to 
count  enemy 


Ship  on  bow 
flashed  I  A  R. 

British  Ar- 

moured Crui- 
ser blew  up. 


British  Ar- 

moured  Crui- 
ser blew  up. 


120 


BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 


Time. 


''  Benbow." 


Canada." 


P.M. 
6.30 


b.32 


0.34 


0.35 


0.38 


0.40 


0.45 
0.48 
7.0 
7.U 

7.11 
7.15 

7.17 


7.19 
7.20 


Opened  fire. 
Shots  lost  in 
liaxe. 


Fired  again 
with  A  and 
B  turrets. 

Fired  again 
with  A  and 
B.  Target 

then  obscured 
by  ship  on  fire 
drifting  be- 
tween ship 
and  enemy. 
Fire  again 

opened,  12,500 
Target  crossed 
after  second 
salvo.  Mist 
then  obscured. 


Observetl  en- 
emy turn 
away. 


Fired  at 

T.B.D's.  (0-in) 


German  T.B.D 
on  fire. 


Opened        fire 
A.      and      B. 

?  "  Liitzow." 


Opened  with  all 
turrets. 


'  Bellero- 
phon." 


"  Teme- 
raire." 


"  Vanguard. 


Opened 
fire  on 
Cruiser. 
Hit  third 
salvo. 


Opened   fire   at 
3 -funnelled 
cruiser      {    ?   ) 
"  Freya," 
11,000.        Hit 
fourth     salvo. 


German  cruiser 
(?)  "  Freya  " 
stopped,  dis- 
abled. 


Checked  fire. 
No  enemy  in 
sight. 


Engaged 
T.B.D's.  be 
fore  beam. 


Four  salvoes 
at  Battle- 
ship or 
Battle  Crui- 


A.  Turret 

and  4-in.  at 
Destroyers. 
Hit. 


Opened  fire  at 
Battle  Crui- 
ser, 11,000. 
Straddled. 


Checked  fire. 
(  ?  )  "  Freya  " 
out  of  sight. 


Geiman  Battle 
Cruiser  "  Liit- 
zow "  on  fire. 


Opened  fire 
at  enemy 
Battle 
Cruiser 
12,000,  7 
salvoes. 


Fired  a  few  12- 
in.  at  torpedo 
craft. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES. 


121 


Time. 

"  Benbow." 

"  Canada." 

"  Bellero- 
phon." 

"  Teme- 
raire." 

"  Vanguard." 

P.M. 

7.20 

Hit     seen     on 
German   Bat- 
tle      Cruiser. 
Mean        R.F. 
range  same  as 
on   sights     at 
this  salvo. 

7.25 

Engaged  de- 
stroyers 
with  6-in. 

Few  salvoes  at 
T.B.D's. 

7.28 

Ceased         lii-e. 
Smoke  screen 

— 

— 

— 

— 

7.30 

Three  salvoes 
of  14-in   on 
T.B.D.  Hit. 

Fired  at  Enemy 
Light  Cruiser, 
Disabled. 

? 

4-in.       on 
T.  B.  D's 
also    two 
12-in.  sal- 
voes. 

7.32 

German  T.B.D. 
sunk. 

— 

— 

— 

— 

7.34 

German  T.B.D. 

sunk. 
German  T.B.D. 

observed      to 

capsize. 

7.35 

6-in.                on 
T.B.D's.   Ene- 
my's     Battle 
Cruiser        re- 
ported      still 
afloat.       Two 
funnels      and 
two         masts 
showing  above 
water. 

8.57 

One  salvo,  6-in. 
at  T.B.D. 

— 

— 

— 

— 

10.35 

Destroyer 
Leader 
giow^  from 
shell 
bursts. 

Destroyer 
Leader     dis- 
appeared   or 
smdc. 

Enclosure  No.  7  to  .Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 

C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 
No.  0131.  "  Benbow," 

Sir,  5th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  tliat,  in  the  battle  of 
31st  May  1916,  off  the  Jutland  Coast  the  Fourth  Battle 
Squadron  was  in  the  centre  of  the  Battle  Line  with  the 
"  Blanche  "  acting  as  repeating  ship  on  the  off  side. 

The    "  Emperor  of    India  "  and    "  Dreadnought  "  were   not 
present,  being  away  refitting. 


122  BATTLE   OF   JUTLAND  : 

Tlie  Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Alexander  L.  Duff,  C.B.,  was 
hoisted  in  the  "  Superb." 

2.  The  ships  under  my  direct  command  were  the  "  Benbow,"  . 
"  Belk'r()i)hon,"    ''  Temeraire,"    and   "  Vanguard,"   they   formed 
the  Fourth  Division  of  the  J3attle  Fleet,  \vith  the  "  Benbmv  " 
leading. 

The  "  Superb  "  and  "  Canada  "  were  in  the  Third  Division 
under  the  immediate  command  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  who 
led  that  Division  in  the  Fleet  Flagship  "  Iron  Duke." 

3.  The  Fourth  Division  being  placed  in  the  centre  of  the 
Fleet  conformed  generally  to  the  movements  ordered  by  the 
Com  mander-i  n  -Chief . 

4.  On  one  occasion  only  was  any  separate  action  necessary, 
when  at  7.10  p.m.  a  Destroyer  attack  was  observed.  The 
Fourth  Division  were  then  ordered  to  turn  away  by  Sub- 
Divisions  two  points  in  succession  in  conformity  with  the  Grand 
Fleet  Battle  Orders. 

The  attack  was  soon  repelled  by  the  gun  fire  of  the  ships, 
and  the  Division  ordered  to  turn  back  to  the  course  of  the  Fleet 
forming  astern  of  the  Third  Division. 

5.  At  8.31.  p.m.,  the  track  of  a  torpedo  was  seen  passing 
ahead.  "  Benbow  "  turned  towards  it.  It  is  beheved  that  the 
torpedo  passed  ahead  of  "  Iron  Duke." 

6.  The  attached  summary  shows  the  principal  points  noted 
by  the  four  ships  of  the  Fourth  Division, 

7.  Our  ships  were  not  seriously  under  fire,  but,  considering 
the  youth  of  the  ships'  companies  and  the  fact  that  it  was  their 
first  time  under  fire,  it  is  most  satisfactory  to  be  able  to  report 
on  the  keenness  and  cool  behaviour  of  the  Officers  and  men  of 
all  the  ships.     No  apprehension  was  shown. 

8.  The  general  gunnery  efficiency  seemed  to  be  good,  and  no 
breakdowns  were  reported. 

The  conditions  of  hght  and  haze  did  not  give  the  ships  much 
opportunity  for  using  their  guns  and  the  restraint  from  firing 
when  the  enemy  was  hidden  by  haze  reflects  credit  on  the  control. 

The  rapid  manner  in  which  the  Destroyers  were  made  to  turn 
away  promptly  showed  good  control  and  effective  fire. 

9.  None  of  the  ships  were  struck  nor  were  there  any 
casualties. 

10.  The  visibihty  Avas  low  and  variable,  the  maximum  range 
obtained  being  13,500  yards,  which  was  recorded  in  "  Benbow  " 
at  6.14  p.m.,  as  the  range  of  an  enemy  capital  ship. 

The  average  range  obtainable  was  about  11,000  yards. 

11.  Owing  to  the  haze  and  low  visibihty  the  targets  were 
few  and  consisted  of  a  Light  Cruiser  at  moderate  range,  a  Battle 
Cruiser  at  longer  range  and  Destroyers  approaching  to  attack, 

12.  Firing  commenced  on  an  enemy's  Battle  Cruiser  at 
6.30  p.m.,  and  due  to  the  varjdng  visibihty,  was  intermittent 
up  to  7.28  p.m.,  when  the  enemy  retired  behind  a  smoke 
screen. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  123 

At  7.18  p.m.,  a  big  fire  was  observed  in  this  ship. 

13.  There  was  considerable  difficulty  in  distinguishing  friend 
from  foe  owing  to  these  large  Fleets  meeting  in  varying 
visibility. 

14.  The  following  ammunition  was  expended  froni  the  main 
armament  : — 

"  Benbow  "        -    40  rounds       "  Vanguard  "      -    80  rounds 
"  Bellerophon  "      62  rounds       "  Temeraire  "     -    72  rounds 

If).  Rear- Admiral  Duff's  report  is  attached. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

F.   C.   D.   STURDEE, 

Vice-Admiral. 
The  Commander-in-Chief, 

H.M.  Ships  and  Vessels, 
Grand  Fleet. 


REAR-ADMIRAL'S   REPORT,   4th   BATTLE    SQUADRON. 

From — The  Rear-Admiral  Fourth  Battle  Squadron. 

To — The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding  Fourth  Battle  Squadron. 

Dafe— 4th  June  1916.  A^o.— 017. 

Submitted.  The  enclosed  report  was  written  before  arriving 
in  harbour  on  June  2nd.  It  was  not  sent  in  at  the  time  as  not 
being  in  command  of  a  Division  the  report  of  the  Captain  of 
"  Superb  "  would  practically  cover  all  the  points  coming  under 
mv  observation. 

A.   L.  DUFF, 

Rear-Admiral. 

Report  on  action  of  31st  May  1916. 

No.  017. 

"  Superb," 
Sir,  1st  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  signal  1835  of  1st  instant,  I  have 
the  honour  to  make  the  following  report. 

2.  Owing  to  weather  conditions  under  which  the  action  was 
fought,  and  knowing  little  of  the  general  situation  preceding  the 
arrival  of  the  Battle  Fleet  on  the  scene  of  action,  or,  in  fact,  at 
any  time,  necessarily  limits  the  scope  of  my  remarks  to  what  I 
actually  saw  take  place. 

3.  The  main  features  of  the  action  appeared  to  be  : — 

(a)  The  low  visibihty  ; 

(6)  The  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  friend  and 
foe,  owing  to  the  weather  conditions.  This  was  accen- 
tuated through  ignorance  of  the  disposition  of  the  Rosyth 


124  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND: 

force,  already  in  action,  presumably  with  the  enemy  Battle 
Cruisers  but  possibly  with  his  Battle  Fleet  as  well; 

(c)  The  Cruiser  line  being  caught  under  a  heavy  fire 
before  being  able  to  take  up  their  Battle  station  on 
the  flanks  of  the  Battle  Fleet. 

4.  The  scene  immediately  before  and  during  deployment  of 
the  Battle  Fleet  was  an  interesting  one.  To  the  right,  in  the 
haze,  our  Battle  Cruisers  could  be  distinguished  hotly  engaged, 
but  with  what  portion  of  the  enemy's  forces  could  not  be  seen. 
In  front,  and  between  us  and  the  enemy  whose  position  was 
onl}^  denoted  by  the  flash  of  his  guns,  were  our  Cruisers 
endeavouring  to  take  up  their  after- deployment  station  on  the 
flanks  under  a  heavy  fire. 

A  Cruiser  of  the  "  Minotaur  "  class  was  observed  to  be  badly 
damaged  and  I  was  informed  that  she  was  observed  to  blow  uj). 
Another  of  the  "  Warrior  ".  class  was  being  Hterally  smothered 
in  salvoes ;  and  a  Light  Cruiser,  after  being  hidden  from  view  by 
columns  of  water,  seemed  to  have  disappeared. 

5.  At  6.14  p.m.  (G.M.T.)  the  Fleet  was  deployed  by  "  equal 
speed  pendant  "  to  S.E.  by  E.,  and  line  of  battle  was  formed  with 
the  Second  Battle  Squadron  leading.  At  6.45,  the  firing 
appeared  to  be  general  in  our  Battle  Fleet. 

6.  During  the  engagement,  the  Third  Sub-division  was 
never  under  fire  of  the  enemy  and  the  few  shots  that  fell  in 
our  vicinity  were  either  ricochets  or  "  overs."  Only  two  ships 
of  the  enemy  were  seen  with  sufficient  distinctness  to  enable 
fii'e  to  be  opened  on  them.  These  ships  I  beheve  to  have  been 
the  "  Derfflinger  "  and  a  Cruiser  of  the  "  Prinz  Heinrich  "  type. 
Identification  was  an  extraordinarily  difficult  matter,  but  I  am 
fairly  sure  that  neither  were  Battleships,  and  that  the  only 
indication  I  saw  of  the  enemy  fine  of  battle  was  from  smoke  and 
the  flash  of  guns. 

7.  The  ship  beheved  to  be  a  Cruiser  of  the  "  Prinz  Hein- 
rich "  type  came  under  a  verj^  heavy  fire  and  was  apparently 
disabled  and  her  guns  silenced.  The  "  Derfflinger  "  at  fii-st  was 
firing  from  four  turrets,  but  latterly  it  seemed  from  only  one.  A 
fire  was  seen  to  break  out  aft.  I  thought  it  was  followed  by  an 
explosion. 

8.  Visibility. — At  the  time  the  signal  for  deployment  was 
made  (6.14  p.m. — G.M.T.)  I  estimated  the  visibihty  at  about 
5  to  6  miles.  By  6.45  p.m.  it  had  somewhat  decreased  and  the 
fight  was  becoming  bad.  From  then  on,  the  visibihty  varied, 
but  was  not,  I  think,  ever  more  than  12,000  yards.  The 
tfirection  of  the  wind  was  S.W.  by  S. — Light. 

9.  Destroyer  Attack. — At  7.10  p.m.,  the  course  of  the  Fleet 
being  South,  enemy  Destroyers  were  observed  approximately 
abeam,  attempting  under  cover  of  a  smoke  screen  to  dehver  an 
attack  on  the  centre  and  rear  of  the  Fleet.  The  attack  was 
neither  made  with  dash  nor  was  it  pressed  home,  whether  on 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  '  125 

account  of  the  fire  from  the  6-in.  guns  of  our  ships  or  the  threat 
of  a  counter-attack  from  our  Light  Cruisers,  I  do  not  know. 
The  Destroyers,  however,  before  they  retired,  were  well  within 
long-range  distance,  and  possibly  the  attack  might  have  proved 
effective,  had  the  Fleet  not  been  turned  away  by  the 
"  Preparative." 

10.  The  weather  conditions  were  very  favourable  to  Torpedo 
attack,  and  it  is  an  interesting  fact  that  the  enemy  made  so 
Uttle  effective  use  of  this  weapon  against  our  Battle  Line. 
Possibly  he  was  reserving  his  Destroyers  in  the  hope  of  making 
more  effective  use  of  them  after  dark. 

11.  As  the  result  of  turning  away,  touch  was  lost  with  the 
enemy  Battle  Fleet  and  was  not  regained  before  darkness 
necessitated  drawing  the  Fleet  off  for  the  night. 

12.  Of  the  enemy's  Battle  formation  and  movements,  I  was 
unable  to  form  any  definite  idea. 

13.  The  enemy  had  much  to  be  thankful  for  to  the  weather 
conditions,  which,  it  seems  to  me,  alone  saved  him  from  being 
cut  off  from  his  base,  and  denied  the  British  Fleet  the 
satisfaction  of  fighting  a  decisive  battle. 

14.  The  steaming  of  the  "  Superb  "  during  the  afternoon  of 
the  31st  was  highly  satisfactory,  and  reflects  great  credit  on  the 
Engine  Room  Department. 

15.  The  incidents  as  affecting  the  "  Superb  "  are  dealt  with 
in  the  report  of  her  Commanding  Officer. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 

A.   L.  DUFF, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Rear-Admiral. 

Fourth  Battle  Squadron. 

Enclosure  No.  8  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 
C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

CAPTAIN'S   REPORT,    H.M.S.    "  BENBOW." 

No.  C.  85. 

H.M.S.    "Benbow," 
Sir,  8th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  on  the 
action  with  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  on  31st  May  1916,  and 
a  simple  narrative  of  events  as  they  appeared  from  the  Control 
Officer's  point  of  view  in  the  Gun  Control  Tower.     *     *     *i 

(1)  Very  great  difficulty  was  experienced  in  getting  the 
Director  on  to  the  target,  and  fire  could  not  be  opened  as  soon 
as  it  ought  to  have  been,  the  enemy  could  be  seen  from  the 
Gun  Control  Tower  and  Conning  Tower  when  using  Zeiss  Glasses, 
but  not  from  the  Gun  Telescope  on  the  bearing  plate. 

^  See  note  on  page  381. 


126  .  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND: 

4:  9ic  >ic  4:  :|cl 

At  6.38  nearly  all  turret  Officers  thought  that  we  opened 
fire  on  the  enemy  cruiser  drifting  down  between  the  lines,  whereas 
we  were  firing  at  one  of  the  "  Kaiser  "  class  beyond  her. 

*  *  *  *  *2 

Attached  also  are  some  extracts  from  reports  of  officers  from 
their  several  positions. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
8ir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

H.    W.    PARKER, 

Captain. 
The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding 
Fourth  Battle  Squadron. 

II. 

No.  94. 

Commander  in  Chief, 

Submitted  in  continuation  of  former  reports. 

F.  C.  D.  STURDEE, 
10th  June  1916.  Vice- Admiral. 

EXTRACTS    FROM    OFFICERS'    REPORTS. 
H.M.S.  "BENBOW." 

Sitting  Officer  in  the  Top. — The  difficulties  of  spotting  on 
this  occasion  were  very  great. 

With  the  mist  varying  in  intensity,  enemy  ships  coming  into 
sight  for  a  few  seconds  and  then  disappearing,  I  found  it  extremely 
hard  to  be  certain  that  I  was  spotting  on  to  the  same  ship  as 
that  indicated  (through  the  voice  pipe)  by  the  Control  Officer. 

The  difficulty  of  being  certain  that  one  was  spotting  on  to 
the  ship  fired  at  was  even  more  marked. 

For  some  seconds  after  each  salvo  my  vision  was  blanked  by 
smoke,  my  glasses  shaken  off  the  object,  and  owing  to  the  short 
range  and  consequent  short  time  of  flight  in  which  to  recover 
(to  say  nothing  of  the  fact  that  between  the  moment  of  firing 
and  the  fall  of  shot  there  was  often  a  small  change  of  helm)  it 
was  practically  impossible  to  be  certain  that  one  was  spotting 
on  the  ship  fired  at. 

The  position  was  galling  and  trying  to  the  last  degree;  but 
I  had  no  alternative  on  more  than  one  occasion  but  to  inform 
the  Control  Officer  that  I  could  not  observe  the  fall  of  shot  (this 
being  probably  due  to  my  spotting  on  the  wrong  ship). 

1  See  note  on  p.  381. 

2  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  127 

*  *  *  *  ilfl 

2.  Director  Layer. — Little  difficulty  was  experienced  due  to 
smoke  from  our  own  guns,  but  great  ^fficulty  due  to  the  short 
range  of  visibility. 

Great  difficulty  was  experienced  in  getting  on  to  the  object 
at  which  the  Control  Officer  wished  to  fire,  due  to  the  distance 
of  the  Control  Officer  from  Director  Tower. 

When  aloft,  the  Control  Officer  has  the  same  condition  of 
light  as  Director  Layer,  when  below,  either  may  see  the  object, 
whereas  the  other  may  not  be  able  to  do  so. 

(3)  Spotting. — Was  extremely  difficult  owing  to  the  poor 
visibihty.  It  was  useless  attempting  to  use  the  high  power 
glasses,  and  with  binoculars  it  was  not  easy  to  get  on  the  correct 
bearing. 

(4)  Respirators. — The  respirators  supphed  are  unsuitable. 
The  small  ones  are  easily  displaced,  and  the  "  sausage  "  ones  are 
awkward  and  frail.  Two  came  to  pieces  during  handling  in 
the  T.S. 

(5)  It  was  particularly  noticed  with  regard  to  the  enemy's 
salvoes  that  in  all  cases  one  projectile  fell  well  to  the  left  (our 
left)  of  the  remainder,  and  that  whereas  the  single  shell  invariably 
exploded  on  striking  the  water,  the  remainder  did  not. 


REPORT     OF     ENGAGEMENT     WITH     THE     GERMAN 
HIGH    SEA    FLEET    ON    31st  MAY    1916. 

Narrative   of   Events   from   a   Gunnery   Point   of   View. 

Wednesday. 
G.M.T. 

P.M. 

5.59.   Observed    Battle    Cruisers    engaged    on    Starboard    Bow. 

Observed  flashes  of  enemy's  guns. 
6.  4.    Sighted  enemy  ships  right  ahead. 
6.14.  Obtained  ranges  of  an  enemy  ship  with  3  funnels  (13,000- 

14,000  yards)  bearing  Green  60,  apparently  in  a  damaged 

condition.    Probably  "  Helgoland  "  Cla.ss.     Trained  guns 

on,  but  did  not  fire. 
6.26.    "  Iron  Duke  "  opened  fire. 

6.29.  After  great  difficulty  owing  to  the  haze  and  smoke,  succeeded 

in  getting  Director  on  to  a  German  ship,  apjjarently  of 
the  "  Kaiser  "  class,  obtaining  two  ranges  from  "  X  " 
turret,  mean  of  16,000  yards. 

6.30.  Opened  fire  with  "  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets,  Green  73.     Shots 

lost  in  haze. 

^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


128  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

G.35.  Fired  again  with  "  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets.  Object  obscured 
by  haze. 

G.3G.    ''  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets  fired. 

6.38.  "  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets  fired,  object  was  then  obscured 
by  smoke  from  an  enemy  ship  on  fire  drifting  down 
between  "  Benbow  "  and  the  enemy.  This  ship  was 
apparently  an  enemy  cruiser  with  three  or  four  funnels. 
Several  of  "  Benbow's  "  rangefinders  were  apparently 
taking  ranges  of  this  ship  instead  of  the  ship  actually 
fired  at. 

6.40.  Fire  was  again  opened  mth  "  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets,  at  a 
range  of  12,500  yards,  the  target  was  crossed  after  the 
second  salvo,  and  the  order  "  Control  "  was  given  by 
the  Control  Officer.  The  Cease  Fire  Gong  was  then 
rung,  mist  and  smoke  obscuring  the  target. 

6.48.  The  enemy  were  observed  turning  away  to  Starboard. 
6.54.    Ship  turned  to  Southward. 

7,  2.    Passed  wreck  of  "  Invincible." 

7.  9.    6-in.  opened  fire  on  Destroyers  bearing  Green  56,  at  8,000 

yards.     *     *     *i 
7.11.    One  destroyer  observed  to  be  on  fire. 
7.17.    Opened  fire  with  "  A  "  and  "  B  "  turrets  on  enemy  ship, 

"  Liitzow  "  class.  Green  132  (about). 

7.19,  Spotted  down    *     *     *i     and  opened  fire  with  all  turrets. 

7.20.  Hit  observed  near  after  turret  by  several  observers. 

7.28.    Ceased    fire.     Enemy    destroyers    making    smoke    screen. 

6-in.  ceased  fire  about  this  time. 
7.32.    German  destroyer  observed  to  sink. 
7.34.    German  destroyer  making  smoke  observed  to  sink. 

7.34.  German  destroyer  observed  to  capsize. 

7.35.  6-in.  opened  fire  on  two  lots  of  Destroyers.     Enemy  Battle 

Cruiser  reported  to  be  still  afloat,  2  masts  and  2  funnels 
showing  above  water. 
7.47.   TrembUng  shock  felt  in  T.S. 

7.49.  Collected  reports  of  rounds  fired  : — 

"  A  "  turret    -     12 

"B"  „  -  12 

"Q"  „  -  4 

"X"  „  -  5 

"Y"  „  .  5 

Total  rounds  fired     38 

7.57.   Turrets,  stand  easy. 

8.24.    Heavy  firing  heard  right  ahead. 


See  note  on  p.  381, 


Ol-'FICfAI.    DKSI'ATCIilOS.  121) 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

8.27.    Altered  course  4  points  to  Port. 

Top  reported  track  of  torpedo  right  ahead,  cios.-itig 
"  Iron  Duke's  "  bows. 
8.34.    Course  S.W.  by  S. 

8.57.    6-in.  firing  on  destroyers,  one  salvo  (short). 
9.  2.    Altered  cour.se  4  points  to  Port. 
9.14.    Observed  star  shell  on  starboard  bow. 

Thursday. 

Observed  Zeppelin  on  Port  quarter  passing  astern  P.  or  S. 
Opened  fire  with   "  Y  "  turret,  1  round. 
6-in.,   1  round. 


VICE-ADMIRAL'8   REPORT,  BATTLE   CRUISER  FLEET. 

Enclosure  No.  9  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16  from 
C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

B.C.F.  01.  "  Lion," 

SiE,  12th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  at  2.37  p.m.  on  31st  May 
1916,  being  in  Lat.  56.47  N.,  Long.  4.59  E.,  I  altered  course 
to  the  Northward  to  join  the  Commander-in-Chief,  in  accordance 
with  previous  orders. 

2,  The  force  under  my  command  was  as  follows  : — 

"Lion"  (Captain  A.  E.  M.  Chatfield,  C.V.O.)  flying  my 
flag,  "  Princess  Royal  "  (Captain  W.  H.  Cowan,  M.V.O.,  D.S.O.) 
flying  the  Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  O.  de  B.  Brock,  C.B.,  "  Tiger  " 
(Captain  H.  B.  Pelly,  M.V.O.),  "Queen  Mary"  (Captain 
C.  I.  Prowse),  "  New  Zealand  "  (Captain  J.  F.  E.  Green)  flying 
the  Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  W.  C.  Pakenham,  C.B.,  M.V.O., 
"  Indefatigable "  (Captain  C'.  F.  Sowerby),  "  Southampton," 
flying  the  Broad  Pennant  of  Commodore  W.  E.  Goodenough, 
M.V.O.,  "  Nottingham  "  (Captain  C.  B.  Miller),  "  Birmingham  " 
(Captain  A.  A.  M.  Duff),  "Dublin"  (Captain  A.  C.  Scott), 
"  Galatea,"  flying  the  Broad  Pennant  of  Commodore  E.  S.  Alex- 
ander Sinclair,  M.V.O.,  "  Inconstant  "  (Captain  B.  S.  Thesiger, 
C.M.G.),  "  Phaeton  "  (Captain  J.  E.  Cameron,  M.V.O.),  "  Cor- 
deUa "  (Captain  T.  P.  H.  Beamish),  "  Falmouth  "  (Captain 
J.  D.  Edwards),  flying  the  Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  T.  D.  W.  Napier, 
M.V.O.,  "Birkenhead"  (Captain  E.  Reeves),  "Gloucester" 
(Captain  W.  F.  Blunt,  D.S.O. ),  "  Yarmouth  "  (Captain  T.  D. 
Pratt),  "  Champion  "  (Captain  J.  U.  Farie,  Captain  D,  13th 
Destroyer  Flotilla),  with  Destroyers  "Nestor"  (Commander 
Hon.  E.  B.  S.  Bingham),  "  Nomad "  (Lieut. -Commander 
P.   Whitfield),    "  Narborough  "    (Lieut. -Commander  G.   Corlett), 

*     12872  I 


13(»  BATTLE    OF    Jl  TLAND: 

"  Obdurate  "  (Lieut. -Commander  C.  H.  Sams),  "  Petard  "  (Lieut.- 
Comraander  E.  D.  O.  Thomson),  "  Pelican  "  (Lieut. -Commander 
K.  A.  Beattie),  "  Nerissa  "  (Lieut. -Commander  M.  C.  B.  Legge), 
"  Onslow  "  (Lieut.-Commander  J.  C.  Tovey),  "  Moresby  "  (Lieut.- 
Commander  R.  V.  Alison),  "  Nicator "  (Lieut,  in  Command 
J.  E.  A.  Mocatta),  "  Fearless  "  (Captain  C.  D.  Roper,  Captain  D, 
1st  Destroyer  Flotilla),  with  Destroyers  "  Acheron "  (Com- 
mader  C.  G.  Ramsey),  '"  Ariel  "  (Lieut.-Commander  A.  G.  Tippet), 
"  Attack  "  (Lieut.-Commander  C.  H.  N.  James),  "  Hydra " 
Lieut.  F.  G.  Glossop),  "  Badger  "  (Commander  C.  A,  Fremantle), 
"  Goshawk  "  (Commander  G.  H.  Knowles),  "  Defender  "  (Lieut.- 
Commander    L.     R.     Palmer),     "  Lizard  "     (Lieut.-Commander 

E.  Brooke),  "  Lapwing  "  (Lieut.  H.  W.  D.  Griffith),  Destroyers 
from  the  Harwich  force  temporarily  attached  to  my  command, 
"  Lydiard  "  (Commander  M.  L.  Goldsmith),  "  Liberty  "  (Lieut.- 
Commander  P.   W.   S.   King),    "  Landrail  "    (Lieut.-Commander 

F.  E.  H.  G.  Hobart),  "  Laurel "  (Lieut.  H.  D.  Stanistreet), 
"  Moorsom  "  (Commander  J.  C.  Hodgson),  "  Morris  "  (Lieut.- 
Commander  E.  S.  Graham),  "  Turbulent "  (Lieut.-Commander 
J.  L.  C.  Clark),  "  Termagant  "  (Lieut.-Commander  C.  P.  Blake), 
and  Seaplane  Carrier  "  Engadine  "  (Lieut.-Commander  C.  G. 
Robinson). 

The  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  was  accompanied  by  four  ships 
of  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  under  the  command  of  Rear -Admiral 
H.  Evan-Thomas,  M.Y.O.,  flying  his  Flag  in  "  Barham  "  (Captain 
A.  W.  Craig).  The  other  three  ships  were  "  Warspite  "  (Captain 
E.  M.  Phillpotts),  "VaUant"  (Captain  M.  Woollcombe),  and 
"  Malaya  "  (Captain  Hon.  A.  D.  E.  H.  Boyle,  C.B.). 

3.  The  force  was  disposed  as  follows  :  5th  Battle  Squadron 
N.N.W.  5  miles  from  "  Lion,"  screened  by  ''  Fearless  "  and  9 
Destroyers  of  1st  Flotilla.  The  2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  was 
stationed  E.N.E.  3  miles  from  "  Lion,"  screened  by  6  Destroyers 
of  the  Harwich  Force.  "  Lion  "  and  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron 
were  screened  by  "  ChamjDion,"  10  Destroyers  of  13th  Flotilla, 
"  Turbulent  "  and  "  Termagant."  Squadrons  were  in  single 
line  ahead,  steering  N.  b  E.  Light  Cruisers  were  in  L.S.  6, 
centre  of  screen  bearing  S.S.E.,  line  of  direction  of  screen  E.N.E. 
and  W.S.W.,  "  Engadine  "  was  stationed  between  B  and  C. 

4.  At  2.20  p.m.  reports  w'ere  received  from  "  Galatea  " 
indicating  the  presence  of  enemy  vessels  to  the  E.S.E.,  steering 
to  the  Northward.  The  direction  of  advance  was  immediately 
altered  to  S.S.E.,  the  course  for  Horn  Reef,  so  as  to  place  my 
force  between  the  enemy  and  his  base.  "  Galatea  "  reported  at 
2.35  p.m.  that  she  had  sighted  a  large  amount  of  smoke  as  from 
a  fleet,  bearing  E.N.E.  This  made  it  clear  that  the  enemy  was 
to  the  Northward  and  Eastward,  and  that  it  would  be  impossible 
for  him  to  round  the  Horn  Reef  without  being  brought  to  action. 
Course  was  accordingly  altered  to  the  Eastward  and  North-East- 
ward,  the  enemy  being  sighted  at  3.31  p.m.  They  appeared  to 
be  the  1st  Scouting  group  of  five  Battle  Cruisers. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


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5.  After  the  first  report  of  the  enemy  the  1st  and  3rd  Light 
Cruiser  Squadrons  changed  their  direction  and  without  waiting 
for  orders  spread  to  the  East,  thereby  forming  a  screen  in  advance 
of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Squadrons  and  5th  Battle  Squadron  by 
the  time  we  had  hauled  up  to  the  course  of  approach.  They 
engaged  enemy  Light  Cruisers  at  long  range.  In  the  meantime 
the  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  had  come  in  at  high  speed  and 
was  able  to  take  station  ahead  of  the  Battle  Cruisers  by  the 
time  we  turned  to  E.S.E.,  the  course  on  which  we  first  engaged 
the  enemy.  In  this  respect  the  work  of  the  Light  Cruiser 
Squadrons  was  excellent  and  of  great  value. 

6.  From  a  report  from  "  Galatea  "  at  2.25  p.m.  it  was  evident 
that  the  enemy  force  was  considerable  and  not  merely  an  isolated 
unit  of  Light  Cruisers,  so  at  2.45  p.m.  I  ordered  "  Engadine  " 
to  send  up  a  seaplane  and  scout  to  N.N.E.  This  order  was 
carried  out  very  quickly,  and  by  3.8  p.m.  a  seaplane  with 
Flight-Lieutenant  F.  J.  Rutland,  R.N.,  as  Pilot,  and  Asst.  Pay- 
master G.  S.  Trewin,  R.N.,  as  Observer,  was  weU  under  way; 
her  first  reports  of  the  enemy  were  received  in  "  Engadine  " 
about  3.30  p.m.  Owing  to  clouds  it  was  necessary  to  fly  very 
low,  and  in  order  to  identify  4  enemy  Light  Cruisers  the  Seaplane 

I   2 


i:iL'  HA'I'11,1-;    (»K    .JITl.AXD  : 

had  to  fly  at  a  height  (»!'  i)()()  ft.  within  8,000  yards  of  them, 
the  Light  Cruisers  opening  fire  on  her  Avith  ev^ery  gun  tliat  would 
bear.  This  in  no  waj'  interfered  with  the  clarity  of  their  reports 
and  both  Flight-Lieutenant  Rutland  and  Asst.  Paymaster 
Trewin  are  to  be  congratulated  on  their  achievement,  which 
indicates  that  seai^hines  under  such  circumstances  are  of  distinct 
value. 

7.  At  3.30  p.m.  1  increased  speed  to  25  knots  and  formed 
Line  of  Battle,  the  2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  forming  astern 
of  the  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  Avith  Destroyers  of  the 
13th  and  9th  Flotillas  taking  station  ahead,  t  turned  to  E.S.E., 
slightly  converging  on  the  enemy,  who  were  now  at  a  range  of 
23,000  yards,  and  formed  the  Ships  on  a  Une  of  bearing  to  clear 
the  smoke.  The  5th  Battle  Squadron,  who  had  conformed  to 
our  movements,  were  now  bearing  N.N.W.,  10,000  yards.  Tlie 
visibihty  at  this  time  was  good,  the  sun  behind  us  and  the 
wind  S.E.  Being  between  the  enemy  and  his  base,  our  situatif»n 
was  both  tactically  and  strategically  good. 

8.  At  3.48  p.m.  the  action  commenced  at  a  range  of  18,500 
yards,  both  forces  opening  fire  practically  simultaneously. 
Both  appeared  to  straddle  the  target  early,  and  at  3.51  p.m. 
"  Lion "  received  her  first  hit.  Course  was  altered  to  the 
Southward,  and  subsequently  at  intervals,  to  confuse  the  enemy's 
fire  control ;  the  mea.n  direction  Avas  S.S.E.,  the  enemy  steering 
a  parallel  course  distant  about  18,000  to  14,500  j^ards.  For 
the  next  ten  minutes  tlie  firing  of  the  enemy  was  very  rapid 
and  effective.  "  Lion  "  was  hit  repeatedly,  the  roof  of  Q  turret 
being  bloAvn  off  at  4  p.m.  Immediately  afterwards  "  Indefati- 
gable "  Avas  hit  by  three  shots  falling  together.  The  shots 
appeared  to  hit  the  outer  edge  of  the  upper  deck  in  Une  wdth 
the  after  turret.  An  explosion  foUoAAed,  and  she  fell  out  of  the 
line  sinking  by  the  stern.  Hit  again  by  another  salvo  near 
A  turret  she  turned  over  and  disappeared. 

9.  At  4.8  p.m.  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  came  into  action 
and  opened  fire  at  a  range  of  20,000  yards.  The  enemy's  fire 
now  seemed  to  slacken.  It  would  appear  that  at  this  time  AA^e 
passed  through  a  screen  of  enemy  submarines.  In  evidence 
of  this  a  torpedo  was  sighted  passing  astern  of  '"  Lion  "  from 
Starboard  to  Port.  The  Destroyer  "  Landrail  "  of  9th  Flotilla, 
Avho  Avas  on  our  Port  beam  trying  to  take  station  ahead,  sighted 
the  periscope  of  a  Sulimarine  on  her  Port  quarter,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  track  of  a  torpedo  Avhich  passed  under  her  and 
crossed  the  line  of  the  Battle  Cruisers  betAveen  "  Tiger  "  and 
"  New  Zealand."  Though  causing  considerable  inconvenience 
from  smoke,  the  presence  of  "  Lydiard  "  and  "  Landrail  " 
undoubtedly  preserved  the  Battle  Cruisers  from  closer  Submaiine 
attack.  "  Nottingham  "  also  reported  a  Submarine  on  the 
Starboard  beam. 

10.  Eight  Destroyers  of  the  13th  FlotiUa,  "Nestor," 
"  Nomad,"    "  Nicator,"    "  Narborough,"     ■  PeHcan,"    "  Petard," 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  133 

"  Obdurate,"  "  Nerissa,"  with  "  Moorsom  "  and  "  Morris  "  of 
10th  Flotilla,  "  Turbulent "  and  "  Termagant  '  of  the  0th 
Flotilla,  having  been  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy  M'ith  torpedoes 
when  oj)portunity  offered,  moved  out  at  4.15  p.m.  ssimultaneously 
with  a  similar  movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  The  attack 
was  carried  out  in  the  most  gallant  manner  and  with  great 
determination.  Before  arriving  at  a  favourable  j^O'^ition  to 
fir^)  torpedoes,  they  intercepted  an  enemy  force  consisting  of 
a  Light  Cruiser  and  15  Destroyers.  A  fierce  engagement  ensued 
at  close  quarters,  with  the  result  that  the  enemy  were  forced 
to  retire  on  their  Battle  Cruisers,  having  lost  two  Destroyers  sunk, 
and  having  their  torpedo  attaclc  frustrated.  Our  Destroyers 
sustained  no  loss  in  this  engagement,  but  their  attack  on  the 
enemy  Battle  Cruisers  was  rendered  less  effective  owing  to  some 
of  the  Destroyers  having  dropped  astern  during  the  fight.  Their 
position  was  therefore  unfavourable  for  torpedo  attaclv. 

11.  "Nestor,"  "Nomad,"  and  "  Nicator  "  gallantly  led  by 
Commander  Hon.  E.  B.  S.  Bingham  of  "  Nestor,"  pressed  home 
their  attack  on  the  Battle  Cruisers  and  fired  two  torpedoes  at 
them  at  a  range  of  6,000  and  5,000  yards,  being  subjected  to 
a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's  secondary  armament.  "  Nomad  " 
was  badly  hit  and  apparently  i-emained  stopped  between  the 
lines.  Subsequently  "  Nestor  "  and  "  Nicator  "  altered  course 
to  the  S.E.  and  in  a  short  time,  the  opposing  Battle  Cruisers 
having  turned  16  points,  found  themselves  within  close  range 
of  a  number  of  enemy  Battleships.  Nothing  daunted,  though 
under  a  terrific  fire,  they  stood  on,  and  their  position  being 
favourable  for  torpedo  attack,  fired  a  torpedo  at  the  2nd  ship 
of  the  enemy  line  at  a  range  of  3,000  yards.  Before  they  could 
fire  their  fourth  torpedo,  "  Nestor  "  was  badly  hit  and  swung 
to  Starboard,  "  Nicator  "  altering  course  inside  her  to  avoid 
collision  and  thereby  being  prevented  from  firing  the  last  torpedo. 
"  Nicator  "  made  good  her  escape  and  subsequently  rejoined  the 
Captain  D,  13th  Flotilla.  "  Nestor "  remained  stopped,  but 
was  afloat  when  last  seen.  "  Moorsom  "  also  carried  out  an 
attack  on  the  enemy's  Battle  Fleet. 

12.  "  Petard,"  "  Nerissa,"  "  Turbulent,"  and  "  Termagant  " 
also  pressed  home  their  attack  on  the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers, 
firing  torpedoes  at  a  range  of  7,000  yards  after  the  engagement 
with  enemy  Destroyers.  "  Petard  "  reports  that  all  her  torpedoes 
must  have  crossed  the  enemy's  line,  while  "  Nerissa  "  states 
that  one  torpedo  appeared  to  strike  the  rear  ship.  These 
Destroyer  attacks  were  indicative  of  the  spirit  pervading  His 
Majesty's  Navy,  and  Avere  worthy  of  its  highest  traditions.  I 
propose  to  bring  to  your  notice  a  recommendation  of  ( 'ommander 
Bingham  for  the  Victoria  Cross,  and  other  officers  for  some 
recognition  of  their  conspicuous  gallantry. 

13.  From  4.15  to  4.43  p.m.  the  conflict  between  the  opposing 
Battle  Cruisers  was  of  a  very  fierce  and  resolute  character.  The 
5th    Battle    Squadron    was    engaging    the    enemy's    rear    ships, 


134  BATTLE    Ol*'    JUTLA.ND  : 

uiifoitunately  at  very  long  range.  Our  fire  began  to  tell,  the 
accuracy  and  rapidity  of  that  of  the  enemy  depreciating  con- 
siderably. At  4.18  p.m.  the  3rd  enemy  ship  was  seen  to  be  on 
fire.  The  visibiUty  to  the  North-Eastward  had  become  con- 
siderably reduced  and  the  outline  of  the  ships  very  indistinct. 
This,  no  doubt,  was  largely  due  to  the  constant  use  of  smoke 
balls  or  charges  by  the  enemy,  under  cover  of  which  thej-^  were 
continually  altering  course  or  zig-zagging. 

14.  At  4.26  p.m.  there  was  a  violent  explosion  in  "  Queen 
Mary " ;  she  was  enveloped  in  clouds  of  grey  smoke  and 
disappeared.  From  the  evidence  of  Captain  Pelly,  of  "  Tiger," 
who  was  in  station  astern,  corroborated  by  Rear- Admiral  Brock 
in  "  Princess  Royal  "  ahead,  a  salvo  pitched  abreast  of  Q  turret, 
and  almost  instantaneously  there  was  a  terrific  upheaval  and  a 
dense  cloud  of  smoke  through  which  "  Tiger  "  passed  barely 
30  seconds  afterwards.  No  sign  could  be  seen  of  "  Queen  Mary." 
Eighteen  of  her  Officers  and  Men  were  subsequently  picked  up 
by  "  Laurel." 

15.  At  4.38  p.m.  "  Southampton  "  reported  the  enemy's 
Battle  Fleet  ahead.  The  Destroyers  were  recalled,  and  at  4.42  p.m . 
the  enemy's  Battle  Fleet  was  sighted  S.E.,  Course  was  altered 
16  points  in  succession  to  Starboard,  and  I  proceeded  on  a 
Northerly  course  to  lead  them  towards  the  Grand  Fleet.  The 
enemy  Battle  Cruisers  altered  course  shortly  afterwards,  and 
the  action  continued.  "  Southampton  "  with  the  2nd  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron  held  on  to  the  Southward  to  observe.  They 
closed  to  within  13,000  yards  of  the  enemy  Battle  Fleet  and  came 
under  a  very  heavy  but  ineffective  fire.  "  Southampton's  " 
reports  were  most  valuable.  The  5th  Battle  Squadron  were  now 
closing  on  an  opposite  course  and  engaging  the  enemy  Battle 
Cruisers  with  all  guns.  The  position  of  the  enemy  Battle  Fleef 
was  communicated  to  them,  and  I  ordered  them  to  alter  course 
16  points.  Led  by  Rear- Admiral  Hugh  Evan-Thomas,  M.V.O., 
in  "  Barham,"  this  Squadron  supported  us  briUiantly  and 
effectively. 

16.  At  4.57  p.m.  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  turned  up  astern 
of  me  and  came  under  the  fire  of  the  leading  ships  of  the  enemy 
Battle  Fleet.  "  Fearless  "  with  the  Destroyers  of  1st  Flotilla 
joined  the  Battle  Cruisers  and,  when  speed  admitted,  took  station 
ahead.  "  Champion  "  with  13th  Flotilla  took  station  on  the 
5th  Battle  Squadron.  At  5  p.m.  the  1st  and  3rd  Light  Cruiser 
Squadrons,  which  had  been  following  me  on  the  Southerly  course, 
took  station  on  my  Starboard  bow ;  the  2nd  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron  took  station  on  my  Port  quarter. 

17.  The  weather  conditions  now  became  unfavourable,  our 
ships  being  silhouetted  against  a  clear  horizon  to  the  Westward, 
while  the  enemy  were  for  the  most  part  obscured  by  mist,  only 
showing  up  clearly  at  intervals.  These  conditions  prevailed 
until  we  had  turned  their  van  at  about  6  p.m.  Between 
5  and  6  p.m.  the  action  continued  on  a  Northerly  course,  the 


Ori'lCIAL    DESPATCHES.  13") 

range  being  about  14,000  yards.  During  this  time  the  enemy 
received  very  severe  punishment,  and  undoubtedly  one  of  their 
Battle  Cruisers  quitted  the  hne  in  a  considerably  damaged 
condition.  This  came  under  my  personal  observation,  and  was 
corroborated  by  "  Princess  Royal  "  and  "  Tiger."  Other  enemy 
ships  also  showed  signs  of  increasing  injury.  At  5.5  p.m. 
**  Onslow  "  and  "  Moresby,"  who  had  been  detached  to  assist 
"  Engadine  "  with  the  Seaplane,  rejoined  the  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadrons  and  took  station  on  the  Starboard  (engaged)  bow 
of  "Lion."  At  5.10  p.m.  "Moresby,"  being  2  points  before 
the  beam  of  the  leading  enemy  ship  at  a  range  of  6,000  to  8,000 
yards,  fired  a  long-range  torpedo  at  the  3rd  in  their  hne.  Eight 
minutes  later  she  observed  a  hit  with  a  torpedo  on  what  was 
judged  to  be  the  6th  Ship  in  the  hne.  Later  analysis  of  the 
director  setting  indicated  a  probabihty  of  this  result.  "  Moresby  " 
then  passed  between  the  hnes  to  clear  the  range  of  smoke,  and 
rejoined  "  Champion."  In  corroboration  of  this,  "  Fearless  " 
reports  having  seen  an  enemy  heavy  ship  heavily  on  fire  at  about 
5.10  p.m.,  and  shortly  afterwards  a  huge  cloud  of  smoke  and 
steam  similar  to  that  which  accompanied  the  blowing  up  of 
"  Queen  Mary  "  and  "  Indefatigable." 

18.  At  5.35  p.m.  our  course  was  N.N.E.  and  the  estimated 
position  of  the  Grand  Fleet  was  N.  16  W.,  so  we  gradually  hauled 
to  the  North-Eastward,  keeping  the  range  of  the  enemy  at 
14,000  yards.  He  was  gradually  hauhng  to  the  Eastward, 
receiving  severe  punishment  at  the  head  of  his  line,  and  probably 
acting  on  information  received  from  his  Light  Cruisers  which 
had  sighted  and  were  engaged  with  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron  {vide  "  Indomitable's  "  report).  Possibly  Zeppelins 
were  present  also.  At  5.50  p.m.  British  Cruisers  were  sighted 
on  the  Port  Bow,  and  at  5.56  p.m.  the  leading  Battleships  of 
the  Grand  Fleet  bearing  North  5  miles.  I  thereupon  altered 
course  to  East  and  proceeded  at  utmost  speed.  This  brought 
the  range  of  the  enemy  down  to  12,000  yards.  I  made  a  visual 
report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers 
bore  South-East.  At  this  time  only  3  of  the  enemy  Battle 
Cruisers  were  visible,  closely  followed  by  Battleships  of  the 
"  Konig  "  class. 

19.  At  about  6.5  p.m.  "  Onslow,"  being  on  the  engaged 
bow  of  "  Lion,"  sighted  an  enemy  Light  Cruiser  at  a  distance 
of  6,000  yards  from  us,  apparently  endeavouring  to  attack  with 
torpedoes.  "  Onslow  "  at  once  closed  and  engaged  her,  firing 
58  rounds  at  a  range  of  from  4,000  to  2,000  yards,  scoring  a  number 
of  hits.  "  Onslow  "  then  closed  to  within  8,000  yards  of  the 
enemy  Battle  Cruisers  and  orders  were  given  for  all  torpedoes 
to  be  fired.  At  this  moment  she  was  struck  amidships  by  a 
heavy  shell,  with  the  result  that  only  one  torpedo  was  fired. 
Thinking  that  all  his  torpedoes  had  gone,  the  Commanding 
Officer  proceeded  to  retire  at  slow  speed.  Being  informed  that 
he  still  had  three  torpedoes,  he  closed  the  Light  Cruiser  pre- 


136  BATTJ.K    OK    Jl    ll-A.NJ*  : 

viously  engaged  and  torpedoed  her.  The  enemy's  Battle  Fleet 
was  then  sighted  at  a  distance  of  8,000  yards,  and  the  remaining 
torpedoes  were  fired  at  them;  having  started  correctly,  they 
must  have  crossed  the  enemy's  track.  Da)nage  in  her  feed 
tank  then  caused  "'  Onslow  "  to  stop. 

20.  At  *7.15  p.m.  "  Defender,"'  whose  speed  had  been  reduced 
to  10  knots,  while  on  the  disengaged  side  of  the  Battle  Cruisers, 
by  a  l2-in.  shell  which  damaged  her  foremost  boiler,  but  failed 
to  explode,  closed  '  Onslow  "  and  took  her  in  tow.  Shell  were 
falling  all  round  them  during  this  operation,  which,  however, 
was  successfidly  accomphshed.  During  the  heavy  weather  of 
the  ensuing  night  the  tow  parted  twice,  but  was  re-secured. 
The  two  struggled  on  together  until  1  p.m.,  1st  June,  when 
"  Onslow  "  was  transferred  to  tugs.  1  consider  the  performance 
of  these  two  destroyers  to  be  gallant  in  the  extreme,  and  I  am 
recommending  Lieut.-Commander  J.  C.  Tovey  of  "  Onslow  " 
and  Lieut. -C'ommander  Palmer  of  '  Defender  "  for  special 
recognition.  "  Onslow  "  was  possibly  the  Destroyer  referred  to 
by  the  Rear- Admiral  Commanding  the  3rd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron 
as  follows  : — "  Here  I  should  hke  to  bring  to  your  notice  the 
action  of  a  Destroyer  (name  unknown,  thought  to  be  marked 
with  the  number  '  59  '  V  Acasta  "  which  we  passed  close  in 
a  disabled  condition  soon  after  6  p.m.  .She  apparently  was 
able  to  struggle  ahead  again  and  made  straight  for  the  "  Derf- 
tiinger  "  to  attack  her.  The  incident  appeared  so  courageous 
that  it  seems  desirable  to  investigate  it  further,  as  I  am  unable 
to  be  certain  of  the  vessel's  identity." 

21.  At  6.15  p.m.  "Defence"  and  "Warrior"  crossed  oui- 
bows  from  Port  to  Starboard,  necessitating  our  hauling  to 
Port  to  clear.  They  were  closely  engaging  an  enemy  Light 
Cruiser,  but  immediately  after  clearing  us  they  came  under  the 
fire  of  enemy  heavj'^  ships,  and  passed  down  between  us  and 
the  enemy  on  opposite  courses. 

22.  At  6.20  p.m.  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  consisting 
of  **  Invincible  "  (Captain  A.  L.  Cav)  flving  the  flag  of  Rear- 
Admiral  Hon.  H.  L.  A.  Hood,  C.B.,  M.V'iO..  D.S.O.,  -Indomit- 
able "  (Captain  F.  W.  Kennedy),  and  '  Inflexible  "  (Captain 
E.  H.  F.  Heaton-ElUs,  M.V.O.)  appeared  ahead,  steaming  South 
towards  the  enemy's  van.  I  ordered  them  to  take  station 
ahead,  which  was  carried  out  magnificently,  Rear- Admiral  Hood 
bringing  his  Squadron  into  action  ahead  in  a  most  inspiring 
manner,  worthy  of  his  great  naval  ancestors.  At  6.25  p.m. 
I  altered  course  to  the  E.S.E.  in  support  of  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron,  who  were  at  this  time  only  8.000  yards  from  the 
enemy's  leading  ship.  They  were  pouring  a  hot  fire  into  her 
and  caused  her  to  turn  to  the  Westward  of  South.  At  the  same 
time  I  made  a  visual  report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
bearing  and  distance  of  the  enemy  Battle  Fleet.  At  6.33  p.m. 
"  Invincible  "  was  struck  by  a  complete  .salvo  about  Q  turret  and 
immediately  blew  up. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  137 

23.  After  the  loss  of  "  Invincible,"  the  iSquadron  was  led  by 
^'  Inflexible  "  until  (>.50  p.m.  By  this  time  the  Battle  Cruisers 
were  clear  of  our  leading  Battle  ISquadron  then  bearing  about 
N.N.W.  3  miles,  and  I  ordered  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  .Squadron 
to  prolong  the  line  astern  and  reduced  to  18  knots.  The  visibility 
at  this  time  was  very  indifferent,  not  more  than  4  miles,  and 
the  enemy  shij^s  w^ere  temporaiily  lost  sight  of.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  after  6  p.m.,  although  the  visibihty  became  reduced, 
it  was  undoubtedly  more  favourable  to  us  than  to  the  enemy. 
At  intervals  their  ships  showed  up  clearly,  enabling  us  to  punish 
them  very  severely,  and  establish  a  definite  superiority  over 
them.  The  damage  received  by  our  ships  during  this  period, 
excepting  the  destruction  of  "  Invincible,"  was  shght.  From 
the  reports  of  other  ships  and  my  own  observation  it  was  clear 
that  the  enemy  suffered  severely,  Battle  C'ruisers  and  Battleships 
ahke.  The  head  of  their  line  was  crumpled  ujd,  leaving  Battle- 
ships as  targets  for  the  majority  of  our  Battle  Cruisers.  Before 
leaving  us  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  were  also  engaging  Battle- 
ships. The  report  of  Rear-Admiral  Evan-Thomas  shows  that 
excellent  results  were  obtained,  and  it  can  be  safely  said  that 
his  magnificent  Squadron  wrought  great  execution. 

24.  From  the  report  of  Rear-Admiral  T.  D.  W.  Napier,  M.V.O., 
the  3rd  Light  Cruiser  Squadi'on,  which  had  maintained  its  station 
on  our  Starboard  bow  well  ahead  of  the  enemy,  at  6.25  p.m. 
attacked  with  the  torpedo  at  a  range  of  6,000  yards.  "  Falmouth" 
and  "  Yarmouth  "  both  fired  torpedoes  at  the  leading  enemy 
Battle  Cruiser,  and  it  is  beheved  that  one  torpedo  hit,  as  a  heavy 
under-water  explosion  was  observed.  The  3rd  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron  then  gallantly  attacked  the  heavj^  ships  with  gun-fire, 
with  impunity  to  themselves,  thereby  demonstrating  that  the 
fighting  efficiency  of  the  enemy  had  been  seriously  impaired. 
Rear-Admiral  Napier  deserves  great  credit  for  his  determined 
and  effective  attack.  "  Indomitable  "  reports  that  about  this 
time  one  of  the  "  Derffiinger  "  class  fell  out  of  the  enemy's  fine. 

25.  At  7.6  ]).m.  I  received  a  signal  from  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  that  the  course  of  the  Fleet  was  South.  Subsequently 
signals  were  received  up  to  8.46  p.m.,  shoAving  that  the  course 
of  the  Grand  Fleet  was  to  the  South-Westward.  Between 
7  and  7.12  p.m.  we  hauled  round  gradually  to  S.W.  bj^  S.  to 
regain  touch  with  the  enemy,  and  at  7.14  p.m.  again  sighted 
them  at  a  range  of  about  15,000  yards.  The  ships  sighted 
at  this  time  were  two  Battle  Cruisers  and  two  Battleships, 
apparently  of  the  "  Konig  "  class.  No  doubt  more  continued 
the  fine  to  the  Northward,  but  that  was  all  that  could  be  seen. 
The  visibility  having  improved  considerably  as  the  sun  descended 
below  the  clouds,  we  re-engaged  at  7.17  p.m.  and  increased 
speed  to  22  knots.  At  7.32  p.m.  my  course  was  S.W.,  speed 
18  knots,  the  leading  enemy  Battleship  bearing  N.W.  by  W. 
Again  after  a  very  short  time  the  enemy  showed  signs  of 
punishment,  one  ship  being  on  fire  while  another  appeared  to 


138  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

(Irop  right  astern.  The  Destroyers  at  the  head  of  the  enemy's 
line  emitted  volumes  of  grey  smoke,  covering  their  capital  ships 
as  with  a  pall,  under  cover  of  which  they  undoubtedly  turned 
away,  and  at  7.45  p.m.  we  lost  sight  of  them. 

26.  At  7.58  p.m.  I  ordei'ed  the  1st  and  3rd  Light  Cruiser 
.Squadrons  to  sweep  to  the  Westward  and  locate  the  head  of  the 
enemy's  line,  and  at  8.20  p.m.  we  altered  course  to  West  in 
support.  We  soon  located  twO  Battle  Cruisers  and  Battleships, 
and  were  heavily  engaged  at  a  short  range  of  about  10,000  yards. 
The  leading  ship  was  hit  repeatedly  by  "  Lion  "  and  turned 
away  8  points,  emitting  very  high  flames  and  with  a  heavy  hst 
to  Port.  "  Princess  Royal  "  set  fire  to  a  3-funnelled  Battleship ; 
"  New  Zealand  "  and  "  Indomitable  "  report  that  the  3rd  Ship, 
which  they  both  engaged,  hauled  out  of  the  line  heeUng  over 
and  on  fire.  The  mist  which  now  came  down  enveloped  them, 
and  "  Falmouth  "  reported  they  were  last  seen  at  8.38  p.m. 
steaming  to  the  Westward. 

27.  At  8.40  p.m.  all  our  Battle  Cruisers  felt  a  heavy  shock 
as  if  struck  by  a  mine  or  torpedo,  or  possibly  sunken  wreckage. 
As,  however,  examination  of  the  bottoms  reveals  no  sign  of 
such  an  occurrence,  it  is  assumed  that  it  indicated  the  blowing 
up  of  a  great  vessel.  This  seems  a  very  probable  explanation 
in  view  of  the  condition  in  wliich  the  enemy  was  last  seen. 

28.  I  continued  on  a  South -Westerly  course  with  my  Light 
Cruisers  spread  until  9.24  p.m.  Nothing  further  being  sighted, 
I  assumed  that  the  enemy  were  to  the  North- Westward,  and 
that  we  had  estabUshed  ourselves  well  between  him  and  his 
base.  "  Mnotaur  "  w^as  at  this  time  bearing  North  5  miles, 
and  I  asked  her  the  position  of  the  leading  Battle  Squadron  of 
the  Grand  Fleet.  Her  reply  was  that  it  was  not  in  sight,  but 
was  last  seen  bearing  N.N.E.  5  miles  at  8.10  p.m.  My  position, 
course,  and  speed  had  been  made  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  at 
7.30,  8.40,  and  9  p.m.,  the  latter  signal  giving  the  bearing  of 
the  enemy  as  N.  by  W.,  steering  S.W.  by  S.,  which  as  near  as 
could  be  judged  was  correct.  At  9.16  p.m.  I  received  a  signal 
from  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  the  course  of  the  Fleet  was 
South. 

29.  In  view  of  the  gathering  darkness  and  for  other  reasons, 
viz.  :  (a)  Our  distance  from  the  Battle  Fleet;  (6)  The  damaged 
condition  of  the  Battle  Ci'uisers;  (c)  The  enemy  being  concen- 
trated; (d)  The  enemy  being  accompanied  by  numerous 
Destroyers;  (e)  Our  strategical  position  being  such  as  to  make 
it  appear  certain  that  we  should  locate  the  enemy  at  daylight 
under  most  favourable  circumstances,  I  did  not  consider  it 
desirable  or  proper  to  close  the  enemy  Battle  Fleet  during  the 
dark  hours.  I  therefore  concluded  that  I  should  be  carrying 
out  the  Commander-in-Chief's  wishes  by  turning  to  the  course 
of  the  Fleet,  reporting  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  I  had 
done  so. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  139 

30.  My  duty  in  this  situation  was  to  ensure  that  the  enemy 
Fleet  could  not  regain  its  base  by  passing  round  the  Southern 
flank  of  our  forces.  I  therefore  turned  to  South  at  9.24  p.m. 
at  17  knots,  and  continued  this  course  until  2.30  a.m.,  with  the 
1st  and  3rd  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  spread  to  the  Southward 
and  Westward.  My  intention  was  to  ask  permission  to  sweep 
S.W.  at  dayhght,  but  on  receiving  a  signal  that  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  was  turning  to  North,  and  ordering  me  to  conform  and 
close,  I  proceeded  accordingly,  and  rejoined  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  at  5.20  a.m. 

31.  The  movements  of  the  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  and 
Flotillas  are  described  in  detail  in  their  own  reports.  "  Champion" 
and  most  of  the  13th  Flotilla  were  in  visual  touch  after  the 
Destroyer  attack  on  the  enemy  hne  at  4.40  p.m.  on  31st  Ma}^ 
but  they  became  detached  later  and  stationed  themselves  at 
the  rear  of  the  Battle  Fleet  for  the  night.  At  0.30  a.m.  on 
1st  June  a  large  vessel  crossed  the  rear  of  the  Flotilla  at  high 
speed.  She  passed  close  to  "  Petard "  and  "  Turbulent," 
SAvitched  on  searchlights  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  which  severely 
damaged  "  Petard  "  and  disabled  "  Turbulent."  At  3.30  a.m. 
"  Champion  "  was  engaged  for  a  few  minutes  with  4  enemy 
destroyers.  "  Moresby "  reports  4  ships  of  "  Deutschland  " 
class  sighted  at  2.35  a.m.,  at  whom  she  fired  one  torpedo.  Two 
minutes  later  an  exi:)losion  was  felt  by  "  Moresby  "  and 
"  Obdurate."  On  investigation  I  find  the  "  Moresby  "  was  in 
station  with  "  Obdurate  "  astern  of  "  Champion."  Some  of  the 
strange  vessels  were  sighted  by  "  Champion  "  and  "  Obdurate," 
who  took  them  to  be  some  of  our  own  Light  Cruisers.  This  was 
impossible,  and  it  is  very  much  to  be  regretted  that  '"Champion  " 
did  not  take  steps  to  identify  them.  If,  as  was  probable,  they 
were  the  enemy,  an  excellent  opportunity  was  missed  for  an 
attack  in  the  early  morning  light.  More  important  still,  a 
portion  of  the  enemy  might  have  been  definitely  located. 

32.  "  Fearless  "  and  the  1st  Flotilla  were  very  usefully 
employed  as  a  submarine  screen  during  the  earHer  part  of  the 
3 1st  May,  but  their  limited  speed  made  it  almost  impossible  for 
them  to  regain  their  proper  stations  when  the  Battle  Cruisers 
altered  course.  At  6.10  p.m.  when  joining  the  Battle  Fleet, 
"  Fearless  "  was  unable  to  follow  the  Battle  Cruisers  without 
fouhng  the  Battleships,  so  turned  32  points  and  took  station 
at  the  rear  of  the  hne.  She  sighted  during  the  night  a  Battleship 
of  the  "  Kaiser  "  class  steaming  fast  and  entirely  alone.  She 
was  not  able  to  engage  her,  but  believes  she  was  attacked  by 
destroyers  further  astern.  A  heavy  explosion  was  observed 
astern  not  long  after.  The  incident  could  be  identified  by  the 
fact  that  this  ship  fired  a  star  shell.  By  midday  on  1st  June 
all  the  1st  Flotilla  were  getting  short  of  fuel  and  had  to  be 
detached  in  pairs  to  make  their  base  at  15  knots. 

33.  The  1st  and  3rd  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  were  almost 
continuously  in  touch   with    the   Battle  Cruisers,   one  or  both 


14(J  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

Squatlrons  being  usually  ahead.  They  were  most  valuable  as 
a  submarine  screen  when  no  destroyers  were  present;  they 
very  effectively  protected  the  head  of  our  line  from  Torpedo 
attack  by  Light  Cruisers  or  Destroyers,  and  were  prompt  in 
helping  to  regain  touch  w^hen  the  enemy's  line  was  temporarily 
lost  sight  of.  The  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  was  at  the  rear 
of  our  Battle  line  during  the  night,  and  at  9  p.m.  assisted  to 
repel  a  Destroyer  attack  on  the  5th  Battle  Squadron.  They 
were  also  heavily  engaged  at  10.20  p.m.  with  5  enemy  Cruisers  oi- 
Light  (bruisers,  "  Southampton  "  and  "  Dublin  "  suffering  severe 
casualties  during  an  action  lasting  about  15  minutes.  "  Birming- 
ham," at  11.30  p.m.,  sighted  2  or  more  heavy  ships  steering 
South.  A  report  of  this  was  received  by  me  at  11.40  p.m.  as 
steering  W.S.W.  They  were  thought  at  the  time  to  be  Battle 
Cruisers,  but  it  is  since  considered  that  they  Mere  probably 
Battleships. 

34.  The  work  of  "  Engadine  '"  ajjpears  to  have  been  most 
praiseworthy  throughout,  and  of  great  value.  Lieut. -Commander 
C.  G.  Robinson  deserves  great  credit  for  the  skilful  and  seamanUke 
manner  in  Avhich  he  handled  his  shi]).  He  actually  towed 
"  Warrior  "'  for  75  miles  between  8.40  p.m.,  31.st  May,  and 
7.15  a.m.,  1st  June,  and  was  instrumental  in  saving  the  lives  of 
her  Ship's  Company. 

35.  I  have  not  referred  to  "  Chester  "  as  she  did  not  come 
under  my  personal  command  or  observation.  Her  report  show^s 
that  she  fought  gallantly  and  successfully  against  superior  forces 
and  suffered  considerably  in  casualties  and  damage. 

36.  It  is  impossible  to  give  a  definite  statement  of  the  losses 
inflicted  on  the  enemy.  The  visibihty  was  for  the  most  part 
low  and  fluctuating,  and  caution  forbade  me  to  close  the  range 
too  much  Avith  mj^  inferior  force. 

A  review'  of  all  the  reports  which  1  have  received,  however, 
leads  me  to  form  the  following  estimate  of  the  enemy's  losses 
during  the  course  of  the  operations  described  in  this  report : — 

3  Battle  Cruisers, 

2  Battlesliips  ("  Konig  "  or  "  Kaiser  "  class) 

1  "  Pommern  "  class,  ^Sunk. 

2  Light  Cruisers, 

3  Destroyers.  ] 

2  Battle  Cruisers,  "1    Severely 

Several  Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers,       J   damaged. 

This  is  eloquent  testimony  to  the  very  high  standard  of 
Gunnery  and  Torpedo  efficiency  of  His  Majesty's  Ships.  The 
Control  and  drill  remained  undisturbed  throughout,  in  many 
cases  despite  heavy  damage  to  material  and  personnel.  Our 
superiority  over  the  enemy  in  this  respect  was  very  marked, 
their  efficiency  becoming  rapidly  reduced  under  punishment, 
while  ours   Avas  maintained  throughout. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  141 

37.  As  was  to  be  expected,  the  behaviour  of  the  .Shi})s' 
Companies  under  the  terrible  conditions  of  a  modern  sea  battle 
was  magnificent  without  exception.  The  strain  on  their  moral 
was  a  severe  test  of  disciphne  and  training.  Officers  and  men 
were  imbued  with  one  thought,  the  desire  to  defeat  the  eneun . 
The  fortitude  of  the  wounded  was  admirable.  A  report  from 
the  Commanding  Officer  of  "  Chester  "  gives  a  splendid  instance 
of  devotion  to  duty.  Boy,  1st  Class,  John  Travers  Cornwell, 
of  "  Chester  "  was  mortally  wounded  early  in  the  action.  He 
nevertheless  remained  standing  alone  at  a  most  exposed  post, 
quietly  aAvaiting  orders  till  the  end  of  the  action,  with  the  gun's 
crew  dead  and  wounded  all  round  him.  His  age  was  under 
16|  years.  I  regret  that  he  has  since  died,  but  I  recommend  his 
case  for  special  recognition  in  justice  to  his  memory,  and  as  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  high  example  set  by  him. 

Our  casualties  were  very  heavy,  and  T  wish  to  express  my 
deepest  regret  at  the  loss  of  so  many  gallant  comrades,  Officers, 
and  Men.     They  died  gloriously. 

38.  Exceptional  skill  was  displayed  by  the  Medical  Officers 
of  the  Fleet.  They  performed  operations  and  tended  the 
wounded  under  conditions  of  extreme  difficulty.  In  some  cases 
their  staff  was  seriously  depleted  by  casualties,  and  the  inevitable 
lack  of  such  essentials  as  adequate  Ught,  hot  water,  &c.,  in 
ships  battered  by  shell  fire,  tried  their  skill,  resource,  and  physical 
endurance  to  the  utmost. 

39.  As  usual,  the  Engine  Room  Departments  of  all  ships 
displayed  the  highest  quahties  of  technical  skill,  disciphne,  and 
endurance.  High  speed  is  a  primary  factor  in  the  tactics  of  the 
Squadrons  under  my  command,  and  the  Engine  Room  Depart- 
ments never  fail. 

40.  I  have  already  made  mention  of  the  brilliant  support 
afforded  me  by  Rear-Admiral  H.  Evan-Thomas,  M.V.O.,  and 
the  5th  Battle  Squadron,  and  of  the  magnificent  manner  in 
which  Rear-Admiral  Hon.  H.  L.  A.  Hood,  C.B.,  M.V.O.,  D.S.O., 
brought  his  Squadron  into  action.  I  desire  to  record  my  great 
regret  at  his  loss,  which  is  a  national  misfortune.  I  would  now 
bring  to  your  notice  the  able  support  rendered  to  me  by  Rear- 
Admiral  W.  C.  Pakenham,  C.B.,  and  Rear-Admiral  O.  de  B. 
Brock,  C.B.  In  the  course  of  my  report  I  have  expressed  my 
appreciation  of  the  good  work  performed  by  the  Light  Cruiser 
Squadrons  under  the  command  respectively  of  Rear-Admiral 
T.  D.  W.  Napier,  M.V.O.,  Commodore  W.  E.  Goodenough, 
M.V.O.,  and  Commodore  E.  S.  Alexander-Sinclair,  M.V.O. 
On  every  occasion  these  Officers  anticipated  my  wishes  and  used 
their  forces  to  the  best  possible  effect. 

41.  I  desire  also  to  bring  to  your  notice  the  skill  mth  which 
their  respective  ships  were  handled  by  Captains  F.  W.  Kennedy 
("  Indomitable "),    who    commanded    the    3rd    Battle    Craiser 


142  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND: 

Squadron  after  the  loss  of  Rear-Admiral  Hood,  C.  F.  Sowerby 
("Indefatigable"),  H.  B.  Pelly,  M.V.O.  ("Tiger"),  J.  F.  E. 
Green  ("New  Zealand"),  W.  H.  Cowan,  M.V.O. ,  D.S.O. 
("  Princess  Royal  "),  C.  I.  Prowse  ("  Queen  Mary  "),  A.  L.  Cay 
("  Invincible  "),  E.  H.  F.  Heaton-Ellis,  M.V.O.  ("  Inflexible  "), 
(\  B.  Miller  ("Nottingham"),  A.  E.  M.  Chatfield,  C.V.O. 
("  Lion  "),  on  whom  lay  special  responsibility  as  commanding 
my  Flagship,  J.  D.  Edwards  ("  Falmouth  "),  A.  A.  M.  Duff 
("  Birmingham  "),  E.  Reeves  ("  Birkenhead  "),  W.  F.  Blunt 
("Gloucester"),  T.  D.  Pratt  ("Yarmouth"),  A.  C.  Scott 
("  Dubhn  "),  B.  S.  Thesiger  ("  Inconstant "),  R.  N.  Lawson 
("  Chester  "),  J.  U.  Farie  ("  Champion  "),  (Captain  D,  13th 
Flotilla),  J.  E.  Cameron,  M.V.O.  ("  Phaeton  "),  T.  P.  H.  Beamish 
("  Cordelia  "),  and  C.  D.  Roper  ("  Fearless  "),  (Captain  D, 
Ist^Flotilla).  With  such  Flag  Officers,  Commodores  and  Captains 
to  support  me,  my  task  was  made  easier.  The  Destroyers  of 
the  1st  and  13th  Flotillas  were  handled  by  their  respective 
Commanding  Officers  with  skill,  dash  and  courage.  I  desire  to 
record  my  very  great  regret  at  the  loss  of  Captains  C.  F.  Sowerby 
("  Indefatigable  "),  C.  I.  Prowse  ("  Queen  Mary  "),  and  A.  L.  Cay 
("  Invincible  "),  all  Officers  of  the  highest  attainments  who  can 
be  ill-spared  at  this  time  of  stress. 

42.  I  wish  to  endorse  the  report  of  the  Rear-Admiral 
Commanding  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  as  to  the  abiUty  displayed 
by  Captains  E.  M.  Phillpotts  ("  Warspite  "),  M.  Woollcombe 
("  Valiant  ").  Hon.  A.  D.  E.  H.  Boyle  ("  Malaya  "),  and  A.  W. 
Craig  ("  Barham  "). 

43.  In  conclusion,  I  desire  to  record  and  bring  to  j^our  notice 
the  great  assistance  that  I  received  on  a  day  of  great  anxiety 
and  strain  from  my  Chief  of  the  Staff,  Captain  R.  W.  Bentinck, 
whose  good  judgment  was  of  the  greatest  help.  He  was  a  tower 
of  strength.  My  Flag  Commander,  Hon.  R.  A.  R.  Plunkett, 
was  most  valuable  in  observing  the  effect  of  our  fire,  thereby 
enabUng  me  to  take  advantage  of  the  enemy's  discomfiture, 
my  Secretary,  F.  T.  Spickernell,  who  made  accurate  notes  of 
events  as  they  occurred,  which  proved  of  the  utmost  value  in 
keeping  the  situation  clearly  before  me ;  my  Flag  Lieutenant, 
Commander  R.  F.  Seymour,  who  maintained  efficient  communi- 
cations under  the  most  difficult  circumstances  despite  the  fact 
that  his  signalling  appUances  were  continually  shot  away.  All 
these  Officers  carried  out  their  duties  with  great  coolness  on 
the  manoeuvring  platform,  where  they  were  fully  exposed  to 
the  enemy's  fire. 

44.  In  accordance  with  your  wishes,  I  am  forwarding  in 
a  separate  letter  a  full  list  of  Officers  and  Men  whom  I  wish  to 
recommend  to  your  notice. 

45.  I  enclose  the  reports  rendered  to  me  by  Flag  Officers 
Commodores  and  Commanding  Officers  regarding  their  proceedings 


Plat^  9. 


DIAGRAMS     SHOWING      PHASES       31.5.16. 


Diaqrama    are  not  to  Scale .      Margin  of  paper  is   approximately  N.  (Mag). 


I  Enemy 
V  B.S.\  T  3.Cs 

r.0 


\" 


B.C.^ 


4-.0  p.m. 


V  B.S.' 


^<s>. 


'oo 


,00^ 


B.Cs  {J 


4:4-0 


J^HSf: 


B.C's. 


V.B.S.  I 
B.C's.  A 


f8,£00 


~00 


VB.S^ 


\8P 


\  H.s.r. 


f  H.s.rr 


4-.50 


5.30 


G.r. 


M  B.Cs 
B.C's  \ 


G.F. 


VB.S. 
Warspite 


^Battleships. 


B.Cs. 


6.23 


VB.S. 

iff 


B.Cs 


B.S.         >* 

B.Cs. 


6.30 


HTB.Ss. 


/op  72.£f4-2ffe  If!  173  [l6\  SOOO .  12.  ZO. 


MaJbviions  Lilli. 


Plate  10. 


k 


16 


T  Magnetic    North 


Fa  I m.  fired 
6  50  2  torpedoes 

6-2(1      B.Cs. 
I 


In  flex. 
Indom.  took 
4^      station 
astern 


TOO 


TRACK    OF    B.C.F    H-O  P.M.  to   rx:-24   P.M.  31/5/16 


Dfrted 


Falm.  fired 

6  SO  2  torpedoes 

_         X  <i/  3^^  BtS  at  £nemy 

Q,        X    6  20      S.Cs 


Inflex. 
Indom.  took 
e-4S       stslion 
astern 


igaged  German  TBDS. 

Q  n  B.S. 

tr'   80S 


Track  oP 
Track  of 
Track  of 
Track   of 


B.C's   in      Red 
L  C's    in     Green 
B.F.    in     Black 
Enemy  in  Brown 


^^i-^^CU^ 


PlwUll. 


For  movements  during  battle 
see  large  scale 

9  24  PM. 
3t?t 


Stit/thama(oit  e\ 
eiK/nyz  crJiTj  \ 
tt-M  rbrgf.. 


[lO.ZO.PM 


PlcUeU. 


For  iDOvements  during  battle 
see  large  scale 

9  24  PM 
31  ?t 


SoiKhtma(/>i  f.\ 


[  10.20.  P.M 


TRACING    FROM   CHART    F.  071. 
SHOWING    TRACK   OF  B.C.F. 


924  P.M.  31V  MAY   TO  1-30  P.M.  I ''^  JUNE. 


Note  ■-  Small  circles  mth  arrc  ws 
show  position  &  course  of 
squadrons  at  time  stated. 


r'""'<K 


Q'    II  37PM.Chtinp<on  hears 
*    heavy  firing  b^.  tf! 

qh^UsighiMd  3  Cnemy  B.Cs. 

■  Q  j\orBMttlesh;fubg.NHC.  /  ia2S,AU  Champion 


^,^^3 Z5AH(Champicr.  engages 
^^  \  3  Enemy  T.B  Ds  3000yd 


Horn  Rf^ 


]IOAM  {Dublin  siqhted 
SEl'CoS 


O  Seydlitz/AM.Junei?^ 
*l  {Neofsptper  report) 
Cooanhmasn  S^r/£. 


.U'^^f-^^.-^/^'t^a'^:^^ 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  143 

during  the  period  under  review.    A  sheet  of  diagrams  is  attached  ;i 
a  track  chart  has  already  been  forwarded. ^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

DAVID   BEATTY, 
Commander-in-Chief,  Vice- Admiral. 

Grand  Fleet. 

Note. — On  17th  July  1916  a  Plan  of  Battle,  prepared  from  all 
available  data,  was  forwarded  by  Vice-Admiral  Beatty  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  Grand  Fleet.     See  Plate  8a. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,   H.M.S.     'LION." 

Enclosure  No.  1  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.     Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

No.  115. 

H.M.S.   "Lion." 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  on  31st  May  1916, 
H.M.  Ship  under  my  command,  flying  your  flag,  was  in  action 
with  the  enemy  under  the  follomng  circumstances. 

At  3.25  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  enemy  ships  were  reported  on  the 
starboard  bow,  bearing  E.  by  N. 

At  3.30  p.m.,  enemy  ships  were  in  sight  from  "  Lion  "  and 
a  range  of  23,000  yards  obtained. 

At  3.44  p.m.,  the  enemy,  who  were  rapidly  closing,  were 
identified  as -5  German  Battle  Cruisers. 

2.  Enemy  opened  fire  at  3.47  p.m.,  "  Lion  "  replying  half 
a  minute  later,  the  range  being  18,500,  course  E.S.E. 

'■  Lion  "  was  twice  hit  by  heavy  shell  at  3.51  ]).m.  At 
4.0  p.m.  a  shell  disabled  "  Q  "  turret,  and  shortly  afterwards 
"  Indefatigable  "  was  seen  to  be  blown  up,  evidently  by  a 
magazine  explosion. 

3.  At  4.2  p.m.  the  range  was  14,600  and  as  the  enemy  appeared 
to  have  our  range,  course  was  altered  on  2  or  3  occasions  1  point 
to  throw  him  out. 

The  enemy  appeared  to  be  hit  several  times  by  our  shell. 
"  Lion "  was  firing  at  the  leading  sliip,  which  was  either 
"  Lutzow  "  or  "  Derfflinger." 

4.  At  4.12  p.m.  our  course  was  S.S.E.  and  range  21,000 
and  course  was  altered  to  S.E.  to  close  the  enemy. 

At  this  period  more  than  one  enemy  ship  was  firing  at  "  Lion  " 
and  she  was  liit    several  times,  but  no  important  damage  was 

1  Plate  9.  2  iQ^  in  two  portions,  see  Plates  10  and  11. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  143 

during  the  period  under  review.    A  sheet  of  diagrams  is  attached  } 
a  track  chart  has  already  been  forwarded. ^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

DAVID   BEATTY, 
Commander-in-Chief,  Vice-Admiral. 

Grand  Fleet. 

Note. — On  17th  July  1916  a  Plan  of  Battle,  prepared  from  all 
available  data,  was  forwarded  by  Vice-Admiral  Beatty  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  Grand  Fleet.     See  Plate  8a. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,   H.M.S.    "LION." 

Enclosure  No.  1  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.     Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

No.  115. 

H.M.S.   "Lion." 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

1  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  on  31st  May  1916, 
H.M.  Ship  under  my  command,  flying  your  flag,  was  in  action 
with,  the  enemy  under  the  following  circumstances. 

At  3.25  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  enemy  ships  were  reported  on  the 
starboard  bow,  bearing  E.  by  N. 

At  3.30  p.m.,  enemy  ships  were  in  sight  from  "  Lion  "  and 
a  range  of  23,000  yards  obtained. 

At  3.44  p.m.,  the  enemy,  who  were  rapidly  closing,  were 
identified  as -5  German  Battle  Cruisers. 

2.  Enemy  opened  fire  at  3.47  p.m.,  "  Lion  "  rep]3dng  half 
a  minute  later,  the  range  being  18,500,  course  E.S.E. 

"  Lion  "  was  twice  hit  by  heavy  sheU  at  3.51  ]).m.  At 
4.0  p.m.  a  shell  disabled  "  Q  "  turret,  and  shortly  afterwards 
"  Indefatigable  "  was  seen  to  be  blown  up,  evidently  by  a 
magazine  explosion. 

3.  At  4.2  p.m.  the  range  was  14,600  and  as  the  enemy  appeared 
to  have  our  range,  course  was  altered  on  2  or  3  occasions  1  point 
to  throw  him  out. 

The  enemy  appeared  to  be  hit  several  times  by  our  shell. 
"  Lion "  was  firing  at  the  leading  sliip,  which  was  either 
"  Lutzow  "  or  "  Derfflinger." 

4.  At  4.12  p.m.  our  course  was  S.S.E.  and  range  21,000 
and  course  was  altered  to  S.E.  to  close  the  enemy. 

At  this  period  more  than  one  enemy  ship  was  firing  at  "  Lion  " 
and  she  was  liit    several  times,  but  no  important  damage  was 

^  Plate  9.  2  ,;  g ^  [j^  ^^q  portions,  see  Plates  10  and  11. 


144  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

done  thougli  several  fires  were  started,  and  there  was  a  large 
number  of  killed  and  wounded,  chiefly  from  a  shell  that  exploded 
on  the  Mess  Deck  in  the  Canteen  Flat. 

5.  At  4.26  p.m.  a  very  great  explosion  was  seen  in  the  "  Queen 
Mary  "  and  she  entirely  disappeared. 

6.  At  4.38  p.m.  the  enemy  Battle  Fleet  was  sighted  ahead, 
and  course  was  altered  16  points  to  North,  enemy  Battle 
Cruisers  responding  so  as  to  take  station  ahead  of  their  Battle 
Fleet. 

7.  "  Lion  "  reopened  fire  at  4.38  p.m.  re-engaging  enemy 
leading  ship  ("  Von  Der  Tann "  ?)  shortly  after  we  passed 
wreckage  of  "  Queen  Mary,"  with  survivors  in  water  and  a 
destroyer. 

The  ship  was  now  liit  several  times,  the  range  being  1 5,000 
yards.  The  ship  had  fires  in  several  places,  including  a  cordite 
case  in  the  starboard  4-in.  battery,  which  I  ordered  the  4-in. 
crews  to  extinguish,  but  this  could  not  immediately  be  done 
owing  to  their  extent  and  to  the  pressure  on  the  fire  mains  being 
lost  from  perforations.      All  fires  were  eventually  got  under. 

8.  About  this  time,  a  fire  which  had  been  smouldering  in 
"  Q  "  turret  ignited  the  charges  still  in  the  trunks  :  this  killed 
all  the  Magazine  and  Shell  Room  parties  and  reached  to  the 
Mess  Deck,  where  it  burnt  some  of  the  Ship's  Company.  The 
Magazine  doors  being  shut,  however,  saved  a  more  serious 
explosion. 

A  fire  was  also  reported  in  "  X  "  Magazine,  but  this  proved 
to  be  an  error  due  to  smoke  penetrating  down  from  a  heavy 
shell  burst  in  the  Sick  Bay,  which  killed  a  large  number  of  men 
in  the  vicinity. 

9.  At  5.1  p.m.  fire  was  shifted  to  ''  Liitzow  "  class  again, 
range  15,000  yards.  "  Lion  "  was  hit  twice  by  big  shell,  one 
of  which  wrecked  the  ship's  galley  compartment. 

At  5.12  p.m.  "  Lion  "  ceased  fire  owing  to  the  enemy  being 
obscured,  and  did  not  reopen  until  5.41  p.m.  The  visibifity 
at  this  time  Avas  decreasing,  and  when  fire  was  reopened  on 
a  ship  that  appeared  to  be  of  the  "  Konig  "  class  Battlesliip, 
the  range  was  14,000  yards,  the  enemy  being  just  visible. 

Ship's  course  was  now  N.E.  by  N. 

10.  At  5.46  j).m.  the  range  was  14,000  yards  and  the  enemy 
was  observed  to  be  hit  by  two  salvoes,  causing  him  to  alter 
course  to  starboard  and  to  cease  fire. 

11.  At  5.56  p.m.  the  Battlefleet  was  in  sight  on  the  port 
bow.  Altered  course  to  N.E.  by  E.,  and  at  6.4  p.m.  to  East, 
the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  bearing  S.E. 

12.  "  Defence  "  and  "  Warrior  "  now  crossed  "  Lion's  "  bow 
and  were  engaging  a  Light  German  Cruiser,  who  was  seriously 
injured  by  them.  This  caused  "  Lion  "  to  cease  fire  and  to 
lose  touch  with  the  enemy. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  145 

13.  At  6.21  p.m.  the  Tliird  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  was 
sighted,  and  took  station  ahead,  and  "  Lion "  reopened  at 
distant  ships  on  the  starboard  beam  ("  Konig  "  class  ?). 

At  6,29  p.m.  course  was  E.  by  S.  and  at  6.32  p.m.  enemy 
heavy  ships  again  came  into  view  and  opened  fire  on  the  3rd 
B.C.S.     At  6.36  p.m.  "  Invincible  "  blew  np. 

14.  Course  was  continued  to  be  altered  to  starboard  to  close 
the  enem3%  and  at  6.37  p.m.  was  altered  to  E.S.E. ;  at  6.44  to 
S.E.,  and  6.48  p.m.  to  S.S.E. 

At  6.53  p.m.  speed  was  reduced  to  18  knots  to  keep  station 
on  the  Battlefleet,  who  were  leading  away  to  port  owing  to  a 
Destroyer  attack. 

"  Lion "  continued  to  engage  the  leading  ship  of  enemy., 
occasionally  ceasing  fire  when  he  became  invisible. 

Very  few  liits  were  made  on  the  ship  subsequent  to  this, 
the  enemy's  fire  appreciably  slackening. 

15.  The  ship  continued  to  circle  to  starboard. 

At  7.3  p.m.  our  course  was  altered  to  S.S.E. ,  and  at 
7.6  p.m.  to  South;  at  7.9  p.m.  to  S.S.W.  and  at  7.11  p.m.  to 
S.W.  by  S. 

16.  Fire  Avas  reopened  on  the  leading  ship  of  the  enemy 
at  15,000  yards  at  7.15  p.m.,  and  speed  was  increased  to 
22  knots;    at  7.25  p.m.  to  24  knots. 

At  7.19  p.m.  the  enemy's  leading  Destroyers  made  a  heavy 
screen  of  black  smoke  to  protect  their  ships  from  our  gunfire. 

At  7.32  p.m.  course  was  S.W.,  and  7.50  p.m.  W.S.W.  The 
enemy  was  still  not  sufficiently  visible  to  open  fire,  and  this 
continued  until  8.21  p.m.,  when  the  flashes  of  his  guns  were 
again  seen  on  our  starboard  beam. 

At  8.23  p.m.  "  Lion  "  opened  fire  with  rapid  salvoes  on  his 
leading  ship,  either  "  Liitzow  "  or  "  Konig  "  class.  Our  shooting 
appeared  to  be  very  effective,  and  the  enemy  appeared  on  fire 
at  8.27  p.m. 

17.  The  enem}'  now  turned  away  more  to  starboard,  and 
the  light  was  failing. 

•'  Lion "  ceased  fire  at  8.30  p.m.,  our  course  then  being 
N.  35°  W. 

18.  At  8.40  p.m.,  a  heavy  bump  was  felt  on  the  starboard 
side.  This  appeared  to  me  like  a  heavy  hit  on  the  water-line 
but  this  was  not  the  case,  and  it  has  not  yet  been  ascertained 
what  was  the  cause.  It  is  possible  "  Lion  "  may  have  run  over 
a  sunken  ship,  and  divers  are  examining  her  bottom. 

Shortly  afterwards,  "Indomitable"  hauled  out  of  line  and 
reported  she  had  been  torpedoed,  Avhich  she  subsequently 
negatived,  which  seems  to  imply  that  she  had  the  same  experience 
as  "  Lion." 

19.  The  enemy  was  not  sighted  again. 

Damage  : — 

20.  The  damage  to  the  ship  is  not  serious,  except  that 
**  Q  "  turret  is  wrecked,  but  is  repairable. 

C    12872  ^ 


146  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

The  ship  was  hit  altogether  12  times  by  enemy  heavy  shell, 
but  the  damage,  which  I  have  already  reported  to  you  separately, 
docs  not  seriously  affect  our  sea-worthiness  or  fighting  efficiency, 
and  the  ship  is  now  ready  for  sea. 

Conduct  of  Officers  and  Men  .— 

21.  The  conduct  of  the  Officers  and  Ship's  Company  was 
in  every  detail  magnificent. 

The  ship  has  been  in  commission  for  so  long,  and  the  men 
are  so  highly  trained,  and  have  such  a  fine  spirit,  that  even  in 
action  they  can  do  almost  anything  without  their  officers. 

The  unnerving  sights  that  occurred,  with  the  heavy  casualties 
which  amounted  to  95  killed  and  49  wounded,  mostly  in  the 
first  two  hours  of  the  action,  were  a  tremendous  strain  on  the 
strongest  discipline,  yet  there  was  never  the  least  sign  of 
wavering  in  the  least  degree  from  their  duty. 

On  visiting  the  Mess  Deck  twice  during  the  action  while 
the  ship  was  temporarily  disengaged,  I  observed  nothing  but 
cheerful  determination,  zeal  to  succour  the  wounded,  and 
thoughtfulness  for  the  good  safety  of  the  ship  to  keep  her 
efficient. 


I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  E.  M.  CHATFIELD. 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 


REAR-ADMIRAL'S      REPORT.— 1st     BATTLE      CRUISER 

SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  2  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01  of 

12/6/16. 
No.  Oil. 

"  Princess  Royal," 
.Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  BEG  to  forward  a  narrative  of  events  of  the  engagement 
of  31st  May;  the  times  given  and  the  sequence  are  approximate 
only.  A  track  chart  is  also  attached.^  The  First  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron  followed  the  "  Lion "  during  the  engagement  and 
conformed  to  her  movements. 

2.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  engagement  the  conditions 
of    hght    were    most    unfavourable,    the    German    Fleet    were 

^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to   personnel,  recommendations,. 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 
2  Plate  12.' 


Plaie  12. 

4  6°  10'  10'  30'  4-0'  50'  7" 


10  — 


57" 


50-- 


40  - 


30- 


6  23 


—to 


-57' 


-50 


_40' 


-30' 


Malbv  ASoos.Utli 


to'  10  30'  *0  SO 

_l I I I L_ 


lo'                  10'                30                  40'                 SO' 
_l I I I L_ 


10'  10  30 


4-0  SO' 

_J L_ 


PRINCESS   ROYAL 


Mftlh*- ASc"s.'-iih 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  147 

partially  obscured  by  mist  which  made  spotting  very  difficult, 
whereas  our  own  Hne  were  showing  up  against  a  clear  horizon. 

3.  The  "  Queen  Mary  "  was  hit  by  a  plunging  salvo  near 
"  Q  "  turret  which  apparently  penetrated  the  armoured  deck 
and  ignited  the  magazine.  A  bright  flame  was  observed  to  shoot 
up  as  she  was  hit,  followed  almost  immediately  by  a  mass  of 
cordite  smoke  in  which  the  ship  disappeared.  I  deeply  regret 
the  loss  of  Captain  Prowse  and  an  exceptionally  fine  company 
of  Officers  and  men. 

4.  Further  reports  on  the  damage  sustained,  lists  of  killed 
and  wounded  will  be  forwarded. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
O.  DE  B.  BROCK, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Bear- Admiral. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 

NOTES   ON   ACTION— 31st   MAY    1916. 

The  first  news  of  the  enemy  being  in  the  vicinity  was  a  report 
from  the  Commodore  Commanding  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
at  2.25  p.m.,  who  reported  two  Cruisers.  He  then  reported 
a  large  amount  of  smoke,  bearing  E.S.E.,  at  2.40  p.m.,  and  at 
3.0  p.m.  "  Galatea  "  further  reported  that  the  smoke  appeared 
to  be  from  7  vessels,  besides  Destroyers  and  Cruisers,  and  that 
they  had  turned  to  the  Northward.  Fleet  then  altered  course, 
leading  ships  together,  remainder  in  succession,  to  S.E. 
At  2.59.     Altered  course  to  East. 

At  3.10.     Altered  course  to  N.E.,  speed  increased  to  23  knots. 
At  3.16.     "  Galatea  "   reported  that  enemy  had  altered  course 

to  N.W.,  his  own  course  being  N.N.W. 
At  3.23.     "  Princess  Royal  "  called  attention  to  E.  by  N.,  from 

which  direction  Enemy  were  first  sighted. 
At  3.26.     Ships   were   ordered   to   action   stations,   and   at   3.30 

speed  increased  to  26  knots. 
At  3.42.     The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 

reported  the  enemy  to  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
At  3.45.     Battle   Cruisers   were   formed   on   a   compass   line   of 

bearing  N.W.,  and  S.O.,  1st  L.C.S.,  reported  he  was 

leading  enemy  to  the  N.W. 
At  3.45.     Concentration  of  fire  signal  was  made  :    "  Leading  pair 

engage  right-hand  ship  of  enemy." 
At  3.50.     Enemy  opened  fire  and  missed  over,  which  was  returned 

by  the  Battle  Cruisers  at  3.51  p.m. 
The  action  then  became  general,  the  enemy  rate  of  fire 

being  greater  than   ours  due  to  the  conditions  of 

light  and  wind.     "  Lion  "  was  hit  at  3.55  p.m.  and 

"  Princess  Royal  "  at  3.56,  putting  main  control  out 

of  action.     Enemy  fire  then  became  short,  spread 

K  2 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  147 

partially  obscured  by  mist  which  made  spotting  very  difficult, 
whereas  our  own  line  were  shoeing  up  against  a  clear  horizon. 

3.  The  "  Queen  Mary  "  was  hit  by  a  plunging  salvo  near 
"  Q  "  turret  which  apparently  penetrated  the  armoured  deck 
and  ignited  the  magazine.  A  bright  flame  was  observed  to  shoot 
up  as  she  was  hit,  followed  almost  immediately  by  a  mass  of 
cordite  smoke  in  which  the  ship  disappeared.  I  deeply  regret 
the  loss  of  Captain  Prowse  and  an  exceptionally  fine  company 
of  Officers  and  men. 

4.  Further  reports  on  the  damage  sustained,  hsts  of  killed 
and  wounded  will  be  forwarded. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
O.  KE  B.  BROCK, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Rear- Admiral. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 

NOTES   ON   ACTION— 31ST   MAY    1916. 

The  first  news  of  the  enemy  being  in  the  vicinity  was  a  report 
from  the  Commodore  Commanding  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
at  2.25  p.m.,  who  reported  two  Cruisers.  He  then  reported 
a  large  amount  of  smoke,  bearing  E.S.E.,  at  2.40  p.m.,  and  at 
3.0  p.m.  "  Galatea  "  further  reported  that  the  smoke  appeared 
to  be  from  7  vessels,  besides  Destroyers  and  Cruisers,  and  that 
they  had  turned  to  the  Northward.  Fleet  then  altered  course, 
leading  ships  together,  remainder  in  succession,  to  S.E. 
At  2.59.     Altered  course  to  East. 

At  3.10.     Altered  course  to  N.E.,  speed  increased  to  23  knots. 
At  3.16.     "  Galatea  "   reported  that  enemy  had  altered  course 

to  N.W.,  his  own  course  being  N.N.W. 
At  3.23.     "  Princess  Royal  "  called  attention  to  E.  by  N.,  from 

which  direction  Enemy  were  first  sighted. 
At  3.26.     Ships   were   ordered   to   action   stations,   and   at   3.30 

speed  increased  to  26  knots. 
At  3.42.     The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 

reported  the  enemy  to  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
At  3.45.     Battle   Cruisers   were   formed   on   a   compass   fine   of 

bearing  N.W.,  and  S.O.,  1st  L.C.S.,  reported  he  was 

leading  enemy  to  the  N.W. 
At  3.45.     Concentration  of  fire  signal  was  made  :    "  Leading  pair 

engage  right-hand  ship  of  enemy." 
At  3.50.     Enemy  opened  fire  and  missed  over,  which  was  returned 

by  the  Battle  Cruisers  at  3.51  p.m. 
The  action  then  became  general,  the  enemy  rate  of  fire 

being  greater  than   ours  due  to  the  conditions  of 

fight  and  wind.     "  Lion  "  was  hit  at  3.55  p.m.  and 

"  Princess  Royal  "  at  3.56,  putting  main  control  out 

of  action.     Enemy  fire  then  became  short,  spread 

K  2 


At  4.11. 

At  4.16. 

At  4.21. 

At  4.23. 

At  4.27. 

At  4.40. 

14S  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

of   salvoes  being  very  small,  and  error  for  direction 
practically  nil. 
At  3.59.     Hits  were  observed  on  enemy  No.  3  in  line.     Spotting 
became  difficult  owing  to  smoke  from  Destroyers. 
Torpedo  missed  "  Princess  Royal." 
Argo  Tower  was  repaired  and  ship  fired   with  main 

control  again. 
A  heavy  explosion  occurred  in  "  Queen  Mary,"  and 

ship  sank  immediately. 
The  leading  ship  of  enemy  was  hit. 
And  again  at  4.32  "  Princess  Royal  "  was  hit. 
Our    Destroyers    attacked    Enemy's    Destroyers,    who 
appeared  to  be  getting  into  a  position  for  attacking 
the  Battle  Cruisers. 
At  4.40.     Altered  course  16  points   to  Starboard  and   reopened 

fire  at  4.50  p.m. 
At  5.  0.     Passed  an  "  L  "  class  Destroyer  picking  up  survivors 
from  "  Queen  Mary." 
Shortly    afterwards,    about    4.45    p.m.,     5th    Battle 
Squadron  came  down   on  an   opposite   course   and 
were  ordered  by  "  Lion  "  to  turn  16  points  by  Com- 
pass Pendant.     They  were  then  heavilj^  engaged  by 
the   Battle  Cruisers  and  a  Division   of  the   Enemy 
Battle  Fleet.     After  about  ^  of  an  hour,  "  Warspite  " 
hauled  out  of  line. 
At  5.35.     Course  was  altered  to  N.N.E.,  and  at  5.40  p.m.  fire 
was    reopened  at  which    time  leading  divisions  of 
our   Battlefieet   were    sighted   on    the   port    beam. 
Armoured  Cruisers  and  Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers 
were  close  to,  taking  station  for  deployment.     The 
Third   Battle    Cruiser    Squadron    came   into    action 
ahead  of  the  "  Lion,"  and  apparently  the  "  Invinc- 
ible "  was  shortly  afterwards  hit,  as  her  wreck  was 
noticed  with  the  stern  and  bow  standing  out  of  the 
water.     About  this  time  a  torpedo  was  noticed  to 
pass  under  the  ship  from  port  to  starboard  from 
the  direction  of  our  oAvn  Fleet. 
At  6.  5.     The  First  Cruiser  Squadron  was  apparently  engaging 
a  Light  Cruiser,  and  stood  out  across  the  "  Lion's  " 
bows,  necessitating  an  alteration  of  course  of  Battle 
Cruisers  to  port. 
"  Onslow  "  then  approached  the  light  cruiser  at  full 
speed    and    apparently    fired    a    torpedo,    but    was 
driven  off  and  hit  by  enemy's  heavy  ships. 
Leading    Battle    Cruisers'    fire    was    then   masked   by 
First    Cruiser    Squadron    Avho    were    very    heavily 
engaged    by    the    enemy.     Enem}'    appeared   to    be 
firing  shrapnel  at  times. 
This  movement  of  the  First  Cruiser  Squadron  appeared 
to  cause  a  division  of   the   enemy's  Battlefieet  who 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  149 

had  been  directing  their  fire  on  the  Battle  Cruisers 

to  concentrate  on  the  First  Cruiser  Squadron. 
At  6.22.     Destroyer  was  hit  near  after  funnel  by  an  over. 

What  appeared  to  be  an  over  at  First  Cruiser  Squadron 

put  "  Princess  Royal's  "  "  X  "  turret  out  of  action. 
At    tliis    time    the    leading    four    enemy    battleships 

appeared  to  concentrate  on  "  Lion  "  and  "  Princess 

Royal." 
At  6.40.     A  torpedo  passed  "  Princess  Royal  "  from  starboard 

to  port. 
At  7.15.     Enemy  ship  on  fire,  and  remainder  of  enemy  Battle 

Cruisers    apparently    had   enough,    making    a    very 

successful  smoke  screen.     Ceased  fire. 
At  7.28.     Enemy's    Destroyers    appeared    to    be    launching    an 

attack,  and  were  driven  off  by  Battle  Fleet. 
At  8.26.     Enemy  opened  fire,  "  Princess  Royal  "  engaged  what 

appeared  to  be  a  3-funnelled  Battleship.     Hits  were 

undoubtedly  obtained  and  fire  observed. 
About    8.32    "  Lion  "    and    "  Princess    Royal  "    were 

again  hit. 
At  8.32.     "  Princess  Royal  "  fired  a  torpedo. 
At  8.40.     Ship  gave  two  very  distinct  shudders,  which  were  at 

first  thought  to  be  a  torpedo.     This  was  afterwards 

ascertained  to  be  incorrect. 

Three-funnelled  Battleship  had  three  bands  round  after 
funnel. 

What  appeared  to  be  "  Hindenburg "  had  two  massive 
funnels,  wide  apart  and  painted  duU  red. 


Enclosure  No.  3  to  Battle  Cruiser    Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

REPORT    OF    LOSS    OF    "QUEEN    MARY"    IN    ACTION 
ON   31ST   MAY    1916. 
No.  Oil. 

II. 
Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 
The  attached  report  from  Midshipman  J.  L.  Storey,  R.N,, 
the  senior  uninjured  survivor  from  H.M.S.   "  Queen  Mary,"  is 
submitted  for  information. 

"  Princess  Royal,"  0.  de  B.  BROCK, 

3rd  June  1916.  Rear- Admiral. 

H.M.S.  "  Crescent," 
Sm,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  DEEPLY  regret  to  report  that  H.M.S.   "  Queen  Mary," 
commanded   by   Captain   C.    I.    Prowse,   R.N.,   was   completely 


ISO  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

destroyed  when  in  action  with  the  German  Fleet  at  5.25  p.m. 
on  Wednesday,  the  31st  May. 

The  total  number  of  Officers  and  men  saved  was  18. 

1    :|c  :|e  «  9|c  4i 

The  circumstances  of  the  loss  of  the  Ship  are,  as  far  as  I  know, 
as  follows  : — 

At  4.20  p.m.  the  "  Queen  Mary  "  was  third  ship  in  the  line 
of  the  1st  B.C.S.,  and  action  was  sounded,  and  at  4.45  the  order 
was  given  "  load  all  guns."  At  4.53  fire  was  opened  on  the  third 
ship  of  the  enemy's  line,  the  range  being  about  17,000  yards. 

The  fire  was  maintained  with  great  rapidity  till  5.20,  and 
during  this  time  we  were  only  slightly  damaged  by  the  enemy's 
fire.  At  5.20  a  big  shell  hit  "  Q  "  Turret  and  put  the  right  gun 
out  of  action,  but  the  left  gun  continued  firing.  At  5.24  a 
terrific  explosion  took  place  which  smashed  up  "  Q  "  Turret  and 
started  a  big  fire  in  working  chamber  and  the  Gun  House  was 
filled  with  smoke  and  gas.  The  Officer  on  the  Turret,  Lieutenant 
Commander  Street,  gave  the  order  to  evacuate  the  Turret. 
All  the  un wounded  in  the  Gun  House  got  clear  and,  as  they  did 
so,  another  terrific  explosion  took  place  and  all  were  thrown 
into  the  water.  On  coming  to  the  surface  nothing  was  visible 
except  wreckage,  but  thirty  persons  appeared  to  be  floating  in 
the  water. 

At  5.55,  H.M.S.  "  Laurel  "  saw  the  survivors  in  the  water 
and  lowered  a  whaler  and  rescued  seventeen.  When  this  number 
had  been  picked  up,  H.M.S.  "  Laurel  "  received  orders  to  proceed 
at  full  speed,  being  in  grave  danger  of  the  enemy's  ships. 

All  Officers  and  men  were  treated  with  the  greatest  kindness 
by  the  Officers  and  men  of  H.M.S.  "  Laurel,"  and  were  landed 
at  Rosyth  at  about  8  p.m.,  1st  June.^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

J.  L.  STOREY, 

Midshipman,  R.N. 


CAPTAIN'S     REPORT.— H.M.S.     "  PRINCESS     ROYAL." 

Enclosure  No.  4  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  1/125. 

H.M.S.  "  Princess  Royal," 
Sir,  8th  June  1916. 

I   HAVE   the   honour   to   report   that    "  Princess   Royal," 
fljdng  your  Flag,  was  in  company  with  "  Lion,"  First  and  Second 

^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 

2  It  will  be  noted  that  the  above  times  are  "  Summer  time  "  and 
not  G.M.T. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  151 

Battle  Cruiser  Squadrons,  less  "  Australia,"  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  31st  May,  when  the  Enemy's  Fleet  was  sighted  bearing 
N.E.,  our  position  being  Lat.  56"  51  N.,  Long.  5°  16  E.,  and  course 
N.E.  Fire  was  opened  by  the  enemy  at  3.46  p.m.  and  imme- 
diately returned  by  us,  "  Lion "  and  "  Princess  Royal " 
concentrating  on  the  leading  ship  (of  "  Derfflinger  "  type),  the 
opening  range  being  16,000  yards.  She  was  straddled  at  the 
third  salvo,  and  a  hit  was  observed  at  3.54  p.m.  Course  was 
gradually  altered  to  southward. 

2.  The  hit  forward  at  3.56  p.m.  caused  the  electric  training 
of  the  Argo  Tower  to  fail,  and  the  hand  gear  was  found  to  be 
set  up.  Control  was  turned  over  to  "  B  "  turret  for  ten  minutes, 
and  then  resumed  by  the  Argo  Tower,  of  which  the  rangefinder 
was  out  of  action.  At  4.11  a  torpedo  missed  the  Ship,  passing 
under  the  midship  section  from  starboard  to  port.  The  shooting 
of  '■  Lion  "  and  "  Princess  Royal  "  appeared  good  for  some  time 
before  the  enemy  turned  away  at  4.26  p.m. 

3.  Shortly  afterwards,  the  High  Sea  Fleet  came  in  sight, 
and  our  course  was  altered  to  the  northward  (4.38  p.m.).  On 
picking  up  the  enemy  again,  then-  right-hand  ship  was  seen  to 
be  enveloped  in  smoke  and  steering  away.  Four  salvoes  were 
fired  at  a  three-funnelled  cruiser  steering  southwards,  and  fire 
at  4.50  was  opened  on  the  second  ship  in  the  hne,  as  "  Lion's  " 
smoke  interfered  with  our  viev,'  of  the  leading  ship ;  she 
resembled  the  "  Seydhtz."  The  "  Lion's  "  smoke  becoming 
better,  fire  was  shifted  at  4.56  to  the  leading  ship  again  (also 
of  the  "  Seydhtz  "  or  similar  tjrpe).  At  5.8  the  enemy  could  no 
longer  be  seen  and  fire  w^as  checked. 

4.  At  5.41  p.m.  fire  was  opened  on  the  left-hand  ship  which 
at  5.48  was  seen  to  be  on  fire.  The  wreck  of  the  "  Invincible  " 
was  passed  at  6.36  p.m.  on  the  starboard  hand.  The  course 
of  the  Squadron  was  gradually  altered  to  the  eastward.  At 
6.4  fire  was  checked,  the  enemy  not  being  visible. 

5.  Fire  was  reopened  at  6.12,  the  target  being  apparently 
a  battleship  (two  funnels  wide  apart).  Course  had  to  be  altered 
shghtly  to  the  N.E.  at  6.15  to  allow  the  First  Cruiser  Squadron 
to  cross  our  front ;  the  original  course  was  afterwards  resumed 
and  then  gradually  worked  round  to  the  southward,  and  haK 
an  hour  later  to  the  south-westward. 

6.  The  Ship  came,  about  this  time,  under  a  heavy  fire, 
possibly  from  the  battleships  of  the  "  Konig  "  class,  which 
were  seen  abaft  the  beam.  "  X  "  Turret  was  put  out  of  action 
by  this  fire,  and  the  ship  was  holed  in  the  starboard  after  reserve 
bunker  by  another  shot  of  the  same  salvo,  which  wTCcked  the 
after  engine-room  casings  before  explocUng  against  the  upper 
deck  on  the  port  side.  Fire  was  checked  at  6.22  p.m.,  the 
enemy  being  invisible  owing  to  smoke,  and  advantage  was 
taken  of  the  lull  to  check  the  instruments.  At  6.40  p.m.  a 
torpedo  missed  the  Ship,  passing  from  port  to  starboard  under 
the  middle  section  again. 


152  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

7.  Fire  was  reopened  at  7.14  p.m.  for  three  minutes  on  an 
enemy  ship  which  was  on  fire  amidships,  having  been  hit  by 
"  Lion." 

About  8.40  p.m.  a  very  heavy  shock  was  felt,  and  everyone 
thought  a  torpedo  had  hit  us,  but  this  was  not  so,  however; 
and  therefore  we  must  have  struck  and  passed  over  a  very 
heavy  object,  possibly  a  submarine  or  a  sunken  vessel. 

8.  At  8.21  p.m.  fire  was  reopened  on  the  leading  battle 
cruiser,  which  could  now  be  seen  without  any  interference 
from  "  Lion  "  smoke,  and  good  ranges  could  be  obtained  for 
the  first  time.  She  was  repeatedly  hit  until  8.30,  when  she 
dropped  astern  on  fire  and  was  hidden  l^y  destroyer  smoke 
screen.  Fire  was  resumed  at  8.33  on  a  three-funnelled  battleship 
of  the  "  Helgoland "  or  "  Pommern "  type,  and  hits  were 
obtained  with  the  second  and  third  salvoes.  Fire  was  checked 
at  8.36,  the  target  being  obscured  by  the  smoke  screen. 

9.  Nothing  more  was  seen  of  the  enemy  after  this. 

10.  After  the  turn  northwards  at  4.38  p.m.  the  enemy  was 
always  on  the  starboard  side. 

11.  The  only  electrical  defect  which  developed  in  the  course 
of  the  action  affecting  the  fighting  efficiency  was  the  failure 
of  the  electrical  training  of  the  Argo  Tower  at  the  beginning 
of  the  action,  caused  by  the  blowing  of  the  fuzes  in  No.  1 
starboard  and  port  pipe  passages  (caused  b}^  the  explosion  of 
the  shell  which  hit  at  3.56  p.m.).  These  Avere  replaced  and  the 
Argo  Tower  Motor  worked  correctly. 

12.  The  gunnery  interruptions  were  : — 

"  A  "  Turret — Eight  Gun. — Retractor  lever  bent, 
causing  missfires.  Turret  Armourer  and  Chief  Armourer 
away  on  advance  leave,  and  considerable  delay  caused. 

Lejt  (rww.^Crank  pinion  axis  broke  with  breech 
in  closed  position.  Breech  could  not  be  opened  for 
11  hours.     Gun  out  of  action. 

"  5  "  Turret. — Turret  armour  hit  without  internal 
damage.     Tubes  occasionally  missfired — bad  tubes. 

"  Q  "  Turret. — Right  gun  hit  on  muzzle,  cracked 
inner  "  A  "  tube  for  2  ins.  and  caused  scoring  of  right 
trunnion  bush. 

"  X  "  Turret. — -12-in.  hit  on  armour  which  was  badly 
distorted.  Large  piece  thrown  through  gunhouse,  killing 
left  gun's  crew,  damaging  shding  shaft  to  breech  and 
destroying  aU  pressure  pipes  on  left  side.  Turret  jambed 
and  out  of  action. 

Gun  Control  Tower. — Two  12-in.  shell  striking  forward 
caused  vibration  which  put  training  gear  temporarily  out 
of  action  and  jammed  transmitter  gear  of  Argo  Range- 
finder.  Slight  damage  by  splinters  to  4-in.  gun  circuits, 
&c.  repaired  by  Ship's  Staff. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  153 

Voice-pipes. — Captain's,  on  Compass  Platform  to  Argo 
Tower  and  between  Argo  Tower  and  Director  Tower 
both  cut  by  fragments  of  the  first  salvo  which  hit  the 
sliip.  AH  voice-pipes  in  both  struts  and  auxiliary  director 
circuit  destroyed  by  shell. 
Rounds  Fired. — 

"  A "  Turret  -         -     34 

"  B  "  Turret  -         -     78 

"  Q "  Turret  -         -     78 

"  X  "  Turret  -         -     40 

13.  The  main  engines  and  boilers  were  not  affected  by  hits, 
and  steam  was  easily  maintained  for  all  services. 

Examination  of  the  propellers  by  divers  shows  that  a  verj' 
small  piece  has  been  removed  from  one  blade,  and  a  cone  from 
a  propeller  nut  has  come  off.  This  may  have  been  caused  by 
the  colhsion  referred  to  in  para.  7. 

The  explosion  of  the  shell  which  came  through  the  starboard 
after  reserve  bunker  and  wrecked  the  casings  of  the  after  engine 
rooms,  filled  them  with  dense  smoke,  some  of  which  penetrated 
to  the  starboard  forward  engine  room,  but  this  dispersed  after 
the  fire  was  subdued,  the  hole  on  the  port  side  of  the  after  deck 
facilitating  the  dispersion. 

14.  The  electric  hght  on  the  upper  and  main  decks  was  cut  off 
at  the  switchboard  previous  to  the  action  to  prevent  probable 
causes  of  fire  through  short-circuiting  of  leads. 

15.  "  Princess  Royal  "  was  hit  by  approximately  nine  heavy 
shell,  besides  a  constant  stream  of  shell  fragments.  The  principal 
damage  was — 

(a)  Caused  bj^  shell  exploding  against  upper  deck  in 
Admiral's  Port  cabin  over  "  B  "  Turret  Flat,  which 
wrecked  the  cabin,  killed  and  wounded  many  of  the 
Fore  4-in.  guns'  crews  and  salvage  party,  put  the  Fore 
Distributing  Station  out  of  action  till  it  could  be  cleared 
of  smoke,  partially  gassed  the  men  in  the  Transmitting 
Station  and  Lower  Conning  Tower,  and  started  several 
fires,  which  were  very  difficult  to  put  out  owing  to  gas 
and  darkness. 

(6)  Hole  through  base  of  No.  1  Funnel. 

(c)  Hole  through  armour  in  port  forward  reserve 
bunker,  by  which  the  fire  main  pipe  and  the  gearing  of 
the  flood  valve  to  "  B  "  port  magazine  were  shot  away. 

(d)  Gunhouse  of  "  X  "  Turret. 

(e)  Shell  through  starboard  after  reserve  bunker, 
wiiich  wTecked  the  after  engine  room  casings  and  exploded 
on  the  port  side  of  the  main  deck,  lulling  and  wounding 
many  of  the  After  4-in.  guns'  crews  and  salvage  party, 
breaidng  the  fire  main  and  brine  system,  and  causing 
several  fires. 

The  fires  were  subdued  in  a  minimum  of  time  but  under 
much  difficulty,  due  to  the  lack  of  electric  fight,  the  failure  of 


154  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

the  oil  lighting,  the  breaking  of  fire  mains  and  valves,  and  the 
heavy  smoke  and  gases  caused  by  the  explosions  and  fires. 

The  two  holes  in  the  Ship's  side  were  plugged  as  soon  as  it 
was  possible  to  get  at  them  after  the  fires  were  dealt  with. 

16.  Soon  after  opening  fire,  a  shell  burst  in  "  B  "  Turret  Flat, 
putting  out  the  lights,  jambing  the  hatch  to  the  Fore  Distributing 
Station,  and  filling  the  air  with  thick  clouds  of  smoke,  which 
were  ver}'^  irritating  to  the  eyes  and  throat,  especially  the  latter. 
Respirators  were  immediately  put  on,  and  were  found  most 
useful.  Goggles  were  used  but  w^ere  found  to  get  dimmed.  The 
gases,  being  heavy,  hung  about  in  the  Distributing  Station  for 
hours  afterwards.  The  effects  of  the  gas  on  the  system  also 
became  obvious  by  nausea,  giddiness  and  vomiting,  so  that  the 
Station  was  evacuated  and  the  Port  Fore  4-in.  Battery  used. 
The  removal  of  wounded,  as  anticipated,  proved  slow  and  very 
difficult.  After  the  action  was  over,  the  Fore  Distributing 
Station  was  used  for  operations. 

The  Port  After  Mess  Deck,  the  Distributing  Station  and  the 
Issue  Room  were  used  for  the  treatment  of  the  wounded  aft. 

The  greater  proportion  of  the  injuries  consisted  of  burns 
about  the  face  and  arms,  which  proved  serious  and  led  in  a 
few  hours  to  much  swelUng  of  mouth  and  eyes,  and  great  shock. 

The  conduct  of  the  v/ounded  was  steady,  no  complaint  being 

heard. 

1     *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

WALTER   COWAN, 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding.  Captain. 

First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "TIGER." 

Enclosure  No.  5  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  F.  61/5.  '  H.M.S.  "  Tiger," 

Sir,  6th  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  signal  0945  of  2nd  June  1916 
I  have  the  honour  to  submit  herewith  report  of  proceedings  of 
31st  May  1916. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

H.  B.  PELLY, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 
(Through  R.A.C.,  1st  B.C.S.) 

'  Part  omittefl  here,  referring   solely  to  personnel,  recommendations' 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  coiu^se  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  ifi5 

G.M.T. 
P.M. 

3.44.     Enemy  reported  in  sight  from  "  Lion." 

3.46.  Observed  enemy  Battle  Cruisers,  5  in  number,  which 
appeared  to  be  "  Hindenburg,"  "  Liitzow,"  "  Derf- 
flinger,"  "  Seydlitz,"  and  "  Moltke,"  in  the  order 
named  from  right  to  left,  bearing  North  and  on  the 
Port  Beam. 
Weather  was  misty  in  patches  with  varying  visibility. 

3.46.     Target  given,  4th  ship  from  the  left,  probably  "  Reydlitz." 

3.49.  Enemy  opened  fire ;  first  salvo  about  2,000  yards  short. 

3.50.  "  Lion  "opened  fire. 

3.5L     "Tiger"  oxjened  fire.     Smoke  from  our  own  T.B.D.s  on 
engaged  side  which  were  proceeding  to  take  station 
ahead  caused  considerable  interference. 
Range,  18,500  yards. 

1st  salvo  missed  for  direction.     2nd  over, 
3.52.     "  Tiger  "  hit  on  Forecastle. 

"  Tiger's  "  salvors  apparently  short  and  hitting. 
Licreased  rate  of  fire. 

3.55.  "  Q  "  turret  hit  and  "  X  "  turret  hit. 

3.56.  Hit  under  P.  6    6-in.  gun. 

It    is    of    interest    to    note    here    that    after    3.56    p.m. 

"  Tiger  "  v/as  apparently  not  hit  again  by  heavy  shell. 

Several  minor  hits  were  registered  but  no  appreciable 

damage  was  done. 
4.  4.     Observed  "  Indefatigable  "  sinking. 
4.10.     T.B.D.s  ordered  to  attack  enemy.      A  desultory  action 

was  continued,  but  the  enemy's  fire  appeared  to  be 

wild  and  uncertain. 

4.24.  I  observed  a  salvo  pitch  abreast  "  Q  "  turret  of  "  Queen 

Mary  "  (this  was  the  first  time  I  had  seen  "  Queen 
Mary  "  hit)  and  almost  instantaneously  there  was  a 
terrific  upheaval  and  a  dense  cloud  of  smoke.  This 
could  not  altogether  be  avoided  as  "  Tiger "  was 
close  up  (about  2  cables)  from  "  Queen  Mary." 
As  "  Tiger  "  passed  through  the  cloud  there  was  a  heavy 
fall  of  material  on  her  decks,  but  no  sign  whatever 
could  be  seen  of  the  "  Queen  Mary."  She  must  have 
sunk  instantaneously. 

4.25.  Shifted   target   to    3rd   ship   from   the   left,    apparently 

the  "  Derffiinger." 

4.26.  Estabhshed  hitting. 

4.34.     Enemy  Torpedo  Boats  were  observed  to  turn  and  attack. 

Opened  fire  on  them  with  6-in.  battery  and  appeared 

to  find  their  range  after  three  salvoes.      Range  11,000 

yards. 
4.39.     Checked  fire. 
4.42.     Altered    Course   in    succession    16   points    to    Starboard 

on  observing   8  enemy  Battleships  of  the   "  Konig  " 

class. 


166  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

4,45.     5th  Battle  Squadron  opened  fire. 

4.50.     Recommenced  firing  at  opposite  number  ("  Derfflinger  "). 

Long  range,  18,000  yards,  and  enemy  verj^  indistinct. 

Only  two  salvoes  fired. 
4.58.     Altered    Course  to  Port.     Recommenced    fire    at    same 

ship  ("  Derfflinger  ").     Light  conditions  improved  and 

hitting    seemed    to    be    estabhshed    and    maintained. 

"  Derfflinger  "  appeared  to  be  down  by  the  stem  and 

to  leave  the  fine. 
5.10.     Enemy  obscured.     Speed  24  knots. 
5.42.     Enemy  Battle  Cruisers  reappeared  (only  4). 
5.44.     Engaged  3rd  ship  from  the  left,  apparently  "  Seydhtz." 

5th  Battle  Squadron  were  also  engaging  the  Battle 

Cruisers. 
5.56.     Checked  fire  as  unable  to  spot  and  5th  Battle  Squadron 

appeared  to  be  engaging  the  Enemy  Battle  Cruisers. 

6.  5.     Sighted  Battleships  of  Grand  Meet. 

6.  7.  6-in.  battery  opened  fire  on  Light  Cruiser  of  "  Kolberg  " 
class  on  Starboard  bow  and  hit  her.  This  Cruiser 
eventually  drifted  between  the  lines  and  6-in'.  battery 
fired  several  salvoes  at  her  and  she  w^as  last  seen 
sinlving  by  the  stern  at  6.19. 

6.19  to  6.29.  Firing  a  few  salvoes  at  opposite  number,  but 
spotting  was  not  possible  and  fall  of  shot  lost. 

6.25.  The  "  Defence  "  class  made  a  fine  entry  across  the 
"  Lion's  "  bow  into  the  battle,  but  they  were  met 
by  a  very  heavy  fire  and  suffered  disaster.  I  did 
not  actually  observe  their  loss. 

6.36.  Enemy  developed  a  very  heavj^  smoke  screen  and  under 

cover  launched  a  T.B.D.  attack  on  the  Battle  Fleet. 
Opened  fire  with  6-in.  guns.  The  shooting  appeared 
to  be  good  and  so  the  attack  was  not  pressed  home. 
The  heavy  smoke  clouded  fall  of  shot,  but  apparently 
several  hits  were  made.  Under  cover  of  smoke  the 
enemy  turned  away. 

6.37.  Cease  Fire. 

6.37  to  6.39.  About  this  time  three  torpedoes  passed  close 
to  the  stern  of  the  ship.  Course  was  altered  for  one 
of  them,  but  the  others  were  passing  clear. 

6.40  to  7.17.     Nothing  in  sight. 

7.17.  Enemy  squadron  of  four  ships  ajDpeared,  of  which  tw'o 
were  Battle  Cruisers,  but  I  am  not  sure  of  the  other 
two. 

7.19.  Opened  fire  on  opposite  number.  She  appeared  to 
drop  astern  past  Number  4  ship. 

7.23.     Ceased  fire. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  157 

G.M.T. 
P.M. 

7.27.  Much  smoke  observed  on  Starboard  bow,  and  apparently 
T.B.D.  attack  developing.     Opened  fire  with  6-in. 

7.31.     Ceased  Fire. 

8.21.  Enemy  sighted,  apparently  Battle  Ship  witli  3  funnels. 
Opened  fire  and  hitting  established. 

8.29.     Enemy  altered  away. 

8.37.  Felt  a  very  heavy  shock  and  had  no  doubt  that  ship 
had  been  torpedoed.  Enquiries  gave  no  result,  so 
I  concluded  that  the  ship  must  have  struck  something 
under  water. 

8.40.     Cease  Fire. 

Reports  are  attached  which  were  written  by  various 
Officers  in  accordance  with  my  directions,  also  a 
report  in  detail  of  the  damage  done. 

These  consist  of — 

Enclosure  No.      I. — Report  by  Commander  A.  G.  Craufurd,  R.N. 

Enclosure  No.    IT. — Report   by   Lieutenant-Commander   W.    N. 
Lapage,  R.N.,  Torpedo  Officer. 

Enclosure  No.  III. — Report  by  Lieutenant-Commander  P.  Mac- 
namara,  R.N.,  Gunnery  Officer. 

Enclosure  No.  IV. — Report  by  Engineer  Commander  C.  H.  A. 
Bermingham,  R.N. 

Enclosure  No.     V. — Report  in  detail  of  damage  sustained  during 
action.^ 

A  separate  report  of  recommendations  is  also  forwarded. 


REPORT  OF  REAR-ADMIRAL  SECOND  BATTLE 
CRUISER    SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  6  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 

No.  513.  "  New  Zealand," 

3rd  June  1916. 

SECOND   BATTLE   CRUISER   SQUADRON. 

Report  on  Action  of  31st  May  1916, 
Sir, 

Herewith  I  have  the  honour  to  submit  observations 
on  the  engagement  between  British  and  German  Fleets,  on 
31st  May   1916.     Time  table  in  Appendix  I.  was  compiled  by 

1  Enclosures  detached  12/6/16  and  not  forwarded  by    V.A.C.  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet. 


168  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

Captain  and  officers  of  "  New  Zealand  "  and  is  believed  to  be 
reliable.  From  this  table  and  tracing  of  courses  steered^  the 
action  of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  can  be  reconstructed. 

2.  On  sighting  the  enemy,  Second  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron 
was  ordered  to  form  astern  of  First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron, 
a  position  retained  throughout  the  action.  Fire  opened  steadily, 
both  sides  using  simultaneous  firing.  The  director  proved 
invaluable.  Though  the  merit  of  German  salvoes  was  unequal, 
yet  many  pitched  all  shots  together.  As  fire  continued,  con- 
centrated falls  became  less  frequent ;  later  on,  whenever  shots 
again  began  to  fall  together,  it  was  taken  as  a  sign  that  a 
fresh  enemy  was  being  encountered. 

3.  Steep  angles  of  descent  reduced  ricochet  and  splash. 
Visibility  was  generally  good,  though  I  was  never  able  personally 
to  identify  the  enemy  vessel  under  fire.  Her  position  in  the 
line  was  the  most  I  could  make  out.  Smoke  and  spray  inter- 
ference were  slight. 

4.  Within  a  few  minutes  of  entering  action,  two  or  three 
shots  falling  together  hit  "  Indefatigable  "  about  outer  edge 
of  upper  deck  in  line  with  after  turret.  A  small  explosion 
followed,  and  she  swung  out  of  line,  sinking  by  the  stern.  Hit 
again  almost  instantly  near  "  A  "  turret  by  another  salvo,  she 
listed  heavily  to  port,  turned  over  and  disappeared. 

5.  As  the  number  of  ships  in  each  line  was  now  equal, 
"  New  Zealand  "  shifted  target  from  the  fourth  to  the  rear 
ship.  Deterioration  in  enemy  fire  was  remarked,  though  one 
of  his  ships,  probably  the  third,  was  still  delivering  salvoes, 
close  in  fall  and  apparently  containing  a  full  number  of  pro- 
jectiles. Soon  splashes  other  than  those  due  to  fire  of  "  New 
Zealand  "  could  be  seen  round  her  target,  thus  showing  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron  was  within  range.  "  New  Zealand  "  accordingly 
resumed  fire  at  the  fourth  enemy  ship,  a  change  recommended 
also  by  the  catastrophe  to  "  Queen  Mary." 

6.  In  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  it  had  been  constantly 
assumed  that  German  battle  cruisers  would  never  be  found 
far  from  adequate  support,  and  thus  no  surprise  was  felt  when 
their  battle  fleet  was  sighted.  This  was  the  moment  when 
the  aid  of  a  powerful  fighting  force  was  indispensable  if  the 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  was  to  be  able  to  avoid  engagement  with 
the  battle  fleet.  Here  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  played  its 
part  nobly,  and  as  elsewhere  during  the  action  it  proved  itself 
a  tower  of  strength. 

7.  After  this  disengagement  the  fleets  again  came  together, 
both  steering  northerly,  fighting  as  obscuration  and  range  allowed, 
but  with  the  British  always  bearing  heavily  on  the  head  of  the 
opposite  line.  The  Third  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  dashing 
gallantly  into  action  ahead  of  "  Lion,"  increased  pressure  on 
enemy  leaders,  checking  their  advance  and  compelling  them 
continually   to   turn   away.     Thus   when   the   Grand   Fleet   Avas 

1  Plates  9a  and  31. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  159 

observed    to    port,    turning    to    parallel    course    and    with    rear 
apparently  well  engaged,  it  was  felt  that  decision  was  at  hand. 

8.  Nothing  now  remained  but  for  the  Battle  Fleet  to  reap 
the  fruits  of  a  situation  brilliantly  prepared  by  the  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet  and  by  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron.  Jointly, 
this  body  had  performed  a  magnificent  feat  of  arms.  Its  position 
relative  to  the  enemy  could  not  have  been  improved.  It  had 
inflicted  severe  punishment  upon  him,  and  was  ready  to 
supplement  the  frontal  attack  of  the  principal  forces.  For 
such  an  attack  light  was  necessary ;  and  visibility  had  already 
begun  to  fail.  The  Germans  may  have  used  smoke  screens ; 
but  from  whatever  cause  or  causes,  the  atmosphere  was  thickening, 
and  this,  together  with  the  turning  away  of  the  enemy  fleet, 
resulted  in  touch  being  lost.  Hope  remained  that  the  decisive 
operation  had  only  been  deferred  until  the  morrow.  Here 
fresh  disappointment  awaited  us,  but  as  search  was  conducted 
under  orders  from  Grand  Fleet,  account  is  unnecessary. 

9.  It  was  evident  the  Germans  had  suffered  severely,  but 
their  full  loss  could  only  slowly  become  known.  The  British 
felt  that  although  an  unlimited  success  had  been  earned,  only 
a  limited  one  had  been  obtained.  The  Germans  had  more 
cause  to  rejoice,  as  they  had  escaped  annihilation.  From  such 
a  point  of  view  they  might  well  congratulate  themselves ;  but 
in  its  nature  such  success  is  essentially  different  from  victory, 
even  though  some  of  the  benefits  of  victory  accompany  it.  By 
the  many  who  have  ignorantly  believed  that  any  and  every 
meeting  of  the  fleets  must  prelude  a  sweeping  British  victory, 
the  inconclusive  nature  of  this  battle  will  be  deeply  felt ;  yet 
inconclusive  actions  are  the  rule  in  naval  warfare,  and  of  all 
the  greater  military  events  recorded  in  history,  the  least  common 
has  been  the  naval  victory  in  which  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy 
has  been  obUterated. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
W.  C.  PAKENHAM, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Rear-Admiral. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 

APPENDIX   I.   TO   REPORT   FROM   REAR-ADMIRAL 

COMMANDING   SECOND   BATTLE  CRUISER  SQUADRON, 

DATED   2nd   JUNE    1916. 

ACTION   OF   31st   MAY    1916. 

Time  Table  compiled  by  Captain  and  Officers  of 
H.M.S.  "  New  Zealand." 
G.M.T. 

P.M. 

2.20.     Course  N.  by  E.  19  J  knots. 
2.30.     Sounded  off  action. 


ItiO  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND: 

G.M.T. 

P.M. 

2.35.  Course    S.S.E.     19|    knots    gradually    increasing    to    25 

knots. 

3.  0.     Course  E. 
3.13.     Altered  to  N.E. 

3.24.     Observed  smoke  of  five  ships  bearing  starboard  40. 
3.30.     Made    out    five    enemy    battle    cruisers    escorted    by 

destroyers,    bearing    E.N.E.,    steering    N.W.    course. 

We  altered  course  to  E.,  speed  26  knots. 

3.36.  Altered    to    take   station   astern   of    1st   Battle   Cruiser 

Squadron. 

3.45.     In  station  astern  of  "  Tiger,"  course  E. 

3.49.  Enemy  altered  course  about  16  points  to  starboard 
(away). 

3.51.  Our  speed  25  knots.  "  Lion  "  altered  course  to  star- 
board to  parallel  course  of  enemy.  Formed  on  line 
of  bearing  N.W. 

3.54.  Speed  26  knots.  Enemy,  "  Lion,"  and  1st  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadron  opened  fire.     Range  19,000  yards. 

3.57.  "  New  Zealand  "  opened  fire,  18,000  yards  on  fourth 
ship  from  the  right. 

4.  0.     Our  course  S.S.E.  25  knots.     Straddled  enemy.     Com- 

menced lyddite  common. 

4.  8.     "  Indefatigable  "  blew  up. 

4.10.     Shifted    fire    on    the    fifth    (rear)    battle    cruiser.     Our 

course  S. 
4.22.     Altered  course  a  Httle  to  port. 
4.26.     "  X  "    turret    reported    hit,    but    still    in    action.     Ship 

now  straddHng. 
4.32.     "  Queen  Mary  "  blew  up. 

4.37.  "  Lion  "  kept  away  to  starboard. 

4.44.  Sighted  enemy  battle  fleet  ahead  on  port  bow. 

4.45.  Altered   course    16   points    to    starboard   in   succession. 

Enemy  battle    fleet    opened    fire    on   us.     Our   course 
N.  by  W.  25  knots. 
4.52.     Unable  to  fire  though  being  heavily  fired  at,  owing  to 
being    unable    to    get    enough    elevation    on.     Range 
19,000  yards. 

5.  0.     Fifth  Battle  Squadron  passed  us  on  our  port  hand  and 

turned    to    northward    soon    after    under    heavy    fire 

from  enemy's  battle  fleet. 
5.42.     Observed  flashes  of  firing  from  enemy's  battle  cruisers. 
5.47.     Opened  fire  on  battle  cruiser  (second  from  left,  all  that 

were  visible).     Range  17,200  yards. 
Firing  till  5.58.     Intermittent  firing  owing  to  mist  and 

smoke. 
5.56.     Sighted    Grand    Fleet    bearing    N.    by    E.     Our    course 

and  speed  being  N.N.E.,  25  knots. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATrHES.  161 

6.  8.1  Altered  to  E.N.E.,  24  knots.  Enemy  gradually  turning 
to    >     away. 

6.30.  J  Heavy  fire  from  enem^-  battle  cruisers  and  battle  fleet. 
"  Invincible  '"  sunk.  "  Defence  ''  and  "  Warrior  " 
crossed  ahead  and  under  very  heavy  fire  passed  doM  n 
starboard  side  of  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  Firing  as 
continuously  as  mist  and  smoke  allowed. 

6.30.  Altered  course  to  S.E.,  26  knots. 

6.41.  Ceased  fire.  Enemy  obscured.  Passed  wreck  of  "  In- 
vincible." 

6.45.     Commenced  to  circle  gradually  to  starboard. 

6.52.  Submarine  rei3orted  on  starboard  bow,  hauled  out  of 
line  and  then  back. 

6.59.  "  Indomitable  "  and  "  Inflexible  "  took  station  astern. 
Speed  18  knots.  Graduall}^  circling  round  to  starboard. 
Enemy  out  of  sight  or  screened  by  mist   and  smoke. 

7.10.     Course  S.  18  knots. 

7.28.  Enemy  destroyers  attacked,  bearing  starboard  80.  Our 
course  S.S.W.  Range  17,800  yards.  Fired  1  wo  salvoes 
at  them,  and  then  4th  Light  Cruiser  Squadrori  (I 
think)  went  out  at  them  and  drove  them  off. 

8.20.  Course  altered  to  W.   17  knots.       Sighted   enemy  battle 

cruisers,  five  ships,  starboard  60. 

8.21.  Opened  fire  on  third  ship.     Range  13,000  closing. 

8.31.  She  appeared  to  be  hit  and  heeling  over,   on  fire  and 

hauled  out  of  line.     Then  shifted  fire  on  to  the  fourth 
ship. 

8.41.     "New   Zealand"    appeared   to   strike   something   under 
water,  but  no  damage.     Observed  what  appeared  to 
be  a  burst  of  air  under  \sater  about  50  yards  on  star- 
board beam. 
Ceased  fire.     Enemy  ob.- cured. 

9.35.     Course  S.  17  knots. 


CAPTAIN'S   REPORT   ON   ACTION   OF   31st   MAY    1916. 
"H.M.S    "NEW   ZEALAND." 

Enclosure  No.  7  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

No.  96/A.  4. 

H.M.S.  "  New  Zealand," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  m.ake  the  following  report  on  the 
action  which  took  place  on  W^ednesday,  31st  May  1916,  between 
our  fleet  and  the  German  Fleet. 

X     12872  L 


162  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

2.  The  day  was  hazy  and  fine  with  practically  no  wind. 
I  should  put  the  visibihty  down  as  between  7  and  10  miles, 
varying  in  patches.  Smoke  also  added  occasionally  to  the 
haziness,  but  I  was  rather  impressed  by  the  little  smoke 
interference  there  was. 

3.  Range-taking  and  Spotting  were  difficult.  It  was  very 
difficult  to  distinguish  hits,  but  occasional  bursts  of  smoke  with 
a  salvo  seemed  to  denote  a  hit. 

4.  The  firing  of  the  enemy  was  extremely  good,  their  salvoes 
having  very  little  spread,  and  they  seemed  to  pick  up  the  range 
quickly  and  correctly,  and  their  salvoes  were  rapid. 

5.  We  were  fortunately  only  hit  once  by  a  heavy  projectile, 
about  1  foot  above  the  deck  on  the  port  side  of  "  X  "  Turret 
(the  after  turret)  which  punched  a  hole  about  2  feet  in  diameter. 
It  also  went  through  the  tongue  of  the  towing  sUp  which  was 
secured  round  the  turret.  The  shell  must  have  burst  on  deck 
as  there  were  sputterings  round  about  there.  It  also  damaged 
the  deck,  cutting  through  it  and  through  the  deck  below  into 
the  Engineer's  Workshop. 

6.  I  attach  a  timed  account  of  the  various  incidents  as  they 
occurred.  All  these  times  are  G.M.T.  and  are,  I  consider, 
absolutely  reliable,  as  they  come  from  3  different  sources. 

rr   1  *  ;li  *  *  * 

8.  I  consider  that  the  Battle  Cruiser  described  at  8.31  p.m. 
to  be  heehng  over  and  on  fire,  was  in  a  sinking  condition  when 
she  hauled  out  of  fine.  The  different  reports  received  by  Officers 
in  this  ship  agree  that  our  last  2  or  3  salvoes  fired  at  her  hit 
her  heavily.     She  appeared  to  be  a  "  Seydhtz  "  class. 

^  Jji  5j€  i^^  5|C  SjC 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 

JOHN  F.  E.  GREEN, 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

Second  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron, 
H.M.S.  "  New  Zealand." 

No.  513a.  ^ 

"NEW   ZEALAND  "—ACTION    OF   31st   MAY    1916. 

Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 

Submitted. 

W.  C.  PAKENHAM, 
*'  New  Zealand,"  Rear- Admiral. 

6th  June  1916. 

1  See  note  on  p.  381. 

2  Part  omitted  here    referring  solely  to  personnel,   recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  163 

REPORT   OF   SENIOR   OFFICER   3rd   BATTLE   CRUISER 

SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  S  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  363/16. 

H.M.S.  "  Indomitable," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  H.M.  Battle  Cruisers 
"Invincible,"  "Indomitable,"  and  "Inflexible,"  H.M.  Light 
Cruisers  "  Chester,"  and  "  Canterbury  "  and  H.M.  Destroyers 
"Christopher,"  "Ophelia,"  "Shark,"  and  "  Acasta  "  left  the 
Pentland  Firth  at  9.35  p.m.  on  30th  May  1916,  just  ahead  of 
the  Grand  Fleet,  with  which  visual  touch  was  kept  by  the  late 
Rear-Admiral  Commanding  Third  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron, 
The  Honourable  Horace  Lambert  Alexander  Hood,  C.B.,  M.V.O., 
D.S.O.,  through  "  Chester  "  till  we  were  in  Latitude  57.49  N., 
Longitude  4.42  E.  at  2.23  p.m.  on  31st  May. 

2.  At  2.23  ]j.m.  we  received  from  "  Galatea  "  our  first 
intimation  that  the  enemy  were  actually  at  sea;  we  were  then 
steering  115°,  speed  of  advance  14  knots;  the  speed  of  advance 
during  the  night  had  been  16.8  knots.  Telefunken  signals  of 
strength  10  had  just  previously  been  heard.  From  then  onwards 
many  signals  giving  various  positions  of  the  enemy  were  received. 

At  3.13  p.m.  the  Rear-Admiral  Commanding  3rd  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadron  increased  speed  to  22  knots;  at  3.18  p.m. 
he  ordered  ships  to  "  Action  Stations  " ;  3.45  p.m.  he  altered 
course  to  137°,  the  squadron  was  then  in  single  line  ahead  with 
"  Canterbury  "  ahead  distant  5  miles,  "  Chester  "  on  starboard 
side  bearing  256°  to  212°  distant  5  miles  and  the  four  destroyers 
ahead  of  the  Battle  Cruisers  as  a  submarine  screen.  By  4.12  p.m. 
we  were  steaming  at  full  speed. 

3.  As  usual,  the  positions  of  the  enemy  received  in  the 
W/T  signals  did  not  agree,  but  they  aU  pointed  to  the  enemy 
steering  345°  or  298°,  and  it  is  evident  that  the  late  Rear- 
Admiral  acted  on  this;  at  3.57  p.m.  we  received  signals  from 
the  Senior  Officer,  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  :  "  Am  engaging  enemy 
1500."  At  5.30  p.m.  the  sound  of  gunfire  was  plainly  heard. 
At  this  time  the  visibility  greatly  decreased  owing  to  the  mist, 
the  density  of  which  was  various  degrees ;  for,  on  some  bearings, 
one  could  see  16,000  yards,  whilst  on  others  only  2,000  yards. 
From  then  till  dark  the  visibihty  ranged  from  14,000  to  5,000 
yards,  which  was,  in  my  opinion,  a  great  handicap  to  us,  the 
attacking  force ;  in  fact  much  more  of  a  handicap  to  the  attacker 
then  the  defenders. 

At  5.40  p.m.  flashes  of  gunfire  were  seen  on  a  bearing  about 
215°,  but  I  could  not  distinguish  any  ships.  The  Rear- Admiral, 
"  Invincible,"  altered  course  to  starboard  without  signal,  turning 
about  9  points,  thus  bringing  the  engaged  vessels  and  "  Chester  " 
on  the  port  bow  of  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  and  leaving 
our  destroyers  off  our  port  quarter ;    after  a  short  time  we  made 

L  2 


1U4  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

out  the  engagement  to  be  between  the  enemy's  light  cruisers 
and  "  Chester.'  The  Rear- Admiral  led  the  squadron  between 
"Chester"  and  the  enemy's  light  cruisers  whom  we  engaged; 
at  5.55  p.m.  we  opened  fire  on  the  enemy  with  our  port  guns. 
Shortly  afterwards  some  more  of  the  enemy's  cruisers  were  seen 
following  at  some  distance  astern  of  the  light  cruisers  which  we 
were  engaging,  and  I  observed  our  destroyers  developing  an 
attack  on  them.  At  the  same  time  these  enemy  vessels  opened 
a  heavy  fire  on  our  destroyers,  and  I  am  afraid  that  "  Acasta  " 
and  another  destroyer  were  either  sunk  or  damaged  for  I  only 
saw  two  of  them  afterwards,  nor  did  I  again  see  either  "  Chester  " 
or  "■  Canterbury."  I  desire  to  record  the  fact  that,  when  I  saw 
them,  they  were  heading  to  make  a  determined  attack.  At 
this  moment  my  attention  was  called  to  the  enemy's  light 
cruisers  turning  16  points;  they  were  at  that  time  under  a 
heavy  guntire  from  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  and  a  few 
minutes  later  one  was  seen  to  be  heavily  on  fire  and  apparently 
she  blow  up.  There  was  also  observed  amongst  them  a  four- 
funnelled  cruiser,  apparently  of  the  "  Roon  "  class.  8he  was 
observed  to  lose  two  funnels,  to  l)e  steaming  and  firing  very  slowly 
and  heavily  on  fire  amidships. 

4.  The  First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  was  then  sighted  on 
our  port  bow,  heavily  engaged  with  some  enemy  whom  I  could 
not  see  owing  to  the  mist.  At  6.13  p.m.  "Invincible'"  turned 
to  starboard,  apparently  stopped,  and  large  quantities  of  steam 
were  observed  to  be  escaping  from  her  escape  pipes.  At  the 
same  moment  "  Inflexible  "  turned  to  port  and  tracks  of 
torpedoes  were  observed  by  "  Indomitable  "  coming  from 
the  enemy's  light  cruisers  with  whom  we  had  been  engaged. 
The  range  at  which  I  engaged  them  was  about  12,000  yards. 
I  turned  away  from  the  torpedoes  and  increased  to  full  speed. 
One  torpedo  actually  ran  alongside  this  ship  at  a  distance  of 
about  20  yards,  which  we  managed  to  outrun.  As  we  turned, 
two  torpedoes  passed  close  to  the  stern  of  the  ship,  but  they 
had  run  their  distance,  for  I  managed  to  turn  ahead  of  them 
and  resume  my  place  in  the  Squadron  as  did  "  Inflexible  " 
astern  of  "  Invincible,"  which  ship  was  then  again  going  ahead, 
having  turned  to  about  153°.  In  all  about  5  torpedoes'  tracks 
were  seen  coming  from  the  enemy's  light  cruisers. 

At  6.14  p.m.  "  Invincible,"  while  steam  was  escaping,  hoisted 
the  "  Disregard,"  but  hauled  it  down  at  once  and  followed  it 
by  hoisting  1  flag  and  the  squadron  got  into  proper  order  again. 
About  6.20  p.m.  at  a  range  of  8,600  j'ards  the  leading  sliip  of 
the  enemy's  battle  cruisers  was  seen  firing  at  the  3rd  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadron.  They  were  promptly  engaged,  and  I  realised 
that  "  Invincible  "  could  have  sustained  little  or  no  damage 
from  a  torpedo,  as  I  had  thought  she  had  when  she  stopped 
at  6.13  p.m.,  for  I  had  to  go  20  knots  to  regain  station  in  the 
line;  6.32  p.m.  shells  were  falling  about  "Indomitable"  from 
the  enemy's  battle  cruisers,  which  were  distant  about  8,000  yards. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  165 

At  C.33  p.m.  "'  Invincible  "  was  straddled  by  a  salvo  and  was 
hit  in  the  after  part;  6.34  p.m.  a  salvo  or  one  shot  appeared  to 
hit  her  about  "  Q  "  turret,  and  she  immediately  blew  up. 
Wreckage,  &c.  was  thrown  about  400  feet  in  the  air.  tShe 
appears  to  have  broken  in  half  immediately,  for,  when  the  smoke 
cleared  and  we  had  got  to  the  position,  the  bows  were  standing 
upright  about  70  feet  out  of  the  water  and  50  yards  away  the 
stern  was  standing  out  of  the  water  to  a  similar  height,  while 
in  a  circle  round  was  wreckage  and  some  few  survivors.  The 
visibility,  which  I  have  before  said  was  sometimes  up  to 
14,000  yards,  was  now  generally  much  less  than  that. 

5.  The  positions  of  affairs,  when  I  took  charge  of  the  3rd 
Battle  tVuiser  Squadron  on  the  lamentable  death  of  Rear- 
Admiral  Hood,  appeared  to  me  to  be  as  follows  : — 

We  were  steering  153°,  as  shown  on  attached  chart. ^  The 
enemy's  battle  cruisers  were  disappearing  out  of  sight,  but  were 
still  firing  on  "  Indomitable  ""  and  "  Inflexible."  The  Director 
Gunner,  Mr.  James  H.  Moore,  reported  that  about  this  time 
one  of  the  "  Derfflinger  "  class  fell  out  of  enemy's  line  and  he 
saw  her  sink.  The  Lieutenant-Comander  (G)  in  the  Control  top 
at  same  period  remarked  that  she  was  very  Ioav  in  the  water. 
The  1st  and  2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadrons  were  coming  up 
astern  of  "  Indomitable  "  ;  "  Inflexible  "  being  about  3  cables 
ahead  of  latter.  When  "  Invincible  "  blew  up,  "  Inflexible  " 
turned  sharply  to  port,  and  I  did  the  same  and  eased  the  speed 
as  I  wanted  to  continue  the  action  in  the  same  direction  as 
previously  and  wished,  if  "  Inflexible  "  turned  8  or  more 
points  to  port,  to  turn  possibly  under  her  stern,  or,  at  all  events, 
to  get  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  to  resume  their  original 
course  and  then  alter  it  further  to  starboard  in  order  to  continue 
the  action.  However,  "  Inflexible  "  quickly  turned  to  starboard 
and  continued  to  turn  towards  the  enemy.  By  being  compelled 
to  ease  my  speed  I  had  dropped  astern  of  "  Inflexible."  I  made 
no  signal  to  her  as  she  was  turning  as  I  desired.  You  then 
ordered  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  to  prolong  your  line, 
which  we  did.  Shortly  after  this  I  saw  the  Grand  Fleet  astern 
of  us  bearing  about  340°. 

6.  Until  7.20  p.m.  none  of  the  enemy  could  be  distinguished 
owing  to  the  mist ;  but  at  that  time  it  commenced  to  lift,  and 
at  7.26  p.m.  "  Indomitable  "  reopened  fire  on  the  enemy's 
rear  ship,  the  range  being  about  14,000  yards  and  decreasing. 
Towards  the  head  of  the  enemy's  line  dense  quantities  of  grey 
smoke  could  be  seen  and  out  of  this  came  a  destroyer  attack, 
which  was  beaten  off  but  caused  our  battlefleet  astern  to  turn 
away  from  the  enemy.  At  7.40  p.m.  our  fire  was  checked  owing 
to  lack  of  visibihty.  At  8.26  p.m.  ranges  could  again  be  got  on 
the  enemy,  and  "  Indomitable  "  engaged  the  2nd  ship  from 
the  enemy's  rear,  which,  as  the  range  decreased,  appeared  to 
bo    "  SeydUtz."     The    enemy    very    quickly    straddled    us    and 

'  PU' to  i:>. 


106  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

continued  to  do  so,  even  after  we  ceased  firing.  I  believe  that 
"New  Zealand  "  was  also  firing  on  this  ship ;  at  all  events. 
"  Seydlitz  "  turned  away  heavily  damaged,  and  her  fire  lessened. 
At  8.42  p.m.  we  ceased  fire  the  enemy  bearing  307°,  but  we 
could  not  see  to  spot. 

7.  The  only  damage  sustained  by  "  Indomitable  "  was  a 
small  hole  in  her  middle  funnel,  though  many  sphnters  from 
shells  fell  on  the  deck,  but  no  one  was  injured.  At  8.44  p.m. 
"  Indomitable  "  received  so  severe  a  shock  that  I  was  knocked 
off  the  compass  platform.  I  thought  that  the  ship  had  been 
mined  or  hit  by  a  torpedo,  but  no  damage  has  so  far  been 
discovered.  I  assume  that  we  either  hit  some  wreckage  or  a 
submarine. 

8.  From  then  onwards  I  conformed  to  your  orders  and 
nothing  further  of  importance  occurred  ^vith  the  exception  that 
at  3.12  a.m.  on  1st  June  a  Zeppelin  was  sighted  on  the  starboard 
quarter  coming  up  from  the  Southward.  At  3.17  a.m.  fire 
was  opened  by  "  A  "  and  "  X  "  turrets,  the  Zeppelin  then  turned 
101°,  but  had  not  been  damaged  in  any  way.  At  3.21  a.m. 
she  turned  to  10°  and  continued  her  course  astern  of  us,  but 
at  too  great  a  range  to  justify  a  further  expenditure  of  ammuni- 
tion. Several  light  cruisers  stationed  on  our  port  quarter  engaged 
the  Zeppehn,  but  apparently  without  causing  her  any  damage. 

1      ^  ^  ^  ^  ^ 

11.  The  following  is  amount  of  ammunition  expended  by 
this  ship  during  the  action  : — 

98  rounds  of  A. P.  Lyddite,  12-in. 

66  rounds  of  Common  Lyddite,  12-in. 

10  rounds  of  Powder  Common,  12-in. 

12.  I  desire  to  emphasize  the  fact  that,  when  "  Invincible  " 
blew  up  and  sank,  the  Captain  of  "  Inflexible  " — Captain  Edward 
Henry  Fitzhardinge  Heaton-Ellis,  M.V.O. — without  warning 
such  as  he  would  have  had  in  the  case  of  a  wounded  ship,  found 
himself  leading  the  squadron,  and  he  at  once  followed  the  highest 
traditions  of  our  Service  by  closing  the  enemy. 

13.  As  the  Officer  left  as  Senior  Officer  of  the  3rd  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadron,  I  desire  to  record  the  sincere  sorrow  of  all 
the  Officers  and  men  of  the  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  in  the 
loss  that  the  Nation  has  sustained  in  the  death  of  Rear-Admiral 
The  Hon.  Horace  L..  A.  Hood,  C.B.,  M.V.O.,  D.S.O.,  Captain 
Arthur  Lindesay  Cay,  Royal  Navy,  and  the  Officers  and  men 
of  H.M.S.  "  Invincible,"  many  of  whom  were  personally  known 
to  me  and  friends  of  mine. 

Of  Rear-Admiral  Hood's  attainments  it  is  not  for  me  to 
speak,  but  he  drew  from  all  of  us  our  love  and  respect.  The 
Officers  and  men  of  "  Invincible "  had  previously  been  our 
chums  in  the  Mediterranean. 

^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  tq  per.sonnel,  recommeudatioas 
&e.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


Plate  13. 


S-30P.M 


-d 


k 


F 


Jk 

^F 


Turning  toStsrb^ 
I4-000 


H  .  M  .S.    I  N  DOMITAB  LE 


Position  at  5-30  P.M.  Ljt  56°58N.  Long  S'lO  E. 

All  times  are  GM.T. 

All  courses  are  true. 

Approx  Range-finder  ranges  in  heavy  type. 


C- 'i^t/LCv^-T^J     • 


'W^d^. 


ic&y?(A^ 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  167 

13.  Since  compiling  the  above  report,  I  have  seen  Commander 
Hubert  E.  Dannreuther,  who  was  the  Gunnery  Commander  of 
H.M.S.  "  Invincible  "  on  31st  May.  He  states  that  the  cause 
of  "  Invincible  "  stopping  at  6.30  p.m.  was  that  her  helm  jammed 
when  put  "  hard-a-port." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

F.  W.  KENNEDY, 

Captain  and  Senior  Officer, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  3rd  B.C.  Squadron. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 


Enclosure  No.  9  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

REPORTS  OF    THE  3rd  BATTLE  CRUISER   SQUADRON 
ON   THE   ACTION   OF   31st  MAY    1916. 

No,  20  S. 

Submitted.  ' 

2.  I  concur  in  the  attached  reports  as  far  as  was  seen  and 
known  in  "  Indomitable." 

3.  I  know  that  the  late  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  3rd 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  had  a  high  opinion  of  Commander 
Dannreuther's  abilities  and  zeal. 

F.  W.  KENNEDY, 

Captain  and  Senior  Officer  of 

3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 
The  Vice -Admiral  Commanding, 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 


REPORT    OF    SENIOR    SURVIVING    OFFICER, 
H.M.S.    "INVINCIBLE." 

H.M.S.  "  Crescent," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  DEEPLY  regret  to  report  that  H.M.S.  "  Invincible," 
commanded  by  Captain  A.  L.  Cay,  R.N.,  and  flying  the  flag  of 
Rear-Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace  L.  Hood,  Rear-Admiral  Com- 
manding the  Third  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  was  blown  up  and 
completely  destroyed  when  in  action  with  the  enemy  at  6.34  p.m. 
on  Wednesday  the  31st  May. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  167 

13.  Since  compiling  the  above  report,  I  have  seen  Commander 
Hubert  E.  Dannreuther,  who  was  the  Gunnery  Commander  of 
H.M.S.  "  Invincible  "  on  31st  May.  He  states  that  the  cause 
of  "  Invincible  "  stopping  at  6.30  p.m.  was  that  her  helm  jammed 
when  put  '"  hard-a-port." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

F.  W.  KENNEDY, 

Captain  and  Senior  Officer, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  3rd  B.C.  Squadron. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 


Enclosure  No.  9  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

REPORTS  OF    THE   3rd  BATTLE  CRUISER   SQUADRON 
ON  THE   ACTION   OF   31st   MAY    1916. 

No,  20  S. 
Submitted. 

2.  I  concur  in  the  attached  reports  as  far  as  was  seen  and 
known  in  "  Indomitable." 

3.  I  know  that  the  late  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  3rd 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  had  a  high  opinion  of  Commander 
Dannreuther 's  abihties  and  zeal. 

F.  W.  KENNEDY, 

Captain  and  Senior  Officer  of 

3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding, 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 


REPORT    OF    SENIOR    SURVIVING    OFFICER, 
H.M.S.    "INVINCIBLE." 

H.M.S.  "  Crescent," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  DEEPLY  regret  to  report  that  H.M.S.  "  Invincible," 
commanded  by  Captain  A.  L.  Cay,  R.N.,  and  flying  the  flag  of 
Rear-Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace  L.  Hood,  Rear-Admiral  Com- 
manding the  Third  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  was  blown  up  and 
completely  destroyed  when  in  action  with  the  enemy  at  6.34  p.m. 
on  Wednesday  the  31st  May. 


168  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

The  total  number  of  officers  and  men  on  board  at  the  time 
was  1,031.  Of  tliese  only  six  survived.  The  names  of  the 
survivors  are  as  follows  : — 

Commander  H.  E.  Dannreuther,  R.N. 
Lieutenant  C.  S.  Sanford,  R.N.  i 

Chief  P.O.  (P.T.I.)  Thompson. 
Yeo.  Signals  Pratt  (Walter  Maclean),  2169G3. 
Able  Seaman  Dandridge  (Ernest  George),  239478. 
Gunner  Gasson,  R.M.A. 

Of  the  above,  all  are  free  from  injury  with  the  exception 
of  Gunner  Gasson,  who  was  severety  burnt  about  the  head  and 
arms.  They  are  now  accommodated  in  this  ship  except  Gunner 
Gasson,  who  is  in  the  Hospital  Ship  "  Plassy." 

The  circumstances  of  the  destruction  of  the  ship  are  briefly 
as  follows  : — 

The  "  Invincible  "  was  leading  the  3rd  B.C.S.  and  at  about 
5.45  p.m.  first  came  into  action  with  an  enemy  light  cruiser 
on  the  port  bow.  Several  torpedoes  were  seen  coming  towards 
the  ship,  but  were  avoided  by  turning  away  from  them. 
"  Invincible's  "  fire  was  effective  on  the  fight  cruiser  engaged, 
and  a  heavy  explosion  was  observed.  A  dense  cloud  of  smoke 
and  steam  from  this  explosion  appeared  to  be  in  the  same 
position  some  minutes  later. 

"  Invincible  "  then  turned  and  came  into  action  at  about 
6,15  p.m.  with  the  leading  enemy  battle  cruiser,  which  was 
thought  to  be  the  "  Derfflinger."  Fire  was  opened  at  the 
enemy  at  about  8,000  yards,  and  several  hits  were  observed. 

A  few  moments  before  the  "  Invincible  "  blew  up  Admiral 
Hood  hailed  the  Control  Officer  in  the  Control  Top  from  the 
fore  bridge  :  "  Your  firing  is  very  good,  keep  at  it  as  quickly  as 
you  can,  every  shot  is  telling."  This  was  the  last  order  heard 
from  the  Admiral  or  Captain  who  were  both  on  the  bridge  at 
the  end. 

The  Ship  had  been  hit  several  times  by  heavy  shell,  but  no 
appreciable  damage  had  been  done  when  at  6.34  p.m.  a  heavy 
shell  struck  "  Q  "  turret  and,  bursting  inside,  blew  the  roof  off. 
This  was  observed  from  the  control  top.  Almost  immediately 
following  there  Mas  a  tremendous  explosion  amidships  indicating 
that  "  Q  "  magazine  had  blown  up.  The  ship  broke  in  half 
and  sank  in  10  or  15  seconds. 

The  survivors  on  coming  to  the  surface  saw  the  bow  and 
stern  of  the  ship  only,  both  of  which  were  vertical  and  about 
50  feet  clear  of  the  water. 

The  survivors  were  stationed  as  follows  prior  to  the  sinking 
of  the  ship  :— 

Commander  Dannreuther   (Gun^ 

Control  Officer)       -         -         -  i  t-.        /-.     ^     i  m 
C.P.O.  Thompson       -         -         -  ^ «^^  ^^"*^°^  ^^^'■ 
A.B.  Danbridge  -        -        -  ; 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  169 

Yeo.  Signals  Pratt     -         -         •     Director  Tower  platform. 

Lieutenant  ^T)  Sandford  •     Fore  Conning  Tower, 

hatch    of    \\hich    was 
open. 

Gunner  Gasson  ...     "  Q  "  turret,  at  the  range- 

finder. 

There  was  very  little  wreckage,  the  six  survivors  were 
supported  by  a  target  raft  and  floating  timber  till  jjicked  up  by 
H.M.S.  "  Badger  "  shortly  after  7  p.m. 

Only  one  man  besides  those  rescued  was  seen  to  come  to  the 
surface  after  the  explosion,  and  he  sank  before  he  could  reach 
the  target  raft. 

The  "  Badger  "  was  brought  alongside  the  raft  in  a  most 
expeditious  and  seamanlike  manner,  and  the  survivors  were 
treated  with  the  utmost  kindness  and  consideration  l)y  the 
officers  and  men. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

H.  E.  DANNREUTHER. 
Captain  Francis  W.  Kennedy,  R.N.,  Commander. 

H.M.S.  "  Indomitable." 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "  INFLEXIBLE.' 
ENGAGEMENT   ON   31st   MAY    1916. 

No.  199  W. 

"  Inflexible," 
Sir,  ^  2nd  June  1916.  ^^ 

I  HAVE  the- honour  to  inform  you  that  "Inflexible" 
left  Scapa  Flow  at  9  p.m.  on  Tuesday,  30th  May  1916,  in  company 
with  "  Invincible  "  (flying  the  Flag  of  Rear-Admiral  the  Hon. 
Horace  L.  A.  Hood,  C.B.,  M.V.O.,  D.S.O.),  "Indomitable" 
(Captain  Francis  W.  Kennedy),  "  Chester,"  "  Canterbury,"  and 
the  four  destroyers  "  Opheha,"  "  Christopher,"  "  Shark,"  and 
"  Acasta."  This  Squadron,  which  left  in  advance  of  the  main 
fleet,  which  sailed  shortly  after,  under  the  command  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  was  stationed  10  miles  ahead  of  the  armoured 
cruiser  screen;   speed  of  advance  of  fleet  was  17  knots. 

2.  At  noon  on  Wednesday,  31st  May,  the  position  of  the 
Third  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  was  58°  7'  North,  3°  55'  East. 
At  2.20  p.m.,  the  first  reports  of  the  enemy  were  intercepted 
by  W/T. 

3.  At  3.15  p.m.  speed  of  Squadron  was  increased  to  22 
knots  and  at  4.0  p.m.  to  24  knots,  gradually  Avorking  up  to  full 
speed,  course  being  altered  as  necessary  by  "  Invincible,"  pre- 
sumably -with  the  idea  of  joining  up  Avith  the  Battle  Cruiser 


170  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

Fleet,  reports  having  been  intercepted  that  "  Lion  "  was  engaging 
the  enemy. 

At  about  5.30  p.m.  firing  was  heard  ahead,  and  at  5.40, 
four  hostile  hght  cruisers  were  sighted  on  the  port  bow, 
apparently  engaging  the  "  Chester."  On  seeing  the  battle- 
cruisers,  these  ships  turned  away ;  fire  was  opened  on  the  second 
light  cruiser  from  the  right  at  a  range  of  8,000  yards,  but  was 
checked  at  0  o'clock  as  the  ship  fired  at  was  enveloped  in  a  high 
column  of  smoke  and  was  not  seen  again ;  it  is  presumed  that 
she  blew  up.  Fire  was  re-opened  on  the  next  cruiser,  but 
after  one  salvo  was  fired  she  disappeared  in  the  mist.  Meanwhile 
the  four  destroyers  in  company  had  left  the  Squadron  in  order 
to  attack  the  enemy  and  were  last  seen  hotly  engaged. 

4.  At  6.15  p.m.,  two  tracks  of  torpedoes  were  observed; 
course  was  altered  to  avoid  one  which  was  seen  to  pass  down 
the  port  side  at  a  distance  of  about  20  ft.  (the  torpedo  was  going 
very  slowly — apparently  near  the  end  of  its  run) ;  the  other 
torpedo  passed  astern. 

At  about  this  time  another  torpedo  was  observed  to  pass 
underneath  the  ship,  and  emerge  the  other  side. 

5.  At  6.20  p.m.,  enemy's  heavy  ships  were  observed  ahead, 
course  was  altered  about  8  points  to  port  and  fire  was  opened 
at  a  range  of  about  8,000  to  9,000  yards.  Owing  to  the  haze 
and  smoke  only  one  ship  was  visible,  apparently  a  battleship 
of  the  "  Kaiser  "  or  "  Konig  "  class,  and  some  direct  hits  were 
considered  to  have  been  obtained  on  this  vessel.  At  6.30  p.m., 
the  "  Invincible "  blew  up,  apparently  owing  to  being  hit 
amidships  abreast  "  Q  "  turret  by  a  salvo.  About  6.35  p.m., 
enemy  disappeared  in  the  mist  and  firing  ceased. 

During  this  engagement,  "  Inflexible "  was  continuously 
fired  at,  and  was  straddled  repeatedly,  but  the  enemy  ship  fired 
at  could  not  be  determined  owing  to  the  mist.  "  Inflexible  " 
was  now  leading  the  line  and  having  passed  the  wreck  of  "  Invin- 
cible," altered  course  two  points  to  starboard,  fire  having  ceased, 
in  order  to  close  the  enemy.  At  6  45  p.m.,  "  Inflexible  "  altered 
a  further  four  points  to  starboard,  when  orders  were  received 
from  "  Lion  "  for  "  Indomitable  "  and  "  Inflexible  "  to  prolong 
the  line  by  taking  station  astern. 

6.  At  7.25  p.m.,  enemy's  torpedo  craft  approached  to  attack, 
but  were  driven  back  by  gunfire ;  the  track  of  a  torpedo  passed 
150  yards  astern  of  the  ship. 

7.  At  8.20  p.m.,  action  was  resumed  at  6,000  yards  range 
with  the  enemy's  armoured  ships — believed  to  be  of  the 
"  Kaiser  "  Class.  At  8.30,  fire  was  checked,  the  enemy's  ships 
disappearing  in  the  mist. 

At  8.35  p.m.,  the  track  of  a  torpedo  was  observed  across  the 
bows  of  "  Inflexible." 

At  8.40,  a  violent  shock  was  felt  underneath  the  ship  and  a 
large  swirl  of  oil  was  observed  about  100  yards  on  the  starboard 
beam  :  this  violent  shock  was  presumably  caused  by  the  ship 
coming  into  colHsion  with  wreckage. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  171 

8.  "  Inflexible  "  remained  in  company  with  the  Vice-Admiral 
Commanding  until  arrival  in  the  Forth  a.m.  the  2nd  June. 

At  2.24  p.m.,  1st  June,  "  Inflexible  "  passed  a  whaler  of 
German  pattern  marked  "  V.  29,"  and  later,  in  about  latitude 
57°  2'  X.,  Longitude  6°  13'  E.,  passed  large  numbers  of  German 

bodies  in  lifebelts  and  a  hfebuoy  marked  "  S.M.S. "  (the  name 

of  the  ship  being  covered  by  a  body  lying  over  it). 

9.  Except  for  the  colhsion  mentioned  in  paragraph  7,  which 
must  have  caused  an  indentation  of  the  outer  skin,  no  damage 
has  been  sustained,  and  no  casualties  have  occurred  on  board 
"  Inflexible  "  during  the  recent  engagement,  but  the  right  gun 
of  "  Q  "  turret,  which  was  cracked  for  a  length  of  30  ft.  during 
caUbration,  was  used  and  this  appears  to  have  enlarged  the 
crack. 

1       ^  4f  ^  ^  '¥ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

EDW.  HEATON  ELLIS. 
Captain. 

Captain  Francis  WiUiam  Kennedy,  Royal  Navy, 
Senior  Officer,  Third  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 


1  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c  ,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


172  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND: 


COMMODORE'S   REPORT.- 1st   LIGHT   CRUISER 
SQUADRON. 

Enclosure   No.  10  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  30. 

"  Galatea," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  for  your  information  the 
part  taken  by  the  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  in  the  recent 
action  and  afterwards. 

2.  At  6.7  p.m.  on  31st  May,  owing  to  damage  to  the  port 
after  forced  draught  fan,  "  Galatea's  "  speed  was  reduced  to 
18  knots  for  a  time,  but  after  temporary  repairs  had  been  made 
a  speed  of  24  knots  was  attained.  "  Inconstant  "  was  placed  in 
charge  of  "  Phaeton  "  and  "  Cordelia  "  until  "  Galatea  '"  was  able 
to  rejoin  next  morning.  Report  from  Ca23tain  of  "  Inconstant  " 
covering  that  period  is  enclosed. 

3.  At  2.18  p.m.  on  3 1st  May  in  latitude  56°  52'  N.,  longitude 
5°  21'  E.,  "  Galatea  "  and  "  Phaeton  "  being  in  the  Port  Wing 
position  of  the  Light  Cruiser  Screen,  course  and  speed  of  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet  being  S.E.,  20  knots,  attention  was  drawn  by  a 
steamer,  bearing  S.  72  E.  about  12  D:iiles,  blowing  off  steam  and 
the  masts  and  two  funnels  of  a  war  vessel  were  made  out  in  her 
vicinity.  This  was  reported  by  "  Galatea,"  who  in  company 
with  "  Phaeton,"  closed  at  high  speed.  It  svas  then  found 
that  two  German  Destroyers  had  stopped  the  steamer  and  that 
a  squadron  of  Cruisers  and  Torpedo-boat  Destroyers  were  a 
little  to  the  North-eastward  apparently  steaming  in  various 
directions  which  made  it  difficult  to  send  an  adequate  report. 

4.  At  2.28  p.m.  "  Galatea  "  and  "  Phaeton  "  opened  fire 
on  the  two  destroyers  who  proceeded  to  the  Northward  at 
speed . 

5.  At  2.32  p.m.  a  three-funnelled  cruiser  opened  fire  at 
15,000  yards,  salvoes  falling  both  sides  of  "Galatea"  and 
"Phaeton,"  but  only  one  o-9-in.  shell  hit  "Galatea":  this 
(lid  not  burst. 

On  the  approach  of  the  other  enemy  cruisers  the  First  Light 
Cruiser  Squaclron — "  Inconstant  "  and  "  Cordelia  "  were  closing 
— proceeded  to  the  North-west  in  extended  order  keeping  just 
out  of  gun  range,  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Battle  Cruiser 
Fleet,  who  was  to  the  West-south-westward  about  15  miles, 
having  signalled  that  he  was  steering  east,  and  it  was  hoped  by 
drawing  the  enemy  North-west  the  Battle  Cruisers  would  be  able 
to  get  in  behind  them,  but  shortly  afterwards  the  Battle  Cruisers 
were  seen  in  action  with  the  enemy's  heavy  ships. 

6.  At  3.35  p.m.  the  enemy's  Light  Cruisers  turned  to  the 
South-eastward  and  the  1st  and  3rd  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons, 
the  latter  having  come  up,  followed  on  a  parallel  course. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  173 

7.  At  3.45  p.m.  the  Battle  Cruisers  were  sighted  about  South- 
south-east  in  action  with  an  enemy  to  the  South-eastward. 

About  4.0  p.m.  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  sighted  to 
the  South-west  and  opened  fire  on  the  enemy's  Light  Cruisers, 
which  turned  to  the  Northward  under  cover  of  smoke  bombs. 
1st  and  3rd  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  followed  them. 

8.  At  4,15  p.m.  the  enemy's  Light  Cruisers  turned  again 
to  the  South-east  and  course  was  altered  to  steam  parallel. 

9.  At  5.1  p.m.  the  Battle  Cruisers  were  sighted  to  the  South- 
ward steering  about  North-west,  and  course  was  altered  to 
North-west. 

10.  At  5.27  p.m.  a  signal  was  received  from  "  Lion  "  to 
keep  touch  with  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers ;  these  were  not  in 
sight,  but  course  was  altered  to  Northward  and  shortly  after  the 
enemy's  Battle  Cruisers  were  made  out  steering  in  the  same 
direction  about  16,000  yards  on  Starboard  beam.  The  Squadron 
continued  in  this  direction. 

11.  At  5.50  p.m.  a  signal  was  received  from  "Lion"  for 
Light  Cruisers  to  attack  with  torpedoes ;  speed  was  increased 
to  get  into  position,  but,  shortly  after,  the  advance  Cruisers 
of  our  Battle  Fleet  were  met  steering  a  South-easterly  course 
and  the  leading  ships  of  the  latter  turned  to  port  when  quite 
close,  but  almost  immediately  turned  12  points  to  starboard 
and  it  appeared  that  the  Battle  Fleet  was  going  to  deploy  in 
that  direction. 

12.  At  6.7  p.m.  course  was  altered  to  the  Westward  and 
then  to  the  Northward  between  the  4th  and  5th  Divisions  of 
the  Battle  Fleet  to  get  out  of  the  way. 

At  this  time  the  port  forced  draught  fan  broke  down  and 
speed  had  to  be  reduced.  "  Inconstant  "  was  directed  to  go 
on  Avith  '■  Phaeton  "  and  "  Cordelia  "  to  the  head  of  the  line, 
"  Galatea  "  following  and  taking  station  at  the  head  of  the 
Battle  Fleet  clear  of  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Scjuadron  and 
Destroyers  by  8  p.m.,  remaining  in  that  position  for  the  night. 

13.  At  2.35  a.m.  on  1st  June,  on  the  Battle  Cruisers  being 
sighted,  "  Galatea,"  who  was  then  able  to  steam  24  knots, 
rejoined  the  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

14.  During  the  action  several  metal  cylinders  about  the 
size  of  a  picket  boat's  funnel  were  passed,  these  had  been  thrown 
overboard  by  enemy  Light  Cruisers  with  material  in  them  to 
make  smoke. 

15.  On  the  1st  June,  in  latitude  56°  25'  N.,  longitude  6°  21'  E., 
several  bodies  with  life-belts  which  did  not  appear  to  be  British 
were  seen  and  shortly  afterwards  two  pear-shaped  blue  and 
white  mines  were  passed ;  it  was  thought  that  these  and  the 
bodies  must  have  belonged  to  a  German  destroyer. 

16.  At  7.30  p.m.  on  the  31st  May  in  latitude  57°  0'  N., 
longitude  6°  23'  E.,  the  wreck  of  what  is  believed  to  be  "  Invin- 
cible "  was  passed,  the  bow  and  stern  standing  out  of  the  water. 
As   "  Galatea  "   passed  the  stern  sunk.     There  was   practically 


174  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

no  wreckage  cabout  and  none  of  the  crew  were  seen  at  the  time, 
but  on  passing  the  same  spot  next  day  three  or  four  bodies  in 
life-belts  were  seen  in  the  vicinity.  The  above  position  was 
verified  on  the  second  day. 

About  7  miles  331  degrees  from  the  wreck  of  "  Invincible  " 
a  large  amount  of  heavy  oil  and  a  great  deal  of  wreckage  was 
seen;   this  did  not  appear  to  have  come  from  "  Invincible." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 
E.  S.  ALEXANDER  SINCLAIR, 

Commodore  Commanding 
First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding, 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 

CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "INCONSTANT." 

C.  141/46. 

H.M.S.  "Inconstant," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  as  follows  with  regard  to 
my  movements  after  receiving  your  signal  to  go  on  with  the 
1st  L.C.S.  at  6.27  p.m.  on  31st  May. 

2.  I  proceeded  full  speed  on  an  Easterly  and  then  Southerly 
Course  passing  round  the  Battle  Fleet.  Owing  to  the  necessity 
of  keeping  on  the  far  side  of  the  'Repeating  Light  Cruisers  of 
the  various  Battle  Squadrons  and  to  the  fact  that  the  Battle 
Fleet  was  continually  altering  course  to  starboard,  I  had  to  go 
on  the  outside  of  a  circle  and  it  was  not  until  about  7.25  p.m. 
that  I  reached  the  head  of  the  Battle  Fleet  hne. 

3.  On  arrival  at  the  head  of  the  Battle  Line,  I  found  the 
5  ships  of  the  4th  L.C.S.  with  at  least  one  complete  Destroyer 
Flotilla,  a  Light  Cruiser  and  also  four  or  five  Cruisers. 

4.  The  Battle  Cruisers  were  at  this  time  about  4  miles  ahead 
of  the  Battle  Fleet,  and  I  moved  up  and  placed  the  three  ships 
of  the  1st  L.C.S.  on  the  engaged  quarter  of  the  Battle  Cruisers, 
from  where  we  could  prevent  a  Destroyer  attack  coming  down 
from  the  bow  on  to  our  Battle  Fleet,  and  at  the  same  time  afford 
some  protection  to  the  rear  of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Line. 

5.  At  about  8.0  p.m.  the  ship  struck  or  was  struck  by 
something.  "  Cordelia "  has  since  reported  that  she  struck 
something  at  about  the  same  time,  so  it  is  assumed  we  struck 
some  submerged  wreckage. 

6.  At  about  8.15  p.m.  the  Battle  Cruisers  became  engaged, 
apparently  with  the  Enemy's  Battle  Fleet,  and  the  3rd  L.C.S., 
Avho  were  ahead  of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Line,  went  on  at  full  speed 
and  became  engaged,  but  I  could  not  see  against  whom.     OAAdng 


OFFICIAL    DESPATOHTr.  175 

to  this  the  Battle  Cruisers  had  no  Light  Cruisers  at  the  head  of 
their  line,  and  so  I  proceeded  there  at  full  speed. 

7.  At  8.29  p.m.  all  three  ships  of  the  Squadron  sighted  a 
submarine  breaking  surface  on  the  Port  Side.     This  was  reported 

by  W/T. 

8.  Owing  to  the  overs,  I  passed  about  2,000  yards  on  the 
dis-engaged  side  of  the  line  and  formed  on  the  engaged  bow 
of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  By  the  time  I  got  there,  the  3rd 
L.C.S.  had  ceased  j&ring. 

9.  In  order  to  prevent  having  too  many  independent  Squad- 
rons, just  before  dark,  T.  took  station  mth  the  1st  L.C.S.  astern  of 
the  3rd  L.C.S. 

10.  At  9.57  p.m.  I  received  a  signal  from  the  S.O.,  B.C.F., 
to  take  station  W.  by  S.  4  miles  from  "  Lion.  "  Lion's  " 
estimated  position  at  this  time  was  about  12  miles  N.E. 

11.  I  picked  up  the  Battle  Cruisers  at  daylight,  steering 
South.  At  2.35  a.m.  "  Lion  "  signalled  "  Course  N.",  and  again 
at  3.10  a.m.,  "  Course  N.E." 

12.  At  4.10  a.m.  "  Lion  "  signalled,  "  Spread  well  to  Westward 
and  endeavour  to  locate  enemy.  Keep  Hnking  ships  in  visual 
touch." 

Whilst  spread  in  this  manner,  "  Galatea  "  rejoined  and  took 
command  of  1st  L.C.S. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 

B.  S.  THESIGER, 
The  Commodore  Commanding,  Captain. 

First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 


COMMODORE'S     REPORTS.— 2nd    LIGHT     CRUISER 

SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  11  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  037/5. 

"  Southampton," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron,  consisting  of 
H.M.  Ships  "  Southampton  "  (wearing  my  Broad  Pendant), 
"  Nottingham  "  (Captain  Charles  B.  Miller),  "  Birmingham  " 
(Captain  Arthur  A.  M.  Duff),  and  "Dublin"  (Captain" Albert 
C.  Scott)  during  the  operations  on  31st  May  and  1st  June  : — 

3lst  May. 
2.  The  enemy  were  reported  by  the  Senior  Officer,  1st  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron,  between  2.23  and  2.56  p.m. 


I7t)  BATTLE    OF   JCTTLAND  : 

3.  At  i.40  p.m.  "  Southampton  "  sighted  and  reported 
enemy's  battle  fleet  bearing  8.  by  E.,  steering  N.  The  Second 
Light  Cruiser  Squadron  closed  to  within  13,000  yards  to  observe 
enemy's  battle  fleet,  and  came  under  very  heavy  fire. 

At  5.00  p.m.  the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  turned 
Northwards  and  followed  our  Imttle  cruisers  and  5th  battle 
squadron.  The  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  were  at  this 
time  practically  in  line  with  the  rear  ship  of  the  5th  battle 
squadron,  and  came  under  a  very  heavy  fire  from  time  to  time 
until  about  6.05  p.m. ;   no  damage,  however,  resulted. 

4.  At  0.15  ]).m.  our  battle  fleet  was  sighted  right  ahead. 

5.  At  6.35  p.m.  "  Warspite  "  suddenly  turned  South  and 
ran  in  towards  the  German  Mne,  coming  under  heavy  concentrated 
fire. 

"  Warspite  "  shortly  afterwards  rejoined  the  line  at  the 
rear.  During  this  time  the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron 
occupied  position  "  N  "  (in  accordance  with  Grand  Fleet  Battle 
Orders,  page  41). 

6.  At  about  6.40  p.m.  the  action  appeared  to  become  general, 

7.  At  6.47  p.m.  the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  turned 
in  towards  the  German  line  partly  to  finish  off  a  disabled 
battleshi]),  but  more  to  observe  the  enemy's  rear  more  clearly, 
their  course  being  in  doubt.  Enemy's  turn  to  E.S.E.  was 
reported  by  "  Southampton  "  at  7.04  p.m. 

The  Squadron  now  came  under  heavy  fire  from  the  German 
battle  fleet,  and  it  became  necessary  to  return  to  the  rear  of 
our  battle  line. 

Between  6.55  and  7.05  p.m.  water  and  spray  was  constant^ 
coming  on  board  "  Southampton  "  from  enemy's  salvoes,  which 
w^ere  dropping  all  round  the  ship. 

8.  At  7.30  ]3.m.  the  Germans  altered  course  together  to 
S.  by  W.,  and  their  destroyers  made  an  effective  smoke  screen, 
as  the  German  fleet  was  now  in  bad  light. 

9.  At  about  8.30  p.m.  a  German  destroyer  was  sighted  and 
fired  on  by  "  Southampton  "  and  "  Dublin,"  who  hit  her  heavily 
amidships.  She  was  afterwards  sunk  by  a  division  of  our 
destroyers. 

10.  At  9.00  p.m.  the  enemy's  destroyers  attempted  to  attack 
our  5th  battle  squadron  from  the  North -West.  They  were 
driven  off  by  the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron ;  one  destroyer 
was  observed  to  have  been  hit. 

11.  At  10.20  ]).m.  the  Squadron  was  engaged  with  five  enemy 
ships,  apparently  a  cruiser  and  four  light  cruisers,  who  concen- 
trated on  "  Southampton  "  and  "  Dublin  "  at  very  short  range. 
The  action  was  very  sharp  while  it  lasted  (about  15  minutes),  and 
the  casualties  in  "  Southamjiton  '"  were  heavy.  Detailed  fists 
f)f  killed  and  wounded  in  "  Southamj^ton  "  and  "  Dublin  "  have 
been  forwarded  separately.^ 

^  Not  printed. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  177 

Three  tires  broke  out  on  board  "  tSouthampton  "  during  the 
action;  these  were  promptly  extinguished,  though  the  hoses 
had  been  very  much  cut  up  by  shell  tire. 

12.  On  the  enemy  retiring,  "  Southampton,"  "  Nottingham," 
and  "  Birmingham  "  proceeded  and  remained  astern  and  on 
starboard  quarter  of  the  centre  of  the  battle  fleet  during  the 
night,  as  it  was  not  known  what  protection  they  had  against 
destroyer  attack.  Firing  astern  was  heard  at  intervals  between 
10.30  p.m.  and  2.00  a.m. 

H.M.S.  "  Dublin  "  became  detached  from  the  Squadron 
during  the  night,  and  did  not  rejoin  till  10.00  a.m.  the  next  day. 

1st  June. 

13.  Squadron,  except  "  Dubhn,"  regained  touch  with  our 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  at  4.30  a.m.,  and  j^roceeded  as  ordered. 

"  Southampton  "  passed  a  mine,  with  horns,  at  4.25  a.m. 
in  Latitude  bb°  25'  N.,  Longitude  6°  11'  E. 

14.  The  behaviour  of  all  ranks  and  ratings  of  "  Southampton  " 
while  the  ship  was  in  the  trying  position  of  receiving  a  heavy 
fire  from  11  and  12-in.  guns  without  being  able  to  return  it, 
and  also  during  the  night  action  with  fires  breaking  out  on  board 
was  in  every  way  in  accordance  with  the  best  and  highest 
traditions  of  the  Service. 

1    *  *  *  *  * 

15.  A  track  chart ^  of  movements  of  "  Southampton  "  is 
enclosed  (Enclosure  2). 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

W.  E.  GOODENOUGH, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Commodore, 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 

H.M.S.  "  Lion." 

Enclosure- No.  12  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 
Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01  of  12/6/16. 

No.  037/7. 

"  Southampton," 
Sir,  5th  June  1916. 

In  continuation  of  my  letter  No.  037/5  of  2nd  June,  I  have 
the  honouPto  report  that  from  a  piece  of  shell  found  on  board 
"  Southampton  "  it  appears  that  one  of  the  cruisers  engaged 
with  the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  at  10.20  p.m.  on 
31st  May  was  armed  ^\dth  9-4-in.  guns,  probably  the  "  Roon  " 
or  "  FUrst  Bismarck." 

1  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 

2  There  is  no  trace  of  this  chart  at  the  Admiralty. 

X     12872  M 


178  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

The  course  of  the  enemy  squadron  was  S.S.E.,  and  position 
at  10.20  p.m.  Latitude  56°  10'  Nl.,  Longitude  6°  11'  E.  When 
beaten  off,  they  appeared  to  retire  to  the  westward. 

One  torpedo  (high  speed  setting)  was  fired  at  close  range  by 
"  Southampton  "  at  10.21  p.m.  It  is  worth  observing  that 
when  passing  within  about  a  mile  of  the  spot,  by  reckoning, 
at  11.30  a.m.  the  next  day,  the  sea  was  covered  b}^  oil,  for  an 
area  of  about  a  square  mile. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

W.  E.  GOODENOUGH, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Commodore, 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

H.M.S.  "  Lion." 

Enclosure  No.  13  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter   No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  037/8. 

"  Birmingham," 
Sir,  6th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  submit  the  enclosed  reports  of 
proceedings  on  31st  May  and  1st  June,  which  have  been  received 
from  H.M.  Ships  "  Nottingham,"  "  Birmingham,"  and  "  Dubhn." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

W.  E.  GOODENOUGH, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,  Commodore. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 
H.M.S.  "  Lion." 

CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "BIRMINGHAM." 

No.  309/10. 

H.M.S.  "  Birmingham," 
Sir,  2nd  June  lSl6. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  during  the  operations  on 
31st  May  1916  and  1st  June  1916  I  was  in  the  immediate  presence 
of  your  broad  pendant  except  for  a  few  hours  during  the  night 
31st  May  1916-lst  June  1916,  and  I  therefore  on^y  mention  a 
few  points  that  may  be  of  interest  together  with  an  account  of 
my  proceedings  during  the  time  I  was  separated  from  you. 

2.  About  4.35  p.m.  G.M.T.  on  Wednesday,  31st  May  1916, 
H.M.S.  "  Birmingham  "  was  under  heavy  fire  from  11 -in.  or 
12-in.  guns  of  the  enemy's  battle  fleet,  and  on  one  or  two  other 
occasions  later  in  the  evening. 

^  Part  omitted  hero,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  i-ecominendatioas. 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  179 

On  all  these  occasions  the  shells  were  falling  all  round  the 
ship  so  close  that  a  good  many  pieces  of  the  shells  as  they  burst 
came  on  board  and  also  a  good  deal  of  water  thrown  up  by  them. 
The  fact  that  the  ship  was  not  actually  hit  appeared  extra- 
ordinary, and  I  attribute  it  in  a  great  measure  to  the  fact  that 
on  each  occasion  when  fire  was  opened  the  ship  at  once  steered 
away  at  full  speed,  and  on  each  salvo  faUing  near  the  ship,  course 
was  at  once  altered  2  points  one  way  or  another.  As  a  result 
of  this,  although  the  next  salvo  appeared  correct  for  range  it 
was  generally  well  clear  to  the  right  or  left.  But  there  was 
also  a  large  element  of  good  fortune  in  it,  as  when  there  was 
more  than  one  ship  firing  at  us  it  was  impossible  to  avoid  them 
all  and  many  fell  all  round  the  ship. 

It  was  noticed  that  just  before  they  ceased  firing  on  account 
of  the  ship  getting  out  of  range,  the  time  of  flight  was  40  seconds, 
which  appeared  also  to  be  the  time  between  the  salvoes. 

3.  About  7.0  p.m.  G.M.T.  on  3Ist  May  1916  fire  was  opened 
on  a  disabled  battleship  or  large  cruiser  with  the  remainder  of 
the  squadron,  and  the  shooting  appeared  to  be  good,  the  bursts 
of  the  shell  on  her  being  quite  obvious. 

4.  I  was  unable  to  fire  on  the  destroyer  that  the  rest  of  the 
squadron  fired  at  later  in  the  evening  owing  to  being  blanketed 
by  some  of  our  own  destroyers. 

5.  During  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  cruisers  about  10.15  p.m. 
G.M.T.  it  was  impossible,  owing  to  the  smoke  made  by  the 
three  ships  that  were  ahead  of  me  in  the  fine,  to  see  anything 
until  the  enemy's  ships  switched  on  their  searchlights  when  fire 
was  opened  on  the  rear  ship.  From  the  same  cause  it  was  then 
so  difficult  to  see  that  I  could  not  distinguish  what  class  of 
ships  they  were.  The  enemy  ship  returned  the  fire  and  the 
shot  fell  very  close  round  the  ship. 

6.  After  the  squadron  turned  to  the  Eastward  together 
I  found  myself  approaching  our  oth  Battle  Squadron,  who  were 
steering  to  the  Southward,  and  was  obliged  to  turn  to  the  north- 
ward to  avoid  the  two  rear  ships,  thus  losing  touch  with  the 
remaiji^der  of  the  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron.  As  I  could  not 
see  any  destroyers  or  light  cruisers  guarding  the  5th  Battle 
Squadron  from  enemy  destroyer  attack  in  that  direction, 
I  remained  during  the  dark  hours  on  the  starboard  quarter  of 
the  rear  ship  from  where  I  could  act  in  the  event  of  an  attack 
on  them.  At  dayhght  I  sighted  "  Southampton  "  and  "  Notting- 
ham "  on  my  starboard  bow  and  rejoined. 

7.  At  about  11.30  p.m.  G.M.T.  on  31st  May  1916  I  observed 

two  or  more  large  enemy  ships  switch  on  their  searchhghts  and 
open  fire  on  some  of  our  destroyers  or  fight  cruiser  and  destroyers, 
astern.  At  the  time  I  was  convinced  from  their  appearance 
and  the  speed  they  were  going  that  they  were  the  enemy  battle 
cruisers,  but  I  have  since  ascertained  that  they  were  probably 
battleships, 

M  2 


180  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

8.  Soon  after  midnight  31st  May-lst  June  1916  I  observed 
heavy  firing  some  distance  away  to  the  North-eastward. 

9.  When  under  fire  of  the  battle  fleet  the  engines  were  put 
to  full  speed  and  subsequently  kept  at  it  for  two  hours  in  order 
to  regain  station.  During  this  period  the  revolutions  averaged 
381,  or  14  higher  than  the  ship  has  done  since  she  was  in  commis- 
sion. The  work  of  the  engine-room  department  under  Engineer 
Commander  John  B.  Hewitt  was  most  satisfactory  throughout 
a  very  arduous  day. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  DUFF, 
The  Commodore  Commanding,  Captain. 

Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
H.M.S.  "  Southampton." 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "DUBLIN." 

H.M.S.  "  DubUn," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  the  proceedings  of 
H.M.  Ship  under  my  command  during  30tli-31st  May  and 
1st  June  were  as  follows  : — 

Tuesday  Night,  30th  May. 

At  9.30  p.m.  Proceeded  to  sea  with  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 
When  clear  of  May  Island,  took  up  usual 
screen  ahead  of  Battle  Cruisers,  2nd  L.C. 
Squadron  on  Starboard  wing  position. 

3\st  May. 

At  2.30  p.m.     "  Galatea  "  reported  enemy's  Cruisers  in  sight. 

At  3.40  p.m.  Sighted  5  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  and  several 
destroyers  with  them. 

At  3.50  p.m.     "  Lion  "  opened  fire  on  enemy's  Battle  Cnjisers. 

At  4.  4  p.m.     "  Inclefatigable  "  blew  up. 

At  4.12  p.m.  Ordered  by  Commodore  of  2nd  L.C.  Squadron 
to  support  our  Destroyers  in  a  Torpedo  attack. 
"  Dubhn  "  at  the  time  being  about  5  cables 
on  disengaged  bow  of  "  Lion  "  and,  proceeding 
at  "  Full  speed,"  it  was  found  impossible  to 
cross  the  bows  of  the  "  Lion "  to  take  up 
position,  also  our  smoke  would  have  much 
interfered- with  the  "Lion"  if  I  could  have 
crossed  her  bows. 
4.30  p.m.  "  Queen  Mary  "  blew  up  and  sank. 
4.35  p.m.  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  in  "  Single  Line 
ahead." 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  181 

4.40  p.m.  Our  Battle  Cruisers  altered  course  16  points  to 
Starboard,  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  now 
to  rear. 

4.43  p.m.  Enemy's  Battle  Fleet  sighted — steering  to  the 
Northward. 

4.56  p.m.  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  under  very  heavy 
shell  fire  from  enemy's  Battle  Fleet,  salvoes 
falling  very  close,  but  the  ship  did  not  receive 
a  direct  hit,  although  many  pieces  of  12-in. 
shell  came  inboard,  the  Navigating  Officer, 
Lieutenant  Percy  Strickland,  being  hit  by 
a  small  piece  which  did  no  harm.  He  was 
standing  by  my  side  at  the  time,  on  the 
Upper  Bridge. 

4.58  p.m.  A  12-in.  shell  struck  the  water  a  few  yards  on 
Starboard  beam  and  4  shells  passed  just  over 
the  bridge. 

5.15p.m.  Observed  one  of  our  "M"  class  Torpedo  Boat 
Destroyers  sinldng. 

5.47  p.m.     "  Opened  fire  "  on  damaged  enemy  ship. 

6.22  p.m.     Ship  bearing  N.E.  blew  up. 

6.23  p.m.     "  Warspite "    hauled   out   of   Une    and   enemy's 

Battle  Fleet  concentrated  their  fire  on  her,  but 
she  had  regained  her  position  in  line  by 
6.45  p.m. 

7.20  p.m.  Our  Battle  Fleet  "  opened  fire  "  on  enemy's 
Battle  Fleet. 

7.45  p.m.  Observed  two  enemy  destroyers  on  Starboard 
Beam,  "  opened  fire  "  on  same. 

8.  6  p.m.     Lost  sight  of  enemy's  Battle  Fleet. 

8.56  p.m.  Observed  two  enemy  torpedo  boat  destroyers  on 
Starboard  bow  and  "  opened  fire  "  on  same, 
and  they  disappeared  in  a  cloud  of  smoke. 

9.10  p.m.     Heard  heavy  firing  S.W. 

10.40  p.m.  Sighted  enemy's  vessels  on  Starboard  Beam,  it 
being  quite  dark  and  rather  misty.  Directly 
enemy  "  switched  on  "  searchhghts  "  Dubhn  " 
opened  a  very  rapid  fire  on,  an  enemy  ship 
on  the  Beam,  but  it  was  imj^ossible  to  distin- 
guish what  ship  it  was. 
10.45  p.m.  Lieutenant  Percy  Strickland.  Navigating  Officer, 
was  killed  as  he  was  stepping  on  to  tne  Upper 
Bridge,  ship  was  being  hit  many  times,  and 
on  a  fire  starting  on  the  Seamen's  Mess  Deck 
the  ship  was  hauled  out  3  points,  which  made 
enemy's  shells  fall  short. 
10.55  p.m.     Resumed  course  of  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

11.0    p.m.     All  firing  ceased,   and  in   total  darkness  hauled 

About  over    3    points    to    Port    as    "  Southampton  " 

appeared  to  be  doing  so. 


182  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

11.20  p.m.     Resumed  Course  and  .Speed  of  2nd  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron,  but  lost  sight  of  them. 

From  11.0  p.m.  until  2.0  a.m.  on  1st  June, 
observed  continuous  flashes  of  guns  to  the 
Northward. 

At  daylight,  ho  vessel  in  sight  but  visibility  low; 
I  think  the  shell  which  passed  through  the 
Chart  House  and  then  exploded  must  have 
affected  the  Standard  Compass,  otherwise  the 
ship  must  have  been  in  close  touch  with 
2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 
4.  0  a.m.  Course  North.  Nothing  in  sight.  Weather  very 
misty.  Impossible  to  work  up  a  "  dead 
reckoning,"  as  Navigating  Officer  is  dead 
and  his  records  gone,  and  the  charts  in  Chart 
House  badly  damaged. 

The  wireless  trunk  having  been  shot  away,  it 
was  some  considerable  time  before  the  main 
aerials  were  connected  up ;  in  the  meanwhile 
the  Battle  aerial  was  connected  up  and  signals 
were  received. 
4.10  a.m.  Sighted  about  one  mile  off  some  enemy's  vessels, 
one  of  which  resembled  the  "  Roon,"  the 
others  were  too  indistinct  to  make  out  what 
class  of  vessel  they  belonged  to,  they  were 
steering  a  southerly  course  at  a  high  rate  of 
speed. 

In  a  few  seconds  the  enemy  was  lost  in  the  fog, 
the  ship  was  turned  with  the  object  of  chasing 
and  shadowing  them,  but  the  existing  condi- 
tions of  weather  made  this  impossible.  Course 
was  therefore  shaped  for  a  position  where  it  was 
hoped  to  meet  with  and  join  up  with  the 
2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron.  The  Commander- 
in-Chief  was  informed  of  sighting  the  enemy. 
The  Commodore,  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
was  asked  for  course  and  speed  of  Squadron. 

6.30  a.m.  Passed  a  lot  of  oil  fuel  and  rescued  a  man  on 
a  piece  of  wood  who  turned  out  to  be  George 
T.  A.  Parkyn,  Stoker  1st  class  of  H.M.S. 
"  Tipperary,"  who  had  been  in  the  water  for 
about  5  hours,  and  stated  his  ship  had  been 
sunk  by  shell  fire  at  night.  (His  statement 
is  enclosed.) 
The  ship  had  j^revious  to  this  passed  through  a 
large  number  of  dead  bodies. 

6.  0  a.m.  Sighted  Torpedo  Boat  Destroyer  "  Sparrow- 
hawk  "  in  a  very  damaged  condition,  bows 
crumpled  up  to  the  Bridge  and  stern  badly 
damaged.      Destroyer    Leader    "  Marksman  " 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  183 

standing  by  to  take  men  from  her ;  helped 
"  Marksman  "  by  giving  her  a  lee,  and 
when  I  parted  company  with  "  Marksman  " 
she  was  attempting  to  tow  "  Sparrowhawk," 
but  I  saw  it  was  a  hopeless  case,  and  an 
intercepted  signal  later  stated  that  "  ^Sparrow- 
hawk  "  had  been  sunk. 
At    8.  5  a.m.     Joined  the  Flag  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

During  the  night  action  the  ship  was  struck  by  13  shells, 
about  half  of  which  did  not  explode. 

I  would  like  to  mention  the  cool  behaviour  of  all  Officers  and 
Men  during  the  time  when  the  12-in.  shell  were  faUing  thickly 
around  the  shij)  by  day,  and  also,  when  the  ship  was  under 
heavy  fire  at  night. 

1  *  *  *  *  *  . 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  C.  SCOTT, 
The  Commodore  Commanding,  Captain. 

2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

statement  of  george  thos.  aug.  parkyn,  stoker 
1st  class,  ex  "tipperary."   rescued  at  sea  on 

THE   MORNING   OF    1st  JUNE    1916. 

I  was  at  work  in  No.  3  Stokehold,  and  at  about  11.0  p.m. 
(31st  May  1916)  I  learnt  that  we  were  in  action  with  German 
Torpedo  Craft.  We  had  been  in  action  about  I  of  an  houi- 
w^hen  the  Bridge  caught  fire  from  shells. 

The  vessel  kept  afloat  for  some  time  after  this,  going  down 
about  break  of  day,  1|  hours  or  2  hours  after  being  hit. 

When  abandoning  the  ship  the  Motor  Boat  was  tried,  the 
only  boat  left,  but  sank  as  soon  as  it  touched  water. 

Some  men  had  previously  got  away  on  a  small  raft,  and 
about  17  men  got  on  to  the  larger  raft.  I  saw  neither  of  these 
after. 

"  Tipperary  "  plunged  suddenly,  going  down  by  the  Bows. 
I  saw  no  other  survivors  while  in  the  water. 

GEORGE  THOMAS  AUGUSTUS  PARKYN, 

Stoker  1st  Class. 

CAPTAIN'S  REPORT.— H.M.S.  "  NOTTINGHAM." 

No.  66. 

H.M.S.  "  Nottingham," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  the  proceedings  of  H.M.  Ship 
under  my  command,  during  the  Action  on  31st  May  1916. 

'  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recominendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


184  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

2.  At  2.55  p.m.  a  signal  was  received  from  Senior  Officer, 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  to  2n(I  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  :  "  Prepare 
to  attack  the  van  of  the  enemy." 

3.  "  Nottingham  "  was  at  that  time  on  "  Lion's  "  starboard 
bow  and  took  up  a  position  a  shade  on  her  port  bow  as  far  ahead 
as  possible,  in  order  to  break  up  any  attack  from  Enemy 
Torpedo  Craft,  and  to  support  our  own  Torpedo  Boat  Destroyers 
of  13th  Flotilla. 

4.  The  enemy  Torpedo  Boat  Destroyers  started  to  attack 
about  4.0  p.m.,  and  "  Nottingham  "  opened  fire  upon  them, 
Avliich  fire  appeared  to  be  effective,  and  the  attack  was  not 
jjressed  home. 

5.  As  "  Lion  "  was  gradually  opening  the  range,  "  Notting- 
ham "  altered  to  starboard  to  prevent  getting  in  her  way,  and 
when  "  Nottingham  "  could  no  longer  support  the  T.B.D.'s, 
she  took  station  on  Commodore  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
which  station  she  maintained  during  the  remainder  ot  the  action. 

6.  About  4.40  p.m.,  "  Nottingham  "  fired  an  E.R.  Torpedo 
at 'Enemy  Battle  Fleet;  the  range  being  about  16,500  yards, 
the  Battle  Fleet  being  in  line  ahead.  No  other  opportunity  for 
firing  torpedoes  jiresented  itself. 

7.  The  ship  was  steaming  at  high  speed  from  3.0  p.m.  until 
8.0  p.m.,  and  from  4.0  p.m.  to  6.0  X3.m.  the  engines  were  running 
at  a  mean  speed  of  377  revolutions,  the  greatest  S.H.P.  developed 
being  28,156. 

8.  No  defects  were  brought  to  light  except  an  increased 
leakage  of  oil  fuel  from  after  tanks  into  reserve  feed  tanks  in 
After^Engine  Room,  caused  probably  by  the  vibration. 

9.  I  would  submit  that  this  performance  is  most  creditable 
to  the  whole  of  the  Engine  Room  Staff  especially  in  that 
Engineer  Commander  Gerald  Moore,  R.N.,  was  able  to  receive 
no  assistance  from  the  Senior  Engineer  Lieutenant,  he  and 
14  Engine  Room  Ratings  (including  seven  chief  or  P.O.'s)  being 
out  of  the  ship  at  the  time. 

10.  I  enclose  a  tracing  showing  the  rough  track  of  "  Notting- 
ham "  between  3.0  p.m.  and  10.30  p.ni.^  This  track  was  plotted 
by  a  trained  rating  working  in  the  Lower  Conning  Tower. 

11.  "Nottingham  "  sustained  no  damage  and  no  direct  hits 
from  heavy  shell,  although  she  was  frequently  straddled  and 
fragments  of  heavy  shell  bursting  in  the  water  close  to  the  ship 
struck  the  side^  and  fell  about  the  upper  deck. 

12.  The  behaviour  of  both  Officers  and  Ship's  Company  was 
everything  that  could  be  desired. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

CHARLES   B.   MILLER, 
The  Commodore  Commanding,  Captain. 

Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
H.M.S.  "  Southampton." 

1  Plate  14. 


TRACING 
H.M.S 


TEERED    BY 


Flatel4f. 


10' 


Plafel*. 


TRACING    OF    THE    APPROXIMATE  COURSES    STEERED    BY 
H.M.S  "NOTTINGHAM  "  FROM   100'="   TO  X- 30 '':" 
MAY    31  ^> 


Enemy  Battle 
V  Cruisers  JSLOP^ 


Enemy  Battle  Fleet 
TS.-  25  P."" 


57?N. 


■  so' 


\a^ 


lOOJZ .  mse/f.  II 73  Q)  SOOO.  I 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  185 


REAR-ADMIRAL'S    REPORT.— 3rd    LIGHT   CRUISER 

SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  14  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  0447. 

"  Falmouth," 
Sir,  5th  June  1016. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  under  my 
command  during  the  action  on  31st  May  1916.^ 

2.  At  2.23  p.m.,  the  Light  Cruiser  Screen  being  then  spread 
in  an  E.N.E.  direction,  the  centre  bearing  S.S.E.  from  "  Lion," 
and  the  course  just  being  altered  to  N.  by  E.,  "  Galatea's  " 
report  of  enemy  Cruisers  was  received,  and  the  First  Light 
Crui.ser  Squadron  proceeded  in  an  E.S.E.  direction  at  full  speed, 
and  the  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  closed  in  support,  also 
at  full  speed. 

3.  I  directed  "  Engadine  "  to  take  cover  near  our  Battle 
Cruisers. 

4.  At  2.45  p.m.,  we  sighted  two  or  three  enemy  Cruisers, 
about  12  miles  E.S.E.,  firing  at  the  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
and  the  shots  falling  mostly  short.  Being  far  outranged,  we 
endeavoured  to  keep  touch  without  closing  much,  and  to  lead 
the  enemy  round  to  the  direction  of  our-  Battlefleet  (N.W.), 
whilst  the  Battle  Cruisers  were  steering  to  the  eastward  to  cut 
them  off. 

5.  At  3.33  p.m.,  the  enemy  altered  to  about  E.S.E.  and 
the  First  and  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  did  the  same.  At 
this  time  splashes  were  falling  close  ahead. 

6.  At  4.32  p.m.,  we  passed  a  quantity  of  what  looked  Hke 
large  brass  cartridge  cases  of  tAvelve  to  fifteen  inches  diameter, 
but  have  since  been  considered  to  have  probably  been  smoke 
boxes,  as  the  enemy  had  already  been  much  obscured  by  whitish 
clouds  of  smoke. 

7.  We  then  endeavoured  (at  4.30  p.m.)  with  the  First  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron  to  engage  the  four  enemy  cruisers  which 
appeared  to  be  detached  to  the  northward  of  the  enemy's  main 
body,  but  at  4.50  p.m.  we  sighted  our  own  Battle  Cruisers 
ahead  and  steering  towards  us  (W.N.W.),  and  engaged  with 
the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  to  starboard.  We  accordingly  altered 
to  keep  ahead  of  our  Battle  Cruisers,  and  twenty  minutes  later 
passed  the  wreckage  of  a  sunken  ship. 

8.  At  5.33  p.m.,  we  sighted  two  or  three  cruisers  approaching 
from  the  N.W.,  which  were  the  first  jDortion  of  our  own  Battle- 
fleet  screen,  and  we  altered  round  gradually  and  joined  in  with 
the  Battlefleet  screen  steering  about  S.E. 

9.  Here  we  were  much  restricted  for  room,  the  First  Cruiser 
Squadron,  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  and  Destroyer  Screen 

1  Plate  1.5. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  185 


REAR-ADMIRAL'S    REPORT.— 3rd    LIGHT   CRUISER 

SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  14  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 
No.  0447. 

"  Falmouth," 
Sir,  5th  June  1016. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  under  my 
command  during  the  action  on  31st  May  1916.^ 

2.  At  2.23  p.m.,  the  Light  Cruiser  Screen  being  then  spread 
in  an  E.N.E.  direction,  the  centre  bearing  S.S.E.  from  "  Lion," 
and  the  course  just  being  altered  to  N.  by  E.,  "  Galatea's  " 
report  of  enemy  Cruisers  was  received,  and  the  First  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron  proceeded  in  an  E.S.E.  direction  at  full  speed, 
and  the  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  closed  in  support,  also 
at  full  speed. 

3.  I  directed  "  Engadine  "  to  take  cover  near  our  Battle 
Cruisers. 

4.  At  2.45  p.m.,  we  sighted  two  or  three  enemy  Cruisers, 
about  12  miles  E.S.E.,  firing  at  the  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
and  the  shots  falling  mostly  short.  Being  far  outranged,  we 
endeavoured  to  keep  touch  without  closing  much,  and  to  lead 
the  enemy  round  to  the  direction  of  our-  Battlefleet  (N.W.), 
whilst  the  Battle  Cruisers  were  steering  to  the  eastward  to  cut 
them  off. 

5.  At  3.33  p.m.,  the  enemy  altered  to  about  E.S.E.  and 
the  First  and  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  did  the  same.  At 
this  time  splashes  were  falling  close  ahead. 

6.  At  4.32  p.m.,  we  passed  a  quantity  of  what  looked  like 
large  brass  cartridge  cases  of  twelve  to  fifteen  inches  diameter, 
but  have  since  been  considered  to  have  probably  been  smoke 
boxes,  as  the  enemy  had  already  been  much  obscured  by  whitish 
clouds  of  smoke. 

7.  We  then  endeavoured  (at  4.30  p.m.)  with  the  First  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron  to  engage  the  four  enemy  cruisers  which 
appeared  to  be  detached  to  the  northward  of  the  enemy's  main 
body,  but  at  4.50  p.m.  we  sighted  our  own  Battle  Cruisers 
ahead  and  steering  towards  us  (W.N.W.),  and  engaged  with 
the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  to  starboard.  We  accordingly  altered 
to  keep  ahead  of  our  Battle  Cruisers,  and  twenty  minutes  later 
passed  the  wreckage  of  a  sunken  ship. 

8.  At  5.33  p.m.,  we  sighted  two  or  three  cruisers  ajDproaching 
from  the  N.W.,  which  were  the  first  portion  of  our  own  Battle- 
fleet  screen,  and  we  altered  round  gradually  and  joined  in  with 
the  Battlefleet  screen  steering  about  S.E. 

9.  Here  we  were  much  restricted  for  room,  the  First  Cruiser 
Squadron,  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  and  Destroyer  Screen 

1  Plate  1.5. 


186  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

all  moving  in  the  ^^ame  direction  with  us.  The  First  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron  managed  to  turn  away  and  get  clear  and  thus 
eased  the  crowding. 

10.  We  then,  in  common  with  other  ships,  engaged  a  large 
3-funnellcd  Light  Cruiser,  I  think  "  Elbing,"  from  9,700  to 
4,000  yards;  and  she  was  soon  brought  to  a  standstill.  "  Fal- 
mouth "  fired  a  torpedo  at  her  at  about  5,000  yards,  but  the 
result  is  unknown. 

11.  Fire  was  then  shifted  to  two  other  Light  Cruisers  who 
were  firing  at  our  destroyers ;  and  after  a  short  time  they  turned 
away  and  were  lost  to  view. 

12.  Two  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  then  appeared  detached 
from  the  others,  and  steering  about  east,  thought  to  be  "  Derf- 
flinger  "  and  one  other  (possibly  "  Liitzow  "). 

They  were  from  6,000  to  5,000  yards  on  our  starboard  beam, 
and  were  engaged  by  the  Third  Battle  Cruiser  Scjuadron,  who 
joined  from  the  north  and  turned  to  the  eastw^ard  about  2,000 
yards  on  our  port  beam. 

13.  No  other  target  presenting  itself,  fire  was  directed  at 
the  leading  Battle  Cruiser  from  5,200  to  6,100  yards,  and  fire 
was  returned  by  the  Battle  Cruisers  with  6-in. 

14.  "  Falmouth  "  and  "  Yarmouth  "  both  fired  torpedoes 
at  her,  and  it  is  beheved  that  "  Falmouth's  "  torpedo  hit,  as 
an  underwater  explosion  was  distinctly  visible. 

15.  About  6.30  p.m.,  "  Tnvincible  "  blew  up  in  approx. 
57°  8'  N.,  6°  17'  E.  My  impression  is  that  it  was  the  result  of 
a  shot  into  her  magazine.  There  was  certainly  so  sign  of  water 
in  the  explosion. 

16.  Soon  after,  the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  turned  away  to 
westward,  and  were  were  left  "without  an  enemy  to  engage. 

17.  Here  I  should  like  to  bring  to  your  notice  the  action  of 
a  destroyer  (name  unknown,  thought  to  be  marked  with  the 
number  "  59,"  ?  "  Acasta  "  ?)  which  we  passed  close  in  a  disabled 
condition  soon  after  6.0  p.m.  She  apparently  was  able  to 
struggle  ahead  again  and  made  straight  for  the  "  Derffiinger  " 
to  attack  her.  The  incident  appeared  so  courageous  that  it 
seems  desirable  to  investigate  it  further,  as  I  am  unable  to  be 
certain  of  the  vessel's  identity. 

18.  "  Canterbury  "  joined  my  squadron  at  7.0  p.m.,  and 
being  ahead  of  our  Battle  Cruisers  we  kept  that  position,  steering 
about  W.S.W.,  and  at  7.36  p.m.  reduced  to  18  knots  by  signal 
from  "  Lion." 

19.  At  7.50  i).m.  I  was  directed  by  "  Lion  "  to  sweep  to 
the  westward  and  to  locate  the  head  of  the  enemy's  line  before 
dark ;  and  I  formed  the  Light  Cruisers  on  a  line  of  bearing  South, 
course  West,  24  knots. 

20.  Five  enemy  cruisers  were  sighted  W.  by  N.  and  fire  was 
opened  at  8.18  p.m.,  at  9,600  yards,  closing  to  6,000;  the  enemy 
replied,  but  their  fire  was  erratic.     At  8.25  p.m.  the  course  was 


I'Ltdie  15. 


7^. 


A 


Ppouol  the  Log 
of 

H.M.S"FALMOUTH^ 

Courses  ste^re^  (^urin^  act/on 
May3l^^  1916 


072-z^2e6/f^in3. 


-57"N. 


TIE. 

JvlaJbv  iSons,  P'totoUlio. 


i'Uiic  15. 


CoursKS   ste^re^  t/urin^  action 
May3l'^  1916 


TIE. 

NU'b«&Sons,PSo»lj*Jio. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  187 

S.W.,  25  knots.     At  8.32  the  course  was  W.S.W.  and  the  enemy 
altered  8  points  together  away  from  us. 

21.  Our  course  was  altered  to  West  and  W.N.W.,  but  at 
8.38  p.m.  we  lost  sight  of  the  enemy  in  the  mist,  and  fire  was 
checked. 

22.  We  then  found  ourselves  drawing  across  the  bows  of 
the  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers,  who  I  think  were  being  engaged 
by  our  Battle  Cruisers,  and  we  turned  to  about  W.S.W. ,  and 
then  S.S.W\  to  regain  our  position  ahead  of  our  Battle  Cruisers. 

23.  During  the  night  we  kept  on  the  starboard  bow  of  our 
Battle  Cruisers  and  Battle  ships,  steering  South,  and  altering  to 
N,  by  E.  at  dayhght. 

24.  At  3.15  a.m.  a  Zeppehn  was  following  the  rear  of  our 
Fleet,  observing,  and  we  drove  it  off  with  shrapnel  fire,  although 
unable  to  bring  it  down  at  the  range,  which  was  14,000  yards. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Naval  Airship  "  L.  24  "  in  a 
badly  damaged  condition  succeeded  in  reaching  the  coast  of 
Schlesmg  on  1st  June,  but  then  came  down,  and  broke  in  two 
pieces  "  (D.A.R.  No.  83  of  3rd  June  1916). 

25.  The  remainder  of  the  second  day  was  spent  sweeping 
to  the  Northward  with  our  Battle  Cruisers  without  sighting 
any  enemy,  and  at  night  we  returned  Avith  them  to  our  base. 

26.  Although  the  Squadron  was  under  fire  during  the  afternoon 
and  evening  of  the  31st  May,  no  ships  received  any  direct  hits 
except  "  Falmouth  "  whose  fore  top  communications  were  out. 

Ships  were  occasionally  struck  by  shrapnel  and  small  pieces 
of  shell. 

There  were  no  casualties. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

T.  D.  W.  NAPIER, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  Rear- Admiral. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "CHESTER." 

Enclosure  No.  15  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

H.M.S.  "Chester," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

In  confirmation  of  my  telegram  1700  and  0830  of  June  1st, 
I  have  the  honour  to  make  the  following  preHminary  report 
on  the  circumstances  in  which  H.M.S.  "  Chester  "  went  into 
action  on  May  31st. 

2.  From  dayhght  on  May  31st  "  Chester  "  was  attached  to 
3rd  B.C.S.  and  stationed  as  a  hnking  ship  between  the  armoured 
cruiser    screen   of   the   Battlefleet   and   the   three  ships   of   the 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  187 

S.W.,  25  knots.     At  8.32  the  course  was  W.S.W.  and  the  enemy 
altered  8  points  together  away  from  us. 

21.  Our  course  was  altered  to  West  and  W.N.W.,  but  at 
8.38  p.m.  we  lost  sight  of  the  enemy  in  the  mist,  and  fire  was 
checked. 

22.  We  then  found  ourselves  drawing  across  the  bows  of 
the  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers,  who  I  think  were  being  engaged 
by  our  Battle  Cruisers,  and  we  turned  to  about  W.8.W.,  and 
then  S.S.W.  to  regain  our  position  ahead  of  our  Battle  Cruisers. 

23.  During  the  night  we  kept  on  the  starl)oard  bow  of  our 
Battle  Cruisers  and  Battle  ships,  steering  South,  and  altering  to 
N.  by  E.  at  dayUght. 

24.  At  3.15  a.m.  a  ZeppeHn  was  following  the  rear  of  our 
Fleet,  observing,  and  we  drove  it  off  with  shrapnel  fire,  although 
unable  to  bring  it  down  at  the  range,  which  was  14,000  yards. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Naval  Airship  "  L.  24  "  in  a 
badly  damaged  condition  succeeded  in  reaching  the  coast  of 
Schleswig  on  1st  June,  but  then  came  down,  and  broke  in  tA\o 
pieces  "  (D.A.R.  No.  83  of  3rd  June  1916). 

25.  The  remainder  of  the  second  day  was  spent  sweeping 
to  the  Northward  with  our  Battle  Cruisers  without  sighting 
any  enemy,  and  at  night  we  returned  with  them  to  our  base. 

26.  Although  the  Squadron  was  under  fire  during  the  afternoon 
and  evening  of  the  31st  May,  no  ships  received  any  direct  hits 
except  "  Falmouth  "  whose  fore  top  communications  were  out. 

Ships  were  occasionally  struck  by  shrapnel  and  small  pieces 
of  shell. 

There  were  no  casualties. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

T.  D.  W.  NAPIER, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  Rear- Admiral. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "CHESTER." 

Enclosure  No.  15  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

H.M.S.  "Chester," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

In  confirmation  of  my  telegram  1700  and  0830  of  June  1st, 
I  have  the  honour  to  make  the  following  prehminary  report 
on  the  circumstances  in  which  H.M.S.  "  Chester  "  went  into 
action  on  May  31st. 

2.  From  dayhght  on  May  31st  "  Chester  "  was  attached  to 
3rd  B.C.S.  and  stationed  as  a  hnking  ship  between  the  armoured 
cruiser    screen   of   the   Battlefleet   and   the   three  ships   of   the 


188  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

3rd  B.C.S.,  to  pass  signals  visually,  W/T  not  being  in  use  except 
in  cases  of  emergency. 

3.  The  distance  between  the  Battle  cruisers  and  the  cruiser 
screen  varied  during  the  day  from  about  18  to  12  miles,  "  Chester  " 
keeping  a  midway  position.  The  mean  course  was  about  S.  50  E. 
after  5.20  a.m.  and  the  Battle  cruisers  were  from  a  point  to  two 
points  on  the  Port  bow  of  the  battle  fleet.  At  noon  they  were 
about  30  miles  apart.  Check  bearings  and  distances  were 
passed  through  "  Chester  "  twice  during  the  day.  "  Chester's  " 
noon  position  was  Lat.  58-8  N.,  Long.  3-36  E. 

4.  At  3.26  p.m.  the  battle  cruisers  increased  speed  and  steered 
E.S.E.  and  "  Chester  "  had  to  turn  towards  the  "  IVIinotaur  " 
(S.O.  of  Armoured  cruisers)  to  pass  to  her  the  signal  reporting 
Battle  Cruisers  alteration  of  course  and  speed,  the  visibihty 
having  slightly  decreased,  perhaps  to  8  miles.  Having  passed 
the  signal,  "  Chester "  followed  Battle  cruisers  (which  were 
then  just  visible)  at  full  speed. 

5.  A  W/T  from  C.-in-C.  to  3rd  B.C.S.  was  intercepted  at 
4.15  p.m.  ordering  the  squadron  to  re-inforce  B.C.F.  At  about 
this  time  a  large  number  of  reports,  some  apparently  contradic- 
tory, were  being  intercepted,  relative  to  position,  course,  and 
speed  of  enemy  sighted  and  engaged  by  various  units  of  the 
Fleet. 

6.  Third  B.C.S.  steered  to  the  Southward  at  about  4.15  p.m. 
(their  mean  course  was  apparently  S.  by  E.)  to  carry  out 
C.-in-C. 's  signal,  proceeding  at  a  high  speed.  "  Chester  "  turned 
with  them.  The  bearing  and  distance  of  3rd  B.C.S.  from 
"  Chester  "  was  then  about  S.  70  E.  8  miles.  On  a  S.  by  E.  course 
"  Chester  "  at  full  speed  was  very  slowly  overhauHng  3rd  B.C.S. 
The  distance  was  gradually  decreased  to  about  6  miles,  and 
the  bearing  kept  about  the  same.  The  visibihty  was  rapidly 
decreasing. 

7.  At  2.23  p.m.,  intercepted  reports  indicated  that  enemy 
ships  were  in  the  close  vicinity.  Visibility  to  the  Westward 
was  rather  less,  I  think,  than  to  the  Eastward. 

8.  At  5.30  p.m.  the  sound  of  gunfire  to  the  S.W.  was  heard 
and  flashes  of  guns  were  seen  in  this  direction.  This  was  reported 
to  "  Invincible  "  by  searchlight,  and  "  Chester "  turned  to 
S.W.  to  investigate. 

9.  At  5.36  one  3-funnelled  hght  Cruiser  with  one  (or  perhaps 
two — opinions  differ)  destroyers  was  sighted  dimly  a  little  on 
Starboard  bow.  She  was  challenged  and  made  no  reply. 
"  Chester  "  altered  course  to  about  West.  The  appearance  of 
the  destroyer  made  it  most  probable  that  the  ship  was  an  enemy. 
(The  hght  cruiser  had,  I  think,  been  firing  at  some  ships  to  the 
westward  of  her,  but  her  target  was  not  in  sight  from  "  Chester  "). 
As  the  "  Chester's  "  course  laid  her  open  to  torpedo  attack  by 
the  destroyer  at  once,  course  was  altered  to  starboard  from 
about  West  to  about  North  (the  approximate  course  of  enemy) 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  189 

bringing  enemy  Mell  abaft  the  port  beam.     The  approximate 
position  at  this  time  was  Lat.  57*  10  E.,  Long.  5-42  E. 

10.  While  turning  two  more  hght  cruisers  were  sighted 
astern  of  the  other.  The  leading  hght  cruiser  opened  fire  on 
"  Chester  "  at  about  the  time  of  the  completion  of  the  turn  to 
Northward,  and  "Chester's"  first  salvo  was  fired  at  her  at 
about  the  same  time  as  her  (the  leading  light  cruiser's)  second 
salvo. ^  The  range  was  about  6,000  yards.  After  "  Chester's  " 
third  salvo,  the  fourth  salvo  (about)  of  the  enemy  disabled 
No.  1  gun  portside,  and  Idlled  or  wounded  a  large  proportion 
of  the  guns'  crews  of  Numbers  1,  2,  and  3  Port.  The  appearance 
of  two  more  light  cruisers  made  it  desirable  to  increase  the  range 
rapidly.  "  Chester "  turned  to  N.  Eastward,  her  speed  and 
rapid  alteration  of  course  making  any  effective  firing  from 
"  Chester "  impracticable.  The  after  gun  continued  firing 
steadily  in  local  control.  By  the  time  "  Chester  "  had  steadied 
on  a  North  Easterly  course  all  enemy  ships  had  apparently 
opened  fire  and  obtained  an  accurate  range.  In  about  the 
first  five  minutes  of  the  action  most  of  "  Chester's  "  casualties 
occurred  and  the  three  guns,  No.  1  Port,  and  Nos.  1  and  2  star- 
board were,  I  beheve,  disabled  during  the  same  period.  There 
were  several  small  cordite  fires  in  the  first  few  minutes ;  they 
were  not  serious,  except  for  damage  to  personnel.  The  personnel 
of  all  guns'  crews  was  also  seriously  reduced. 

12.  Enemy  ships  turned  together  to  North  Eastward  soon 
after  ''  Chester's  "  turn,  bringing  the  enemy  leading  ship  astern 
of  "  Chester  "  and  the  two  other  sHghtly  on  starboard  quarter. 
The  3rd  B.C.S.  had  approached  from  the  Eastward,  and  when 
first  noticed  by  me  were  on  a  North  Westerly  course  to  Eastward 
of  "  Chester." 

13.  From  the  time  of  altering  course  to  the  N.E.  my  attention 
was  given  to  dodging  enemy's  salvoes  by  steering  towards  the 
last  fall  of  shot;  thus  maintaining  the  mean  course  to  the 
N.  Eastward,  and  keeping  enemy's  salvoes  falling  alternately 
on  either  side,  on  account  of  the  constantly  changing  deflections. 
This  was  apparently  successful,  as  regards  saving  the  ship  from 
a  large  amount  of  further  serious  damage.  In  the  last  few 
minutes  I  beheve  she  was  seldom  hit,  but  the  changes  of  ship's 
course  rendered  it  impossible  for  the  after  guns  to  make  effective 
shooting,  even  if  the  guns'  crews  had  been  in  a  fit  state  and 
sufficient  numbers  to  do  so.  But  it  was  obvious  to  me  that 
"  Chester  "  was  smothered  with  enemy's  fire,  and  I  considered 
only  the  best  way  of  getting  out  of  action,  withour  further  heavy 
loss,  by  zigzagging  and  taking  shelter  to  the  North  Eastward 
of  the  Battle  Cruisers. 

1  The  Commanding  Officer  H.M.S.  "Chester"  on  13th  June  1916, 
reported  that  it  appeared  "that  the  leading  German  Light  Cruiser  fired 
two  salvoes  before  '  Chester  '  fij-ed.' "  He  also  stated  that  "it  appears 
likely  that  the  three  enemy  Light  Cruisers  concerned  were  the '  Wiesbaden,' 
•  Frankfurt,'  and  '  PiUau.'  " 


lt)0  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND: 

14.  After  10  minutes  under  fire,  as  observed  in  the  trans- 
mitting station,  "  Chester  "  crossed  the  bows  of  "  Invincible  " 
and  took  station  on  her  starboard  bow.  The  last  enemy  salvo 
was  fired  about  the  time  "  Chester  "  passed  "  Invincible," 
and  took  station  on  her  starboard  bow.  The  Battle  cruisers 
opened  fire  on  enemy  light  cruisers  shortly  before  this. 

15.  "  Chester  "  remained  to  North  Eastward  of  3rd  B.C.S. 
for  a  short  time,  and  when  they  went  into  heavy  action  shortly 
afterwards,  took  station  astern  of  "  Minotaur's  "  squadron  further 
to  the  Eastward,  remaining  with  them.  I  reported  condition 
of  ship  and  casualties  to  R.A.  "  Minotaur  "  during  the  night, 
and  was  ordered  to  Humber  by  signal  from  him  at  dayhght, 
June  1st. 

16.  My  opinion  is  that  all  enemy  salvoes  were  fired  by 
director.  Considering  that  there  were  three  enemy  ships,  the 
rate  of  fire  was  perhaps  not  great.  Spread  for  both  elevation 
and  direction  was  small.  Range  was  thoroughly  well  maintained, 
but  correction  for  deflection  was  evidently  difficult.  I  do  not 
estimate  the  rate  of  fire  of  any  one  shij)  higher  than  one  salvo 
every  45  sees.,  and  if  three  ships  were  not  firing  all  the  time,  it 
was  slower  than  this.  There  were  usually  four  or  five  shots 
per  salvo. 

17.  The  behaviour  of  officers  and  ship's  comf)any  was 
admirable.  I  propose  to  forward  a  fuUer  report  on  this  and 
other  matters  when  I  have  had  further  opportunity  of  consulting 
with  officers  of  the  ship. 

18.  The  principal  items  of  serious  damage  to  material  are  : — 

1.  Three  guns  disabled. 

2.  After  control  destroyed. 

3.  Whaler  and  one  cutter  smashed,  and  some  other  boats 

damaged. 

4.  Forecastle  deck  holed  and  splintered  in  many  places. 

5.  Large    amount    of    electrical    circuits    and    voice    pipes 

(including  fire  control)  damaged. 

6.  All  funnels  holed,  foremost  funnel  very  badly. 

7.  Forebridge  considerably  damaged. 

8.  All  rigging  in  a  bad  state. 

9.  Three  holes  in  armour,  and  damage  to  frames  behind 

these. 

10.  Two  holes  in  side  above  armour. 

11.  E.R.  ventilation    trunks  wrecked,  and    forecastle  deck 

fittings  generally  much  damaged. 

12.  Two  boilers,  shght  damage  to  tubes  from  splinters. 

13.  Number  of  small  steam    and  water  pipes    holed  and 

shot  away. 

19.  Since  drafting  the  above,  I  am  informed  that  Commander 
Forbes   (seriously  wounded  and  in  hospital)  stated  that  he  is 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  191 

sure  that  there  was  a  fourth  enemy  light  cruiser  engaged,  besides 
one  destroyer.     I  am  not  yet  able  to  confirm  this. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
The  Secretary  to  the  ROB.  N.  LAWSON. 

Admiralty.  Captain. 

Submitted  for  information. 

Copies    of    this    letter    have    been   forwarded    to    Admiralty, 
C.-in-C.  H.F.,  and  R.A.  Falmouth. 

Vice- Admii al  Commanding, 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  ROB.  N.  LAWSON, 

Captain, 

5th  June  1916. 


192  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 


REAR-ADMIRAL'S   REPORT.— 5th   BATTLE   SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  16  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

No.  024A. 

"  Queen  Elizabeth," 
Sir,  9th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  report  on  the 
Action  of  the  31st  May,  together  with  reports  from  ships  of  the 
5th  Battle  Squadron. 

2.  My  recommendations  of  Officers  and  Men  will  be  forwarded 
later  when  reports  are  received  from  H.M.  Ships  "  Malaya " 
and  "  Bar  ham." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

HUGH  EVAN  THOMAS, 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Rear  Admiral. 

The  Grand  Fleet. 


No.  024. 

"  Queen  Elizabeth," 
Sir,  9th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that,  on  31st  May  1916, 
when  in  Latitude  57°  N,,  Longitude  4°  45'  30"  E.,  at  2.23  p.m., 
the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  consisting  of  "  Barham  "  (Captain 
Arthur  W.  Craig)  bearing  my  Flag,  "  Valiant  "  (Captain  Maurice 
Woollcombe),  "  Warspite  "  (Captain  Edward  M.  Phillpotts),  and 
"  Malaya  "  (Captain  the  Hon.  Algernon  D.  E.  H.  Boyle,  C.B., 
M.V.O.),  in  single  line  ahead  in  the  order  named,  and  accompanied 
by  the  •'  Fearless  "  (Captain  Charles  D.  Roper),  "  Defender  " 
(Lieut. -Commander  Lawrence  R.  Palmer),  "  Acheron  "  (Com- 
mander Charles  G.  Ramsey),  "  Ariel  "  (Lieut. -Commander  Arthur 
G.  Tippet),  "  Attack "  (Lieut.-Commander  Charles  H.  Neill 
James),  "  Hydra  "  (Lieutenant  Francis  G.  Glossop),  "  Badger  " 
(Commander  Theodore  E.  J.  Bigg),  "  Lizard  "  (Lieut.-Commander 
Edward  Brooke),  "  Goshawk  "  (Commander  George  H.  Knowles), 
"  Lapwing  "  (Lieutenant  Hubert  W.  D.  Griffith),  was  five  miles 
N.N.W.  of  the  First  Battle-cruiser  Squadron,  steering  N.  by  E., 
when  a  W/T  signal  was  intercepted  from  "  Galatea  " — "  Enemy 
in  sight,"  upon  which  the  Battle-cruiser  Fleet  and  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron  were  turned  to  S.S.E.  by  signal  from  the  Vice  Admiral 
Commanding  the  Battle-cruiser  Fleet  ar\d  speed  increased  to 
25  knots. 

2.  At  3.50  p.m.,  some  light  cruisers  were  sighted  before  the 
port  beam,  steering  about  S.S.E. ;  these  were  made  out  to  be 
enemy  vessels,  but  not  without  difficulty  owing  to  mist.  The 
"  Fearless "    and    destroyer   screen   were   stationed   astern,    not 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  193 

having  speed  to  go  ahead,  and  when  the  range  was  clear  a  signal 
was  made  to  open  fire  at  3.56  p.m.  After  two  salvoes  short,  one 
cruiser  appeared  to  be  straddled — range  19,000 — upon  which 
the  enemy  turned  away  about  8  points  and,  after  one  or  two 
more  salvoes  had  been  fired,  were  not  seen  again.  -   - 

3.  About  this  time  the  battle-cruisers  in  hne  ahead  were 
heavily  engaged  with  what  afterwards  proved  to  be  the  enemy 
battle-cruisers. 

4.  At  4.02  p.m.,  the  "  Indefatigable  "  blew  up,  the  remaining 
ships  altering  course  gradually  to  the  South-eastward;  the 
enemy  also  turned  to  the  South-eastward,  which  enabled  the 
Fifth  Battle  Squadi-on  to  gain  on  them,  and  at  4.06  fire  was 
opened  at  an  estimated  range  of  19,000  yards.  At  4,08,  a  signal 
was  made  for  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  to  concentrate  in  jDairs  on  the 
two  rear  enemy  ships. 

5.  The  Hght  was  very  difficult,  the  targets  being  constantly 
obscured,  and  seldom  were  more  than  one  or  two  ships  visible  at 
a  time.  Often  only  the  flashes  of  the  enemy's  guns  could  be 
seen,  while  to  the  South-westward — the  direction  of  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron  from  the  enemy — the  destroyers,  which  were  trjdng  to 
get  ahead  some  distance  off,  were  silhouetted  against  a  clear 
horizon. 

6.  About  this  time  two  distinct  explosions  were  seen,  and  a 
second  battle-cruiser,  ahead  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  blew 
up  (ascertained  to  be  "  Queen  Mary  "). 

7.  At  4.21  p.m.,  the  enemy  opened  fire  on  the  Fifth  Battle 
Squadi'on,  "  Barham  "  being  hit  at  4.23. 

8.  From  4.21  p.m.  to  4.40  p.m.,  firing  was  intermittent, 
owing  to  the  great  difficulty  in  seeing  the  enemy. 

9.  At  4.40  p.m.,  enemy  destroyers  were  observed  to  be 
attacking,  and  were  driven  off  by  our  Ught  cruisers  and  destroyers 
attached  to  the  battle-cruiser  fleet.  The  Squadron  was  turned 
away  by  "'  Preparative  Flag,"  and  torpedoes  were  observed  to 
cross  the  line — one  ahead  and  one  astern  of  "  Valiant,"  the 
second  ship. 

10.  About  this  time  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  heavily 
engaged  with  the  enemy  battle-cruisers.  "  Lion  "  and  battle- 
cruisers  were  observed  to  have  turned  to  the  Northward,  and 
the  enemy  battle-cruisers  to  have  turned  away. 

11.  At  4.50  p.m.,  "Lion"  approached  the  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron  steering  to  the  Northward,  with  the  signal  flying  to 
the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron — "  Turn  16  points  in  succession  to 
starboard  " ;  this  turn  was  made  after  our  battle-cruisers  had 
passed  at  4.53,  and  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  altered  course  a 
httle  further  to  starboard  to  follow  and  support  the  battle- 
cruisers.  During  this  turn,  it  appears  that  "  Malaya,"  the  last 
ship  of  the  fine,  sighted  the  enemy's  battle  fleet ;  it  was  .sighted 
by  "  Barham  "  approximately  S.S.E.  a  few  minutes  after  she  had 
steadied  on  her  Northerly  course. 


194  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

12.  At  4.56  p.m.,  "  Barham's  "  auxiliary  W/T  office  was 
wrecked  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell  on  the  main  deck,  and  the 
Warrant  Telegraphist  and  all  the  operators  killed. 

13.  The  enemy's  battle-cruisers  appeared  to  have  turned 
again  to  the  Northward  at  about  the  same  time  as  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron. 

14.  "  Barham  "  and  "  VaUant  "  continued  to  engage  the 
enemy's  battle-cruisers,  while  "  Warspite  "  and  "  Malaya  "  fired 
at  the  head  of  the  enemy's  battle  fleet,  at  a  guessed  range  of 
17,000  yards,  which  proved  to  be  about  19,000  yards. 

15.  At  about  5.25  p.m..,  the  signal  was  made  to  increase  to 
utmost  speed,  and  course  was  altered  a  little  to  starboard  to 
support  the  battle-cruisers  The  enemy  ships  were  constantlj^ 
obscured  by  mist  and  were  only  seen  at  intervals. 

16.  At  5.00  p.m.,  "  Barham's  "  main  W/T  was  put  out  of 
action  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell  which  cut  the  feeders. 

17.  At  6.06  p.m.,  "Marlborough"  was  sighted  on  the  port 
bow,  steering  E.S.E.,  but  no  other  ships  were  seen  for  some 
minutes,  and  then  only  those  astern  of  her.  It  was  therefore 
concluded  that  this  was  the  head  of  our  battle  line,  and  that  tiie 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron  would  be  able  tc  form  ahead  of  the  battle 
fleet. 

18.  At  6.19  p.m.,  however,  other  ships  were  sighted,  and  it 
was  observed  that  the  Grand  Fleet  was  deploying  to  the  North- 
east, the  sixth  division  being  the  starboard  mng  column.  It 
therefore  became  necessary  to  make  a  large  turn  to  port  to  form 
astern  of  the  "Marlborough's  "  division,  and  to  prevent  masldng 
the  fire  of  the  battle  fleet.  This  was  done  without  signal,  and  all 
ships  were  exceedingly  well  handled  by  their  Captains,  and  came 
into  line  by  turning  with  "  Barham  "  in  the  quickest  possible 
time. 

19.  During  this  turn  ships  came  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
enemy's  leading  battleships,  but  the  shooting  was  not  good  and 
very  few  hits  were  made.  At  this  time  "  Warspite's  "  helm 
jambed,  causing  her  to  continue  her  turn  straight  towards  the 
enemy's  battle  fleet.  However,  by  good  handHng,  although  hit 
sevei  al  times  while  approaching  the  enemy's  line,  she  was  enabled 
to  get  away  to  the  Northward.  I  subsequently  ordered  her  to 
proceed  to  Rosyth  on  receipt  of  report  of  her  damage. 

20.  At  6.30  p.m.,  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  (less  "  Warspite  ") 
was  formed  astern  of  "  Agincourt  "  and  in  the  battle  line. 

21.  Up  to  this  time,  "  Barham  "  had  been  hit  six  times,  all 
by  battle -cruisers.  "  VaUant,"  no  hits.  "  Malaya,"  seven  hits, 
probably  three  by  battle  cruisers  and  four  by  battleships. 
"  Warspite  "  had  been  hit  twice  before  her  helm  jambed,  and 
she  turned  towards  the  enemy's  line. 

22.  With  regard  to  the  damage  done  to  the  enemy  up  to  the 
time  of  joining  the  Grand  Fleet,  it  is  difficult  to  be  definite  oAAing 
to  the  thick  haze  to  the  Eastward.  The  enemy  battle-cruisers 
were  frequently  straddled,  as  reported  by  all  ships. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  195 

After  forming  astern  of  our  battle  line, 

"  Malaya  "  reports,  at  7.20  p.m.,  one  enemy's  ship  dropped 
astern  obscured  in  smoke — range,  10,400  yards.  "  Prepared  to 
open  fire  on  an  enemy's  battleship  very  low  in  the  water  and 
dropping  astern.  According  to  two  officers,  she  suddenly 
disappeared  without  an  explosion."  At  7.40  p.m.,  an  enemy 
destroyer  was  seen  to  sink. 

"  Valiant  "  reports  at  6.25  p.m.,  four  enemy  ships  on  fire  at 
the  head  of  the  line,  one  enemy  Dreadnought  stopped  and 
disabled.  At  6.41  p.m.,  three  heavy  columns  of  smoke  seen  on 
the  starboard  bow.  At  7.08  p.m.,  enemy  ship  of  "  Roon  "  class 
heavily  hit.     At  7,18,  enemy's  leading  ship  on  fire. 

"  Barham  "  reports  the  rear  battle-cruiser  ("  Seydlitz  "  ?) 
was  damaged  before  "  Barham  "  opened  fire,  and  was  straddled 
once  by  "  Barham."  The  fore-top  director  officer  reports  that 
a  hit  was  obtained  at  this  straddle. 

The  second  battle -cruiser  ("  Moltke  ")  was  frequently 
straddled,  but  only  hits  with  common  shell  (three  to  five)  were 
made  out  with  certainty. 

Three  enemy  battleships  were  observed  to  be  under  a  heavy 
fire  in  the  last  stage  of  the  action — one  was  hit  simultaneously 
by  two  shells,  and  another  was  on  fire  amidships. 

At  this  time  several  of  the  control  party  in  the  fore-top 
independently  observed  an  enemy  battleship  blow  up,  and  a 
gap  in  the  line  after  it.  "  Barham  "  obtained  at  least  three  hits 
on  a  battleship  of  the  "  Kaiser  "  class. 

An  enemy  cruiser  ("  Roon  "  class?)  was  disabled  and  under 
a  heavy  fire  from  many  ships  about  6.15  to  6.30  p.m. 

23.  After  joining  the  Grand  Fleet  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron 
conformed  to  the  movements  of  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
engaging  the  rear  ships  of  the  enemy's  battle  fleet  until  they 
turned  away  and  went  out  of  sight,  all  ships  apparently  covering 
themselves  with  artificial  smoke. 

24.  At  about  7.18  p.m.,  observed  "Marlborough"  hit  by 
torpedo.  The  squadron  turned  away  to  the  Northward,  avoiding 
a  torpedo,  which  passed  ahead  of  "  Barham." 

At  7.42  p.m.,  altered  course  by  signal,  leading  ships  of  divisions 
together  to  the  South,  "  Marlborough's  "  division  on  the  port 
beam.  At  8.00  p.m.,  turned  to  the  Westward  to  increase  distance 
from  "  Marlborough." 

At  10.00  p.m.,  observing  that  we  had  gone  a  long  way  ahead 
of  "  Marlborough,"  the  squadron  was  turned  round  to  regain 
station  on  her,  again  resuming  the  course  at  10.08.  It  was 
observed,  however,  that  "  Marlborough  "  was  going  very  slowly, 
and  fearing  that  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  would  be  too  far 
astern  of  the  fleet  in  the  morning,  speed  was  increased  to  regain 
station. 

25.  At  10.15  p.m.,  observed  heavy  firing  a  little  abaft  the 
starboard  beam,  which  I  surmised  to  be  attacks  by  enemy 
destroyers  and  light  craft  on  our  light  cruisers  and  destroyers. 

N  2 


196  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND: 

As  destroyers  were  reported  crossing  our  bow  some  distance 
ahead,  the  squadron  was  turned  to  starboard  gradually,  and 
eventually  right  round  to  the  course  again. 

At  10.39,  heavy  firing  was  observed  on  the  starboard  quarter, 
and  destroyers  appeared  to  be  attacking  the  cruisers.  At  11.35, 
a  further  attack  was  seen  farther  off  nearly  right  astern. 

26.  No  further  incident  occurred  until  the  Second  Battle 
Squadron  was  observed  ahead  about  three  to  five  miles  at  early 
dawn.  When  the  fleet  was  turned  to  the  Northward,  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron  kept  station  on  the  Second  Battle  Squadron 
until  ordered  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  take  station  on  the 
beam  of  the  starboard  wing  division. 

27.  Track  charts  are  enclosed,  also  diagrams,  to  show  as 
nearly  as  possible  the  relative  positions  of  the  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron  and  the  enemy  at  twelve  different  phases  of  the  action, 
as  well  as  the  rough  position  of  our  battle-cruisers ;  but  the 
distances  between  our  battle-cruisers  and  the  enemy  are  not 
known,  so  the  diagram  must  not  be  taken  to  represent  their  true 
position. 

28.  Recommendations  of  officers  and  men  whom  I  wish  to 
bring  to  your  notice  are  being  made  the  subject  of  a  separate 
letter. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

HUGH  EVAN  THOMAS, 

Rear  Admiral  Commanding 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 
The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding 
Battle- cruiser  Fleet. 

No.  024. 

"  Queen  EHzabeth," 
Sir,  18th  June  1916. 

With  reference  to  paragraph  21  of  my  report  on  the 
action  of  31st  May  1916,  the  statement  "  Malaya  "  was  hit 
seven  times,  probably  three  by  battle-cruisers  and  four  by 
battleships,"  is  not  correct. 

2.  This  statement  was  based  on  the  impression  I  received 
when  going  round  "  Malaya  "  on  her  arrival  at  Scapa  Flow. 

3.  "  Malaya  "  now  reports  that  all  her  hits  were  from  the 
enemy's  battle  fleet ;  it  is  therefore  submitted  that  the  words  in 
the  third  line  of  paragraph  21  of  my  report  betAveen  "  hits  "  and 
the  second  "  by  "  may  be  deleted,  and  the  word  "  all  " 
substituted. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

HUGH  EVAN  THOMAS, 

Rear  Admiral  Commanding 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 

Grand  Fleet. 


I  -     31  .  5  .  16. 

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OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  197 

SCHEDULE  OF  ENCLOSURES  TO  FIFTH  BATTLE 
SQUADRON  SUBMISSION  No.  024  of  9th  JUNE  1916  TO 
THE    VICE-ADMIRAL    COMMANDING  BATTLE -CRUISER 

FLEET. 

1.  Track  charts  (2).i 

2.  Diagram.- 

3.  "  Barhain's  "  report  of  the  action  dated  6th  June  with 
track  chart^  and  two  enclosures. 

4.  "  Warspite's  "  report  of  the  action  with  track  chart.* 

5.  "  VaUant's  "  report  of  the  action  dated  3rd  June  with 
track  chart^  (tripHcate  only — original  and  duphcate  forwarded 
direct  to  Vice- Admiral  Commanding  Battle-cruiser  Fleet). 

6.  "  Vahant's  "  letter  of  5th  June  1916— Gunnery  and 
Torpedo  Notes. 

7.  "  Malaya's  "  report  on  the  action  dated  6th  June  with 
six  enclosures  A  to  F  (including  track  chart).® 

CAPTAINS    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "  BARHAM." 
No.  181. 

H.M.S.  "Barham," 
Sir,  6th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  a  report  on  the 
action  of  31st  May  1916,  in  which  H.M.  Ship  under  my  command 
flying  your  flag  took  part. 

2.  The  recording  of  details  is  not  so  full  or  accurate  as  I 
should  have  wished.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that 
Lieutenant  Reginald  Edward  Blyth,  R.N.,  Assistant  Navigator, 
who  was  in  the  lower  conning  tower  for  the  purpose,  was 
mortally  wounded  about  1  hour  after  the  engagement  opened. 
Mr.  Alec  Edward  Dodington,  Midshipman,  R.N.,  who  worked 
with  him,  was  afterwards  entirely  occupied  in  keeping  the 
reckoning,  which  he  did  in  a  highly  creditable  maimer  under 
difficult  circumstances. 

3.  Whilst  the  general  trend  of  the  action  remains  clearly  fixed 
in  the  memory,  it  is  impossible  to  reconstruct  it  strategically  or 
tactically,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  seeing  the  enemy,  and  to 
the  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  movements  or  positions  of  our  o\\ai 
squadrons. 

It  is  considered  of  great  importance  that  in  a  squadron 
flagship,  an  Assistant  Navigating  Lieutenant  should  be  per- 
manently borne  who  will  be  able  not  only  to  keep  an  accurate 
reckoning  continuously,  but  also  to  note  tactical  data.  The 
importance  of  a  reliable  position  after  action  cannot  be  over- 
estimated, and  during  action  a  continuous  plot  of  our  own  and 
the  enemy's  tracks  may  be  invaluable  in  avoiding  mines  or  in 
deciding  in  a  tactical  or  strategical  movement. 

1  Receipt  cannot  be  traced  at  the  Admiralty.  ^  Plate  16. 

3  Plate  10a.  *  Plate  17.  ^  Plate  18.  «  Plate  1» 


196 

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OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  197 

SCHEDULE  OF  ENCLOSURES  TO  FIFTH  BATTLE 
SQUADRON  SUBMISSION  No.  024  of  9th  JUNE  1916  TO 
THE    VICE-ADMIRAL    COMMANDING  BATTLE-CRUISER 

FLEET. 

1.  Track  charts  (2).i 

2.  Diagram." 

3.  "  Barham's  "  report  of  tlie  action  dated  6th  June  with 
track  chart^  and  two  enclosures. 

4.  "  Warspite's  "  report  of  the  action  with  track  chart.* 

5.  "  VaUant's  "  report  of  the  action  dated  3rd  June  with 
track  chart^  (tripHcate  only — original  and  dupHcate  forwarded 
direct  to  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Battle-cruiser  Fleet). 

6.  "  Valiant's  "  letter  of  r)th  June  1916 — Gunnery  and 
Torpedo  Notes. 

7.  "  Malaya's  "  report  on  the  action  dated  6th  June  with 
six  enclosures  A  to  F  (including  track  chart).* 

CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "  BARHAM." 

No.  181. 

H.M.S.  "Barham," 
Sir,  6th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  a  report  on  the 
action  of  31st  May  1916,  in  which  H.M.  Ship  under  my  command 
flying  your  flag  took  part. 

2.  The  recording  of  details  is  not  so  full  or  accurate  as  I 
should  have  wished.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that 
Lieutenant  Reginald  Edward  Blyth,  R.N.,  Assistant  Navigator, 
who  was  in  the  lower  conning  tower  for  the  purpose,  was 
mortaUy  wounded  about  1  hour  after  the  engagement  opened. 
Mr.  Alec  Edward  Dodington,  Midshipman,  R.N.,  who  worked 
with  him,  was  afterwards  entirely  occupied  in  keeping  the 
reckoning,  which  he  did  in  a  highly  creditable  manner  under 
difficult  circumstances. 

3.  Whilst  the  general  trend  of  the  action  remains  clearly  fixed 
in  the  memory,  it  is  impossible  to  reconstruct  it  strategically  or 
tactically,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  seeing  the  enemy,  and  to 
the  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  movements  or  positions  of  our  own 
squadrons. 

It  is  considered  of  great  importance  that  in  a  squadron 
flagship,  an  Assistant  Navigating  Lieutenant  should  be  per- 
manently borne  who  will  be  able  not  only  to  keep  an  accurate 
reckoning  continuously,  but  also  to  note  tactical  data.  The 
importance  of  a  rehable  position  after  action  cannot  be  over- 
estimated, and  during  action  a  continuous  plot  of  our  own  and 
the  enemy's  tracks  may  be  invaluable  in  avoiding  mines  or  in 
deciding  in  a  tactical  or  strategical  movement. 

1  Receipt  cannot  be  traced  at  the  Admiralty.  ^  Plate  16. 

3  Plate  10a.  *  Plate  17.  '=  Plate  18.  «  Plate  1» 


198  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

4.  Although  the  "  Barham  "  received  considerable  structural 
damage  from  the  enemy's  shells,  and  the  casualties  were  fairly 
heavy,  the  shij)  was  in  a  thoroughly  efficient  fighting  condition, 
and  had  all  guns  in  actipn  and  fire  control  practically  intact 
at  the  end  of  three  hours'  engagement.  This  reflects  great 
credit  on  the  Officers  responsible  for  the  upkeep  of  the 
propelhng  machinery  and  of  the  guns'  mountings  and  electrical 
equipment. 

5.  During  the  engagement,  the  behaviour  of  the  Officers  and 
men  was  entirely  praiseworthy,  and  their  duties  were  carried 
out  in  a  cool  and  inteUigent  manner,  under,  in  some  cases,  very 
trying  situations. 

1  *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.   W.   CRAIG, 
Rear  Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 

ENCLOSURE    TO    "  BARHAM'S "    LETTER    No.     181    OF 

6th  JUNE   1916. 

Report  of  Action  of  31st  May   1916. 

Disposition  and  courses  prior  to  Action. 

Noon  position  56°  49'  5  N.,  Long.  3°  28'  E. 

Fifth  Battle  Squadron  ("Barham,"  "  Vahant,"  "War- 
spite,"  "  Malaya  ")  5  miles  astern  of  1st  B.C.S.  ("  Lion," 
"  Princess  Royal,"  "  Queen  Mary,"  "  Tiger"). 

2nd  B.C.S.  ("  New  Zealand,"  "  Indefatigable  ")  some  dis- 
tances on  Port  Beam  of  1st  B.C.S. 

Course  S.  81  E.  advancing  18  knots. 

2.15  p.m.  course  N.  by  E.  5th  B.C.S.  5  miles  ahead  of  "  Lion," 
ordered  to  look  out  for  advanced  Cruisers  of  Grand  Fleet. 

2.38  p.m.  S.S.E.  22  knots  in  consequence  of  1st  L.C.S. 
reporting  enemy  cruiser  S.S.E.  at  2.35  p.m. 

The  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  turned  rather  before  the 
5th  Battle  Squadron  and  were  out  of  sight  for  some  time. 

Hauled  round  gradually  to  N.E.  following  motions  of  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet,  and  then  back  to  eastward,  the  enemy  Light 
Cruisers  being  sighted  at  3.50  on  this  course,  and  shortly  after, 
two  Battle  Cruisers  all  steering  to  S.E.     Speed  now  24  knots. 

2.  Our  Destroyer  escort  on  the  enemy  side  attempting  to 
pass  ahead  of  "  Barham  "  prevented  fire  being  opened  until 
3.58,  when  the  two  enemy  Light  Cruisers  (Kolberg  type)  were 
engaged,  range  17,000.  These  turned  away  8  points  after  the 
third  salvo  and  it  is  not  thought  that  they  were  hit. 

^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  com'se  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  199 

3.  At  4.11,  fire  was  opened  with  director  salvoes  on  the 
rear  (left  hand)  Battle  Cruiser,  which  had  smoke  issuing  from 
her,  and  seemed  damaged,  bearing  35°,  Red,  Range  19,000. 
This  ship  was  straddled,  but  hits  could  not  be  seen  with 
certainty. 

4.  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  were  now  following  the  1st  and 
2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadrons,  about  5  miles  astern  of  them  and 
gradually  hauled  round  to  the  southward,  bringing  enemy  Battle 
Cruisers  nearly  abeam.  About  4.16  "  Barham  "' sliif ted  to  second 
ship  from  the  left  ("  Moltke  "')  and  the  squadron  were  ordered 
to  concentrate  in  pairs  on  the  two  left-hand  ships.  The  enemy 
presented  a  fair  target  at  range  of  18,000-17,000  yards,  and  was 
frequently  straddled.  Three  certain  hits  only  were  seen,  but 
after  we  started  using  A. P.  Lyddite,  hits  could  not  be  seen. 
This  would  naturally  be  the  case,  however,  and  it  was  noted 
that  the  enemy  hits  on  "  Barham,"  though  doing  great  internal 
damage,  did  not  show  outside  the  ship. 

6.  Towards  the  latter  part  of  the  southerly  run,  the 
visibiUty  of  the  enemy  got  considerably  worse,  the  ships  being 
the  same  colour  as  the  background.  Two  terrific  explosions  were 
seen  amongst  our  Battle  Cruisers  ahead  at  about  4.10  and  4.24 
respectively,  and  the  WTeckage  of  these  vessels  ("  Indefatigable  " 
and  "  Queen  Mary  ")  was  passed  about  ten  to  twelve  minutes 
later,  with  a  number  of  men  in  the  water  which  were  being 
rescued  by  Destroj^ers. 

During  tliis  part  of  the  Action  "  Barham  "  was  under  a 
steady  fire  from  the  enemy,  but  was  only  hit  twice,  one  below 
the  water  fine,  doing  practically  no  damage. 

7.  About  4.45  p.m.  the  1st  and  2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadrons 
turned  in  succession  16  points  to  Port,  and  it  was  seen  that  the 
enemy  Battle  Cruisers  had  turned  also,  and  that  some  of  the 
German's  3rd  Squadron  were  coming  up  astern  of  them.  The 
"  Lion  "  turned  16  points  to  Port,  the  other  three  Battle 
Cruisers  following  her  and  Vice  Admiral  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet 
ordered  5th  Battle  Squadron  to  turn  16  points  in  succession  to 
starboard.  This  was  done  at  4.53  and  the  squadi'on  hauled  in 
again  astern  of  the  Battle  Cruisers  about  two  miles. 

8.  The  range  was  now  about  19,000  to  20,000,  but  the  enemy 
could  rarely  be  seen,  though  the  flashes  of  his  salvoes  were  very 
bright.  These  salvoes  Avere  very  rapid  ripples  (almost  simul- 
taneous), and  it  was  not  possible  to  lay  on  them,  as  they  were 
gone  before  the  sights  were  on  the  spot.  Our  fire  was  therefore 
intermittent,  and  any  enemy  which  showed  up  for  long  range 
enough  to  lay  on  was  selected.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appeared 
looldng  at  the  horizon  and  sky  behind  us,  that  we  should  be 
very  clear  to  the  enemy  and  offer  at  times  a  splendid  target. 

^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


2(»0  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

9.  Shortly  after  turning,  the  ship  was  hit  by  a  heavy  shell 
which  entered  the  glacis  before  No.  1  6-in.  gun  starboard  and 
abreast  the  after  end  of  "  B  "  turret  redoubt  armour.  This 
shell  burst  at  the  main  deck  over  the  Medical  .Store,  completely 
^vrecking  the  Auxiliary  W/T  Office  and  the  Medical  Store,  and 
jDutting  the  starboard  forward  Hydraulic  Pump  out  of  action. 
The  bulk  of  the  Medical  Stores,  stretchers,  &c.,  were  destroyed, 
and  heav}^  casualties  occurred  amongst  the  Medical  Part}^  and 
the  Wireless  Staff.  The  6-in.  Hand  Ups  and  Dredger  Hoist 
starboard,  and  the  Dredger  Hoist  Port  were  penetrated,  and  the 
flash  of  the  shell  passed  up  to  the  battery  deck  and  ignited  some 
cartridges  in  S.  2  casemate,  causing  severe  casualties. 

Large  pieces  of  the  shell  also  penetrated  the  middle  deck, 
and  a  piece  entering  the  Lower  Conning  Tower  mortally 
wounded  Lieutenant  Blyth,  Assistant  Navigating  Officer.  The 
Platform  Deck,  forming  the  roof  of  the  forward  6-in.  Magazine 
was  also  pierced,  and  the  6-in.  Magazine  and  Shell  Room  filled 
wdth  smoke.  There  were  three  other  heav}^  hits  during  this  part 
of  the  Action,  but  the  first  is  described  in  detail,  as  it  was  much 
more  vital  than  the  remainder,  and  might  have  easily  put  the 
Lower  Conning  Tower  out  of  Action.  As  it  was,  it  put  the 
Auxifiary  W/T  and  starboard  fore  Hydraulic  Pump  out  of  Action 
and  cut  a  number  of  fire  control  voice  pipes,  and  the  pipes  to  the 
port  steering  engine  Telemotor. 

10.  "  Barham  "  was  now  without  wireless  communication 
as  the  Auxiliary  Office  was  completely  wrecked,  and  the  Main 
W/T  feeder  and  Action  feeder  had  gone,  consequently  the 
position  of  our  Battlefleet  was  hot  known  until  a  part  of  them 
were  sighted  before  the  Port  Beam  shortly  after  6  p.m.  Thjs 
turned  out  to  be  the  1st  Battle  Squadron  who  were  on  the  right 
wing  of  the  Battlefleet,  and  as  they  deployed  to  starboard  on  an 
easterly  course,  5th  Battle  Squadron  hauled  round  to  a  parallel 
course,  following  the  Battle  Cruisers.  The  oth  Battle  Squadron 
were  now  blanking  the  range  for  1st  Battle  Squadi-on,  and  it 
was  a  question  as  to  whether  5th  Battle  Squadron  should 
endeavour  to  follow  the  Battle  Cruisers  to  the  head  of  the  fine 
or  form  astern  of  "  Marlborough's  "  Division.  The  Rear- Admiral 
decided  on  the  latter  alternative,  and  '"  Barham  "  led  in  turning 
about  8  points  to  port  and  reducing  speed.  The  leading  enemy 
Battle  Squadron  ("  Konigs  ")  seeing  this,  opened  a  terrific  fire 
on  the  turning  jjoint,  and  "  Barham  "  was  surrounded  by  a 
hailstorm  of  splashes,  but  no  hits  of  importance  were  made. 
The  "  Warsjiite  "  was  now  seen  to  be  dropping  astern  and 
reported  that  she  had  been  holed  several  times  under  water  and 
was  steering  from  engine-room. 

It  should  be  mentioned  that  just  before  turning  into  fine 
astern  of  our  Battle  Fleet,  the  Armoured  Cruisers  "  Defence  " 
and  "  Black  Prince  "  came  down  at  high  speed  between  the 
5th  Battle  Squadron  and  the  enemy  and  al30ut  1  mile  from 
5th  Battle  Squadron  steering  in  the  opposite  direction.     "  De- 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  201 

fence  "  was  hit  by  two  heavy  salvoes  in  succession,  and  blowing 
up,  sank  in  a  few  minutes.  '"  Black  Prince  "  was  heavily  hit 
aft  and  turned  out  of  Action,  apparently  in  a  sinking  condition. 

11.  "  Barham  "  formed  astern  of  "  Agincourt  "  and  opened 
fire  again,  first  at  a  partially  disabled  enemy  ship  believed  to 
be  a  three-funnel  Cruiser,  and  then  at  an  enemy  Battleship  of 
"  Koiiig  "  type,  second  from  right  of  those  visible.  The  range 
was  partly  obscured  by  smoke  from  our  own  Battleships'  guns 
and  funnels,  and  it  was  only  possible  to  sight  the  enemy 
intermittently,  and  spotting  was  very  difficult.  It  appeared, 
however,  that  several  hits  were  obtained  on  a  ship  of  the 
"  Kaiser  "  class.  During  this  period,  at  least  four  torpedoes 
passed  through  the  line  close  to  "  Barham,"  and  were  avoided 
by  turning  awa3^  A  submarine  also  attacked  and  was  fired 
on  by  the  6-in.  guns.  The  attack  apparently  failed.  Enemy 
Destroyers  made  an  attack  from  the  head  of  their  line,  and  fire 
was  opened  on  them  from  6-in.  guns.     One  was  apparently  hit. 

About  6.50  p.m.  the  enemy  were  lost  to  view,  and  fire  ceased. 

Fifth  Battle  Squadron  then  stood  to  the  westward  on  the 
right  wing  of  the  Battle  Fleet,  and  eventually  turned  to  the 
southward,  astern  of  the  line. 

During  the  night  there  appeared  to  be  constant  attacks  by 
Torpedo  Craft  on  ships,  first  to  the  westward  and  then  to  the 
northward,  and  about  0.45  a.m.  an  immense  explosion  was  seen 
to  the  N.N.E.     No  attack  was  made  on  5th  Battle  Squadron. 

A  tracing  shoAving  the  "  Barham's  "  track^  during  the  Action 
with  notations  of  the  principal  events  is  forwarded  herewith 
It  is  proposed  to  forward  as  soon  as  possible  a  detailed  account 
of  the  damage  received,  and  further  details  of  the  Action,  together 
with  proposals  for  the  future,  based  on  the  experience  of  this 
Action.  Also  the  names  of  Officers  and  men  who  especially 
distinguished  themselves,  or  who  are  recommended  for  meri- 
torious conduct. 

A.   W.   CRAIG, 

Captain. 

ENCLOSURE  No.  2  TO  "  BARHAJVI'S  "  LETTER  No.  181 
OF  6th  JUNE  1916. 

Notes  on  Damage  to  the  Enemy. 

1.  Rear    Battle    Cruiser,     This  ship  was  damaged  before  "  Bar- 

"  Seydlitz."  ?  ham  "  opened  fire,  and  was  strad- 

dled once  by  "  Barham."  The  fore- 
top  director  officer  reports  that  a 
hit  was  obtained  at  this  straddle. 

2.  Second  Battle  Cruiser,      This  ship  was  frequently  straddled, 

"  Moltke."  but  only  hits  with  common  shell 

(3  to  6)  were  made  out  with 
certainty. 

1  Plate  lOcf. 


202  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

3.  Enemy  Battleships      -     3  of  these  were  observed  to  be  under 

a  heavy  fire  in  the  last  stage  of 
the  action — one  was  hit  simul- 
taneously by  2  shells,  and  another 
was  on  fire  amidships. 

At  this  time  several  of  the  control  party  in  fore-top  indepen- 
dently observed  an  enemy  battleship  blow  up,  and  a  gap  in  the 
line  after  it.  "  Barham  "  obtained  at  least  three  hits  on  a 
battleship  of  "  Kaiser  "  class. 

4.  Enemj^  Cruiser,  Disabled  and  under  heavy  fire  from 

"  Roon  "  class  (?).  many  ships  about  6.15  to  6.30  p.m. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.8.    "  WARSPITE." 

H.M.S.  "  Warspite," 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  submit  the  following  combined 
diary  of  events  and  report  on  action  of  Wednesday,  3 1st  May,  and 
Thursday,  1st  June,  1916  :— 

2.  The  enemy  was  sighted  at  3.50  p.m.  at  the  time  when  the 
engagement  commenced  between  the  battle  cruiser  fleets. 

3.  On  the  signal  being  received  from  "  Barham  "  to  open 
fire  "  Warspite  "  waited  to  see  at  which  ship  "  Barham  "  was 
firing,  and  at  4.2  p.m.  fire  was  opened  on  the  second  light  cruiser 
from  the  van  (second  from  the  right) — range,  18,500  yards. 
She  was  straddled  and  turned  away  either  on  fire  or  using  smoke 
protection.  On  the  signal  to  attack  the  enemy's  battle 
cruisers,  and  concentration  signal  2P  being  received,  fire  was 
shifted  to  the  rear  battle  cruiser;  range,  19,500;  she  was 
straddled  several  times,  turned  away,  and  eventually  got  out 
of  range. 

Fire  was  then  shifted  to  another  battle  cruiser;  result 
unknown. 

4.  As  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  turned  to  the  northward  at 
4.55  p.m.  the  enemy's  battle  squadron  was  sighted,  and  as  their 
battle  cruisers  were  very  bad  targets  owing  to  visibility,  the 
leading  ship  of  the  enemj^'s  battle  fleet  was  engaged  ;  range  17,000. 
Only  a  few  salvoes  were  fired,  but  it  is  believed  that  she  was 
straddled  after  the  second  salvo ;  the  target  was  then  right 
aft  and  fire  was  checked. 

5.  For  the  next  half  hour  fire  was  intermittent  and  ineffective 
on  the  enemy  battle  cruisers  owing  to  low  visibiHty  causing  great 
difficulty  in  selection  of  target. 

6.  At  6  p.m.  the  Grand  Fleet  was  sighted,  and  course  was 
altered  to  the  south  eastward  in  the  wake  of  "  Barham." 

At  6.18  p.m.  course  was  altered  to  the  northward,  following 
the  motions  of  "  Barham  "  and  "  Valiant,"  but  as  we  were 
apparently  closing  "  Malaya  "  I  ordered  Port  20°,  and  then  the 
steering  gear  commenced  to  give  trouble. 


PLcLie  17. 


6° 


\Q 


57' 


Tff, 
3.4 
5.0. 
6.0. 
6.0 
AP/ 

e./i 


O  8  30 p.m. 


10 


6.18 


57' 


5.40 


50 


50 


OB30p.r 


TRACK    OF    M.M.S.  WARSPITE     FROM     2  P.M.    TILL   6.18  P.M.    31^^  MAY  I9ie 
3.41.  P.M.   ENEMY   REPORTED    IN    SIGHT  BY     H.  M.S.  BARHAM   BEARING  EAST 
5.0.PM     H.M.S.   WARSPITE    SIGHTED    ENEMY'S    BATTLEFLEET   S.S.E.iE. 
6.0.P.M    H.M.S.    BARHAM     REPORTED  "  ■'  S.S.E 

6-0. P.M.    H.M.S.    WARSPITE.    SIGHTED    GRAND    FLEET    NORTH 

APPROXIMATE     POSITION    OF   WRECK    OF    H.M.S,    QUEEN    MARY   56° 37' N  5'.  I-IE 

•I  ■•  ■•  ■■     M.MS.    INDEFATIGABLE56°  50'/V  5°3B'£ 

e.l8.   P.M     STEERING     GEAR     BROKE    DOWN. 


56.41  N. 
4.  «0f 


1^, 
^^t. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  203 

7.  I  have  been  unable  to  ascertain  the  exact  cause  of  the 
trouble,  as  subsequent  events  followed  rapidly  in  succession, 
and  "  Warspite  "  closed  the  enemy's  battle  fleet  so  rapidly  that 
she  came  under  a  very  heavy  fire.  However,  after  careful 
investigation  I  have  elucidated  the  following  facts  : — 

(a)  The  thrust  bearing  on  the  steering  engine  heated, 
probabty  owing  to  the  ship  having  been  hit  about  this 
time,  but  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish  in  the  Conning 
Tower  between  hits  and  shell  falhng  close  alongside. 

The  result  of  this  was  a  slowing  up  of  the  steering  engine. 

(6)  Taking  into  consideration  that  the  ship  was  steaming 
25  knots  at  the  time,  the  helm  was  put  over  far  too  quickly. 

(c)  The  telemotor  gearing  from  the  lower  conning 
tower  to  engine  room  was  bent,  probably  as  a  result  of 
(a)  and  (b)  above. 

8.  "  Warspite  "  shaved  close  under  "  Valiant's  "  stern,  and 
every  attempt  was  made  by  helm  and  engines  to  bring  her  head 
back  to  port  with  the  dire  result  that  she  only  closed  the  head 
of  the  enemy's  battle  fleet  at  decreasing  speed.  I  then  decided 
to  go  full-speed  ahead,  and  continued  the  turn  to  starboard; 
I  am  unable  to  give  further  details,  except  that  I  managed  to 
get  away  to  the  northward  after  practically  turning  two  circles 
under  the  concentrated  fire  of  several  of  the  enemy's  battle- 
ships. 

During  this  time  centralised  control  was  impossible,  but  fire 
was  kept  up  by  all  turrets  on  local  control.  Closest  range  was 
estimated  to  be  about  12,000  yards,  and  the  ship  was  badly 
damaged  by  shell  fire,  but  not  completely  disabled. 

I  then  attempted  to  take  station  astern  of  ''  Malaya,"  but 
before  arriving  at  5  cables  distance  I  realised  that  the  ship  was 
still  unmanageable,  so  I  withdrew  to  the  northward  to  shift 
over  steering  gear  to  some  other  position.  The  after  steering 
compartment  was  reported  flooded,  so  the  steering  position  at 
the  engine  itself  was  adopted. 

8.  A  rough  survey  of  the  damage  by  gunfire  was  made,  and 
I  considered  that  owing  to  the  danger  of  flooding  the  engine 
rooms  a  moderate  speed  only  was  safe  for  the  time ;  I  conse- 
quently reported  to  the  Senior  Officer  5th  Battle  Squadron  that 
"  Warspite  "  could  steam  16  knots  and  requested  the  position 
of  the  battle  fleet.     I  received  orders  to  proceed  to  Rosyth. 

9.  I  shaped  course  accordingly  at  8.30  p.m.,  steaming  16 
knots,  and  every  endeavour  was  made  to  plug  holes  and  shore 
bulkheads. 

Speed  was  gradually  increased  until  9.35  a.m.  1st  June,  when, 
whilst  zigzagging  at  19  knots,  two  torpedoes  passed  close  to 
the  ship,  one  on  either  side ;  but  no  periscope  was  seen,  as  owing 
to  a  southerly  breeze  there  were  manj^  "  white  horses  "  on  the 
surface  of  the  water.  Speed  was  then  increased  to  21  knots 
and  subsequently  to  22  knots,  and  a  signal  was  made  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief,     Rosyth,     that     "  Warspite  "     had     been 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  203 

7.  I  have  been  unable  to  ascertain  the  exact  cause  of  the 
trouble,  as  subsequent  events  followed  rapidly  in  succession, 
and  "  Warspite  "  closed  the  enemy's  battle  fleet  so  rapidly  that 
she  came  under  a  very  heavy  fire.  However,  after  careful 
investigation  I  have  elucidated  the  following  facts  : — 

(a)  The  thrust  bearing  on  the  steering  engine  heated, 
probably  owing  to  the  ship  having  been  hit  about  this 
time,  but  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish  in  the  Conning 
Tower  between  hits  and  shell  falling  close  alongside. 

The  result  of  this  was  a  slowing  up  of  the  steering  engine. 

(6)  Taking  into  consideration  that  the  ship  was  steaming 
25  knots  at  the  time,  the  helm  was  put  over  far  too  quickly. 

(c)  The  telemotor  gearing  from  the  lower  conning 
tower  to  engine  room  was  bent,  probably  as  a  result  of 
(a)  and  (b)  above. 

8.  "  Warspite  "  shaved  close  under  "  Valiant's  "  stern,  and 
every  attempt  was  made  by  helm  and  engines  to  bring  her  head 
back  to  port  with  the  dire  result  that  she  only  closed  the  head 
of  the  enemy's  battle  fleet  at  decreasing  speed.  I  then  decided 
to  go  full-speed  ahead,  and  continued  the  turn  to  starboard ; 
I  am  unable  to  give  further  details,  except  that  I  managed  to 
get  away  to  the  northward  after  practically  turning  two  circles 
under  the  concentrated  fire  of  several  of  the  enemy's  battle- 
ships. 

During  this  time  centralised  control  M'as  impossible,  but  fire 
was  kept  up  by  all  turrets  on  local  control.  Closest  range  was 
estimated  to  be  about  12,000  yards,  and  the  ship  was  badly 
damaged  by  shell  fire,  but  not  completely  disabled. 

I  then  attempted  to  take  station  astern  of  ''  Malaya,"  but 
before  arriving  at  5  cables  distance  I  realised  that  the  ship  was 
still  unmanageable,  so  I  withdrew  to  the  northward  to  shift 
over  steering  gear  to  some  other  position.  The  after  steering 
compartment  was  reported  flooded,  so  the  steering  position  at 
the  engine  itself  was  adopted. 

8.  A  rough  survey  of  the  damage  by  gunfire  was  made,  and 
I  considered  that  owing  to  the  danger  of  flooding  the  engine 
rooms  a  moderate  speed  only  was  safe  for  the  time;  I  conse- 
quently reported  to  the  Senior  Officer  5th  Battle  Squadron  that 
"  Warspite  "  could  steam  16  knots  and  requested  the  position 
of  the  battle  fleet.     I  received  orders  to  proceed  to  Rosyth. 

9.  I  shaped  course  accordingly  at  8.30  p.m.,  steaming  16 
knots,  and  every  endeavour  was  made  to  plug  holes  and  shore 
bulkheads. 

Speed  was  gradually  increased  until  9.35  a.m.  1st  June,  when, 
whilst  zigzagging  at  19  knots,  two  torpedoes  passed  close  to 
the  ship,  one  on  either  side ;  but  no  periscope  was  seen,  as  owing 
to  a  southerly  breeze  there  were  man}^  "  white  horses  "  on  the 
surface  of  the  water.  Speed  was  then  increased  to  21  knots 
and  subsequently  to  22  knots,  and  a  signal  was  made  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief,     Rosyth,     that     "  Warspite  "     had     been 


204  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

attacked  by  two  submarines,  and  was  proceeding  to  Rosyth 
without  escort. 

An  escort  of  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers  was  sent,  but 
just  as  the  first  two  were  sighted  at  11.42  a.m.,  another  submarine 
showed  lier  periscope  close  under  the  bows.  Orders  were  given 
to  increase  to  full  speed,  and  to  put  the  helm  over  to  ram  her, 
but  owing  to  the  length  of  time  required  to  transmit  the  orders 
to  the  engine-room  steering  position  she  was  missed  by  a  few 
yards. 

I  then  zigzagged  at  full  speed  from  the  spot  where  the 
periscope  was  last  seen,  and  saw  no  more  of  the  submarine. 

9.  This  increase  of  speed  necessitated  re-shoring  up,  and 
consequently  speed  was  reduced  at  0.20  p.m.,  when  escort  had 
joined  up. 

10.  "  Warspite  "  arrived  at  Rosyth  at  3.15  p.m.,  and 
proceeded  straight  into  dock. 

1  *  *  *  *  ti 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

E.    M.    PHILLPOTTS, 

Captain. 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 

H.M.S.  "VaHant,"  c/o  G.P.O.,  London, 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  heremth  a  report  which  I 
have  to-day  transmitted  to  the  Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  in  compliance  -with  his  signal  of  2nd  June 
1916.  The  report  was  forwarded  to  the  Vice-Admiral  in 
duplicate. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

M.    WOOLLCOMBE, 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 

CAPTAIN'S    REPORT,    H.M.S.    "VALIANT. 

H.M.S.  "  VaUant,"  c'o  G.P.O.,  London, 
2nd  June  1916. 
Sir, 

In  compUance  with  your  signal  of  to-day,  2nd  June,  1 
have  the  honour  to  report  as  follows  on  the  action  of  31st  May 
1916.  All  times  shown  in  this  report  are  G.M.T.,  and  all 
courses  are  true. 

^  Part  omitted,  here  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  205 

2.  About  3.30  p.m.,  from  the  reports  of  our  own  light 
cruisers  and  the  increasing  strength  of  the  enemy's  wireless 
signals,  it  became  evident  that  we  were  in  close  contact  with 
some  part  of  the  German  Fleet.  By  3.45  p.m.  hands  were  closed 
up  at  their  quarters  and  ready  to  open  fire. 

3.  At  4.0  p.m.  my  D.R.  position  was  Lat.  56°  50'  N.,  Long. 
5°  31'  E.,  comse  95°,  speed  23  knots. 

4.  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  then  in  single-hne  ahead, 
with  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  slightly  off  our  starboard  bow, 
distant  about  4  miles,  steering  Easterly,  and  turning  in  succession 
to  the  Southward.  The  enemy,  consisting  of  four  or  five  Battle 
Cruisers,  were  bearing  Red  40°  from  "  Vahant,"  range  about 
22,000  yards.  Our  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  were  6  points  on 
our  port  bow,  distant  about  8,000  yards. 

5.  At  4.1  p.m.  H.M.S.  "  Vahant  "  opened  fire  on  the  enemy, 
who  were  steering  approximately  south-east,  using  the  second 
ship  from  the  right  as  a  target.  Shortly  after  opening  fire  the 
signal  was  received,  "  Concentrate  in  pairs  from  the  rear." 
"  Vahant  "  then  sliifted  her  fire  on  to  second  ship  from  the  left. 

6.  At  4.2  p.m.  a  big  explosion  was  observed  on  the  starboard 
bow,  and  one  of  our  Battle  Cruisers  disappeared — probably 
H.M.S.  "Queen  Mary";  about  five  minutes  later  a  similar 
explosion  was  witnessed  in  the  rear  of  our  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadi'on,  and  what  was  probably  H.M.S.  "  Indefatigable " 
blew  up.  This  ship  did  not  appear  to  be  undergoing  heavy 
punishment  from  gun-fire  and,  in  the  opinion  of  Lieutenant- 
Commander  May  and  two  other  Officers,  there  were  two  separate 
explosions  at  short  intervals,  probably  caused  by  mines  or 
torpedoes. 

7.  At  4.6  p.m.  our  course  was  altered  to  110°. 

8.  Altered  course  to  155°. 

9.  At  4.14  p.m.  "  Warspite  "  opened  fire. 

10.  At  4.17  p.m.  altered  course  140°. 

11.  At  4.21  p.m.  the  enemy  oi)ened  fire  on  the  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron  for  the  first  time,  and  straddled  H.M.S.  "  Barham." 

12.  At  4.23  p.m.  altered  course  164°,  and  at  the  same  time 
"  Barham,"  was  hit. 

13.  At  4.29  p.m.  "  Vahant,"  who  was  shghtly  on  the  star- 
board quarter  of  "  Barham,"  was  ordered  to  take  station  astern. 

14.  At  4.31  p.m.  altered  course  121°. 

15.  At  4.32  p.m.  ship  swdnging  to  starboard,  course  170°. 

16.  At  4.37  p.m.  ship  swinging  slowly  to  port,  course  156°. 

17.  At  4.41  p.m.  we  observed  an  attack  on  the  enemy  from 
ahead  by  our  fight  cruisers  and  destroyers.     Result  unknown. 

18.  At  4.45  p.m.  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  heavily 
engaged. 

19.  At  4.46  p.m.  the  ship  was  severely  shaken  by  one  salvo, 
which  burst  just  short  on  the  port  side  aft,  and  plunging  projectiles 
may  have  hit  the  ship  below  the  water  fine.     On  examination 


206  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

on  arrival  in  harbour,  it  was  ascertained  that  no  internal  damage 
had  been  caused. 

20.  At  4.47  p.m.  ship  turning  to  starboard,  course  172°. 

21.  At  4.48  p.m.  the  enemy's  salvoes  falling  astern  of 
"  VaUant." 

22.  At  4.50  p.m.  observed  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  on 
Port  bow,  steering  North. 

23.  At  4.51  p.m.  passed  one  of  our  "  L  "  class  destroyers 
picking  up  survivors  from  scattered  wreckage  of  a  big  ship. 
She  was  not  being  fired  on  at  the  moment,  but  possibly  a  good 
many  shorts,  intended  for  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  fell  around 
her  shortly  afterwards. 

24.  At  4.54  p.m.  ceased  fire  pro  tern.,  our  Battle  Cruisers 
blanking  us  on  the  Port  side. 

25.  At  4.57  p.m.  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  altered  course 
16  points  to  starboard  in  succession,  course  360°,  following  in 
rear  of  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 

26.  At  5.2  p.m.  "  Barham  "  was  hit  amidships  between  the 
funnels. 

27.  At  5.6  p.m.  "  VaUant  "  reopened  fire  at  enemy's  Battle 
Cruisers,  target  most  indistinct  on  the  starboard  beam,  the  light 
at  this  period  of  the  action  was  very  favourable  to  the  enemy, 
silhouetting  our  ships  against  the  bright  sky  of  the  western 
horizon,  the  sun  being  obscured  by  clouds  at  this  time.  "  Valiant  " 
was  now  firing  at  the  second  ship  from  the  right,  but  due  to 
mist  and  smoke  this  ship  was  occasionally  obscured  and  the 
plainest  target  had  to  be  fired  at. 

28.  At  5.9  p.m.  altered  course  348°.     "  Barham  "  hit  astern. 

29.  At  5.11  p.m.  the  enemy's  Battle  Squadron  appeared 
2  points  abaft  the  starboard  beam,  consisting  of  about  eight 
Dreadnoughts,  but  it  was  very  difficult  to  determine  the  exact 
number.     "  Barham  "  again  hit,  amidships  at  this  time. 

30.  At  5.12  p.m.  "Valiant"  straddled  forward  and  aft,  and 
the  whole  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  under  heavy  fire 
from  the  greatly  superior  forces  of  the  enemy. 

31.  At  5.13  p.m.  "  Valiant  "  altered  course  to  port  and  took 
up  a  position  on  the  j)ort  quarter  of  the  "  Barham,"  as  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron  at  this  time  was  altering  course  slowly  to  port 
to  get  astern  of  our  Battle  Cruisers,  and  it  was  observed  that  a 
very  accurate  fire  was  being  concentrated  on  the  turning  point. 
By  so  doing,  the  next  four  salvoes  intended  for  "  VaUant " 
missed  her  by  10  yards  ahead.  At  this  period  the  enemy  was 
keeping  up  a  very  rapid  and  accurate  fire,  very  small  spread  of 
from  50  to  100  yards,  range  most  accurate,  but  in  most  cases 
missing  for  direction.  It  was  observed  that  the  splashes  from 
the  big  shells  were  extremely  small,  seldom  rising  above  the  level 
of  the  hull  of  the  ship. 

32.  At  5.14  p.m.  course  was  now  295°  after  the  turn  to  port. 


PlaJtB  18. 


TRACK   OF  H.M.S.VALIANT"3P7  MAY  1916. 


639 


8-7 


OMUei 
i    .    I 


10072. 2f266/PJ/73^S00.l22Q, 


MalbyA,Sons  Lith 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  207 

33.  At  5.17  p. in.  the  enemy  was  now  on  the  starboard  quarter. 
The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  now  proceeding  "  all  out  "  at 
25  knots,  but  the  enemy  still  appeared  to  be  keeping  up  with  us. 

34.  At  5.17|  p.m.  altered  course  310°. 

35.  At  5.21  p.m.  altered  course  325°. 

36.  At  5.23  p.m.  "  Barham  '  signalled  "  Proceed  at  utmost 
speed." 

37.  At  5.24  p.m.  enemy  was  now  very  indistinct,  the  sun 
shining  brightly  on  our  port  bow. 

38.  At  5.26  p.m.  the  action  was  gradually  being  broken  off. 

39.  At  5.29  p.m.  one  salvo  landed  just  short  of  "  Valiant  " 
and  one  just  over. 

40.  At  5.35  p.m.  altered  course  355°.  It  was  observed  that 
enemy  was  now  in  port  quarter  line  bearing  135°  Green. 

41.  At  5.37  p.m.  altered  course  360°. 

42.  At  5.40  p.m.  "  VaHant  "  engaging  about  fourth  ship 
from  the  right,  being  the  only  ship  which  was  sufficiently  visible 
to  fire  at. 

43.  At  5.43  p.m.  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  on  starboard 
bow  had  now  altered  course  16  points  to  the  southward  and 
re-engaged  the  enemy  at  long  range. 

44.  At  5.44  p.m.  altered  course  355°. 

45.  x4t  5.47  p.m.  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  altered  course  to 
Starboard,  course  20°,  Avith  the  idea  of  re-engaging. 

46.  At  5.48  p.m.  there  was  a  lull  in  the  action,  target  most 
indistinct.    Lined  up  Director,  which  had  got  out  of  step. 

47.  At  5.53  p.m.  light  much  improved :  re-engaged,  one 
enemy's  salvo  landed  just  over  "  Valiant." 

48.  At  5.56  p.m.  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  was  now  observed 
turning  to  the  Eastward  mth  the  apparent  idea  of  heading  off 
the  enemy  and  crossing  his  "  T." 

49.  At  6.0  p.m.  fired  one  torpedo  from  starboard  after  tube 
at  German  Battlefleet,  bearing  140°  green,  result  unknown. 

50.  At  6.1  p.m.  range  19,000  increasing.     Altered  course  30°. 

51.  At  6.H  p.m.  lost  sight  of  the  enemy  in  the  mist. 

52.  At  6.2  p.m.  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  altered  course 
to  the  E.S.E.     Lull  in  action. 

53.  At  6.5  p.m.  observed  distant  firing  on  starboard  bow. 

54.  At  6.6  p.m.  enemy  reappeared,  bearing  Green  130°. 

55.  At  6.7  p.m.  the  Grand  Fleet  in  sight.  Observed  "  Marl- 
borough '"  leading  First  Division,  bearing  Red  10°  about  three 
miles. 

56.  At  6.10  p.m.  altered  course  90°. 

57.  At  6.13  p.m.  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  altering  course  to 
starboard,  enemy  bearing  Green  38°. 

58.  At  6.14  p.m.  "  Barham  "  reopened  fire. 

59.  At  6.15  p.m.  "  VaUant  "  reopened  fire,  action  resumed, 
enemy  firing  at  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 

60.  At  6.17  p.m.  enemy  bearing  Green  50°,  range  19,000, 
visibihty  now  very  good. 


208  BATTLE    OF    JUTl.AMD  : 

01.  At  6.19  p.m.  observed  Grand  Fleet  deploying  to  port  to 
the  North-East,  weather  B.C.,  very  little  mist. 

62.  At  6.20  p.m.  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  came  under  heavy 
lire ;  our  Battle  Fleet  opened  fire  on  the  enemy  at  the  same  time. 
Observed  our  first  and  second  Cruiser  Squadrons  crossing  from 
our  port  to  our  starboard  bow.  As  H.M.  Ships  "  Defence," 
"  Warrior  '  and  "  Black  Prince  "  came  within  range  of  the  enemy, 
they  received  a  concentrated  and  extremely  hot  fire ;  the  shot 
were  falling  at  regular  intervals,  grouped  in  salvoes,  forming  a 
danger  zone  of  from  1,000  to  1,500  yards.  H.M.S.  "  Defence  " 
was  smothered  in  shell  fire,  the  after  magazine  appeared  to  blow 
up,  shortly  followed  by  the  foremost  one.  All  the  ammunition 
then  appeared  to  explode,  and  the  ship  blew  up  and  sank. 
H.M.S.  "  Warrior  "  also  entered  the  danger  zone.  Shortly  after- 
wards she  came  between  us  and  the  enemy  and  was  overwhelmed  ; 
but,  in  this  case,  some  of  the  enemy's  shooting  was  bad  and 
about  2,000  over.  A  large  explosion  took  place  at  one  end  of 
the  ship  and  clouds  of  very  dense  black  smoke  poured  out,  which 
undoubtedly  screened  us  but  also  prevented  our  seeing  the 
enemy.  H.M.S.  "  Black  Prince,"  although  under  the  same  hot 
fire,  appeared  to  come  through  with  but  little  damage.    , 

63.  At  6.21  p.m.  altered  course  to  port,  course  335°. 

64.  At  6.22  p.m.  "  Warspite  "  was  observed  in  difficulties  on 
the  starboard  quarter,  steering  gear  evidently  broken  down. 

65.  At  6.24  p.m.  several  salvoes  landed  just  over  "  Vahant," 
who  was  also  under  hot  fire  from  enemy's  shrapnel  bursting 
short,  the  fore-top,  ship's  side  and  funnel  being  hit. 

66.  At  6.25  p.m.  the  Grand  Fleet  was  now  fully  engaged 
and  head  of  the  Hne  altering  course  to  starboard  with  the  idea 
of  closing  the  range.  Several  fires  now  broke  out  simultaneously 
at  the  head  of  the  enemy's  battle  Hne,  four  battleships  and  battle 
cruisers  observed  heavily  on  fire.  An  enemy  Dreadnought  was 
also  observed  to  be  stopped  and  disabled  on  the  engaged  side  of 
the  enemy's  hne;  this  was  probably  a  German  Flagship,  as  a 
light  cruiser  was  seen  to  go  alongside  her.  Commander  (N)  saw 
one  big  salvo  fall  exactly  between  these  two  ships  just  as  the 
hght  cruiser  ranged  up  alongside. 

67.  At  6.26  p.m.  reduced  to  18  knots;  Fifth  Battle  Squadron 
forming  astern  of  our  Battle  Fleet,  now  deploying. 

68.  At  6.30  p.m.  reduced  to  14  knots. 

69.  At  6.32  p.m.  ''  Warspite  "  hauled  out  of  the  hne  to  port. 

70.  At  6.33  p.m.  increased  to  16  knots. 

71.  At  6.34  p.m.  decreased  to  12  knots. 

72.  At  6.35  p.m.  bad  kink  in  rear  of  our  line  of  battle; 
altered  course  slowly  to  port. 

73.  At  6.30  p.m.  increased  to  14  knots. 

74.  At  6.39  p.m.  altering  course  slowly  to  starboard. 

75.  At  6.40  p.m.  line  straightened,  course  105°. 

76.  At  6.41  p.m.  observed  three  heavy  columns  of  smoke  on 
starboard  bow,  enemy  bearing  green  16°  and  now  very  indistinct. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  209 

77.  At  6.42  p.m.  "  Valiant  "  very  close  up  to  "  Barham," 
hauled  out  on  latter's  port  quarter  and  reduced  to  slow  speed. 

78.  At  6.49  p.m.  increased  to  12  knots. 

79.  At  6.50  p.m.  increased  to  15  knots. 

80.  At  6.50i  p.m.  increased  to  18  knots,  course  110°.  One 
enemy  ship  observed  bearing  green  93°. 

81.  At  6.56  p.m.  "  Preparative  "  signalled.  Altered  course 
two  points  to  port. 

82.  At  6.57  p.m.  increased  to  20|  knots. 

83.  At  6.58  p.m.  "  Warspite  "  rejoined  the  line. 

84.  At  7.0  p.m.  reduced  to  18  knots. 

85.  At  7.2  p.m.  altered  course  175°,  action  recommenced. 

86.  At  7.3  p.m.  enemy  in  sight  bearing  green  7°. 

87.  At  7.5  p.m.  passed  H.M.S.  "  Acasta  "  close  to  on  port 
side,  evidently  badly  holed,  with  collision  mat  over  starboard 
side  and  some  one  standing  bj^  her.  H.M.S.  "  Galatea  "  pro- 
ceeding alongside  to  her  assistance.     Enemy  reopened  fire. 

88.  At  7.6  p.m.  course  170°. 

89.  At  7.8  p.m.  armoured  cruiser  bearing  green  60°  observed 
to  be  heavily  hit.  It  is  thought  that  this  was  a  German  ship  of 
"  Roon  "  class,  but  she  appeared  to  be  receiving  fire  of  both 
friend  and  foe  ahke. 

90.  At  7.9  p.m.  the  Grand  Fleet  altered  course,  leaders  together 
to  south  (magnetic). 

91.  At  7.10  p.m.  "Valiant"  reopened  fire. 

92.  At  7.15  p.m.  passed  wreck  of  what  was  apparently  a 
Dreadnought  ship  on  port  beam,  about  3,000  yards  distant. 
She  appeared  to  be  broken  in  half,  resting  on  the  bottom  mth 
her  bow  and  stern  about  100  yards  apart,  cocked  up  at  right 
angles  out  of  the  water.  She  was  painted  pale  grey,  red  bottom 
colour,  ram  bow,  overhung  stern  and  balance  rudder. 

93.  At  7.18  p.m.  "Marlborough"  hit  by  torpedo.  Leading 
enemy's  ship  observed  to  be  on  fire. 

94.  At  7.22  p.m.  reduced  to  10  knots. 

95.  At  7.23  p.m.  enemy's  Battlefleet  now  altered  course 
together  away  from  us,  and  broke  off  the  action,  sending  out  a 
low  cloud  of  smoke  which  effectually  covered  their  retreat  and 
obscured  them  from  further  view. 

96.  At  7.24  p.m.  increased  to  12  knots. 

97.  At  7.25  p.m.  increased  to  13  knots. 

98.  At  7.27  p.m.  an  attack  was  made  by  eight  enemy 
destroyers,  bearing  on  our  starboard  bow,  on  the  First  and 
Fifth  Battle  Squadrons.  Two  enemy  destroyers  were  detached 
and  cut  off  by  our  light  cruisers  and  destroyed.  Of  the  six 
remaining,  three  were  beaten  off  and  returned  to  the  South-East, 
two  are  beheved  to  have  been  sunk  and  one  severely  crippled  by 
the  rapid  fire  from  our  starboard  6-in.  battery.  Altered  course 
2  points  to  port,  course  105°,  to  avoid  this  attack. 

99.  At  7.28  p.m.  opened  fire  with  starboard  6-in.  battery  as 
before  mentioned. 

X     12873  ^ 


210  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

100.  At  7.30  p.m.  increased  to  20  knots. 

101.  At  7.3.3  p.m.  altered  course  140°.  Destroyer  attack 
beaten  off. 

102.  At  7.35  p.m.  transferred  6-in.  fire  to  large  destroyer  or 
Flotilla  Leader.  Observed  her  to  be  hit  at  least  twice  and 
straddled  frequently.  This  ship  was  shortly  afterwards  engaged 
by  our  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  when  on  our  starboard 
quarter,  and  on  the  evidence  of  Chief  Petty  Officer  Webster  (aloft 
director  layer)  this  vessel  was  observed  to  founder.  Reduced  to 
18  knots,  enemy  battlefleet  now  out  of  sight. 

103.  At  7.37  p.m.  altered  course  80°. 

104.  At  7.41  p.m.  altered  course  190°. 

105.  At  7.44  p.m.  altered  course  152°. 

106.  At  7.45  p.m.  our  light  cruisers  were  observed  to  finish  off 
three  disabled  German  destroyers. 

107.  At  7.49  p.m.  altered  course  205°. 

108.  At  7.50  p.m.  reduced  to  15  knots. 

109.  At  7.54  p.m.  altered  course  180°. 

110.  At  8.5  p.m.  altered  course  270°. 

111.  At  8.7  p.m.  increased  to  17  knots. 

112.  At  8.25  p.m.  altered  course,  leaders  together,  to  W.S.W. 
(magnetic).    Remainder  of  Grand  Fleet  on  port  bow  and  beam. 

113.  At  8.30  p.m.  observed  firing  one  point  on  port  bow, 
probably  our  Battle  Cruisers  engaging  retiring  enemy. 

114.  At  8.31  p.m.  altered  course  195°  wdth  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron. 

115.  At  8.43  p.m.  altered  course  218°  and  increased  to 
20  knots. 

116.  At  8.55  p.m.  altered  course  247°. 

117.  At  8.56  p.m.  submarine  on  starboard  bow.  Altered 
course  as  requisite.  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron,  coming  up 
from  astern  on  our  starboard  side,  all  opened  fire  with  their 
starboard  guns,  apparently  on  the  submarine  in  question. 

118.  At  9.7  p.m.  altered  course  south  (magnetic)  with  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron. 

119.  At  9.35  p.m.  reduced  to  18  knots. 

120.  At  9.40  altered  course  S.S.E.  (magnetic). 

121.  At  9.47  p.m.  altered  course  S.  by  W.  (magnetic),  16 
knots. 

122.  At  9.55  p.m.  altered  course  S.S.E.  (magnetic). 

123.  At  10.3  p.m.  altered  course  18  points  to  starboard. 
Course  North  (magnetic). 

124.  At  10.8  p.m.  altered  course  16  points  to  port.  Course 
south  (magnetic),  20  knots.  First  Division  of  First  Battle 
Squadron  now  bearing  1  mile  on  port  beam. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  211 

12o.  At  10.15  p.m.  observed  heavy  firing  on  starboard  beam 
about  10  miles  distant,  which  lasted  for  five  minutes.  One  big 
explosion  was  noticed. 

126.  At  10.24  p.m.  passed  drifter  with  nets  out  on  starboard 
side. 

127.  At  10.29  p.m.  reduced  to  17  knots. 

128.  At  10.39  p.m.  observed  heavy  firing  on  starboard 
quarter.  From  the  evidence  of  various  officers  and  the  ('hief 
Yeoman  of  Signals,  who  were  on  the  Bridge  at  this  time,  this 
appeared  to  be  a  night  attack  by  one  of  our  light  cruisers  and 
four  of  our  destroyers  on  a  column  of  enemy's  ships.  Our  light 
cruiser  was  observed  to  be  hit  by  three  successive  salvoes  from 
a  four-funnelled  German  Cruiser.  Also  two  of  our  attacking 
Destroyers  were  seen  to  be  badly  hit.  This  attack  took  place  on 
the  enemy's  port  side  and  they  appeared  to  be  steaming  south. 
Several  shots  from  this  action  fell  close  to  "  Valiant." 

129.  At  10.42  p.m.  altered  course  S.W.  (magnetic). 

130.  At  10.45  p.m.  altered  course  340°. 

131.  At  10.49  p.m.  one  light  cruiser  ("  Southampton  "  class) 
passed  us  on  port  side. 

132.  At  10.50  p.m.  altered  course  16  points  to  starboard, 
course  South  (magnetic). 

133.  At  11.35  p.m.  observed  heavy  night  action  on  starboard 
quarter.  From  the  evidence  we  surmised  that  there  appeared 
on  this  occasion  to  be  two  German  Cruisers  with  at  least  two 
funnels  and  a  crane  amidships,  apparently  steering  to  the  eastward 
at  a  high  speed.  These  cruisers  then  evidently  sighted  an 
unknown  small  number  of  British  ships  ahead  of  them,  possibly 
a  light  cruiser  and  a  few  destroyers  in  station  about  two  miles 
astern  of  "  Malaya  "  (rear  ship  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron). 
Both  Germans  switched  on  top  searchlights  and  opened  a  very 
rapid  and  extraordinarily  accurate  independent  fire  on  our  fight 
cruiser.  She  replied,  but  was  soon  in  flames  fore  and  aft.  The 
enemy,  after  five  minutes,  ceased  fire  and  switched  off. 

134.  With  reference  to  night  attacks,  it  was  noticed  that  on 
each  occasion  German  ships  fired  a  white  star  shell  which  opened 
up  Hke  a  parachute,  before  switching  on  their  searchlights. 
Searchlights  were  already  trained  on  the  ship  before  being 
switched  on. 

135.  At  11.38  p.m.  increased  to  20  knots. 

136.  Midnight.     Reduced  to  17  knots. 

137.  At  0.12  a.m.,  1st  June,  heavy  firing  was  observed  astern 
in  the  distance. 

138.  An  enemy's  torpedo  was  observed  by  Lieutenant  Glenny 
to  pass  100  yards  ahead  of  "  Valiant  "  about  1  hour  after  the 
beginning  of  the  action.  "  Warspite  "  reports  that  another 
torpedo  also  missed  "  Vahant  "  astern  by  20  yards;  time  not 
known. 

139.  This  concludes  my  record  of  the  action  as  no  further 
incidents  of  note  occurred  before  our  return  to  harbour. 

o  2 


212  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

1    *  4t  «  Hf  :)c 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir,  ■ 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

M.   WOOLLCOMBE, 

Captain, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 

GUNNERY  AND  TORPEDO  NOTES  ON  ACTION  OF 
3IST   MAY    1916.     H.M.S.   "VALIANT," 

H.M.S.  "  Valiant,"  c/o  G.P.O.,  London, 
5th  June  1916. 
Sir, 

I   HAVE   the   honour   to   forward   herewith   Gunnery   and 
Torpedo  notes  on  the  action  of  31st  May  1916. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

M.  WOOLLCOMBE, 

Captain. 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 


GENERAL  GUNNERY  REMARKS  ON  ACTION  OF 
31ST  MAY  1916. 

Control. — Was  carried  out  from  the  15-in.  G.C.T.,  the  light 
was  extremely  bad,  the  target  most  difficult  to  be  seen.  During 
the  whole  of  the  action  it  was  only  possible  in  isolated  cases  to 
definitely  state  the  nature  of  ship  fired  at.  Most  of  the  time  it 
was  simply  a  case  of  seeing  a  number  of  patches  of  smoke  and 
it  was  not  even  possible  to  distinguish  funnels,  masts,  &c. 

The  actual  spotting  was  difficult  only  from  the  point  of  view 
of  knowing  at  which  target  the  Director  Layer  had  fired,  and 
whenever  the  control  officer  was  observing  the  ship  actually 
fired  at,  it  was  easy  to  see  if  the  splashes  were  short,  right  or 
left ;  overs  were  not  seen.     Many  hits  were  plainly  visible. 

2  9|c  H:  ^  *  ^ 

At  about  5.30  such  great  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
distinguishing  any  of  the  enemy's  ships  that  the  control  was 
temporarily  turned  over  to  the  control  officer  in  the  Fore  Top 
and  the  Gunnery  Lieutenant  went  aloft,  but  after  about 
five  minutes  he  returned  and  took  over  the  control  in  the 
15-in.  G.C.T.  as  the  conditions  aloft  were  even  more  difficult. 

^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 
*  See  note,  page.  381. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  213 

During  the  first  j^art  of  the.  action,  from  3.30  G.M.T.  till 
about  4.30,  good  ranges  were  obtained,  but  fire  was  actually 
opened  on  an  estimated  range  and  in  consequence  a  correction 
Down  was  given,  but  after  the  next  salvo,  which  went  short,  as 
good  ranges  were  being  obtained,  a  correction  Up  was  applied, 
and  this  again  went  short,  another  Up   gave  a  visible  hit. 

The  Range  Finders  were  a  very  great  help  and  on  three  or 
four  occasions  on  calhng  down  straddle  to  the  T.S.,  they 
reported  gun  range  300  to  400  yards  less  than  Rangefinder 
range. 

Range  Finding — Was  extremely  difficult  except  at  the 
commencement. 

1  *  *  Uti  4(  )|c 

The  target  fired  at  had  to  be  shifted  a  large  number  of  times 
due  to — concentration  signal,  altering  course,  engaging  Battle 
Fleet  in  lieu  of  Battle  Cruisers,  and  frequently  due  to  proper 
target  being  obscured  by  smoke  and  haze. 

The  Range  Finder  Glasses  (especially  those  of  the  after 
turrets)  became  covered  with  cordite  smoke,  and  in  the  case  of 
"  Y  "  turret  a  Boy  1st  CI.  was  employed  sitting  on  the  top  of 
the  turret  cleaning  them. 

After  the  first  haK  hour,  sufficient  ranges  were  not  obtained 
to  give  a  rate,  but  isolated  groups  of  ranges  were  obtained, 
which  were  of  great  value  for  checking  the  range  on  sights. 

Director  Fire — Was  used  throughout  the  action,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  individual  to  have  been  used;  great  diffi- 
culties being  experienced  in  getting  a  Director  Gunlayer  on  to 
the  right  set  of  flashes.  Turret  gunlayers  could  not  see 
sufficiently  plainly  through  their  periscopes. 

The  left  gun  of  "  A  "  turret  went  out  of  step,  firing  was 
carried  out  by  Director  by  means  of  checking  with  the  right 
gun.  The  fault  :  wire  partially  carried  away  from  the  left 
elevating  receiver. 

"  X  "  turret  training  went  out  of  stej).  The  Director  was 
lined  up  twice  during  the  action,  during  a  lull,  thus  overcoming 
the  trouble. 

Enemy's  Sflashes. —A\i\io\igh.  the  ship  was  straddled  many 
times  and  a  large  number  of  shots  were  only  just  short,  the 
splashes  a])peared  to  be  very  small  and  did  not  rise  much  above 
the  hull  of  the  ship ;  no  water  came  on  board  and  no  trouble 
was  experienced  with  spray  on  glasses. 

Due  to  this  the  control  officers  experienced  no  additional 
difficulties  when  ship  was  being  heavily  fired  at  than  when 
receiving  no  fire. 

The  additional  noise  was  much  less  than  expected  and  the 
control  apj^eared  to  run  smoothly,  orders  being  always  able  to 

'^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


214  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

he  got   through   telephones,  the  only  difiRculty  being  the  aloft 
J)ircctor  voice  pipe  due  to  wind. 

Rate  of  Fire. — The  fire  was  kept  slow  and  deliberate  due  to 
the  same  difficulty  of  getting  on  to  the  right  target,  on  four  or 
five  occasions  rapid  bursts  were  carried  out  when  it  was  seen 
that  hitting  was  established.  There  were  several  long  lulls  when 
firing  did  not  take  place  : — 

(1)  When  our  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  steamed  between  us  and 

the  enemy  and  their  smoke  obscured  the  target. 

(2)  When  the  "  Defence  "  was  sunk,  smoke  obscured  the 

target. 

(3)  When  the  "  Warrior  "  was  heavily  hit  and  poured  out 

volumes  of  black  smoke. 

(4)  At  5.30  and  6.45  when  smoke  and  mist  obscured  the 

enemy. 

Breakdoions. 

Director — With  the  exceptions  above  stated,  worked 
extremely  well  and  was  in  step  at  the  end. 

Control  histrimients  ami  Commuiiications. — Nil. 

Turrets. — All  turrets  fired  most  satisfactorily  and  had  no 
breakdowns  of  any  imj)ortance ;  all  turret  officers  reported  that 
they  were  easily  at  the  ready  and  only  missed  a  total  of  three 
salvoes,  i.e.,  "  B  "  three  failures  to  fire,  two  tubes  balanced  very 
high,  one  cause  unknown. 

I      ^  V  'K  •P  *n 

Q-in.  Control. — 6-in.  tiring  was  carried  out,  starboard  side, 
at  extreme  range  against  German  Destroyers  and  a  Light 
Cruiser. 

Control  was  from  fore-top  through  the  G.C.T. 

Firing  was  very  accurate  and  destroyer  attack  was  beaten  off. 

Three  failures  to  fire  occurred,  two  being  tubes  and  one  cause 
unknown. 

No  other  delays  or  accidents. 

The  firing  of  the  6-in.  guns  did  not  inconvenience  the  control 
of  the  15-in.  guns. 

In  accordance  with  Gunnery  Order  No.  56  of  1st  April  1915, 
the  Director  Gunlayer's  eyesight  was  tested  and  his  eyes  showed 
no  ill-effects  whatever. 


1  *  * 

Number  of  Rounds  fired. 


"A"  - 

"B  "  - 

"X"  - 

"  Y  "  _ 

Starboard  6-in. 


Right.  Left. 


36 

35 

39 

36 

40 

34 

35 

33 

76 

^  See  note  on  p.  381. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  215 

GENERAL  TORPEDO   REMARKS   ON  ACTION   OF 
31ST  MAY  1916.     "  H.M.S.  VALIANT." 

The  enemy  was  not  sufficiently  visible  throughout  the  action 
for  ranges  to  be  taken  with  the  torpedo  rangefinder. 

The  visil)ility  was  generally  low  and  observations  from  the 
Torpedo  Control  Tower  were  much  hampered  by  waste  steam 
coming  up  the  engine-room  exhaust. 

2.  In  the  first  period  of  the  action,  from  about  4.10  to 
4.50  p.m.,  t]ie  enemy  was  liefore  the  port  beam  and  the  range 
was  long.     There  was  no  opportunity  to  fire  torpedoes. 

3.  After  becoming  engaged  on  the  starboard  side  one  or  two 
chances  occurred  for  firing  torpedoes,  but  they  involved  con- 
siderable risk  of  hitting  our  own  ships  ;  at  6.0  p.m.  an  opportunity 
presented  itself  to  fire  at  the  enemy's  battlefleet.  The  course 
was  estimated  as  j)arallel  to  our  own  ships,  range  14,000  and 
bearing  140  Green.  A  28-knot  torpedo  was  used  and  started 
correctly  from  the  starboard  after  tube.  Result  of  shot  not 
known. 

4.  No  further  opportunity  presented  itself,  partly  owing  to 
the  long  range  and  partly  owing  to  risk  to  our  own  ships. 

5.  The  enemy  fleet  appeared  to  take  great  care  not  to  get 
within  torpedo  range  when  on  a  bearing  exposing  him  to  torpedo 
fire. 

6.  One  torpedo  was  seen  to  cross  "  Vahant's  "  bows  and 
another  is  understood  to  have  been  seen  from  "  Warspite  "  to 
cross  our  stern.     Times  not  known  with  any  accurac3^ 

7.  The  ship  was  not  hit  and  electrical  gear  was  not  severely 
tested.  There  was  difficulty  in  getting  No.  4  Tube  dynamo  to 
take  its  load,  but  this  did  not  affect  the  electrical  supply 
generally.     All  breakers  stood  the  concussion  without  coming  off. 

All  communications,  gyro  compass,  &c.,  were  intact.  Navy- 
phones  could  be  used  at  all  times  in  spite  of  shell  bursting  close 
to  the  ship. 

8.  The  two  after  searchhght  barrels  and  mirrors,  which  were 
left  up  in  case  of  fog,  were  damaged  by  blast.  One  of  the  24-in. 
mirrors,  though  broken,  was  held  together  by  the  lead  backing 
and  wire  netting  and  was  quite  fit  for  use.  Tliis  is  the  only 
mirror  in  the  ship  so  fitted. 


CAPTAIN'S    REPORT.— H.M.S.    "MALAYA." 

No.  88/14. 

H.M.S.  "Malaya," 
Sir,  6th  June  1916. 

In  reporting  events,  besides  a  few  general  remarks,  I 
cannot  do  better  than  forward  the  attached  diary  of  events 
collected  from  various  sources.  The  times  and  principal  items 
were  taken  by  Assistant  Paymaster  Keith  M.   Lawder  in  the 


2  It)  BATTf.E    OF    JUTLAND: 

spotting  top,  and,  as  he  was  unfettered  by  other  duties,  can  be 
considered  rehable. 

2.  Considering  the  vast  amount  of  ammunition  expended  on 
us,  I  attribute  the  small  number  of  hits  to  the  very  small  spread 
of  the  German  salvoes;  though  the  firing  was  good  and  range- 
taking  good  they  appeared  to  use  very  small  spotting  corrections. 

3.  The  speed  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet  appeared  to  be  very 
high  and  was  estimated  to  be  over  21  knots. 

4.  Our  firing  at  enemy  Battle  Cruisers  at  long  range  a^jpeared 
to  be  good,  but  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  was  the  result,  though 
the  fourth  salvo  was  a  distinct  hit.  When  firing  at  the  High 
iSea  Fleet  after  turning  16  points,  owing  to  the  haze  and  hght 
rendering  spotting  exceedingly  chfficult,  the  fall  of  some  salvoes 
could  not  be  seen. 

5.  Several  tracks  of  torpedoes  were  reported,  but  none  were 
actually  verified. 

6.  The  E.R.  Torpedo  in  the  foremost  submerged  flat  could 
not  be  fired  as  the  bar  was  jambed  owing  to  the  shiji  being  struck 
below  the  water  Une  on  the  starboard  side  forward.  One  torpedo 
was  fired  from  the  after  tube. 

7.  The  conduct  of  the  men  was  aU  that  could  be  desired,  and 
I  wish  to  biing  to  your  notice  several  cases  for  special  mention, 
principally  in  connection  with  the  fire  on  the  Gun  Deck.  This 
will  form  the  subject  of  a  separate  letter. 

8.  Suggestions  for  preventing  the  spread  of  fire  on  the  Gun 
Deck  in  future  will  be  forwarded  later. 

9.  The  following  Enclosures  are  attached  : — 

A.  Diary  of  events. 

B.  Track  of  "  Malaya." 

C.  Gunnery  notes,  accidents,  &c. 

D.  Torpedo  notes,  accidents,  &c. 

E.  Remarks  from  Engine  Room  Department. 

F.  Damage  sustained. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  D.  BOYLE, 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 


Plcute  id. 
TRACING   SHEWING  THE  TRACK   OF   H.M.S.  "MALAYA" 

Dunn g  the   En g a g ement  on  May  31?^  1916 , 
between    3.50  p.m.  and   9.45  p.m. 


4-3 


YI.53 


56'30'/^'. 


IX. 4-5 


^Tn.4-3 


^TIir.4- 


l0.07S.2^!i66>-PII73(i^)  5000   IS.iC 


MaJb^  Jcicni.Lith, 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  217 

Enclosure  "  A  "  to  "  Malaya's  "  No.  88/14  of  6  June  1916. 

DIARY  OF  EVENTS,  MAY  31  TO  JUNE  1,  FROM  N0TE8 
MADE  BY  ASSISTANT  PAYMASTER  LAWDER  IN  THE 
SPOTTING  TOP,  COMBINED  WITH  MY  OWN,  LIEU- 
TENANT-COMMANDER (G)'S,  AND  OTHER  OFFICERS' 
OBSERVATIONS.     "  H.M.S.   MALAYA." 

(All  times  are  G.M.T.) 

r.M. 

4.00.     "  Barham  "  opened  lire.     Our  Battle  Cruisers  were  on 

starboard  bow,  we  not  having  turned,  and  two  enemy 

Light  Cruisers  on  port  bow. 

4.  2.     "  Valiant  "  opened  fire  at  apparently  Light  Cruisers. 

4.  5.     "  Warspite  "     opened    fire.       Observed    enemy    Battle 

Cruiser  about  Red  5°,  steering  to  southward. 

4.  6.     Altered  course  to  starboard. 

4.10.     Altered  course  to  starboard. 

4.15.     Opened  fire  on  rear  enemy  Battle  Cruiser  ("  Seydlitz," 

we  thought).     Range,  18,500;  feU  short. 

Between  4.00  and  4.15  p.m.  (actual  times  not  noted)  one  of 

our  Battle  Cruisers  was  observed  to  blow  up,  a  vast  column  of 

smoke  and  nothing  more  was  seen. 

Shortly    after    another    big   explosion   was    heard   from    the 

dii-ection  of  our  Battle  Cruisers. 

4.20.  "1  Our  Destroyer  Flotilla  fell  back  to  starboard  quarter. 

to      >     First  salvo  :    short  and  left.     Second  salvo  :     ahead 

4.32  J      and    still   short.     Third   salvo  :     over.     Fourth    salvo 

(4.32)  :     straddled    and    apparently    hit    in    fine    with 

foremast.     Range,  19,200.     Enemy  soon  after  altered 

course    to    port    together.     (Armoured    Director    had 

been  used  up  to  now,  but  shifted  to  Aloft  Director 
1  *  *  *  *  * 

4.35.  Enemy  turned  to  port  together.  Enemy's  Destroyers 
sighted  on  port  bow. 

4.45.  Enemy's  salvo  fell  just  ahead  of  us,  followed  by  several 
more.     Our  range,  21,000. 

4.50.  Passed  one  of  our  Destroyers  with  boats  lowered  picking 
up  survivors  among  some  wreckage. 
Soon  after  our  Battle  Cruisers  passed  us  on  engaged  side 
on  opposite  course.  Only  four  present — "  Lion," 
"  Princess  Royal,"  "  Tiger,"  and  "  New  Zealand." 
Shortly  after  our  Battle  Cruisers  passed  observed  enemy's 
Battle  Fleet  on  port  bow  in  three  or  four  columns 
heading  straight  for  us.  (Aloft  reported  three  columns, 
the  fourth  column  seen  from  below  may  have  been 
cruisers  in  the  haze  very  hard  to  distinguish.) 

4.57.  Altered  course  16  points  (in  succession)  to  starboard  and 
followed  our  Battle  Cruisers.  Enemy's  Battle  Fleet 
opened  fire  on  the  turn,  so  "  Malaya  "  turned  short. 

^  See  note  page  381. 


218  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

P.M. 

4.50.     Enemy's  salvo  50  yards  over. 

5.00.     Increased  to  full  speed  (25  knots). 

After  turning  could  see  a  four  funnel  cruiser  ahead  of 
enemy's  Battle  Fleet,  which  by  this  time  had  deployed. 
Opened  fire  at  guessed  range  of  17,000  at  what 
appeared  to  be  a  "  Konig  "  class.  .Spotting  very 
difficult  now  owing  to  haze. 

5.  5.  Enemy  has  our  range  exactly,  so  hauled  out  a  little  to 
port. 

5.12^  Enemy's  salvoes  straddled   "Valiant"   and   "Malaya." 

to      y     At  this  time  we  were  outlined  against  a  bright  yellow 

5.30  J  horizon,  but  enemy  were  nearly  obscured  by  mist, 
and  we  were  under  a  very  heavy  constant  fire  from 
at  least  four  ships  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet.  Only  flashes 
were  visible,  and  six  salvoes  were  falHng  round  the 
ship  per  minute,  and  at  one  time,  counting  some  which 
were  probably  meant  for  "  Warspite,''  nine  salvoes 
fell  in  rapid  succession. 
Shifted  target  to  what  appeared  to  be  the  leading  enemy 
Battleship,  and  as  soon  as  a  short  salvo  was  obtained 
broke  into  rapid  Director  as  it  was  realised  that 
"  Malaya  "  was  presenting  a  good  target. 
It  had  been  decided  to  fire  the  6-in.  guns  short  to  make 
a  screen,  but  before  this  was  done  the  whole  starboard 
battery  was  put  out  of  action  by  shell  bursting  there. 

5,14.  Enemy's  salvo  fell  close  over  our  port  bow,  sending  spray 
well  over  the  spotting  top  and  black  water  into  the 
conning  tower,  &c. 

5.17.     Altered  course  two  points  to  port  together. 

5.20.  Shell  struck  ship  on  starboard  side  forward  about  water 
line,  shaking  the  ship  very  heavily  indeed. 

5.25.  Splinter  cut  steampipe  to  starboard  syren,  escape  of 
steam  rendering  communication  with  top  impossible 
for  a  few  minutes  till  shut  off. 

5.27.     Shell  struck  ship  aft  (roof  of  "  X  "  turret). 

5.30.  Shell  struck  starboard  side  of  upper  deck  just  above 
S.  3  six-inch  gun,  followed  by  another  in  the  same 
place,  wrecking  the  6-in.  battery  and  causing  a  fire 
for  a  short  time. 

5.35.     Shell  struck  somewhere  along  starboard  side. 

5.37.  Two  shell  fell  just  over  and  abreast  of  port  forward 
6-in.  gun.  The  officers  aloft  saw  the  shell  and  state 
that  they  fell  within  a  few  feet  of  the  ship's  side. 

5.45.  Ship  had  now  a  list  of  about  4°  to  starboard,  and  for 
a  short  time  guns  were  firing  at  nearly  extreme 
elevation.  From  the  top  oil  could  be  seen  coming 
from  our  starboard  side  abreast  of  after  6-in.  gun. 

6.00.     Course,  N.N.E.     Enemy's  rate  of  fire  at  us  much  reduced. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  219 

P.M. 

0.  5.  Fired  long  range  torpedo  at  third  ship  of  enemy's  Battle 
Fleet,  four  points  abaft  the  l)eam,  range,  approximately 
12,900  yards. 

6.  6.  Sighted  some  of  the  Grand  Fleet  ahead  of  us  coming 
towards  us. 

6.15.  Altered  course  to  starboard.  We  were  now  past  the 
sun,  and  not  such  a  good  target. 

6.20.  "  Defence  "  coming  down  on  starboard  bow  blew  up, 
and  "  Warrior  "  also  on  starboard  bow  was  severely 
damaged.     Heavy  firing  all  along  the  line. 

6.23.  "  Warspite  "  hauled  out  of  line  and  turned  to  starboard 
in  a  circle.  Enemy  concentrated  on  her.  "  Warspite  " 
replied  rapidly,  but  seemed  to  stop  after  turning  abo^ut 
24  points. 

6.26.     Eased  from  full  speed. 

6.32.  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  altered  course  to  port  so  as  to 
take  station  astern  of  rear  ships  of  First  Battle 
Squadron.  Very  congested  at  this  point,  many  de- 
stroyers and  Light  Cruisers  being  mixed  up  with  us 
and  enemj^  firing  rapidly,  but  no  hits  were  observed. 

6.35.     Altering  course  in  succession  to  starboard. 

6.45.     A  lull  in  the  firing. 

7.15.     Firing  general  again  and  enemy  more  distinct. 

7.20.  Opened  fire  on  what  appeared  to  be  rearmost  ship  of 
enemy  line  (range,  10,400).  That  ship  was  under  fire 
of  several  of  our  ships  and  was  shortly  after  obscured 
by  smoke  and  dropped  astern. 
Prepared  to  open  fire  on  a  Battleship  which  was  very 
low  in  the  water  and  dropping  astern.  According  to 
tAvo  Officers  she  suddenly  disappeared  without  an 
explosion.     She  had  two  short  fat  funnels. 

7.25  ^  Enemy  destroyers  made  an  attack.     Opened  fire  with 
to      >      the  two  remaining  6-in.  guns  of  starboard  battery  and 

7.40  J  also  fired  two  15 -in.  salvoes  at  a  range  of  8,000  yards. 
Other  ships  were  firing  on  the  destroj^ers  as  well, 
which  retired.  One  at  least  was  seen  to  sink,  and 
this  was  the  last  of  the  enemy  seen  in  daylight  owing 
to  the  Battle  Fleet  having  turned  away. 

7.40.     Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers  astern  of  us  turned  to 
starboard,  apparently  to  attack  enemy's  light  craft. 
Ceased  firing — enemy  out  of  sight. 

8.30.     Some  firing  heard  right  ahead  some  distance  off. 

10.20.  Firing  observed  on  starboard  beam.  In  the  flashes  one 
of  our  "  Dublin  "  class  could  be  distinguished,  and 
was  apparently  hit  twice.  Enemy  Destroyers  were 
beyond  her,  and  used  a  form  of  Very's  Light.  It 
appeared  as  if  one  of  enemy's  Destroyers  was  well 
on  fire  and  sank. 

11.40.  Three  points  abaft  starboard  beam  observed  what 
appeared  to  be  an  attack  by  our  Destroyers  on  some 


220  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  ; 

enemy  big  ships  steering  the  same  way  as  ours,  two 
of  which  used  searchhghts.  One  of  our  Destroyers, 
with  three  funnels  (appearance  of  "  Termagant  " 
class),  was  set  on  fire,  but  not  before  she  had  hit  the 
second  ship.  This  was  seen  by  the  column  of  smoke, 
and  also  the  explosion  was  distinctly  heard  and  felt. 
The  leading  ship  of  the  enemy,  which  was  seen  by  the 
flash  of  the  explosion,  had  two  masts,  two  funnels, 
and  a  conspicuous  crane  (apparently  "  Westfalen " 
class). 

A.M.  J^me  1st. 

Two  attacks  some  way  astern  of  us.  We  distinctly  felt 
three  explosions,  and  at  end  of  last  attack  a  brilUant 
flare  lit  up  the  whole  sky. 

Some  firing  a  long  way  off  astern. 

Some  shots,  apparently  6-in.  or  larger  cahbre,  fell  near 
ship,  but  no  flashes  could  be  seen,  and  it  was  afterwards 
concluded  from  W/T  that  they  came  from  ships  firing 
at  enemy  ZeppeUns. 

A.  D.  BOYLE. 


Enclosure  "  C  "  to  "  Malaya's  "  No.  88/14  of  6  June  1916. 

"]\tALAYA."     GUNNERY   REMARKS. 

1.  The  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers  when  we  were  engaging  them 
appeared  to  be  zig-zagging  at  very  short  intervals. 

1  *  *  *  *  * 

The  ranges  obtained  and  reports  showed  that  gun  range  was 
being  kej^t,  so  it  would  appear  that  this  zig-zag  was  quite  a 
constant  one,  and  that  they  were  never  far  off  the  mean  course. 

2    1  *  *  *  *  * 

3.  When  the  High  Sea  Fleet  were  engaging  us  heavily  it 
appeared  that  some  were  using  Director  and  others  Individual. 

4.  "  X  "  turret  was  the  only  turret  which  developed  defects. 
"  A  "  turret  had  no  accidents. 

"  B  "  turret  had  no  accidents  of  a  serious  nature.  One  of 
the  dogs  on  the  main  cage  of  the  right  gun  became  bent  and 
had  to  be  removed.  Whilst  this  w^as  being  done  the  auxihary 
shell  hoist  was  being  used,  and  there  was  no  delay  in  the  firing. 

"  X  "  turret. —  A  heavy  shell  (12-in.)  struck  the  centre  of 
the  roof  rear  end,  bulging  the  roof,  without  exploding.  All  the 
securing  bolts  were  sheared  and  the  roof  was  started  up  clear 
of  the  walls  of  the  turret.  The  only  damage  done  inside  the 
turret  was  to  put  the  rangefiiider  out  of  action,  Kilroy  danger 
signal  right  gun,  and  the  foresight  of  the  open  director  sight. 
During  the  action  it  was  found  impossible  to  load  the  main  cage 

^  See  note,  page  381. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  221 

from  the  shell  bogie  on  the  foremost  side  of  the  trunk  when  the 
turret  was  trained  on  the  beam  bearing,  and  the  auxiliary  shell 
hoist  had  to  be  used  for  the  gun  affected.  This  was  due  to  the 
fixed  rack  having  come  up  5/16  in.  on  the  foremost  side  of  the 
trunk  in  the  fore  and  aft  line.  The  same  trouble,  but  to  a  much 
lesser  extent,  has  been  reported  before,  but  it  was  not  then 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  worldng  of  the  bogie  after  additional 
clearance  had  been  cut  on  the  underneath  side  of  the  traversing 
trolley. 

"  Y  "  turret  had  no  accidents  of  a  serious  nature.  Trouble 
was  experienced  ^vith  the  cordite  trays  of  the  left  gun  loading 
cage,  but  it  was  put  to  rights  mthout  delaying  the  firing. 

Owing  to  the  fist  of  the  ship  the  port  pumps  could  not  get 
enough  water,  so  sea  water  had  to  be  admitted  to  the  system. 

There  was  no  failure  of  Director,  or  an}''  other  electrical  gear. 

There  was  one  missfire,  due  to  a  defective  tube. 


Enclosure  "  D  "  to  "  Malaya's  "  No.  88/14  of  6  June  1916. 
TORPEDO   AND   ELECTRICAL   REMARKS. 

Torpedo. — Fired  one  torpedo,  from  starboard  after  flat  at 
6.5  p.m.  Range  of  torpedo,  10,750;  range  of  enemy,  12,900 
approximately.  Gyro  angle,  20°  left.  Bearing  of  third  ship, 
at  which  ship  torpedo  was  fired,  was  four  points  abaft  the  beam. 
Torpedo  appeared  to  run  correctly. 

Starboard  forward  tube.  The  bar  jambed  owing  to  a  hit 
on  the  armour  close  to  the  Flat. 

Electrical  Breakdowns.  —  Communications.  —  None,  except 
where  circuits  were  cut  or  burnt  in  the  starboard  battery. 

Lighting  and  Power. — None,  except  where  circuits  were  cut 
or  burnt  in  the  starboard  battery. 

Gyro  Compass. — Masters  remained  on  meridian.  The  re- 
peaters got  out  of  step  when  our  guns  fired.  After  the  action, 
remained  in  step  when  the  compass  platform  repeater  was  isolated, 
an  earth  having  developed  on  this  circuit  in  the  starboard  battery. 


Enclosure  "  E  "  to  "  Malaya's  "  No.  88/14  of  6  June  1916. 
REMARKS   FROM   ENGINE   ROOM   DEPARTMENT. 

About  6.00  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  several  sprayers  in  "  A  "  boilers 
were  extinguished  by  water  which  had  become  mixed  with  the 
oil  fuel  in  the  starboard  inner  bunkers.  These  inner  bunkers 
were  shut  off  and  oil  fuel  for  the  sprayers  was  obtained  from 
the  port  side.  It  was  subsequently  discovered  that  the  water  in 
the  inner  bunkers  was  due  to  leakage  from  the  outer  bunkers  in 
which  two  shells  had  exploded. 

Several  compartments  forward  on  starboard  side  were  hit 
below  the  water  hne  and  flooded;    the  consequent  hst  to  star- 


222  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

board  deprived  the  port  hydraulic  tanks  of  water  for  a  few 
minutes  and  recourse  was  had  to  salt  water  supply. 

The  ship  was  gradually  brought  to  the  correct  trim  by 
pumping  oil  fuel  across  from  the  starboard  to  the  port  bunkers. 
It  was  thus  possible  to  avoid  any  increase  in  the  draught  other 
than  that  due  to  the  flooded  compartments. 

During  the  shell  explosion  on  the  starboard  gun  deck,  flame 
and  debris  passed  down  the  starboard  air  supply  trunk  to 
"  A  "  boiler  room,  damaging  fittings  and  shghtly  burning  one 
Stoker  Petty  Officer  on  duty  near  the  boilers. 

Enclosure  "F"  to  "Malaya's"  No.  88/14  of  6  June  191G. 
DAMAGE   SUSTAINED.— EIGHT   HITS. 

Stations  36-60. — Two  hits,  one  indenting  the  upper  armour 
plate,  the  other  indenting  and  tearing  the  ship's  plating  below 
the  armour. 

The  wing  compartments  29-36,  36-52  lower  deck,  and  Chief 
Petty  Officers'  bathroom  36-52  middle  deck,  were  flooded. 

At  52-56  the  angle  at  the  bottom  of  the  armour  on  the  main 
deck  is  sprung  off  the  plates,  several  rivets  are  sheared,  gussets 
and  Z  bars  are  distorted  and  a  few  armour  bolts  are  slackened. 

The  steam  pipe  to  the  syren  was  fractured  by  an  indirect  hit. 

Also  at  52  a  heavy  shell  stnick  the  plates  above  the  water 
Une,  pushing  the  plating  back. 

Stations  82-109. — Two  hits.  The  Gun  Deck  was  depressed 
several  inches,  several  seams  were  opened  out,  the  hatch  was 
distorted.  The  galley,  canteen,  drjdng  room  and  fittings  on  the 
gun  deck  were  wrecked  by  a  large  shell  passing  through  the 
forecastle  deck  and  exploding  in  the  6-in.  gun  battery. 

No.  3  six-inch  gun  starboard  damaged  and  the  mounting 
wrecked. 

Cordite  on  this  deck  set  fire  to  and  destroyed  all  electric 
cables,  &c. 

Below  W.L. — Tavo  hits.  There  is  a  large  hole  at  92-94  below 
the  armour  apparently  caused  by  two  projectiles.  The  inner 
and  outer  oil  bunkers  82-100  and  v.dng  compartments  82-109 
were  flooded;  the  seamen's  bathroom  91-100  middle  deck  was 
flooded,  and  there  were  leaks  into  adjacent  compartments. 

"  X  "  Turret. — A  heavy  shell  struck  the  centre  of  the  roof 
rear  end,  bulging  and  perforating  the  roof  slightly,  without 
ex]"»l()ding.  All  the  securing  bolts  w^ere  sheared  and  the  roof 
started.  The  only  damage  done  in  the  turret  was  that  the 
rangefinder  was  put  out  of  action,  as  was  the  Kilroy  danger 
signal  to  the  right  gun. 

It  was  found  that  the  main  cage  at  the  bottom  could  not  be 
loaded  from  the  shell  bogie  on  the  foremost  side  of  the  trunk 
when  the  turret  was  abeam.  This  was  due  to  the  fixed  rack 
having  come  up  5/16  in.  on  the  foremost  side  of  the  trunk. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  223 

No.  89/14. 

H.M.S.  "  Malaya," 
Sir,  6  June  1916. 

In  continuation  of  mj-  previous  report  of  Events,  I  beg 
to  report  that  early  on  the  morning  of  June  1st  (about  4.0  a.m.), 
officers  in  the  armoured  director  tower  and  engine  room  report 
that  the  ship  struck  something  submerged  on  the  starboard 
side  which  scraped  along  under  the  bottom. 

I  purpose]}^  refrained  from  claiming  or  reporting  anything 
until  the  damage  below  had  been  examined  by  experts. 

2.  The  Chief  Constructor  came  on  board  to-day  and  informed 
me  that  the  lower  damage,  38-48,  could  not  possibly  have  been 
done  by  a  shell,  but  had  been  caused  by  striking  something 
submerged,  and  that,  in  view  of  the  depth  beloAV  the  water  hne, 
he  thought  it  most  likely  was  a  submarine. 

In  view  of  the  distance  from  the  scene  of  the  action  it  could 
not  have  been  any  of  the  wreckage,  besides  which  nothing  w  as 
seen  above  the  water,  and  it  seems  more  than  probable  that  we 
struck  a  submarine. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be.  Sir, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

A.  D.  BOYLE, 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

Fifth  Battle  Sciuadron. 

Commander-in-Chief. 

Submitted. 

HUGH  EVAN-THOMAS, 
10  June  1916.  Rear-Admiral. 


224 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND 


LETTER    OF    PROCEEDINGS    OF    CAPTAIN    (D), 
13th   flotilla. 


Enclosure  No. 


17  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 
of  12/6/16. 


No.  60. 


Sir, 


H.M.S.   "Champion," 

3rd  June  1916. 
I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  of 
Proceedings  of  H.M.S.  "  Champion  "  and  13th  Destroyer  Flotilla 
during  the  recent  action  of  the  31st  May-lst  June  1916. 

2.  At  2.50  p.m.,  31st  May,  H.M.S.  "  Onslow  "  and  "  Moresby  " 
were  detached  to  join  H.M.S.  "  Engadine,"  but  attacked  enemy 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  with  remainder  of  Flotilla,  as  described  in 
paragraph  5. 

3.  At  commencement  cf  action  station  was  taken  up  on  the 
starboard  bow  of  H.M.S.  "  Lion,"  Destroyers  in  comj)any 
being  : — 

"  Nestor "  -  Commander  Hon,     Edward     B.     S. 

Bingham. 

"  Nomad  "         -  Lieut.  Commander  Paul  Whitfield. 
"  Narborough  "-         „  „  Geoflfrey  Corlett, 

"  Obdurate  "     -         „  „  Cecil  H.  H.  Sams. 

"  Petard "  -         „  „  Evelyn  C.  O.  Thomson. 

"  Pehcan "         -         „  „  Kenneth  A,  Beattie. 

"  Nerissa "         -         ,,  „  Montague  C.  B.  Legge. 

"  Onslow  "1        -         „  „  John  C.  Tovey. 

"  Moresby  "i      -         „  „  Roger  V.  Ahson. 

"  Nicator  "         -  Lieutenant  Jack  E.  A.  Mocatta. 

"  Termagant  "  -  Lieut.  Commander  Cuthbert  P.  Blake. 
"  Turbulent "    -         „  „  Dudley  Stuart. 

(The  last  two  named  Destroyers  being  temporarily  attached.) 

4.  At  4.30  p.m.  Enemy's  Battle  Fleet  was  sighted  by 
"  Champion  "  and  reported  to  you. 

5.  At  4.15  p.m.  the  whole  Flotilla  was  ordered  to  attack 
Enemy  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  This  attack  was  well  carried  out, 
and  it  is  thought  that  at  least  two  Enemy  Destroyers  were  sunk. 
I  regret  to  state  that  H.M.S.  "  Nestor "  (Commander  Hon. 
E.  B.  S.  Bingham)  and  H.M.S.  "  Nomad  "  (Lieutenant  Commander 
Paul  Whitfield)  did  not  return  from  this  action,  and  must  be 
considered  to  have  been  sunk. 

6.  At  7.45  p.m.  H.M.S.  "  Onslow  "  was  reported  unable  to 
steam,  and  was  taken  in  tow  by  H.M.S.  "  Defender." 

7.  No  further  opportunity  of  attacking  Enemy  occurred 
during  the  day. 

8.  At  night  station  was  taken  astern  of  Battle  Fleet,  course 
South.  About  11.30  p.m.  heavy  jfiring  was  opened  on  our 
starboard  beam,  apparently  at  some  of  our  Destroyers  between 


^  Attached  to  "  Engadine." 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  225 

the  13th  Flotilla  and  the  enemy.  I  hauled  out  to  the  eastward 
as  I  was  unable  to  attack  with  any  of  our  own  Flotilla,  our  own 
forces  being  between  me  and  the  Enemy.  I  then  resumed  course 
South ;  firing  was  observed  at  intervals  during  the  night  on 
our  starboard  beam.  Destroyers  of  the  13th  Flotilla,  with  the 
exception  of  H.M.S.  "  Obdurate  "  and  "  Moresby,"  lost  touch 
with,  me  during  the  night.  H.M.S.  "  Narborough  "  as  Senior 
Officer,  reports  that  he  took  charge  of  the  remainder,  and  rejoined 
the  Fleet  at  9.45  a.m.  on  the  1st  instant. 

H.M.S.  "  Marksman  "  and  "  Maenad  "  joined  me  at  about 
2.30  a.m.  At  2.50  a.m.  course  was  altered  to  North  to  conform 
with  signal  received  from  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

9.  At  3.25  a.m.  four  Destroyers,  steering  southward,  were 
sighted ;  owing  to  the  mist  I  was  uncertain  at  first  who  they 
were;  but  at  3.30  a.m.  I  made  them  out  to  be  the  enemy,  and 
opened  fire,  range  about  3,000  yards.  Two  torpedoes  were 
fired  at  "  Champion,"  the  first  one  passing  under  our  bows,  the 
second  just  missing  close  astern.  Enemy  passed  on  opposite 
course,  and  when  sliip  had  been  steadied  after  avoiding  torpedoes, 
the  enemy  had  disappeared  in  the  mist,  and  T  resumed  my  same 
course. 

10.  At  4.30  a.m.  H.M.S.  "  Obdurate  "  picked  up  two 
survivors,  and  H.M.S.  "  Marksman  "  one  survivor,  from  H.M.S, 
"  Ardent." 

At  5  a.m.  two  rafts  were  sighted,  and  H.M.S.  "  Moresby  " 
rescued  seven  men,  and  H.M.S.  "  Maenad  "  eleven  men,  survivors 
from  H.M.S.  "  Fortune." 

11.  At  about  6  a.m.  H.M.S.  "Marksman"  was  detached  to 
examine  vessel  to  westward,  which  appeared  to  be  a  disabled 
Destroyer,  and  lost  touch  with  me.  Nothing  further  occurred, 
and  I  returned  to  base,  by  your  orders,  arriving  at  3.30  p.m., 
2nd  June  1916. 

12.  Letter  of  Proceedings  from  H.M.S.  "  Narborough."  the 
Senior  Officer  surviving  from  Destroyer  attack,  is  attached. 
Reports  have  been  called  for  from  remainder  of  Kith  Flotilla, 
and  an  addendum  to  this  letter  will  be  forw^arded  when  the 
reports  have  been  collected. 

13.  In  addition  to  loss  of  H.M.S.  "  Nestor  "  and  "  Nomad," 
H.M.S.  "  Turbulent  "  (Lieutenant-Commander  Dudley  Stuart) 
is  reported  by  H.M.S.  "  Narborough  "  to  have  been  lost  sight  of 
at  0.30  a.m.  on  the  1st  instant,  and  w^as  probably  rammed,  or 
sunk  b}'  gunfire. 

Total  casualties  and  names  have  not  yet  been  ascertained. 

I  have  the  honour  to  l)e. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

J.    U.    FARIE, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  13th  Flotilla. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  H.:\r.S.   "  Lion.'" 

X    12872  P 


220  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

Enclosure  No.   IS!  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of   12/6,10. 

ADDENDUM    TO    LETTER    OF    PROCEEDINGS    NO.   60 
OF    3rd    JUNE    1916. 

No.  60.  H.M.8.   "  Champion." 

Sir,  7th  June   1916. 

With  reference  to  paragraph  12  of  my  letter  of  proceedings 
No.  60  of  3rd  June  1916,  I  have  the  honour  to  forward  this 
addendum,  containing  extracts  from  reports  received  from 
destroyers  of  13th  Flotilla,  who  were  engaged  in  the  action, 
31st  May-lst  June  1916. 

H.M.8.  "  Obdurate,''  dated  drd  June  1916. 

On  receiving  the  signal  to  carry  out  torpedo  attack  on  enemy 
battle  cruiser  fleet,  "  Obdurate  "  turned  towards  the  enemy 
and  soon  became  engaged  with  their  destroyers  and  one  Hght 
cruiser.  Range  varied  from  6,000  to  3,000  yards,  and  during  the 
destroyer  action  one  of  the  enemy's  destroyers  was  blown  up 
and  two  others  badly  damaged ;  prol)ably  one  of  these  two  sank 
as  the  guns  firing  at  her  lost  sight  of  her. 

The  enemy  destroyers  and  light  cruiser  were  driven  back  to 
the  protection  of  their  big  ships,  and  "  Obdurate  "  was  then  too 
far  astern  to  deliver  a  torpedo  attack.  "  Obdurate  "  was  hit 
twice  by  a  4*1  shell,  but  suffered  no  casualties.  ^ 

H.M.8.  "  Petard;'  dated  2nd  June  1916. 

On  receiving  the  signal  to  attack  with  torpedoes,  I  attacked 
Avith  H.M.S.  "  Turbulent."  The  first  torpedo  fired  was  set  for 
liigh  speed,  six  feet  deep,  and  was  aimed  at  the  head  of  the 
German  destroyer  flotilla,  which  was  crossing  over  to  meet  our 
attack.  The  track  was  closely  followed,  and  tube's  crew  state 
that  they  undoubtedly  saw  it  hit  a  German  Destroyer  about 
amidships  and  explode,  I  opened  fire  with  my  gun  on  this 
destroyer  a  few  minutes  later,  and  she  was  then  lying  stopped, 
with  her  upper  deck  awash  and  obviously  sinldng. 

"  Petard  "  then  took  part  in  the  general  engagement  ^vith 
the  German  Destroyers,  and  the  three  remaining  torpedoes  were 
fired  at  a  range  of  about  7,000  yards  on  the  bow  of  the  German 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  All  these  torpedoes  must  have  crossed 
the  track  of  the  German  fine. 

At  12.15  a.m.  course  was  altered  to  S.W.  by  W.,  and  ten 
minutes  later  the  line  crossed  ahead  of  a  division  of  German 
Battleships.  I  sighted  the  leading  battleship  about  six  points 
on  my  starboard  bow  steering  S.E.  at  about  400  or  500  yards. 
This  ship  switclied  on  recognition  lights,  consisting  of  two  red 
over  one  white  light  and,  as  some  destroyer  ahead  of  me  in  the 
line  then  switched  on  her  "  fighting  fights,"  I  think  the  Germans 
at  once  knew  we  were  enemy.      As  "  Petard  "  had  no  torpedoes 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  227 

left  I  could  not  attack,  so  I  increased  to  full  speed,  and  altered 
course  slightly  to  port  to  avoid  being  rammed.  I  passed  about 
200  yards  ahead  of  the  German  ship,  who  appeared  to  be  one 
of  the  "  Wittelsbach  "  class.  As  soon  as  we  were  clear  of  her 
stem,  she  illuminated  us  with  searchlights,  and  we  came  under 
a  heavy  fire  from  her  and  the  next  ship  in  the  line.  Two  salvoes 
seemed  to  strike  us,  and,  in  all,  I  think,  we  received  six  hits. 

I  regret  that  I  never  saw  "  Turbulent,"  who  was  in  station 
astern  of  "Petard,"  after  passing  the  German  Squadron; 
according  to  the  evidence  of  some  of  my  Ship's  Company,  I 
am  afraid  she  must  have  been  j-ammed  and  sunk. 

H.M.S.  ''Pelican;'  dated  4th  June  1916. 

"  Pelican  "  was  unable  to  fire  torpedoes  owing  to  the  other 
two  divisions  being  engaged  by  enemy  torpedo  craft  between 
the  fleets,  and  by  a  division  of  the  9th  Flotilla,  who  were  coming 
up  in  the  opposite  direction. 

At  about  10.35  p.m.  there  w^as  heav}^  firing  in  N.  Westerly 
direction,  and  destro^^ers  were  seen  in  the  searchlight  rays  of 
attacking  ships.  Shortly  afterwards  there  was  a  huge  explosion 
in  that  direction.  At  0.40,  June  1st,  when  on  a  course  S.W., 
speed  30  knots,  I  observed  two  ships  on  starboard  quarter, 
which  were  at  first  taken  to  be  our  Light  Cruisers.  They  switched 
on  three  vertical  lights,  the  upper  two  being  red  and  lower  green, 
at  the  same  time  "  Pelican's  "  stem  was  lit  up  by  a  searchlight 
which  was  immediately  transferred  to  "  Petard  "  and  "  Turbu- 
lent," who  were  astern.  When  sighted  position  was  unfavourable 
for  attack. 

H.M.S.  "  Nerlssa"  dated  5th  June  1916. 

4.30  p.m.,  commenced  attack  on  a  northerly  course,  owing 
to  enemy  turning  16  points,  this  attack  had  eventually  to  be 
carried  out  on  a  southerly  course,  which  I  did  in  company  with 
"  Termagant,"  but  firing  two  torpedoes,  range  7,000  yards. 
Just  previous  to  this  attack  "  Nomad  "  was  observed  quite 
close,  stopjjed  and  apparently  badlj^  damaged  in  the  engine 
room.     One  torpedo  apparentlji'  took  effect  on  rear  ship. 

H.M.S.  "  Onslow;'  dated  2nd  June  1916. 

At  about  6.5  p.m.,  sighting  an  enemy  Light  Cruiser,  class 
uncertain,  with  3  funnels,  with  topgallant  forecastle  only  about 
6,000  yards  from  1st  B.C.S.,  I  decided  to  attack  her.  All  guns 
engaged  enemy  Light  Cruiser,  and  58  rounds  were  fired  at  a 
range  of  2,000  to  4,000  yards ;  undoubtedly  a  large  number  of 
hits  were  scored,  as  they  were  easily  spotted  at  tliis  range.  I 
then  gave  orders  for  all  torpedoes  to  be  fired.  I  saw  the  first 
torpedo  leave  the  ship,  and  immediately  was  struck  by  a  big 
shell  amidships  the  starboard  side.  There  was  a  big  escape  of 
steam,  completely  enveloping  both  torpedo  tubes.  Sub-Lieu- 
tenant  Moore,    Leading    Signalman    Cassin,    also    several   other 

P  2 


228  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

ratings   and   myself   saw   the   torpedo   hit   Liglit   Cruiser   below 
conning  tower,  and  explode. 

Owing  to  two  shells  having  exploded  in  No.  2  Boiler  room, 
and  badly  damaged  main  feed  tank  and  all  the  water  in  the 
reserve  feed  tank  being  now  used,  at  7.0  p.m.  ship  stopped  and 
electric  current  was  lost.  At  7.15  p.m.  ''  Defender  "  closed 
"  Onslow  "  and  asked  if  assistance  was  required.  On  learning 
"  Defender  "  could  only  steam  10  knots,  I  asked  to  be  taken  in 
tow  whilst  endeavouring  to  effect  repairs ;  this  "  Defender  " 
did  under  very  trying  circumstances,  and  with  large  enemy 
ships  rapidly  approaching.  In  tow  of  "  Defender  "  I  then 
proceeded  W.  by  N.  Using  salt-water  feed,  Engineer  Lieutenant 
Commander  Foulkes  raised  speed  for  slow  speed  to  enable  me 
to  use  steering  engine,  and  when  weather  got  worse  to  lessen 
strain  on  to\ving  hawser.  Omng  to  ship's  condition  T  decided 
to  make  for  the  nearest  port — Aberdeen — arriving  there  about 
1.0  p.m.  the  2nd  June. 

H.M.S.  "  Moresby"  dated  Srd  June  1916. 

At  5.0  p.m.  an  enemy  Dreadnought  squadron  then  observed 
steering  Northward  was  attacked.  At  5.10  p.m.,  being  two 
points  before  the  beam  of  the  leading  ship  6-8,000  yards,  a  long 
range  torpedo  was  fired  at  the  third  ship.  About  8  minutes  later 
I  observed  an  upheaval  due  to  a  torpedo,  and  am  informed  it 
was  on  the  6th  ship.  This  agrees  with  the  director  setting. 
The  enemy  were  then  straddling  frecpiently ;  my  smoke  was 
bad ;  I  therefore  turned  towards  the  enemy  and  ran  between 
the  Unes,  in  order  to  clear  the  range  from  smoke  nuisance. 

At  about  2.35  a.m.,  fom*  •' Deutschland "  class  ships  were 
seen  bearing  West,  4,000  yards.  I  hauled  out  to  port,  firing  a 
H.S.  torpedo  at  2.37  G.M.T.  No  more  could  be  fired  as  left 
tube  was  empty,  and  the  fore  director  was  pointed  skywards 
when  the  sight  bore  of  that  tube.  Mist  and  smoke  prevented 
the  enemy  being  seen  again. 

H.M.S.  "  Nicator,"  dated  Uh  June  1916. 

At  4.15  p.m.  torpedo  attack  was  carried  out.  Two  torpedoes 
were  fired  at  a  range  of  about  6,000  yards.  During  tliis  attack 
enemy's  Destroyers  were  continually  engaged  wdth  gunfire,  and 
were  observed  to  be  retiring,  leaving  at  least  two  in  a  disabled 
condition.  A  third  torpedo  was  fired  at  second  ship  of  enemy's 
Battle  Fleet  at  a  range  of  about  3,000  yards.  "  Nestor  "  and 
"  Nicator  "  continued  to  close  until  Avithin  about  2,500  yards, 
when  "Nestor"  was  hit  in  the  region  of  No.  1  Boiler  Room; 
she  immediately  altered  course  8  points  to  starboard,  and 
"  Nicator  "  was  obliged  to  alter  inside  her  to  avoid  collision, 
thereby  failing  to  fire  a  4th  torpedo. 

At  3.30  p.m.,  June  1st,  in  Lat.  55.50  N.,  Long.  0.55  W.,  a 
torpedo  fired  by  a  hostile  submarine  was  observed  approaching 
from  abaft  the  starboard  beam  at  an  angle  of  30  degrees,  running 
on  the  surface ;    helm  was  at  once  put  hard  a  starboard  and 


OFFICIAL    DESi^ATCHES.  229 

telegraplKs  to  fiill  speed.  Torpedo  passed  ahead.  On  resuming 
course  a  submerged  explosion  was  very  distinctly  felt  all  over 
the  ship,  but  no  damage  could  be  found.  Submarine  was  not 
sighted. 

1  *  *  *  *  « 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
8ir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

J.    U.    FARIE, 
Captain  (D), 
The  Vlce-Admiral  C'oininanding  13th  Destroyer  Flotilla. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  H.M.8.   "  Lion.*" 

Enclosure  No.   U>  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

From — Captain  (D),  13th  Destroyer  Flotilla, 

To — The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 

Date— 9th  June  1916. 

No.— 60. 

Submitted. 

Enclosed  are  action  reports  from  Destroyers  in  accordance 
with  your  signal  of  to-day. 

J.    U.    FARIE. 

Captain  (D), 
13th  Destroyer  Flotilla. 


H.M.S.    "  NARBOROUGH," 
Sm,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  in  accordance  with  your 
orders  the  folloMing  movements  of  the  13th  Flotilla  on  31st  May 
and  1st  June  1916. 

Previous  to  action  commencing  the  Flotilla  was  stationed 
ahead  of  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron.  Shortly  after  the  action  had 
commenced  Destroyers  were  ordered  to  attack  with  torpedoes, 
second  and  third  Divisions  drew  out  to  Port  of  "  Champion  " 
in  accordance  with  orders  signalled  to  get  ahead  for  attacking. 
Third  Division  followed  second  Division  down  to  the  attack, 
but  "  Petard  "  and  '"  Turbulent  "  were  separated  by  "  Notting- 
ham "  crossing  "  Petard's  "  bows.  "  Petard  "  and  "  Turbulent  " 
proceeded  independently. 

Previous  to  turning,  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  were 
observed  coming  up  from  the  Southward. 

Before  getting  into  the  favourable  position  to  fire  Torpedoes, 
enemy's  Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers,  fourteen  or  fifteen  in 
No.,  came  across  towards  our  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  and  were 

^  Part  omitted  liere,  leferring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.  in  no  wav  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


230  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

intercepted  by  13th  and  9th  Flotillas.  General  firing  took  place 
the  Third  Division  were  unable  to  open  fire  owing  to  the  9th 
Flotilla,  who  had  come  up  in  the  opposite  direction,  getting 
between  them  and  enemy  Destroyers.  Enemy's  flotilla  retired 
to  their  own  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  after  short  action.  It  is 
thought  that  at  least  two  enemy  Destroyers  were  sunk. 

The  position  of  enemy's  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  was  then 
unfavourable  for  firing  Torpedoes,  and  in  view  of  enemy's  Battle 
Fleet  having  been  sighted,  I  decided  not  to  fire  Torpedoes  at 
long  range  at  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  but  to  retain  all 
Torpedoes  for  use  pending  Fleet  action.  Accordingly  "  Nar- 
borough  "  and  "  Pelican  "  rejoined  "  Champion."  The  remaining 
Destroyers  of  the  13th  Flotilla  rejoined  "  Champion  "  except 
"  Nestor "  and  "  Nomad,"  who  had  been  observed  badly 
damaged. 

Proceeded  in  company  of  "  Champion  "  from  8  p.m.  till 
midnight.  Firing  was  observed  to  starboard  beam  at  intervals 
between  10  and  11  p.m.  and  a  heavy  action  at  11.30  p.m. 
Several  ships  were  seen  on  starboaixl  beam  about  midnight,  but 
it  could  not  be  made  out  whether  hostile. 

At  0.30  a.m.,  1st  June  1916,  a  large  vessel  making  much 
smoke  was  observed  crossing  the  rear  of  the  Flotilla  from 
starboard  to  port  at  a  fast  speed.  This  vessel  was  thought  to 
be  one  of  our  Light  Cruisers  or  an  Armoured  Cruiser  of  the 
"  Warrior  "  class,  one  of  whom  had  been  on  our  starboard 
quarter  during  the  First  Watch.  When  on  starboard  quarter  at 
about  1,000  yards  vessel  switched  on  two  red  Ughts  over  one 
green  for  a  few  seconds,  then  switched  searchlights  on  to  rear 
boats  and  opened  heavy  fire.  "  Petard  "  was  struck  and 
severely  damaged;  "  Turbulent  "  was  either  rammed  or  heavily 
shelled  and  no  further  note  of  her  was  obtained.  Vessel  was 
immediately  lost  sight  of  owing  to  heavy  smoke. 

Flotilla  then  proceeded  to  the  Westward. 

At  Dajdight  it  Avas  noticed  that  Destroyers  ahead  were  not 
in  touch  ^vith  "  Champion."  I  took  charge  of  Destroj^ers 
13th  Flotilla,  consisting  of  "  Narborough,"  "  Pehcan,"  "  Ne- 
rissa,"  "  Nicator,"  and  "  Petard,"  and  placed  myself  under 
orders  of  "  Lydiard "  of  9th  FlotiUa.  "  Termagant  "  had 
previously  rejoined  9th  Flotilla. 

On  receiving  orders  by  W/T  to  join  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron 

1  proceeded  as  requisite,  rejoining  Fleet  at  9.45  a.m.,  having 
pre\dously  despatched  "  Petard  "  and  "  Nicator  "  to  base  as 
they  were  running  short  of  fuel.  At  7  p.m..  13th  Flotilla  were 
ordered  to  join  "  Badger  "  and  return  to  base.     Arrived  base  at 

2  p.m.  2nd  June  1916. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
To  Captain  (D)  GEOFFREY    CORLETT, 

13th  Destroyer  FlotiUa,  Lieutenant-Commander. 

H.M.S.  "  Champion." 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  231 

H.M.S.    'OBDURATE," 

13th  Flotilla, 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  BEG  to  report  that  at  the  commencement  of  the  action 
on  31st  May  between  H.M.  Battle  Cruisers  and  the  German 
High  Sea  Fleet,  H.M.S.  "  Obdurate  "  was  separated  from  the 
remainder  of  the  13th  Flotilla,  and  Mas  about  1,000  yards  on 
the  engaged  side  of  H.M.S.  ''  Lion."' 

Every  endeavour  was  made  to  join  the  flotilla,  but  this  was 
not  accomplished  when  the  signal  was  made  to  carry  out  a 
Torpedo  Attack  on  the  enemy. 

On  receiving  the  Signal.  '"  Obdurate  "  turned  towards  the 
enemy's  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  and  soon  became  engaged  with 
their  destroyers  and  one  Light  Cruiser,  who  were  apparently 
approaching  to  carry  out  a  torpedo  attack  on  our  Battle  Cruisers. 
Range  varied  from  6,000  to  3,000  yards,  and  during  the 
destroyer  action  one  of  the  enemy's  destroj^ers  was  blowTi  up, 
and  two  others  badly  damaged ;  probably  one  of  those  two  sank 
as  the  guns  firing  at  her  lost  sight  of  her. 

The  enemy  Destroj^ers  and  light  cruisers  were  driven  back 
to  the  protection  of  their  big  sliips'  guns,  and  the  "  Obdurate  " 
was  then  too  far  astern  to  dehver  a  torpedo  attack. 

H.M.S.  "  Obdurate  "  was  hit  twice  b}^  a  4*  1  shell,  but  suffered 
no  casualties. 

■'  Obdurate  '  then  rejoined  H.M.S.  ''  Champion,"  and  re- 
mained with  her  till  ordered  to  return  to  base  at  1  p.m.  on 
1st  June. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 
Captain  (D),  C.   H.   HUTTON   SAMS, 

13th  Flotilla,  Lieut.-Com. 

H.M.S.   "  Champion." 


H.M.S.    "PETARD," 

13th  Destroyer  Flotilla, 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  the  proceedings  of  H.M.  Ship 
\inder  my  command  during  the  action  on  31st  May. 

2.  '■  Petard  "'  was  in  company  with  13th  Flotilla  ahead  of 
"  Lion  "  at  the  commencement  of  the  action,  and  when  destroyers 
wore  ordered  to  attack  was  in  station  astern  of  "  Pelican  "  and 
"  Narborough."  Owing  to  "  Nottingham  "  cutting  through 
flotilla.  ••  Petard  "  had  to  reduce  speed  and  pass  astern  of  her, 
and  then  being  some  distance  astern  of  "  Pehcan."  I  decided  to 
attack  with  "  Turbulent,"  and  accordingly  attacked  immediately 
after  "  Nestor's  "  division.  The  first  torpedo  fired  was  set  for 
high  speed,  six  feet  deep,  and  was  aimed  by  Mr.  Epworth,  Gunner 


232  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

(T),  at  the  liead  of  the  Geiman  Dchtroyer  Flotilla,  which  was 
crossing  over  to  meet  our  attack.  Tiie  track  of  the  torpedo  was 
closely  followed,  and  the  tube's  crew  state  they  undoubtedly  saw 
it  hit  a  German  T.B.D.  about  amidships  and  explode.  I  certainly 
myself  o[)ened  fire  with  my  guns  on  this  T.B.D.  a  few  minutes 
later,  and  she  wan  then  lying  stopped,  with  her  upper  deck  awash 
and  obviously  sinking. 

3.  "  Petard  "  then  took  part  in  the  general  engagement  with 
the  German  Destroyers,  and  the  three  remaining  torpedoes  were 
fired  at  a  range  of  about  7,000  yards  on  the  bow  of  the  German 
Battle  Ouisers.  All  these  torpedoes  were  fired  at  about  the 
second  or  third  German  Battle  Cruiser,  and  must  have  crossed 
the  track  of  the  German  line. 

4.  After  this,  as  our  Fleet  had  turned  to  the  Northward, 
"  Petard  "  proceeded  to  rejoin,  and  ])assing  the  spot  where  the 
hull  of  H.M.tS.  "  Queen  Mary  '"  A\as  lying,  picked  up  the  Caf)tain 
of  the  after  turret  of  that  ship.  '*  Petard  "  then  passed  astern 
of  the  5th  Battle  Squadron  and  rejoined  "  Champion."  "  Petard  '" 
remained  with  the  Flotilla,  and  accompanied  it  South  during 
the  night. 

5.  At  12,15  a.m.  course  was  altered  to  8.W.  by  W.,  and  about 
ten  minutes  later  the  line  crossed  ahead  of  a  division  of  German 
Battleshijjs.  I  sighted  the  leading  Battleship  about  six  points 
on  my  starboard  bow,  steering  S.E.  at  about  400  or  500  yards. 
This  ship  switched  on  recognition  lights,  consisting  of  two  red 
over  one  white  light  and,  as  some  destroyer  ahead  of  me  in  the 
line  then  switched  on  her  "  fighting  lights,"'  I  think  the  Germans 
at  once  knew  we  were  enemy.  As  "  Petard  "'  had  no  torpedoes 
left,  I  could  not  attack,  so  I  increased  to  full  speed  and  altered 
course  slightly  to  port  to  avoid  being  rammed.  I  passed  about 
200  yards  ahead  of  the  German  ship,  who  appeared  to  be  one 
of  the  ''  Wittelsbach  "'  class. 

6.  As  soon  as  we  were  clear  of  her  stem,  she  illuminated  us 
with  searchlights,  and  we  came  under  a  heavy  fire  from  her 
and  the  next  ship  in  the  line.  Two  salvoes  seemed  to  strike 
us,  and  in  all,  I  think,  we  received  six  hits. 

•No.  1  was  aft  on  the  port  side  of  the  Quarterdeck ;  this  shot 
disabled  the  whole  after  gun's  crew  and  supply  party. 

No.  2  blew  a  hole  in  the  ship's  side  in  the  Commanding 
Officer's  cabin,  about  three  feet  by  two,  and  then  wrecked  the 
whole  of  the  Officers'  cabins. 

No.  3  made  a  large  hole  in  the  upper  deck  on  top  of  No.  2 
stokehold,  and  then  entering  the  stokehold  cut  an  oil  pressure 
gauge  pipe.  The  oil  spurting  out  of  this  pipe  made  a  considerable 
fire. 

No.  4  hit  beloM  the  midship  gun  platform  and  did  little 
damage. 

No.  5  was,  apparently,  a  shrapnel,  and  this  burst  just  short 
of  the  ship  in  line  with  the  t^o  foremost  funnels,  covering  the 
whole  of  that  part  of  the  shi]i  with  s])linters.  INFost  of  the  cowls 
and  plates  in  this  part  of  the  .shij)  were  penetrated  bj-  these. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  233 

No.  6  hit  a  cowl  aft  and  tlid  little  damage  besides. 
If  only  '■  Petard  "  had  had  some  torpedoes  left,  1  am  certain 
a  successful  torj^edo  attack  could  easily  have  been  made. 

1    *  ^  ^  :):  :!< 

10.  I  regret  that  1  never  saw  H.M.S.  "  Turbulent,"  who 
was  in  station  astern  of  "  Petard,"  after  passing  this  German 
Squadron.  According  to  the  evidence  of  some  of  my  ship's 
company  I  am  afraid  she  must  have  been  rammed  and  sunk. 

11.  After  this  action  "  Petard  "  proceeded  as  fast  as  possible, 
and  eventually  rejoined  the  Flotilla  at  daylight.  At  6.0  p.m. 
'■  Petard  "  and  "  Nicator  "  were  detached  to  return  to  Rosyth. 
At  7.0  a.m.  '"  Nicator  "  transferred  Probationary  Surgeon  Neil 
MacLeod  to  '"  Petard,"  who  carried  out  his  work  iii  a  most 
excellent  manner  but,  I  am  afraid,  was  too  late  to  save  most  of 
the  wounded.  Previous  to  his  arrival  C.P.O.  Thomas  Knight, 
O.N.  (165,128).  had  done  his  utmost  for  them. 

12.  At  3.30  p.m.  in  Lat.  55.50  N.,  Long.  0.55  W.,  "  Nicator  " 
reported  that  she  was  attacked  by  a  submarine,  and  a  torpedo 
passed  under  her  stern.  "  Petard  "  and  "  Nicator  "  eventually 
arrived  at  Rosyth  at  7.45  p.m. 


I  have  the  honour  to  be,| 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

E.   C.    O.   THOMSON, 
The  Captain  (D),  Lieutenant  Commander. 

13th  Destrover  Flotilla. 


H.M.S.    "  PELICAN." 
13th  Flotilla, 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  the  following  proceedings  of 
H.M.  Ship  under  my  command  during  the  engagement  of  31st 
May- 1st  June  1916.' 

The  formation  of  the  fleet  was  cruising  order,  course  S.S.  1  E., 
19|  knots. 

The  eneni}'  Battle  cruisers  accompanied  by  destroyers  were 
sighted  at  3.15  p.m.  G.M.T. 

At  3.45  H.M.S.  '^  Champion  "  and  13th  Flotilla  formed  single 
line  ahead  and  took  station  on  starboard  bow  of  the  B.C.F. 

Fire  was  opened  by  the  enemy  at  3.48  and  by  our  fleet  at  3.50. 

At  4.20,  having  received  a  signal  to  attack  ^ith  torpedoes, 
the  13th  Flotilla  proceeded  in  the  order  1st,  2nd  and  3rd  Divs. 
The    3rd    Div.,    consisting    of    "  Narborough  "    and    ''  Pehcan," 

^  Part  -omitted  here,  referiing  solely  to  personnel,  reconimendatious, 
&c.  in  no  wav  bearing;  on  the  coin-se  of  the  action. 


234  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

were  unable  to  fire  torpedoes  owing  to  the  other  two  divisions 
being  engaged  by  enemy  torpedo  craft  between  the  fleets  and 
by  a  division  of  9th  Flotilla,  who  were  coming  up  in  the  opposite 
direction;    we  therefore  tui-ned  to  rejoin  "Champion." 

The  flotilla  reformed  in  single  line  ahead  and  took  station  on 
the  disengaged  side  of  5th  Battle  Squadron,  Course  Nly. 

At  G.OO  the  Grand  Fleet  was  sighted  steering  about  S.  by  E., 
and  fire  was  opened  at  G.lo  p.m. 

Between  7.10  and  10.20  Courses  were  South  and  South -West 
with  speeds  varying  between  10  and  20  knots,  during  which 
time  firing  was  observed  on  Starboard  beam  and  quarter. 

At  about  10.35  there  was  heavy  firing  in  N.Wly.  direction, 
and  destroyers  were  seen  in  the  Search  light  rays  attacking 
ships.     Shortly  after  there  was  a  huge  explosion  in  that  direction. 

At  0.40,  June  1st,  when  on  a  Course  S.W.,  speed  30  knots, 
observed  two  ships  on  Starboard  quarter,  which  were  at  first 
taken  to  be  our  Light  Cruisers.  They  switched  on  three 
vertical  lights,  the  upper  two  being  red  and  the  lower 
green,  at  the  same  time  "  Pelican's  "  stern  was  fit  up  by  a 
Search  light,  which  was  immediately  transferred  to  "  Petard  " 
and  "  Turbulent  "  who  were  astern. 

When  sighted  position  was  unfavourable  for  attack  and,  as 
she  was  shortly  lost  sight  of,  "  Pelican  "  proceeded  to  regain 
touch  with  the  flotilla. 

At  daybreak  it  was  found  that  the  destroyers  then  in 
company  were  as  follows  : — "  Narborough,"  "'  Pelican,"  "  Pe- 
tard," "  Nerissa,"  "  Nicator "  and  a  division  of  9th  Flotilla, 
led  by  "  Lydiard."  These  were  formed  up  at  1.30  a.m.  and 
steered  N.  70  W.  at  15  loiots. 

At  5.35,  having  received  a  signal  to  rejoin  B.C.F.,  "  Nar- 
borough," "  Pelican  "  and  "  Nerissa  "  proceeded  S.  60  E.  at 
25  knots. 

At  9.50  sighted  Grand  Fleet,  and  at  10.08  joined  Flag 
"  Lion,"  and  took  up  position  for  submarine  screen,  Course 
N.  by  W. 

At  4.0  p.m.  ■'  Pehcan  "  was  ordered  to  return  to  base  to 
replenish  with  fuel,  where  she  arrived  at  1.30  p.m.,  2  June, 
with  9  tons  of  oil  only  remaining  on  board. 

Nothing  of  importance  occurred  on  the  passage  back. 

The  conduct  of  all  officers  and  men  was  everything  that 
could  be  desired  under  the  trjdng  circumstances  of  waiting  to 
join  in  the  action  which  I  felt  confident  would  be  the  case,  ha\'ing 
had  the  majority  of  them  under  my  command  for  over  two 
years. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obecUent  Servant, 

KENNETH   A.   BEATTIE, 
The  Captain  (D),  Lieut. -Commander. 

13th  Flotilla. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  235 

H.M.S.    -^ERISSA," 
Sir,  oth  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  proceedings  of  R.M.  Sliip 
under  mj"  command  during  lecent  action  in  tlie  North  Sea  on 
31st  May  1910,  and  1st  June  1916.  Being  in  company  with 
1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  '"  New  Zealand,"  "  Indefatigable," 
"  Barham,"  '"  Malaya,"  "  Valiant,"  "  Warspite,"  "  Champion," 
"Fearless,"  13th  Flotilla,  two  di\nsions  of  first  Flotilla,  one 
division  of  10th  Flotilla,  1st,  2nd  and  3rd  Liglit  Cruiser 
Squadrons. 

315/  3Iay. 

P.M. 

3.  0.     1st  Light  Cruiser  Sc^uadron  reported  in  action. 

3.30.  Sighted  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers,  five  in  number,  with 
destroyers  and  Light  Cruisers.  13th  Flotilla  took 
station  ahead  of  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  having 
been  screening  them  previously. 

3.44.     Enemy  opened  fire  and  action  developed. 

4.  0.     Sighted  High  Sea  Fleet  ahead. 

4.30.  13th  Flotilla  ordered  to  attack  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers 
wdth  torpedoes.  Took  station  astern  of  3rd  division  of 
13th  Flotilla  and  commenced  attack  on  a  Northerly 
course,  owing  to  enemy  turning  16  points,  tliis  attack 
had  eventually  to  be  carried  out  on  a  Southerly  course, 
which  I  did  in  company  with  "  Termagant,"  firing  two 
torpedoes,  range  7,000  yards.  Just  previous  to  this 
attack  '■'  Nomad  "  was  observed  quite  close,  stopped 
and  apparent!}'  badly  damaged  in  the  Engine  Room, 
the  enemy's  Light  Cruisers  were  firing  accurate  salv^oes 
during  the  attack,  and  this  fire  was  returned,  though 
spotting  was  very  difficult,  one  torpedo  apparently 
took  effect  on  rear  ship.  Rejoined  '"  Champion  "  on 
disengaged  side  of  Battle  Cruisers,  steering  to  the 
Nortliward  and  joined  the  Grand  Fleet,  remaining  in 
comparA'  with  '"  Champion  "  throughout  the  remainder 
of  the  action. 

9.10.     Altered  Course  to  South  20  knots. 

9.36.  Altered  Course  to  S.S.E.  17  knots. 
11.40.  Observed  firing  and  searchlights  abaft  starboard  beam,  a 
ship  apparently  being  attacked  by  destroyers,  many 
salvoes  fell  between  "  Nerissa  "  and  ''  Moresby,"  who 
was  next  ahead. 
11.45.  Lost  touch  with  "Moresby"  and  remained  in  company 
with  "  Lydiard."     Course  S.E.,  25  knots. 

1.5/  June. 

A.M. 

12.28.     Altered  Course  to  S.W.,  30  knots. 
1.20.     Altered  Course  to  N.  70  W.,  25  knots;   more  firing  astern 
was  observed. 


2:Uj  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

A.M. 

3.  0.      IT)  knots. 

5.30.     Altered  course  to  N.  70  E.,  25  knots,  to  rejoin  Battle 

Cruiser    Squadron    in   company    with    "  Xarborough  " 

and  "  Pelican.'" 

I  *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

M.  G.  B.  LEGGE, 
The  Captain  (D),  Lieutenant -Commander, 

H.M.S.  "  Champion." 

H..M.S.  "ONSLOW.'- 
c/o  G.P.O., 
Sir,  2nd  June,  1916. 

I  HAVJ-;  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  of  the 
part  taken  by  H.M.  Ship  under  my  command  during  the  action 
of  the  3 1st  May,  1916.  During  the  forenoon  and  early  afternoon 
of  Wednesday,  31st  May,  "  Onslow,"  working  as  a  unit  of  the 
13tli  Flotilla,  was  screening  the  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 
At  2.50  p.m.  "  Onslow  "  and  "  Moresby  "  were  detached  to  close 
"  Engadine."  I  took  "  Moresby  "  under  my  orders  and  pro- 
ceeded to  close  "  Engadine  "  at  25  knots  course  East,  at  3.0  p.m. 
"  Engadine  "  stopped  and  hoisted  out  one  seaplane  then 
steamed  N.  b}^  E.,  20  knots,  waiting  for  seaplane  to  return, 
finally  hoisting  it  in  at  3.45  p.m.  At  3.50  p.m.  enemy's  Battle 
Cruisers  were  sighted  steering  approximate^  S.S.E.,  short!}'' 
afterwards  being  engaged  b}'^  the  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron 
and  5th  Battle  Squadron  on  a  nearly  parallel  course.  I  then 
asked  the  Commanding  Officer  of  "  Engadine  "  if  he  further 
required  assistance  of  "  Onslow  "  and  "  Moresby,''  and  on 
receiving  reply  "  No,"  I  proceeded  with  "  Moresby  "  to  close 
the  nearest  squadron,  the  5th  Battle  Squadron,  at  30  knots, 
course  S.S.E.  at  4.55  p.m.  I  again  sighted  the  1st  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron  and  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers  returning,  steering  approxi- 
mately N.N.E.  I  turned  to  N.N.E.,  taldng  station  about 
3  miles  on  engaged  bow  of  "  Lion."  I  found  that  steering 
N.N.E.  "  Onslow  "  was  rapidly  opening  from  "  Lion  "  and 
closing  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers  about  5  points  on  their  engaged 
bow,  distant  18,000  yards.  I  was  unabL>  to  see  any  enemy's 
Light  Cruisers  or  Destroyers  ahead  of  their  Battle  Cruisers,  and 
deemed  it  a  favourable  opportunity  to  deliver  an  attack  with 
torpedoes,  and  with  this  idea  proceeded  to  close  enemy  more. 
Shortly  afterwards  four  enemy  Light  Cruisers  a])peared  ahead  of 
their  Battle  Cruisers  and  closed  "  Onslow."  and  opened  a  heavy 
and  very  accurate  fire  on  both  "  OnsloM'  '"  and  "  Moresbj'.'' 

1  *  Part  omitted  hero,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  reeoniinendations, 
&.O.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  coarse  of  the  action 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  237 

Realising  I  should  be  unable  to  get  within  torpedo  range, 
at  5.5  p.m.  I  retired  N.VV.  in  the  direction  of  "  Lion,"  "  Moresbj-,"' 
to  avoid  making  a  double  target  with  "  Onslow,"  separated  and 
went  astern  of  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  "  Onslow  "  taking 
station  astern  of  1st  Light  Cruiser  (Squadron  on  engaged  bow  of 
"  Lion,"  course  N.N.E.  Armoured  cruisers  of  Grand  Fleet  were 
sighted  at  5.45  p.m.  Grand  Fleet  Battle  Squadron  at  5.50  p.m. 
I  had  been  endeavouring  to  join  up  with  one  of  our  Destroyer 
Flotillas,  the  only  one  close  was  the  1st  Flotilla  on  the 
disengaged  beam  of  1st  Battle  (Vuiser  Squadron.  As  I  was  in  a 
most  advantageous  position  for  repelling  enemy's  Destroyers 
endeavouring  to  attack  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  or 
delivering  an  attack  mj'^self,  I  considered  it  better  for  me  to 
remain  on  engaged  bow  of  "  Lion."  At  about  6.5  p.m.  enemy's 
Battle  Cruisers  turned  to  a  course  about  S.E.,  1st  Battle  Cruiser 
Scj[uadron  turned  to  approximately  the  same  course  shortly 
afterwards.  At  this  moment  sighting  an  enemy  Light  Cruiser, 
cla'^s  uncertain,  with  3  funnels  and  topgallant  forecastle,  only 
about  6,000  yards  from  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  I  decided  to 
attack  her  to  endeavour  to  frustrate  her  firing  torpedoes  at  our 
Battle  Cruisers.  I  gave  orders  to  all  guns  to  engage  enemy 
Light  Cruiser,  and  58  rounds  were  fired  at  a  range  of  2,000  to 
4,000  3''ards,  undoubtedly  a  large  number  of  hits  were  scored  as 
.the}'  were  easily  spotted  at  this  range.  While  closing  this  Light 
Cruiser  I  saw  Enemy  Battle  Cruisers  had  again  turned,  placing 
"Onslow"  4  points  on  their  port  bow  about  11,000  yards.  I 
then  gave  orders  for  all  torpedoes  to  be  fired  at  enemy  Battle 
Cruiser  line  by  Gunner  T,  on  receiving  a  further  executive  signal 
from  myself  oji  the  bridge.  On  arriving  at  8,000  yards  from 
leading  enemy  Battle  Cruiser  I  gave  this  signal  and  turned  the 
ship  to  port  to  bring  enemy  on  my  starboard  beam.  There 
appeared  to  be  delay  in  carrying  out  the  order,  and  Sub- 
Lieutenant  R.  L.  Moore  ran  down  to  tubes  and  got  astride 
foremost  tube  alongside  Captain  of  tube's  crew.  On  the  sights 
coming  on  to  centre  enemy's  Battle  Cruiser,  he  gave  the  order 
to  fire.  I  saw  this  torpedo  leave  the  tube  and  instantaneously 
the  ship  was  struck  by  a  big  shell  amidships  the  starboard  side. 
Immediately  there  was  a  big  escape  of  steam,  completely 
enveloping  both  Torpedo  tubes.  On  enquiring  I  received  a 
report  that  all  torpedoes  had  been  fired  and  consequently  turned 
away  at  greatly  reduced  speed,  passing  about  3,500  yards  from 
enemy's  Light  Cruiser  previously  mentioned.  I  sent  to  Sub- 
Lieutenant  Moore  to  find  out  damage  done ;  while  doing  this 
he  discovered  only  one  torpedo  had  been  fired,  and  observing 
enemy's  Light  Cruiser  beam  on,  and  apparenth'  temporarily 
stopped,  fired  a  torpedo  at  her.  Sub-Lieutenant  Moore,  Leading 
Signalman  Cassin,  also  several  other  ratings  and  myself,  saw 
torpedo  hit  Light  Cruiser  below  conning  tower  and  explode. 
Sub-Lieutenant  Moore  then  came  forward  and  reported  to  me  we 
still  had  two  torpedoes  left,  and  at  the  same  time  drew  my 
attention   to   enemy's  fine   of  battleships.     "  Onslow  "   was   on 


238  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

their  port  bow  about  8,000  j^ards.  Both  remaming  torpedoes 
were  tired  under  the  .supervision  of  Sub-Lieutenant  Moore ;  they 
started  the  run  satisfactorily  and  must  have  crossed  enemy's 
hne.  I  then  proceeded  to  close  H.M..S.  "  Champion."  with  the 
idea  of  rejoining  13tli  Flotilla,  l)ut  owing  to  tMo  sliells  having 
exploded  in  No.  2  boiler  room,  and  badh'  damaged  main  feed 
tank,  and  all  the  water  in  reserve  feed  tank  being  now  used  at 
7.0  p.m.,  ship  stopped,  and  owing  to  loss  of  electric  current,  I 
was  unable  to  answer  "  Champion's  "  searchhght.  At  7.15  p.m. 
"  Defender  "  closed  "  Onslow  "  and  asked  if  assistance  was 
required.  On  learning  "  Defender  "  could  only  steam  ten  knots, 
I  asked  to  be  taken  in  tow  whilst  endeavouring  to  effect  repairs, 
this  "  Defender  "  did  under  very  trying  conditions  and  with 
large  enemj^  ships  rapidly  approaching.  In  tow  of  "  Defender  " 
I  then  proceeded  W.  by  N.  Using  salt  water  feed,  Engineer 
Lieutenant  Commander  Foulkes  raised  steam  for  slow  speed  to 
enable  me  to  use  steering  engine  and  Avhen  weather  got  worse, 
to  lessen  strain  on  towing  hawser.  Owing  to  the  ship's  condition, 
No.  2  boiler  room  and  cajDtain's  cabin  fiat  were  flooded  and  a 
considerable  quantity  of  water  also  getting  into  Wardroom  and 
Officers'  cabin  flat,  and  weather  getting  bad,  I  decided  to  make 
for  nearest  port — Aberdeen — arriving  there  at  1.0  p.m.  the 
2nd  June. 

I  have  the  honour  to  ))e, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

JACK  C.   TOVEY, 
Captain  (D),  Lieutenant-Commander. 

13th  Flotilla. 

H.M.S.  "  MORESBY," 

3rd  June  1916. 

REPORT  OF  PROCEEDINGS  31st  MAY  TO  2nd  JUNE. 

Sir, 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  H.M.S.  "  Moresby," 
under  my  Command,  was  in  company  with  "  Engadine  "  and 
"  Onslow  "  at  the  commencement  of  the  Action.  ''  Onslow's  " 
orders  were  carried  out  and  at  5  p.m.  an  enemy  "  Dreadnought  " 
squadron,  then  observed  steering  Northward,  was  attacked. 

I.  5.10  p.m.,  being  two  points  before  the  beam  of  the  leading 
Ship,  6-8,000  yards,  a  long  range  torpedo  was  fu'ed  at  the  third 
Ship.  The  enemy  bad  station  did  not  justify  further  expendi- 
ture in  view  of  the  night  work  expected  to  follow.  About 
eight  minutes  later  I  observed  an  upheaval  due  to  a  Torpedo 
and  am  informed  it  was  on  the  sixth  Ship.  This  agrees  with 
the  director  setting.  The  enemy  were  then  straddhhg  frequently 
— my  smoke  was  bad^ — ^I  therefore  turned  towards  the  enemy 
and  ran  between  the  lines  in  order  to  clear  the  range  from  smoke 
nuisance. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  23  9 

The  enemy  shooting  was  very  good  and  had  they  fired  double 
salvoes  they  would  have  hit.  ^y  observing  attentively  and 
using  large  helm,  the  Ship  was  not  straddled  more  than  (>  times 
and  only  one  piece  of  H.E.  was  picked  up. 

The  enemy  Ships  appeared  not  to  fire  aftei-  a  certain  bearing, 
but  the  fresh  Ship  starting  seemed  to  straddle  with  almost  the 
first  salvo,  though  not  again. 

The  deflection  was  often  too  much,  and  simple  use  of  helm 
avoided  the  follomng  salvo  which  would  have  hit. 

2.  Passing  astern  of  the  5th  B.S.  I  rejoined  "  Champion  "  at 
6.30  p.m.     Her  orders  were  then  carried  out. 

3.  About  2.35  a.m.  four  "  Deutschland  "  Class  Ships  were 
seen  bearing  West,  4,000  yards.  I  considered  action  imperative, 
hoisted  Compass  West,  hauled  out  to  Port,  firing  a  H.S.  Torpedo 
at  2.37  G.M.T.  No  more  could  be  fired  as  the  left  tube  was 
empty  and  the  fore  director  was  pointed  skyward  w^hen  the  sights 
bore  of  that  tube.  This  incident  and  opportunity  was  over  very 
quickly  as  the  enemy  were  steaming  18  knots  S.E.  A  concussion 
shook  the  Ship  about  2  minutes  later,  it  was  well  marked  aft  and 
was  felt  in  the  "  Obdurate."  Mist  and  smoke  prevented  the 
enemy  being  seen  again,  but  I  feel  certain  the  enemy  were 
"  Deutschland  "  and  that  the  Torpedo  hit  something. 

4.  At  2.47  a.m.  the  "  Champion  "  was  rejoined  and  her  orders 
obeyed. 

5.  At  1.30  p.m.,  1st  June,  orders  were  received  to  return  to 
base,  due  to  lack  of  oil.  "  Nonsuch  "  was  heard,  and  a  zigzag 
search  was  carried  out  until  the  uncertainty  of  my  position  and 
lack  of  fuel  caused  me  to  proceed. 

6.  Four  Light  Cruisers  were  met  at  3.30  p.m.,  course  N.W. 
At  4.40  p.m.  5  "  Shannons  "  and  one  Destroyer  steering  N.  50  W. 
Base  was  reached  at  7.30  a.m. 

7.  Torpedoes  were  observed  at  7.48  p.m.,  1st  May,  2  in  No., 
one  ahead  and  the  second  astern. 

About  3.35  a.m.,  1st  June,  two  more  were  seen  set  shallow, 
one  of  these  was  just  avoided,  it  appeared  to  keep  very  good 
depth,  but  was  not  a  Heater. 

1  *  *  *  *  « 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

ROGER   ALISON, 
Captain    (D)  13,  Lieutenant-Commander. 

H.M.S.  "  Champion." 


^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recomrnendationsj 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


240  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

H.M.S.  '  XICATOR," 

4th  June  1918. 
Sir,  War  Base. 

I   HAVE  the  honour  to  report  in  accordance   with  your 
order  : — 

That  on  signal  from  V.A.  Battle  Cruisers  to  take  station  ahead 
being  received,  "  Nicator  "  took  up  station  as  ordered. 

On  finding  it  necessary  to  reduce  speed  to  keep  station  on 
"  Nomad,"  who  appeared  to  be  dropping  astern,  permission  was 
requested  and  approved  to  pass  ahead  and  take  station  astern 
of  "  Nestor." 

At  4.15  p.m.  Second  Division  being  ordered  to  attack,  full 
speed,  was  ordered.  At  4.20  p.m.  enemy's  destroyers  appeared 
to  be  within  gun  range  and  effective  fire  was  opened  at  7,000  yards 
(rate  rapidly  closing). 

At  this  time  "  Nestor,"  with  "  Nicator  "  and  "  Nomad  " 
astern,  was  steering  a  course  closing  enemy's  B.C.F.  at  an 
inclination  of  about  three  points,  to  attain  good  position  to 
attack. 

On  "  Nicator  "  opening  fire,  second  division  w^as  subjected 
to  moderately  heavy  fire  from  enemy's  T.B.D.'s  and  one  Light 
Cruiser. 

On  attaining  a  position  five  points  before  beam  of  leading 
ship  of  enemy's  B.C.F.,  "  Nestor  "  turned  twelve  points  (approxi- 
mately), to  Port  followed  by  "  Nicator  "  and  "  Nomad,'"  thereby 
steering  a  roughlv  reciprocal  course,  closing  enemy's  fine  at  an 
inclination  of  about  two  points. 

At  this  time  "  Second  Division  "  was  subjected  to  a  heavy 
fire  from  secondary  armament  of  enemy's  B.C.F.  and  one  Light 
Cruiser. 

"  Nomad  "  was  badly  hit  and  hauled  out  of  fine  to  Port. 

Range  of  enemy's  B.C.F.  was  now  estimated  at  about 
6,000  yards,  and,  position  being  favourable  for  attack,  a  Torpedo 
was  fired.  A  second  Torpedo  was  fired  at  5,000  yards  on  the 
same  side. 

This  torpedo  was  fired  as  it  was  considered  very  unlikely  that 
the  ship  would  escape  disablement  before  another  opportunity 
occurred.  During  this  attack,  enemy's  T.B.D.'s  were  continuall}?^ 
engaged  with  gunfire,  and  were  observed  to  be  retiring,  leaving 
at  least  two  in  a  disabled  condition. 

When  enemy's  B.C.F.  bore  abeam,  "  Nestor  "  and  "  Nicator  " 
altered  course  about  twelve  points  in  succession  to  Starboard. 
At  the  same  time  enemy's  B.C.F.  altered  course  16  points 
together;  this  brought  "Nestor"  and  "Nicator"  still  closing 
enemy  about  2  points  on  a  reciprocal  course. 

The  enemy's  B.C.F.  was  now  sui:)plemented  by  a  very  large 
number  of  Battleships  in  line  ahead,  astern  of  B.C.F.  "  Nestor  " 
and  "  Nicator  "  were  now  subjected  to  a  very  heavy  fire  from 
secondary  armament  of  enemy's  Battle  Fleet  at  a  range  of  about 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  241 

3,000  yards,  and  position  being  favourable,  a  third  Torpedo  was 
fired  at  second  sliip  of  enemy's  Battle  Fleet. 

"  Nestor  "  and  '"  Nicator  "  continued  to  close  until  within 
about  2,500  yards,  when  "  Nestor  "  was  hit  in  region  of  No.  1 
boiler  room ;  she  immediately  altered  course  8  points  to 
Starboard  and  "  Nicator  "  was  obliged  to  alter  inside  her  to 
avoitl  collision,  thereby  failing  to  fire  a  fourth  Torj)edo. 

Signal  for  Destroyers  recall  being  observed  ''  Nicator  " 
altered  to  West  (approx.)  and  rejoined  ''  Champion  "  forming 
single  Hne  ahead  on  her.  Whilst  returning,  "  Nomad  "  was 
observed  to  be  stopped  between  the  lines. 

During  Torpedo  attack,  enemy's  T.B.D.'s  were  passed  on  a 
reciprocal  course  at  a  range  of  about  600  yards ;  their  fire 
appeared  to  be  very  poor.  Whilst  the  ship  was  subject  to  very 
heavy  fire  from  enemy's  Battle  Fleet,  course  was  altered  to 
•either  side  of  "  Nestor's  "  wake  at  frequent  intervals  to  avoid 
isalvoes. 

At  6.0  p.m.  on  signal  "  Pdts.  lA  "  being  made  "  Nicator  " 
took  station  astern  of  "  Termagant,"  informing  "  Obdurate  "  of 
her  having  joined  First  Division.  Remained  in  company  with 
""  Champion  "  for  remainder  of  action. 

At  about  9.30  p.m.  (course  S.S.E.,  20  knots),  in  company  with 
^'  Champion  "  and  T.B.D.'s,  heavy  firing  was  heard  and  seen  off 
Starboard  bow. 

At  9.50  p.m.  a/c  South,  heavy  firing  was  heard  at  frequent 
intervals  off  the  Starboard  beam.  This  was  assumed  to  be  a 
division  of  enemy's  Battleships  or  Cruisers  being  attacked  by 
divisions  of  a  T.B.D.  Flotilla ;  vessels  attacked  appeared  at  about 
12.15  a.m.  to  be  distant  f  mile. 

"  Nicator  "  was  occasionally  in  beam  of  searchlights  and 
•several  salvoes  fell  close. 

At  12.30  a.m.  a/c  to  S.W.,  Speed  30  knots  (following 
'' Termagant"). 

At  1.17  a.m.  a/c  to  W.N.W.,  25  knots. 

At  daylight  it  was  seen  that  "  Termagant  "  and  "  Nerissa  " 
were  astern  of  Ninth  Flotilla;  "Champion,"  and  remainder  of 
First  Div.  of  13th  Flotilla  not  in  sight— ("  Turbulent  "  not  in 
company). 

At  5.50  a.m.  a/c  to  N.  70  E.,  20  knots. 

At  6.15  a.m.,  on  account  of  shortage  of  oil,  Avas  ordered  by 
"  Lydiard  "  to  return  to  Base  in  company  with  "  Petard." 

At  3.30  p.m.,  in  Lat.  55 — 50  N.,  Long.  0 — 55  W.,  a  Torpedo 
fired  by  a  hostile  submarine  was  observed  approaching  from 
abaft  the  Starboard  beam  at  an  angle  of  thirty  degrees,  running 
■on  the  surface ;  helm  was  at  once  put  hard  a  starboard  and 
telegraphs  to  full  speed.     Torpedo  passed  ahead. 

On  resuming  course  a  submerged  explosion  was  very  distinctly 
felt  all  over  the  ship ;   no  damage  could  be  found. 

X    12872  Q 


242  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

Submarine  was  not  sighted. 

Arrived  Queensferry  0.40  p.m.,  Ist  June. 

1    *  4:  *  *  4l 

I  have  the  honour  to  lie 
8ir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

JACK   E.   A.   MOCATTA, 
Captain    (D),  Lieutenant  in  Command. 

H.M.S.  "Champion." 


REPORTS    OF    CAPTAIN    (D),     1st   FLOTILLA. 

Enclosure  No.  20  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

No.  013.  H.M.S.  "Fearless," 

Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  of  my 
proceedings  during  the  recent  operations  in  the  North  Sea. 

2.  The  first  report  of  the  enemy  being  sighted  was  received 
at  2.30  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  on  31st  May.  The  First  Flotilla  consisting 
of  "  Fearless  "  and  nine  destroyers  : — 

"  Acheron,"  "  Hydra,"  "  Defender," 

"  Ariel,"  "  Badger,"  "  Lizard," 

"  Attack,"  "  Goshawk,"  "  Lapwing," 

was  then  screening  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 

3.  The  action  gradually  becoming  general,  "  Fearless  "  and 
destroyers  took  station  on  the  disengaged  side  of  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron.  About  4.1  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  '"  Indefatigable  " 
was  seen  to  blow  up,  and  another  big  explosion  was  observed 
about  15  minutes  later,  presumably  "  Queen  Mary."" 

4.  At  4.45  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  our  Battle  Cruisers  were  seen  steaming 
North,  and  at  4.55  p.m.  "  Fearless  "  and  First  Flotilla  altered 
course  16  points  and  steamed  North  on  the  disengaged  bow  of 
the  First  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron.  Although  "  Fearless  "  was 
steaming  at  full  speed,  having  received  a  signal  from  "  Lion  " 
to  close  and  form  Submarine  Screen,  she  Avas  unable  to  get  up, 
and  gradually  drojiped  back. 

5.  Soon  after  this  the  Grand  Fleet  was  sighted,  and  at  6.8  p.m., 
G.M.T.,  finding  that  "  Fearless  "  could  not  get  up  and  was 
steaming  across  the  front  of  the  Battle  Fleet  making  heavy 
smoke,  the  ship  was  turned  about  32  points,  and  station  taken 
up  with  other  Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers  on  the  disengaged 
quarter  of  the  Battle  Fleet. 

6.  This  position  was  maintained  until  the  "  Acasta  "  was 
found  disabled  with,  the  signal  •"  In  danger  of  sinking  "  flying. 

^  Part  omitted  here  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&e.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  eoui*se  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  243 

"  Galatea  "  was  taking  her  in  tow.  "  Fearless  "  relieved 
"  Galatea  "  and  would  have  taken  the  destroyer  in  tow,  but  the 
latter  reported  she  was  not  then  in  danger  of  sinking  and  I  did 
not  consider  I  ought  to  hamper  myself  with  a  disabled  vessel  in 
the  middle  of  the  action.  I  therefore  proceeded  and  followed 
after  the  Battle  Fleet,  passing  the  wreck  of  a  Light  Cruiser, 
upside  down  and  stem  out  of  the  water,  apparently  German, 
judging  by  the  draught  markings. 

7.  The  Battle  Fleet  was  not  picked  up  until  after  dusk, 
when  a  column  of  ships  was  sighted  ahead  and  station  was  taken 
astern  of  what  was  subsequently  found  to  be  the  First  Battle 
Squadron.     Much  heavy  firing  was  observed  during  the  night. 

8.  About  midnight,  G.M.T.,  a  large  vessel,  which  appeared  to 
be  a  German  Battleship  was  seen  to  pass  down  the  starboard 
side,  but  as  ships  ahead  did  not  open  fire  and  it  was  considered 
that  she  must  have  been  seen,  it  was  thought  advisable  to  take 
no  action,  as  her  course  led  directly  to  the  destroyers  following, 
and,  judging  from  the  action  which  occurred  shortly  afterwards, 
they  apparently  engaged  her. 

9.  When  daylight  broke  "  Fearless  "  was  found  to  be  astern 
of  "  Agincourt  "  and  was  ordered  alongside  "  Marlborough  "  by 
the  Vice-Admiral,  at  2.45  a.m.  G.M.T.,  1st  June,  to  transfer  him 
to  "  Revenge,"  and  this  was  accomplished  at  3.10  a.m. 

10.  Acting  under  orders  received  from  the  Vice- Admiral, 
"  Fearless  "  then  proceeded  to  join  "  Marlborough  "  and  escort 
her. 

11.  At  4.10  a.m.,  G.M.T.,  fire  was  opened  at  a  Zeppelin, 
Latitude  55°  20'  N.,  Longitude  6°  27'  East.  "Marlborough" 
also  opened  fire,  and  it  retired. 

12.  At  2.45  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  1st  June,  4  destroyers  of  Harwich 
force  joined  "  Marlborough  "'  for  escort  duty,  and  4  more  later; 
also  2  patrol  destroyers  at  about  5.0  p.m. 

13.  "  Marlborough  "  was  left  off  the  Bull  Lightshij)  in  the 
Humber  at  8.0  a.m.,  G.M.T.,  on  2nd  June,  and  "  Fearless  "  then 
returned  to  base,  arriving  at  8.0  p.m.,  G.M.T, 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

C.   D.    ROPER, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  _     Captain  (D.), 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  First  Flotilla. 


Enclosure  No.  21  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of   12/6/ 1ft. 

No.  013. 

H.M.S.  "  Fearless, 
Sir,  6th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  the  reports  of 
proceedings  during  the  action  of  31st  May  of  the  Commanding 

Q  2 


244 


BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 


Officers  of  H.M.  Ships  "Attack"  and  "Defender,"  together 
with  extracts  containing  items  of  interest  from  the  reports  of 
the  Commanding  Officers  of  H.M.  Ships  "  Acheron,"  ^  "  Ariel," 
and  "  Badger." 

2.  Owing  to  lack  of  speed  "  Fearless  "  was  unable  to  keep 
up  with  1st  Flotilla,  and  at  6.0  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  31st  May  parted 
company  with  the  destroyers,  who  from  that  time  onward 
were  in  company  with  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  and  were 
not  seen  again  by  "  Fearless  "  until  return  into  harbour. 

3.  The  report  of  the  Commanding  Officer  of  "  Attack  "  is 
forwarded  complete. 

2  *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  ol^edient  Servant, 

C.   D.   ROPER, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  Captain  (D), 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  First  Flotilla. 


H.M.S.  "ATTACK," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I    HAVE    the    honour    to    report    that    on    Wednesday, 
May  31st,  at : — 


P.M. 

3.40. 


In    Lat.    56.52    N.,    Long.    5.22    E.,    Course    S.  81  E., 
Speed  25  Knots,  the  5tli  B.S.  signalled  "  Enemy  in 
sight.     "  Attack  "     sighted     enemy    immediately     on. 
receipt  of  signal.     B.C.F.  engaged,  and  shortly  after-    ^ 
wards  B.C.F.  appeared  to  alter  course  to  the  S.E. 


i^  rZJ-^^^'^^^no^^ 


lla. 


5 
50 


Scre^"" 


edhy 


reened'^ 


'  Extract  from  "  Acheron  "  (emitted  as  containing  solely  recom- 
mendations of  personnel  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 

-  Part  omitted  lieie,  referring  solely  to  jiersonnel,  recoinmendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES. 


245 


The  1st  Flotilla  was  formed  in  No.  3  Submarine  Screen  on 
5th  B.S.  organisation  as  follows  : — 


0  S^c^aer- 


P.M. 
3.50. 


3.51. 


1st    Flotilla    took    station. in    Division    Line    ahead    on 

Starboard  Quarter  of  5th  B.S. 
"  Barham  "  opened  fire. 
3.54.     "  Valiant  "  opened  fire. 
3.56.     "  Warspite  "  opened  fire. 

5th  B.S.  was  generally  engaged  and  altering  course 
to  the  S.E. 
3.58.     Large  explosion  to  the  S.E'ward  was  observed  amongst 

B.C.F. 
4.  5.     1st  Flotilla  formed  LT2. 
4.  6.     Enemy  returned  5th  B.S.  fire. 
4.15.     5th  B.S.  and  destroyers  steering  SSE. 


^^'%to  ro 


^^ 


oooy 


dr 


d^- 


4.16. 
4.18. 


4.23. 
4.24. 

4.25. 
4.30. 
4.31. 


Enemy's  salvoes  falling  short  of  5th  B.S. 

,,  ,,  ,,         over  5th  B.S. 

5th    B.S.    apparently    altered    formation    to    Sub- 
divisions in  starboard  quarter  line. 

Salvo  appeared  to  hit  last  ship  in  enemy's  Hne. 

Altered  course  to  SE'ward.     Large  explosion  appeared  to 
take  place  amongst  B.C.  Fleet. 

1st  Flotilla  forming  astern  of  5th  B.S. 

Enemy's  salvoes  improving  and  range  decreasing. 

1st  Flotilla  ordered  to  take  station  ahead  of  5th  B.S. 
leaving  5th  B.S.  on  starboard  hand. 


246 

P.M. 

4.38. 

4.38. 
4.42. 

4.48. 

4.50. 


4.51. 

4.55. 
4.59. 
5.  4. 


5.   6. 
5.   9. 

5.10. 
5.10 


BATTLE    OF    .JUTLAND  : 

Small  craft  on  port   bow  opened  fire  (this  ship  was  so 
far  off  that  .she  was  ahnost  undistinguishable). 

Enemy's  salvoes  falling  very  close  to  5th  B.S. 

Destroyers   (1st  Flotilla)   in  divisions   Hne  ahead  astern 
of  5th  B.S. 

rescuing    survivors,    probably 


"  Princess    Royal,"    "  Tiger  " 
passed    5th    B.S.    to    port    on 


Passed    British    destroyer 

from  "  Queen  Mary.' 
Battle   cruisers — "  Lion,"' 

and    "  New    Zealand  '' 

opposite  courses. 

1st   Flotilla   turned    16   points   together   and   took 

station  on  port  beam  of  B.C.F.  heading  N. 
Enemy  concentrated  heavy  fire  on  B.T.F.,  overs  falling 

amongst  1st  Flotilla. — "  Lion  "'  observed  to  be  hit. 
1st  Flotilla  taking  station  astern  of  B.C.F. 
"  Tiger  "  on  fire  aft. — "  Lion  "  and  "  Tiger  "  being  hit. 
Wireless  Office  reported  that  enemy's  ships  repeatedly 

making  by  w/t  RA  RA  RA and  jambing 

each  other. 
a/c   NW   24  knots.     Enemy's  fire   on   B.Cs    slackening, 

apparently    enemy    is     concentrating    their     fire     on 

B.S.  astern. 
Enemy's  salvoes  on  5th  B.S.  observed  to  be  very  good. 
Light    cruisers    and    Destroyers    coming    up    from    the 

Southward. 
More  ships  observed  coming  up  from  the  Southward. 
Approx  disposition  of  ships  in  sight. 


Ltght-  cru/s^ers 

^. 

^nc/  destrouers  sfe&m/ngr  A/.  IV. 


I 


»      ^ 


2^   /^^Destro(/er^lot^//a 


S^^BSsteam ,n^  fo  //^^        /JT-f-  2  '^  B  C.  S^ 


< 


S'.JE h^&rc/  S*  en^^^ec/ 


h^/^h  th 


e  enernu. 


->- 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 


247 


^ 


P.M. 

0.13.     1st   Flotilla   formed   submarine    screen   on   B.   C.   Fleet 
B.CF.  no  longer  engaged  with  enemy. 

0.15.     a/c  X.X.W.,  enemy  no  longer  in  sight. 

5.25.     a/c  N.N.E.,  and  received  signal  from  "  Lion  " — "  Prepare 
to  renew  action." 

5.27.     a/c  N.E.  hy  N. 

5.35.     Renewed    action    with    the    enemy    to    the    S.W.,    who 
appeared  to  be  steaming  to  the  w'ard. 

5.45.     Fires    observed    in     "  Lion  "     and     "  Tiger."     Enemy's 
salvoes  appeared  to  be  very  good. 

6.  0.     Battle  Fleet.   3rd  B.C. 8.,  Armoured  and  Light  Cruisers 
and  T.B.D.  Flotillas  joined  up  from  the  N'ard. 
B.C.  Fleet  altered  course  to  E'ard  and  8.E. 

(3.10.     General  engagement. 

About  this  time  a  Battle  Cruiser  of  the  3rd  B.C.S. 
blew  up.  Course  and  speed  of  1st  B.CF.  S.E,, 
28  knots. 

Nose  of  11-in.  projectile  (A. P.  I)  struck  "Attack," 
passed  through  after  shelter,  pierced  upper  deck,  and 
then  fell  into  the  Ward  Room. 

The  1st  Flotilla  had  difficidty  in  passing  through 
the  G.F.  Flotillas  just  joining  up ;  it  was  not  easy  to 
keep  "  Acheron  "  in  sight,  and  at  the  same  time  avoid 
the  numerous  cruisers  and  destroyers  passing  through. 
The  enemy's  projectiles  were  falling  amongst  this  mass 
of  T.B.D. 's,  and  it  was  remarkable  that  no  one  except 
"  Defender  "  appeared  to  be  seriously  damaged. 

6.15.     Ship  of  "  Defence  "  class — on  starb.  quarter — badly  on 
fire  and  then  appeared  to  blow  up. 

6.25.     "  Badger   '  detached  to  stand  bv  survivors  of  "  Invin- 
cible." 

6.30.     Approx.  disposition  of  ships  in  sight. 

ngJJ  apP 


So 


S.^. 


£nennu  Jb 
S.W- 


<3/?prox. 


24S  BATTLE    OF    Jl'TLAND  : 

P.M. 

6.32.     Passed  two  halves  of  vessel  (red  bottom  colour)  with  bow 

and  stern  sticking  out  of  the  water,  and  bearing  SW. 
()..39.     Fire  of  B.C.F.  and  enemy  eased  up  considerably. 
0.43.     Firing  ceased — speed   18  knots — received  signal  to  take 

station  ahead  of  Admiral. 
6.50.     a/c  East. 
7.  2.     a/c  88E  and  1st  Flotilla  formed  submarine  screen  No.  3 

on  B.C.  Fleet,  speed  22  knots. 
7.  3.     Battle    iieet    engaged    to    the    N.W.     B.C.    F    a/c    to 

8SW  and  8W. 
7.11.     B.C.  Fleet  reengaged  the  enemy.     1st  Flotilla  in  Division's 

Line  ahead  on  prto  beam  of  B.C.  Fleet. 
7.15.     Course  S.W.  and  S..  speed  24  knots. 

7.21.  Received  signal  from  "  Lion  " — "  Enemy's  torpedo  craft 

approaching."     Followed  "  Acheron,"   who  proceeded 

to    take    station    ahead    of    B.C.    Fleet.     (No    attack, 

however,    was    delivered    by    enemy's    torpedo    craft.) 
7.30.     B.C.  Fleet  ceased  fire.     Battle  Fleet  still  engaged. 
7.35.     Course    S.8.W.,    speed    28    knots,    enemy    away  to    the 

westward. 
8.20.     B.C.    Fleet    again    engaged    the    enemy.     Course    S.W., 

enemy  bearing  N.W.     Great  number  of  enem3"'s  overs 

falling   amongst    1st   Flotilla,    small   splinters   striking 

"  Attack." 
8.30.     Light  cruisers  engaged  to  the  W.8.W.  of  us.     "  Badger  " 

rejoined.     First  Flotilla  formed  submarine  screen  No.  3 

on  B.C.F. 
8.40.     Firing  ceased.     Course  S.W.   10  knots. 
8.50.     Speed   17  knots. 
9.  0.     Large  explosion  N. 

Action  ceased  as  far  as  B.C.  Fleet  and  1st  Flotilla 

were  concerned.     Two  balls  of  flame  were  noticed  to 

fall  from  the  sky  far  away  astern — time  not  actually 

noted,  ])ut  alKUit  10.0  to  10.30  p.m. 
9.18.     a/c  South,  and  steamed  S.   17  knots  until  2.30  a.m.  on 

1st  June,  when  at  2.35  a'c  16  points. 

June  1st. 
2.45.     a/c  N.N.E. 

3.  0.     Increased  to  20  knots. 

3.22.  a/c  N.  by  E.     "  Inflexible  "  and  '•'  Indomitable  "  opened 

fire  on  starboard  side — nothing  visible  from  "  Attack." 

4.  0.     "Lion's"  position  55.2G  N.\ 

6.15  E.J 
4.  3.     a/c  N.N.W. 
4.20.     a/c  N.iE. 
4.40.     a/c  East. 
4.50.     a/c  South,  15  knots,  and  passed  down  between  two  lines 

of  the  Battle  Fleet,  bound  to  the  N"ard. 
4.55.     a/c  E.S.E. 


PiaJc  20. 


D.R.    P0SIT10!>I3     OF     H.IV1.S.     ATTACK 

D u rTn g   t h e    engagement 

ON  WEDNESDAY.    MAY  31  ^i-  1916  . 


3  .40.|  D.R.  Lat.56°52^N. 
P.M.)    "      Long.    5°22'E. 


lit    FLOTILLA    SCREENING       59-6.5. 
|s.t  "  "  B.C.F- 


6.iO 

"f^TTACK"  Struck 

b^'GO-^headafProJecthe.ni'J 


6.^3.  B.C-F.  ceased  fif-e 


Battle  Fleet 

'■^     toN.W'.f?) 


B  C.F.  again 
engaged  with 
Enemy  to  Ward 


7  pi  Prepared  to  tahe  Station 
'^     ahead  of  B.C.F  to  repel 
J 25  Enemy  Torpedo  CraFt. 

Enemy  //est 
(  J\pprox .) 


5-5.  Enemy 
f^pprox 

I  7.-98 
/  Pa&sed  Floating 
Wreckage 


8  20  B.C.F  heavily  engaged 
with    Enemy 


Lsr-je  explosion    x 
obseryvd    north 


Scafe 


10  Miles 


IC07Z  -2t?^ I  =''!:'}  Q^  so'jc  -y  "j 


Malbv  ASons.Uth. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  249 

P.M. 

5.  5.  a/c  N.N.E.,  speed  18  knots  (appeared  to  be  making  N.iP]. 

course.) 

5.25.  Sighted  the  Battle  Fleet,  N.^E.,  steering  N.iE. 

5.30.  Increased  to  20  knots. 

5.32.  a/c  S.E. 

6.10.  a/c  South. 

7.25.  a/c  N.N.E. 

8.  0.  a/c  N. 

8.30.     B.C.F.  formed  divisions  in  line  ahead  disposed  abeam 
to  port. 

9.  0.     Formed  submarine  screen  No.  5  on  "  New  Zealand." 
9.40.     a/c  W.S.W 

9.45.  a/c  S.iW. 

9.50.  a/c  S.S.W. 

9.57.  15  knots. 

10.  5.  a/c  N.N.by  W. 

11.  0.  Received  orders  from  "  Badger  "  to  return  to  base  and 

complete  with  oil.     CWrse  N.  74  W.,  15  knots. 

Position    56.03  N.^0.45  p.m.  "Lizard"  took  sta- 
6.22  E.J         tion  astern. 

At  0.30  a.m.  on  2nd  June.  Reduced  to  13  knots 
to  economise  oil,  as  was  running  very  short.  At 
2.30  a.m.  saw  what  appeared  to  be  gun  flashes  bearing 
West. 

7.50  a.m.     Passed  May  Island. 

Note. — All  times  G.M.T.     All  courses  and  bearings  Magnetic. 

(2)  Diagram  of  courses  during  the  action  is  attached. 

(3)  On  arrival  in  harbour  completed  with  oil ;  effected 
temporary  repairs  by  ship's  staff  to  hole  in  U.D.,  and  then  at 
1.0  p.m.  reported  to  ''  Lion  " — "  Ready  for  sea." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
Captain  (D),  C.   H.   N.   JAMES, 

1st  Flotilla,  Lieut. -Comdr. 

H.M.S.    "DEFENDER," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  my  proceedings  during  period 
noon  30th  May  to  noon  3rd  June. 

Ship  was  undocked  at  Leith  at  1.00  p.m.  30th,  and  jjroceeded 
to  Rosyth,  ammunition  and  fuel  taken  on  board.  At  6.00  p.m. 
I  reported  to  Captain  (D).  First  Flotilla  that  ship  was  ready  for 
sea,  and  requested  orders.  Orders  were  given  to  raise  steam  and 
proceed  with  them.  Sailed  with  them  and  under  orders  of 
"  Fearless  "  screened  the  5th  B.S. 

At  about  4.30  p.m.  31st  May.  the  action  commenced  with 
the  enemy,  ship  then  being  with  5th  B.S.     At  about  5.30  p.m. 


250  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

"  Lion  "  ordered  First  Flotilla  to  screen  ahead  of  Battle  Cruisers; 
using  our  utmost  sjieed  endeavoured  to  do  so,  and  by  the  time 
the  2nd  action  was  in  progress  ship  was  200  yards  on  the  beam 
of  "  Lion  "  away  from  the  enemy.  At  0.30  a  12-in.  shell  struck 
the  ship's  side  in  the  foremost  boiler  room,  placing  that  boiler 
room  out  of  action,  killinf^a  Stoker  Petty  Officer,  and  causing  an 
oil  fuel  fire.  The  shell  failed  to  explode,  but  wrecked  a  fan,  and 
other  damage  to  No.  1  boiler,  finally  lodging  in  the  ashpit.  Being 
unable  to  maintain  my  position  in  the  line,  turned  16  points,  and 
passed  between  the  battle  fleets  until  reached  an  area  of  com- 
parative calm,  when  turned  again  and  rej^aired  damage.  The 
fire  having  been  dealt  with,  it  was  found  a  mat  kept  the 
stokehold  dry,  my  only  trouble  now  being  lack  of  speed.  I 
looked  round  for  useful  employ nuMit.  and  saw  a  destroyer  in 
great  difficulties,  so  closed  her.  She  proved  to  be  H.M.S. 
"  Onslow  "  (Lieut. -Commander  C.  J.  Tovey)  and  unable  to 
steam.  Proceeded  to  take  her  in  tow ;  meanwhile  the  action 
had  developed  more  in  our  direction,  and  stray  shells  were  falling 
round  us ;  however,  by  7.15  the  "  Onslow  "  was  in  tow,  steaming 
for  Rosyth  at  12  knots.  During  the  night  No.  2  boiler  was  got 
into  use. 

At  1.00  a.m.  the  weather  became  bad  and  the  tow  parted; 
*'  Onslow  "  was  able  to  steam  slowly  by  herself  then,  so  we  went 
on  slow  together.  At  about  5.00  a.m.  had  to  stop  and  adjust 
bottom  lines,  which  had  carried  away.  It  then  appeared  that 
"  Onslow  "  could  not  make  headway,  so  by  his  orders  took  in 
tow  again,  using  my  wire ;  managed  this,  but  towing  slip  parted 
shortly  afterwards.  Using  two  shackles  of  cable  round  the  after 
bollards  and  gun,  got  her  in  tow  again.  Proceeded  at  eight 
knots ;  sea  still  rising  continually ;  had  to  reduce  speed  until 
very  little  headway  on. 

Unfortunately  had  hazy  idea  of  position,  sounding  failed 
owing  to  the  sea.  The  wind,  which  had  been  blowing  all  day 
from  the  S.W.,  backed  suddenly  to  the  North,  adding  to  our 
troubles,  as  it  blew  hard  with  a  nasty  sea. 

At  9.30  a.m.,  2nd  June,  land  was  sighted,  and  as  Aberdeen 
was  the  nearest  course,  was  steered  for  it,  "  Onslow  "  being 
transferred  to  tugs  about  1.00  p.m, 

"  Defender  "  proceeded  to  Rosyth,  where  temporary  repairs 
to  side,  shell  extracted,  were  carried  out  by  "  Woolwich,"  orders 
were  given  to  proceed  to  Harwich, 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
Captain  C,  D.  Roper,  R.N,  L,    R,   PALMER, 

H.M.S.  "  Fearless,"  Lieutenant-Commander, 

'  Part  oniittetl  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
cVcc.  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  251 

H.M.S.  "  LIZARD," 

1st  Flotilla, 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I    HAVE    the    honour    to    forward    report    of    proceedings 
whilst  at  sea  on  31st  May,  1st  and  2nd  -lune. 

P.M.  30th  May. 

10.30.  Left    harbour    and    formed    JG    3    on    5th    B.S.     After 
leaving  May  Island  proceeded  on  an  easterly  course. 

315/  May. 
2.50.  Received  signal  that  enemy  had  been  sighted.     Shortly 
after 

3.  0        several   enemy   B.C.    and   light    cruisers   were   sighted 

ahead  on  a  Southerly  course  about  12  miles  distant.    At 
3.40        speed   of  squadron   was  increased   to   24|   knots,   the 

B.C.S.  having  already  opened  fire.     At 
3.50        destroyers    were   ordered   out   of    the   May    and   were 

ordered  to  form  L.T.  formation  on   "  Fearless."     At 

this  time  "  Barham  "  commenced  ranging. 

4.  0.  "  Fearless  "  and  First  flotilla  were  ordered  to  take  station 

astern,    and   whilst   doing    so,    B.C.S.    were    observed 
returning  on  opposite  course.     At 
5.15        the  course  being  now  about  North,  Destroyers  were 
ordered  into  JG  3  on  "  Lion,"  but  were  unable  to  get 
into  position  as  "  Lion  "  was  steaming  24  knots.     At 

6.  5        course  was  altered  to  N.E.  by  E.,  and  action  resumed. 

The  Grand  Fleet  which  had  been  sighted  about  5.30  on 
Port  bow  and  deployed  at  this  time  commenced  firing. 

6.20.  Course  E. 

6.30.  Course  S.E.  Enemy  being  apparently  out  of  range, 
fire  now  ceased. 

7.  0.  Formed  JG  3  on  "  Lion's  "  division.     At 

8.20        sighted  several  enemy  light  cruisers  on  Starbd.  Beam, 
and   "  Lion  "   opened  fire,   destroyers   drawing  ahead 
to  avoid  being  hit. 
8.25.  Course  W.N.W.  (towards  enemy).     Meanwhile  the  Grand 
Fleet  seemed  to  be  heavily  engaged  astern  and  on  our 
Starbd.  quarter. 
8.27.  Course    S.W.     Received    signal    that    enemy    destroyers 
were  advancing  to  attack,  but  their  attack  seemed  to 
be  driven  off  by  Light  Cruiser  squadron,  which  after- 
wards appeared  to  form  a  screen  between  us  and  the 
enemy.     Nothing  further  happened  until  about 
2.30  a.m.,   when    a  Zeppelin  was    observed  at  about  5,000  ft. 
and    about    6-7    miles    away.     A    Battle   cruiser   was 
observed  to  fire  a  salvo  at  her,  and  at  about 
3.30        heavy  firing  was  heard  astern.     At 
11.30        "  Lizard  "  was  ordered  to  return  to  base  and  oil. 

E.  BROOKE, 
The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding,         Lieutenant  Commander. 
1st  B.C.S. 


252  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

EXTRACT   FROM   REPORT   OF   PROCEEDINGS   OF 
H.M.S.    "BADGER,"    31st   MAY-Ist   JUNE    1916. 

"  At  6.0  p.m.  the  3rd  B.C.S.  was  observed  ahead  heavily 
engaged,  and  shortly  afterwards  2  explosions  occurred  in  the 
'  Invincible,'  and  she  disappeared  in  a  cloud  of  smoke.  When 
it  cleared  the  bow  and  stern  were  seen  sticking  out  of  the  water 
surrounded  by  a  quantity  of  wreckage,  and  at  6.40  I  was  ordered 
by  V.A.,  B.C.F.,  to  return  to  the  '  Invincible  '  and  pick  up 
survivors.  Commander  Dannreuther,  Lieutenant  Sanford,  C.P.O. 
Thompson,  Yeo.  Sigs.  Pratt,  A.  B.  Danbridge,  Gunner  R.M. 
Gasson,  were  picked  up,  the  last-mentioned  suffering  from  severe 
burns.  '  Badger  '  then  rejoined  '  Lion,'  passing  through  the 
Battle  Fleet  which  was  engaged." 


EXTRACT   FROM   REPORT   OF   PROCEEDINGS   OF 
H.M.S.    "ARIEL,"    30th   MAY   TO   2nd   JUNE. 

"  Witnessed  the  sinking  of  H.M.S.  '  Invincible,'  also  of  an 
enemy  capital  ship  near  the  commencement  of  the  action  at 
about  the  same  time  that  the  '  Indefatigable  '  was  sunk,  but 
was  unable  to  distinguish  class  or  type. 

"  Continued  with  B.C.F.  till  3.50  p.m.,  1st  June.  At  2.15  p.m., 
1st  June,  when  in  approximate  position  57°  00'  N.,  6°  02'  E. 
passed  20  to  30  bodies  of  German  bluejackets,  all  supported  by 
black-covered  life  jackets  bearing  a  name  consisting  of  about 
six  letters  commencing  with  the  letter  L,  the  bodies  had  in  all 
but  one  case  the  appearance  of  having  been  drowned  or  having 
died  of  exposure,   only  one  appearing  to  be  damaged.     A  red 

hfe  belt  bearing  the  lettering    S.M.S.    '  L "    was  also  seen, 

also   black  jolly  boat  marked  '  V '  probably  from  a  German 

Destroyer,  it  was  empty." 


Enclosure  No.  22  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

No.  013b. 

H.M.S.  "  Fearless," 
Sir,  8th  June  1916. 

With  reference  to  your  Memorandum  No.  B.C.F.  01  of 
8th  June  1910,  I  have  the  honour  to  report  as  follows  : — 

2.  At  about  5.10  p.m.  on  Wednesday,  31st  May,  when  on  a 
Northerly  course,  "  Fearless  "  being  on  the  i^ort  side  of  1st  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadron,  with  the  latter  heavily  engaged,  one  of  the 
enemy's  ships  was  seen  to  be  heavily  on  fire  aft,  and  shortly 
afterwards  a  huge  cloud  of  smoke  and  steam,  exactly  similar 
to  that  which  accompanied  the  blowing  up  of  ''  Indefatigable  " 
and  "  Queen  Mary,"  was  seen  to  ascend  and  it  was  assumed  that 
one  of  the  enemy's  ships  had  blown  up. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  253 

3.  An  enemy  ship  was  seen  to  blow  up  about  6.30  p.m., 
though  beyond  the  fact  that  it  was  a  hirge  ship  the  class  could 
not  be  stated. 

4.  As  stated  in  my  report  No.  (ii:^  of  I'lid  .June,  shortly  after 
INIidniglit  when  "  Fearless  "  was  asteiii  of  "  Agincourt,"  an 
enemy  battlcsliip,  either  of  the  "  Koenig  "  or  "  Kaiser  "  class, 
was  seen  to  pass  down  the  starboard  side.  As  she  was  not 
engaged  by  the  ships  ahead  no  action  was  taken,  it  being  too 
late  to  fire  a  torpedo  when  she  could  be  identified  as  she  was 
then  well  abaft  the  beam. 

Her  course  led  directly  towards  the  destroyers  following 
astern,  aiid,  judging  from  the  action  which  followed  about 
10  minutes  afterwards,  they  apparently  engaged  her.  Heavy 
firing  broke  out  which  lasted  a  few  minutes,  and  then  a  star 
shell  was  fired,  and  shortly  afterwards  a  very  heavy  explosion 
occurred — much  too  big  for  any  destroyer  or  Flotilla  leader — 
and  this  was  followed  by  complete  silence,  which  was  taken  as 
eloquent  testimony  that  the  one  ship  had  disappeared. 

It  is  considered  probable  that  it  was  either  the  4th  or  12th 
Destroyer  Flotilla  which  engaged  this  shij). 

The  fact  that  this  ship  fired  a  star  shell  should  be  an  easy 
means  of  identifying  the  incident. 

It  cannot  be  stated  as  to  whether  any  other  ships  observed 
this  incident, 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

C.   D.    ROPER, 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  Captain  (D), 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  First  Flotilla. 


REPORTS  OF  DESTROYERS  FROM  HARWICH  FORCE 
ATTACHED  TO  BATTLE  CRUISER  FLEET. 

Enclosure  No.  23  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet.  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12/6/16. 

From. — The  Commodore  (T). 

iV^o.— 00101. 

2>a/e.— 10th  June  1916. 

To. — The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet. 

Submitted. 

In  accordance  with  j^our  telegram  of  !)th  June,  timed  11.11, 
herewith  are  forwarded  reports  from  the  following  destroyers 
on  the  action  of  31st  May  1916  :— 

"  Lydiard."  "  Liberty." 

"Laurel."  "  Moorsom." 

"  Landrail."  "  Morris." 


254  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

2,  H.M.S.  "  Termagant  "  is  at  present  detached,  Ijut  has 
been  directed  by  telegraph  to  forward  direct  to  you  her  report 
without  delay. 

3.  Copies  of  these  reports  are  being  forwarded  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Grand  Fleet. 

R.  Y.   TYRVVHITT, 

Commodore  (T). 


H.M.S.    "  LYDIARD,  '  i 

Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  in  the  recent  action 
I  was  in  nominal  command  of  the  following  destroyers  detached 
from  the  Harwich  force  : — 

"  Lydiard."  "  Moorsom."  "  Turbulent." 

"  Liberty."  "  Morris."  "  Termagant." 

"  Landrail."  "  Laurel." 

The  first  six  boats  were  detailed  as  submarine  screen  for 
*'  New  Zealand  "  and  "  Indefatigable  "  (2nd  B.C.S.). 

"  Turbulent  "  and  "  Termagant  "  worked  with  1 3th  Flotilla 
and  1st  B.C.S.  ("  Lion,"  &c.). 

At  10.40  p.m.  May  30th.     Fleet  proceeded. 

Noon  31st.     56.44;  3.45. 

3.28  "  Enemy  in  sight,  E.  by  N." 

3.33  5     Flag.     Destroyers     ordered    ahead 

5  miles. 
Owing  to  lack  of  speed  my  division 
was  not  able  to  get  ahead,  and 
I  therefore  had  to  remain  on  the 
engaged  side  of  the  B.C.S.  or  drop 
astern.  I  chose  to  remain  where  I 
\^'as  rather  than  lose  all  chance  of 
making  a  torpedo  attack. 

At  3.45.     The  action  commenced. 
3.58.     "  Indefatigable  "  blew  up. 
4.30.     "  Queen  Mary  "  blew  up. 

A  torpedo  from  a  submarine  went  under  "  Landrail  " 
and  passed  between  "  Tiger  "  and  "  New  Zealand." 

At  4.30.     "  Lion  "  ordered  us  to  go  away.     I  turned  16  points 

in  succession  and  formed  astern  of  line. 
Ordered  "  Laurel  "   (who  had  also  failed  to  keep  up) 

to  pick  up  survivors  of  "  Queen  Marv  "  (she  found 

17  in  all). 
Owing  to  taking  up  this  position  the  "  L  "  destroyers 

missed  making  a  torpedo  attack  with  the  "  M's." 

1  Plates  21  and  22. 


H.M.S.    LYDIARD 
3|ST     MAY     1916. 


Plole  Zi. 


B.C.S. 


Tiqer\     ^-'     -"^'Z .  Liberty 


QM\ 


4   35  P.  M 


Speed  25  knots 


Lion  6 


1  ir>ttt 


IS""-  Flotilla 
I  Champicn 


"  Magnetic 


Enemy 
y    X  Battle 
i  I        \  Cruisers 
» 
"\  L.C.S  & 
'Destroyers 


4-45   -  5  35  P.M 


I  Indefatigable  4  58 


Laurel     ' 
I  '      \Q.M.5-30 

\  \ 

1  Lydiard 

Full  speed  about  28  knot 


Lion 


Champion\ 


5-40    P.  M. 


5'^  B.C. 
opened  -Fine 


Pos"  of  Q.  IW's    wreckaqe. 

i-    i-L'0urel  ordered  to  rescue 
Suri/ivors. 


IN.I.  ; 
iTiger  \,_^diard 
I      \P.R. 


Full  speed ,   Z8  knots 


/  Lion 


Champion 


,  _    13  ■•    Flo.  Bttdcking. 


I        Enemy 


10072-  2»?ff«-  Pini.  ©.  SOOO     IZ    zo 


Malbv  iioii.-i.Litii. 


H.MS.  LYDIARD. 

■      31  ST    MAY. 


6  00  P.M. 


Plate  22. 


Champion 

•  t 


I  Lydiard 


Lion 


:r 


Bat  1 1  ecru  I  sens 
firing 


*    t  5^  B.S. 
I         firing,  but  not 
regularly 


f    t  Enemy 

I  Battle 

A  Cruissr 

.  Squadron 


Light  Cruisers 

^      Scsome  destroyers 
\  \    under  heavy  fire 


High  Sea  Fleet 
H.  unknoY^n 


11-30  P.M. 


i 


Large  9f»ips 
firing  on 
destroyers 


l3^Flat/lli 


Charnpion^ 


\  \  IZ^FIotiJIa 


Lyaiord     \ 


South 
HKnots 


J  SI.  20  Knots 
'^S  W.  25  Knots 


SE -25  Knots 


iao72-^2ee/p„73  Q  sooo.  n-TO 


Malby  iSonsLith. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  255 

By  5  p.m.  B.C.vS.  had  turned  N.W.  "  Champion  "  and  T.B.D.'s 
were  on  their  port  quarter  3-4  miles,  and  my  division 
was  endeavouring  unsuccessfully  to  keep  up  with 
them. 
The  5th  B.S.  on  our  S.  beam  wa.s  engaging  to  star'd 
to  their  great  disadvantage  (vile  background,  though 
standing  out  clearly  against  the  Western  sky  them- 
selves). 

At  7.30.     "  Champion   "    turned   south,   and   I   took   station   on 
her  port  beam  for  the  night. 
8.30.     Position  57.7  N.,  6.13  E. 

9.57.     Ordered  "  Moor.som  "  to  return  to  base — holed  aft  and 
short  of  oil. 
A  great  deal  of  firing  was  observed  to  westward  about 
2  or  3  miles  away  and  at  about — 
11.30  p.m.     Fire  was  opened  on  us  by  a  line  of  large  ships 
which  we  took  to  be  our  own. 
"Turbulent  '"  (I  learnt  next  morning)  was  sunk — and 

another. 
"  Champion  "  suddenly  increased  to  high  speed  and 
disappeared  to  starboard.  I  continued  8.  and 
eventually  turned  8.W.  and  W.  to  get  on  other  side 
of  the  big  ships — who  still  spasmodically  opened 
fire  towards  us. 

At  4.15,  "  Laurel  "  reported  sufficient  oil  to  reach  base,  and 
survivors  of  "  Queen  Mary  "  in  need  of  medical 
aid.     Despatched  her  to  Firth  of  Forth. 

At  6  a.m.     I    discovered    what    the    haze    had    hitherto    hidden 

from  me — that  I  had  a  long  line  of  stragglers  astern 

of  my  division — "  Narborough,"   "  Pelican,"  "  Nica- 

tor,""^    "Nerissa,"     "Petard,"    "Termagant,"    and 

"  Morris." 

Intercepted   4  a.m.   position   of   "  Lion."     Set  course 

N.  77  E.  to  meet  "  Lion,"  but  found  "  L.'s  "  had 

not  sufficient  oil  to  reach  her  and  get  back  to  base. 

Put    "  Narborough  "    in    charge    of    all    the    "  M.'s  '* 

and  ordered  him  to  rejoin  "  Lion." 

7.30  a.m.     Proceeded  to  Firth  of  Forth  with  "  Liberty  "  and 

"  Landrail." 
7.10  p.m.     Arrived  oiler. 

1.30  a.m.     Proceeded  with  five  boats  to  escort  "  Lion  "  and 
B.C.S.  into  Firth  of  Forth. 
In  utmost  haste  to  catch  "  Landrail." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
8ir. 
"*  Your  obedient  servant, 

M.  L.  GOLDSMITH, 
Com.  T.,  H.M.S.  "  Carysfort."  Commander. 


256  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND: 

H.M.S.  ••  LAUREL," 
Str,  9th  June  1916. 

Ix   accordance   ^^ith   your   signal    1545   of   the    9th  June 
I  have  the  honour  to  submit  the  following  re^^ort  : — 

When  the  enemy  were  sighted  "  Laurel  "  was  in  position 
E.  of  Submarine  Screen,  Figure  4. 

Battle  Cruisers  formed  single  line  ahead  and  destroyers  were 
ordered  to  take  station  ahead  of  B.C.  Squadron. 

"  J^aurel  "  was  on  the  engaged  beam  of  "  New  Zealand," 
after  the  B.C.  Squadron  had  formed  single  Une  ahead,  and  was 
going  full  sjjeed  to  get  ahead  into  station.  Owing  to  dense 
smoke  from  the  funnels  which  would  have  obscured  the  range 
of  the  Battle  Cruisers,  and  as  it  is  impossible  for  "  Laurel  "  to 
proceed  at  full  speed  without  this  dense  smoke,  it  was  decided 
to  pass  under  the  stern  of  the  "Indefatigable";  a  parallel 
course  was  then  steered  on  the  disengaged  side.  A  position 
before  the  beam  of  the  4tli  ship  of  the  line  had  been  reached 
when  9th  Flotilla  were  ordered  astern. 

At  that  time  "  Laurel  "  was  proceeding  towards  the  wreckage 
of  the  "  Queen  Mary  "  to  pick  up  survivors  and  signal  was  received 
from  "  Lydiard  "  to  carry  out  this  operation.  Difficulty  was 
experienced  owing  to  the  heavy  wash  caused  by  the  Battle 
Cruiser  and  5th  Battle  Squadrons  passing  and  re-passing  at 
close  range. 

While  attempting  to  hoist  the  whaler  after  this  operation 
one  of  the  blocks  carried  away,  and  as  the  signal  to  proceed  at 
utmost  speed  had  been  received  and  the  enem}'^  were  closing, 
whaler  was  cleared  and  abandoned.  Course  was  steered  to 
re-join  9th  Flotilla. 

En  route  it  was  observed  that  a  light  cruiser  of  the  "  Birming- 
ham "  class  was  being  fired  at  apparently  by  enemy  battle 
cruisers ;  endeavour  was  made  to  make  a  smoke  screen  between 
her  and  the  enemy. 

"  Laurel  "  rejoined  9th  Flotilla,  at  7  p.m  under  the  orders 
of  ■'  Champion." 

During  the  night  of  the  31st  May  "  Laurel  "  followed  astern 
of  "  Morris,"  9th  Flotilla  being  in  single  line  ahead.  The  13th 
Flotilla  was  on  the  starboard  and  the  11th  Flotilla  on  the  port 
beam  columns  1  cable  apart. 

Course  was  shaped  for  "  Queensferry  "  at  4  a.m.  1st  June. 
''  Laurel  "  being  sent  on  ahead  with  survivors  from  "  Queen 
Mary." 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

HENRY  D.  C.  STANLSTREET, 
Lieutenant  in  Command. 
The  Commodore  (T.), 

H.M.S.  "  Carysfort." 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  267 

H.M.S.  "LANDRAIL," 
9th  Flotilla. 
Sir,  9th  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  orders  I  forward  the  following 
report  : — 

On  the  30.5.16  at  9.35  p.m.  Destroyers  sHpped  and  proceeded 
joining  the  2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  outside  the  outer  boom 
Firth  of  Forth.  Having  been  in  company  in  Night  Cruising 
Order,  Submarine  Screen  No.  4  was  formed  at  4.37  a.m.,  on  the 
31.5.16. 

At  2.38  p.m.  31.5.16.     Steam  was  raised  for  full  speed  by  Battle 

Cruisers. 
At  3.28  p.m.     Signal  was  made.  Flag,  General,  "  Enemy  in  sight, 
Bearing  E.  by  N." 
The  Second  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  were  in  the 
van  and    "  L "  boats    were    carrying  out  the 
Submarine  Screen  for  them. 
At  3.30  p.m.     Second  B.C.S.  took  station  astern  of  First  B.C.S., 
and  "  L  "  boats  were  in  Division  hne  ahead  on 
the    engaged     side    of    B.C.S.    distance    about 
5  cables. 
3.32  p.m.     Course  was  altered  to  East,  and  fire  was  opened. 
3,35  p.m.     Destroyers  were  ordered  to  take  station  5  miles 
ahead  of  B.C.S.  and  full  speed  was  put  on  the 
telegraphs. 
At  that  time  the  "  L  "  boats  were  on  the  beam  of 

"  Indefatigable  "  and  "  New  Zealand  " 
Every  endeavour  was  made  to  take  up  the  station 
ordered  and  to  keep  smoke  from  funnels  under. 
At  3.45  p.m.     Signal  was  received  from   "  Lion  "   to  clear  the 
range   and   as   slow   progress   was   being  made 
in  getting  ahead  the  "  Lydiard  "  altered  course 
16  points  to  starboard  to   get  astern  of  B.C.S. 
Previous  to  this  signal  a  torpedo  passed  under 
"  Landrail  "  directed  at  the  B.S.C.  and  passing 
about  60  yards  ahead  of   "  Queen  Mary."     A 
periscope  was  observed  on  the  Port   Quarter, 
and  the  signal  was  hoisted  to  this  effect. 
On  getting  clear  of  B.C.S.   to  the  rear,   H.M.S. 
"  Laurel  "   was   detailed  to  pick  up  survivors 
from  "  Queen  Mary." 
At  5.5  p.m.       Destroyers   were    ordered   to    attack,   but   before 
the    attack    could    be    dehvered    by    the    "  L  " 
boats  the  recall  was  hoisted. 
Recall  was  hoisted  at  5.10  p.m.  and  "  L  "  boats 
took    station    on    the    disengaged    side    of    the 
"Barham,'^  "Malaya,"  "  Vahant,"  and  "War- 
spite  "  about  2  miles. 
At  6.40  p.m.     Speed  was  reduced  to   20  knots  and  destroyers 
joined  H.M.S.  "  Champion." 

«     12827  R 


268  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

At  7.5  j^.m.  Course  was  altered  to  South,  and  "  L "  boats 
proceeded  in  comijany  with  H.M.S.  "  Lydiard," 
leader  of  the  Division. 

At  11.30  p.m.  Steering  south  fire  was  opened  to  starboard  of 
us ;  this  we  took  to  be  our  own  ships  and 
continued  on  our  course.  Tliis  fire  was  con- 
tinued spasmodically,  and  during  it  H.M.S. 
"  Chamj)ion  "  went  on  to  high  speed  and  disap- 
peared without  signal. 

7.30  a.m.,  1st  June.  Owing  to  shortage  of  oil  fuel  Division 
returned  to  Firth  of  Forth,  where  it  arrived 
at  7  p.m.,  and  completed  with  oil. 

At  1.30  a.m.  2nd  June.  Proceeded  to  sea  to  escort  B.C.S.  into 
harbour. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

F.  E.  HOBART, 

Lieut. -Comdr.,  R.N. 


H.M.S.  "LIBERTY," 

Sir,  9th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  in  the  recent  action 
fought  on  May  31st,  I  was  in  command  of  H.M.S.  "  Liberty," 
her  position  was  Fleet  No.  2,  in  the  1st  Div.  of  9th  Flotilla, 
astern  of  H.M.S.  "  Lydiard." 

At  10.40  p.m.  May  30th  proceeded  out  of  harbour,  and  formed 
submarine  screen  as  ordered,  the  Port  side  of  2nd  B.C.S. 

At  Noon,  May  1st,  position  approx.  56.44  N.,  3.  45  E. 

At  3.28  approx.  "  New  Zealand  "  hoisted  "  Enemy  in  sight, 
E.  by  N." 

At  3.33  approx.  "  Lion  "  hoisted  "  5  flag  "  destroyers  take 
station  5  miles  ahead  of  B.C.  Fleet.  1st  Div.  was  then  on  the 
quarter  of  the  rear  Battle  Cruiser. 

Telegraphs  were  put  to  full  speed,  and  Division  endeavoured 
to  reach  their  appointed  station,  passing  up  the  engaged  side 
of  our  Battle  Cruiser  Une  ^  mile  inside,  a  very  heavy  fire  was 
experienced  from  the  "  shorts  "  of  the  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers, 
but  "  Liberty  "  was  only  hit  by  spHnters  and  no  damage  was 
done. 

At  3.45  approx.  Fire  was  opened  by  the  B.C.S. 

At  3.50  "  Indefatigable  "  blew  up. 

At  4.10  approx.  "  Queen  Mary  "  blew  up. 

At  4.30,  when  division  was  abeam  2nd  Battle  Cruiser  in  our 
line,  "  Lion  "  hoisted  destroyers  clear  the  range.  The  Division 
turned  16  points  passed  down  the  engaged  side  and  formed 
astern  of  B.C.  Line. 

At  4.45  approx.  the  destroyers  from  the  van  deUvered  an 
attack. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  269 

The  1st  Div.  closed  the  enemy  Hne,  but  owing  to  the  position 
they  had  come  from  and  the  van  destroyers  attacking  from 
ahead,  it  was  impossible  for  the  attack  to  get  home. 

"  Lion  "  hoisted  "  destroyers  recall,"  and  all  destroyers 
retm'ned  ahead  of  B.C.S. 

At  5  p.m.  B.C.S.  tm-ned  to  N.W.  and  destroyers  passed 
under  their  stern,  and  took  station  on  the  disengaged  side  of  the 
5th  B.S.,  who  were  engaging  the  enemy  to  starboard. 

Division  again  came  under  a  heavy  fii'e,  but  no  damage  was 
done. 

At  6.30  p.m.  Division  joined  up  with  "  Champion "  and 
13th  Flotilla. 

At  7.30  approx.  "  Champion  "  turned  to  South  and  division 
took  station  on  her  port  beam.     Speed,  15  knots. 

At  11.30.  Fire  was  opened  on  the  Flotilla  by  about  4  heavy 
ships,  who  appeared  to  be  4,000  yards  on  our  port  beam. 
SearchUghts  were  trained  on  the  flotilla,  and  heavy  firing 
continued.     H.M.S.  "  Turbulent  "  being  sunk. 

Speed  was  increased  to  20  knots  and  course  altered  away 
from  heavy  ships,  gradually  being  .  altered  to  round  ahead  of 
them  to  the  S.W. 

Speed  was  increased  to  25  knots  and  course  S.W.  and  W.  till 
dayUght. 

H.M.S.  "  Liberty  "  kept  close  station  on  "  Lydiard  "  so  as 
not  to  lose  her. 

At  dayhght.  1st  Division  not  having  enough  oil  left  to 
continue,  returned  to  base  to  oil  arriving  alongside  oiler  at 
7.30  p,m. 

At  1.30  a.m.  division  proceeded  to  sea  to  meet  B.C.S.  and 
escort  them  in. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir," 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
PHILIP  W.   KING, 
The  Vice  Admiral,  Lieutenant-Commander. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet 

(through  Com.  T.). 

H.M.S.  "MOORSOM," 

6.6.16. 

PvEPORT   OF   PROCEEDINGS,    30th  MAY-Ist  JUNE. 

Sir, 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  "  Moorsom  "  under 
orders  of  "  Lydiard  "  left  Queensferry  at  9.35  p.m.,  30th  May, 
in  company  with  2nd  B.C.S. 

At  3.25  p.m.,  31st  May,  Enemy  was  sighted  bearing  E.  by  N. 

2nd  B.C.S.  took  station  astern  of  1st  B.C.S.  and  9th  Flotilla 
(which  included  10th)  were  ordered  to  take  station  ahead  of 
''  Lion." 

"  Moorsom  "  took  station  with  13th  Flotilla  ahead  of  "  Lion." 

E  2 


260  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

At  4.10  p.ra  destroyers  were  ordered  to  attack  enemy  with 
torpedoes. 

"  Moorsom  "  attacked  with  the  leading  division  of  1 3th 
Flotilla ;  but  torpedoes  were  not  then  fired,  as  enemy  destroyers 
attacked  simultaneously,  and  to  engage  them  made  position  for 
torpedo  attack  bad. 

When  enemy  destroyers  had  been  driven  off,  Battle  Cruisers 
had  turned  IC  points  and  enemy's  Battle  Fleet  was  coming  up 
astern  of  their  Battle  Cruisers.  Torpedo  attack  was  made  on 
van  of  Battle  Fleet,  two  torpedoes  being  fired. 

^  Ship  was  shortly  afterwards  hit  aft,  but  no  immediate  damage 
to  fighting  efficiency  was  done. 

A  second  torpedo  attack  on  Battle  Fleet  was  then  carried 
out,  two  torpedoes  being  fired. 

"  Moorsom  "  then  rejoined  "  Lydiard,"  who  was  with 
Capt.  "  D,"  13th  FlotiUa,  on  disengaged  side  of  5th  B.S. 

>  No  further  active  part  was  taken  in  the  action,  ship  returned 
to  base  at  10.15  p.m.  in  accordance  with  orders  from  "  Lydiard," 
as  oil  fuel  was  short  owing  to  damage  to  oil  tanks  aft. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir,     • 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

J^.   C.   HODGSON, 
To  Commodore  "  T,"  Commander. 

H.M.S.  '•  Carysfort." 


H.M.S.  "MORRIS," 
SiE,  1st  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  on  31st  May  1916  when 
attached  to  the  2nd  Division  of  the  9th  Flotilla  ("Moorsom," 
"  Morris,"  and  "  Laurel  "),  screening  the  Battle  Cruisers,  I 
sighted  the  German  Battle  Cruisers  (five  ships)  bearing  East  by 
North  at  3.35  p.m.,  G.M.T.  As  soon  as  tbe  1st  and  2nd  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadrons  formed  line  ahead,  I  increased  to  fuU  speed 
to  join  the  "  Moorsom." 

At  3.50  p.m.,  G.M.T. ,  action  was  joined  between  the  British 
and  German  Battle  Cruisers.  I  was  then,  owing  to  the  position 
I  had  been  in  when  acting  as  submarine  screen,  one  mile  astern 
of  the  "  Moorsom,"  on  the  engaged  side  of  the  1st  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron,  and  steering  S.  64°  E. 

By  the  time  I  had  drawn  ahead  to  the  beam  of  H.M.S.  "  Lion," 
I  observed  German  Destroyers  making  an  attack  on  our  Battle 
Cruisers.  T  turned  to  Port  and  engaged  those  nearest  me,  one 
of  which  was  sunk  and  two  disabled.  The  Enem}'^  Destroyers 
were  driven  off  and  did  not  get  within  torpedo  range  of  our 
Battle  Cruisers. 

Shortly  before  the  end  of  this  Destroyer  action,  I  came 
within  torpedo  range  of  the  Enemy  Battle  Cruisers,  but  could 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  261 

not  fire  my  torpedoes  owdng  to  my  range  being  fouled  by  our 
own  destroyers.  I  did  not  again  get  within  torpedo  range  of  tJie 
Enemy. 

On  rejoining  H.M.S.  "  Moorsom  "  after  the  destroyer  action, 
we  were  on  the  disengaged  quarter  of  our  Battle  Cruisers  v.ilh 
H.M.S.  "  Champion  "  and  about  20  to  30  Destroyers  of  other 
Flotillas.     We  took  no  further  active  part  in  the  engagement. 

H.M.S.  "  Moorsom,"  having  been  hit,  returned  to  the  Base 
at  10.15  p.m.,  after  which  I  remained  with  the  9th  Flotilla  led 
by  H.M.S.  "  Lydiard  "  for  the  remainder  of  the  night. 

1    *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

E.  S.  GRAHAM, 
Captain  (D.),  ^  Lieutenant  Commander. 

10th  Flotilla. 


"  TERIVIAGANT  "—REPORT  OF  PROCEEDINGS]  IN  ACTION 
OF   31ST  MAY-lST   JUNE    1916. 

III. 

No.  83/00101. 

Commander-in-Cliief 
Grand  Fleet. 

Submitted  in  continuation  of  my  submission  No.   76/00101 
of  10th  June  1916. 

R.  Y.  TYRWHITT, 
15th  June  1916.  Commodore  (T). 


H.M.S.  "  Termagant," 
Sir,  11th  June  1916. 

I   HAVE    the   honour   to    forward    herewith    a   report    of 
proceedings  of  this  ship  on  31st  May-lst  June  1916. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

C.  P.  BLAKE, 
The  Commodore  (T)  Lieutenant-Commander, 

(through  Captain  (D),  10th  Flotilla). 


1  Part  oroitted  here,  referring    solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


262  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

II. 

No.  A/709. 

Commodore  (T). 
Submitted. 

A  copy  has  been  sent  to  V.A.,  Commanding  Battle  Cruiser 
Fleet. 

WILMOT  NICHOLSON, 
"Aurora,"  Captain  (D),  10th  Flotilla. 

12th  June  1916. 


H.M.S.   "  TERMAGANT  "—REPORT   OF  PROCEEDINGS, 
31ST  MAY-lST  JUNE. 

SOth  May, 

P.M. 

9.46.     Proceeded    under    orders    of    "  Champion,"    with    13th 
Flotilla. 

3l5^  May. 

A.M. 

0.  0.     Formed  submarine  screen  on  1st  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron, 

speed  18  knots;  course,  N.  73°  E. 
1.15.     Co.  N.  81°  E. 
2.35.     Fleet  commenced  to  zig-zag.     Co.  and  speed  as  requisite 

for  keeping  station. 

P.M. 

3.25.     Co.  of  Fleet,  East;   speed,  25  knots.     Assumed  complete 

readiness  for  action. 
3.30.     Enemy  sighted  E.  by  N. 

3.32.     13th  Flotilla  proceeded  to  take  station  ahead  of  "  Lion." 
3.42.     13th  Flotilla  proceeded  to  take  station  on  starboard  bow 

of  "  Lion,"  2  mUes. 
3.45.     13th  Flotilla  proceeded  to  form  Divisions  in  Une  ahead. 
4.05.     "  Lion  "  ordered  destroyers  to  attack  with  torpedoes. 

Proceeded  astern  of  "  Nerissa  "  to  attack. 
4.32.     Opened  fire  on  enemy  Light  Cruiser,  range  5,000  yards. 
Under  fire  of  enemy  Light  Cruiser  and  destroyers. 
No  suitable  opportunity  occurred  for  firing  torpedoes. 
4.45.     Ceased  firing. 

Proceeded  astern  of  "  Nerissa  "  to  rejoin  Flotilla. 
5.10.     "  Lion  "  recalled  destroyers. 
5.30.     "  Lion  "  a/c  N.N.E. 
6.  0.     Sighted  British  Battle  Fleet. 

6.10.     "  Champion  "  formed  13th  Flotilla  in  single  line  ahead, 
stationed   on   port   side   of   British   Cruisers.     Speed, 
25  knots. 
6.35      13th  Flotilla.     Speed,  15  knots. 
7.05.     Flotilla  a/c  S.E. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  263 

P.M. 

7.45.  Flotilla  a/c  S.,  10  knots. 

8.05.  Flotilla  a/c  W.  by  S. 

8.15.  Flotilla  a/c  West,  17  knots. 

8.27.  Flotilla  a/c  W.S.W.,  17  knots. 

8.40.  Flotilla  a/c  S.W. 

9.  0.  Flotilla  a/c  S.,  20  knots. 

9.30.  Flotilla  reduced  to  17  knots. 

10.05.  Flotilla  reduced  to  10  knots. 

10.20.  Flotilla  increased  to  17  knots;   firing  and   searchlight  to 

starboard. 

10.45.  Flotilla  a/c  S.E.,  20  knots. 

11.40.  Flotilla  a/c  S.W.,  30  knots. 

1st  June. 

A.M. 

1.  0.     FlotiUa  a/c  W.N.W.,  28  knots. 

2.40.     Flotilla  reduced  to  15  knots. 

2.55.     Formed  divisions  in  line  abreast.     Co.,  S.  70  W. 

During  the  night  the  9th  flotilla  joined  the  13th  flotilla. 
"  Termagant  "  ordered  to  join  9th  flotilla, 

5.20.     13th  flotilla  a/c  N.  77  E.,  20  knots. 

6.10.     '  Lydiard  '  ordered  "  Termagant  "  to  rejoin  13th  flotilla. 
Proceeded  26  knots  to  search  for  13th  flotilla. 

7.40.  Owing  to  loss  of  fresh  water,  which  shortly  afterwards 
necessitated  drawing  fires  in  one  boiler,  and  oil  running 
low,  not  having  sighted  13th  flotilla,  decided  to  return 
to  base.  Shaped  course  N.  75  West;  speed,  18  knots. 
Arrived  Rosyth  midnight. 


REPORTS  FROM  COMMANDING  OFFICER— 
H.M.S.  "ENGADINE." 

Enclosure  No.  24  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

12.6.16. 

H.M.S.  "Engadine," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  make  the  following  report  on  this 
Ship's  movements  on  31st  May  and  1st  June  1916  : — 

When  in  company  with  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Seaplane 
No.   8359  was  hoisted  out  at  3.7  p.m.  with  Fhght  Lieutenant 

F.  J.     Rutland,     R.N.     as    Pilot,    and    Assistant    Paymaster 

G.  S.  Trewin,  R.N.  as  Observer,  with  orders  to  scout  N.N.E.  for 
hostile  Ships,  in  accordance  with  your  signal  received  on  board 
at  2.40  p.m.     Their  reports  are  attached. 

The  delay  in  hoisting  out  Seaplane  was  caused  through  the 
Ship  having  to  keep  clear  of  the  Cruisers. 


264  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

After  the  Seaplane  was  hoisted  out,  the  Ship  proceeded  in 
an  E.N.E.  direction,  same  direction  as  the  Seaplane  and  Light 
Cruisers. 

The  following  signals  were  received  from  the  Seaplane  : — 

1530. — Three  enemy  Cruisers  and  5  Destroyers,   distance 

from   me    10  jniles   bearing   90°,   steering  course 

to  the  N.W. 
1533. — Enemy's  course  is  South, 
1545. — Three  enemy  Cruisers  and  10  Destroyers     steering 

South. 
1548. — Four  enemy   Cruisers   and    10  Destroyers   steering 

South. 

The  last  signal  was  not  received  in  the  Ship,  which  I  think 
was  due  to  Seaplane  descending  at  the  time  and  the  amount  of 
other  W/T  going  on.  Attempts  were  made  to  pass  these  signals 
on  to  H.M.S.  "  Lion  "  by  searchlight,  but  this  could  not  be 
done,  as  apparently  she  had  already  opened  fire  on  the  enemy. 
An  attempt  was  also  made  to  pass  them  through  H.M.S. 
"  Barham,"  but  this  failed  also  for  the  same  reason. 

The  Seaplane  returned  at  3.47  p.m.  and  was  hoisted  in,  and 
the  Ship  proceeded  then  to  about  4  miles  on  the  disengaged  side 
of  the  Battle  Cruiser.-;  and  followed  their  movements.  Two 
Destroyers  who  had  been  told  off  as  our  escort  were  ordered  to 
rejoin  their  Flotilla  at  4.12  p.m. 

At  6.40  p.m.  I  passed  H.M.S.  "  Warrior,"  who  had  fallen 
out  of  hne  in  a  damaged  condition  and  was  proceeding  W.N.W. 
I  asked  her  if  I  could  be  of  any  assistance  and  was  ordered  to 
stand  by  her. 

At  8.40  p.m.  I  took  H.M.S.  "  Warrior  "  in  tow,  using  her 
6|-in.  wire,  and  towed  her  at  8  knots  W.N.W.  until  7.15  a.m. 
(June  1st)    (this  Ship  doing  revolutions  for  18  knots). 

At  7.15  a.m.  I  was  ordered  to  shp  and  proceed  alongside 
to  take  off  the  Ship's  company.  This  was  completed  by  8.25  a.m. 
The  position  of  H.M.S.  "  Warrior  "  at  this  time  was  Lat.  57°  21'  N., 
3°  2'  E.  She  was  still  afloat,  but  midships  and  the  afterpart 
of  the  deck  were  awash.  The  Captain  stated  she  was  making 
water  fast  and  would  sink  in  an  hour. 

H.M.S.  "  Engadine  "  then  proceeded  straight  to  Rosyth, 
arriving  there  at  1.35  a.m.  (2nd  June),  having  on  board  the 
crew  of  H.M.S.  "  Warrior,"  numbering  743,  consisting  of 
35  officers,  681  men,  25  Cot  cases,  and  2  walking  cases. 

The  weather  at  the  time  the  "  Warrior "  was  abandoned 
was  S.W.  swell,  and  wind  S.W.,  force  5,  increasing. 

When  alongside  H.M.S.  "  Warrior  "  the  rubbing  streak  on 
the  port-side,  midships,  was  torn  off  to  the  extent  of  about  10  ft., 
and  a  plate  burst  on  the  port  side  of  foremost  stokehold,  5  ft. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  265 

below  the  waterline  to  the  extent  of  about   6  ins.     This  lias 
been  temporarily  repaired  and  is  quite  water-tight. 

1     *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

C.  G.  ROBINSON, 
Lieutenant-Commander,  R.N., 
The  Vice- Admiral  Commanding,  In  Command. 

1st  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 
H.M.S.  "Lion." 

H.M.S.  "  Engadine," 
Sir,  31st  May  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  make  the  following  report  : — 

At  2.40  p.m.  (G.M.T.),  in  accordance  with  signal  and  your 
orders,  Seaplane  No.  8359  was  got  out  and  proceeded  to  scout 
for  enemy  ships. 

I  was  hoisted  out  at  3.7  p.m.  (G.M.T.)  and  was  off  the  water 
at  3.8  p.m.  (G.M.T).     (Times  were  taken  on  board.) 

The  last  information  from  Ship  which  I  received  was,  that 
the  enemy  were  sighted  in  a  N.N.E.  direction,  steering  North. 

I  steered  N.  10  E.,  and  after  about  ten  minutes  sighted  the 
enemy.  Clouds  were  at  1,000  to  1,200  ft.,  with  patches  at 
900  ft.     This  necessitated  flying  very  low. 

On  sighting  the  enemy  it  was  very  hard  to  tell  what  they  were 
and  so  I  had  to  close  to  \vithin  a  mile  and  half  at  a  height  of 
1,000  ft.  They  then  opened  fire  on  me  with  anti-aircraft  and 
other  guns,  my  height  enabhng  them  to  use  their  anti-torpedo 
armament. 

When  sighted  they  were  steering  a  northerly  course.  I  flew 
through  several  of  the  columns  of  smoke  caused  through  bursting 
shrapnel. 

When  the  Observer  had  counted  and  got  the  disposition  of 
the  enemy  and  was  making  bis  W/T  report,  I  sheered  to  about 
three  miles,  keeping  the  enemy  well  in  sight.  While  the  Observer 
was  sending  one  message,  the  enemy  turned  16  points.  I  drew 
his  attention  to  this  and  he  forthwith  transmitted  it.  The 
enemy  then  ceased  firing  at  me.  I  kept  on  a  bearing  on  the 
bows,  about  three  miles  distant  of  the  enemy,  and  as  the  weather 
cleared  a  Uttle,  I  observed  the  disposition  of  our  Fleet,  and  judged 
by  the  course  of  our  Battle  Cruisers,  that  our  W/T  had  got 
through. 

At  3.45  p.m.  (G.M.T.)  a  petrol  pipe  leading  to  the  left  front 
carburettor  broke  and  my  engine  revolutions  dropped  from 
1,200  to  800  and  I  was  forced  to  descend. 

iPart  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  covirse  of  the  action. 


266  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

On  landing  I  made  good  the  defect  with  rubber  tube  and 
reported  to  the  Ship  that  I  could  go  on  again. 

I  was  told  to  come  alongside  and  be  hoisted  in.  I  was  hoisted 
in  at  about  4.0  p.m.  (G.M.T.). 

The  visibility  at  1,000  ft.  was  about  4  miles  varying  to  one, 
and  this  reduced  the  advantage  of  Seaplane's  height.  Also  the 
Seaplane  having  to  remain  so  close  to  the  enemy  increased  the 
chances  of  jambing  the  W/T.  The  messages,  as  sent,  were 
received  in  H.M.S.  "  Engadine." 

I  could  not  keep  both  our  Fleet  and  the  enemy's  Fleet  in  sight, 
through  low  lying  clouds. 

I  wish  to  point  out  the  desirabihty  of  having  a  good  arc 
lamp  for  this  work.  I  could  have  signalled  direct  to  any  Ship 
the  position  of  the  enemy,  if  the  W/T  had  been  jambed.  As  it 
was,  it  was  not  known  if  the  messages  had  been  received  until 
our  Fleet  were  sighted  and  their  course  observed. 

The  speed  at  which  things  took  place  prevented  any  receiving, 
the  Observer  being  busy  coding  and  sending  all  the  time.  The 
enemy  commenced  to  jam  latterly. 

The  enemy's  anti-aircraft  firing  was  fairly  good,  the  shock 
of  exploding  shrapnel  could  be  felt;  the  explosions  taking  place 
about  200  ft.  away  on  one  side,  in  front  and  astern. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
F.  J.  RUTLAND, 
Commanding  Officer,  *  Fhght  Lieut.,  R.N. 

H.M.S.  "Engadine." 


H.M.S.  "Engadine," 
Sir,  31st  May  1916. 

With  reference  to  the  flight  made  this  afternoon  in 
Seaplane  No.  8359,  to  scout  for  hostile  ships,  I  have  the  honour 
to  report  as  follows  : — 

2.  The  clouds  were  very  low,  which  necessitated  low  flying, 
and  therefore  reduced  the  range  of  visibiUty,  which  varied  from 
nil  to  four  miles,  except  for  one  short  spell,  when  it  was  about 
7-10  miles.  During  this  brief  break  in  the  mist  clouds,  I  sighted 
3  Cruisers  and  5  Destroyers  at  about  3.20  p.m..  We  closed  this 
Fleet,  and  from  their  position  and  composition,  it  appeared  to 
be  hostile.  When  we  had  closed  them  to  about  Ih  miles,  flying 
at  a  height  of  1,000  ft.,  I  saw  more  Destroyers,  and  then  heard 
the  reports  of  bursting  shell  and  saw  shrapnel  bursts  around  us. 

3.  In  the  middle  of  my  sending  a  W/T  message,  timed  1530, 
I  saw  the  hostile  Fleet  altering  course  to  due  South.  On  com- 
pletion of  that  message,  I  transmitted  another,  timed  1533,  giving 
their  alteration  of  course.     The  Seaplane  altered  course  to  the 


OFFICIAL.   DESPATCHES.  267 

Southward  and  stood  off  them  about  3  miles,  in  order  to  watch 
their  movements  and  verify  their  composition,  sending  messages 
timed  1545  and  1548. 

4.  Whilst  proceeding  to  transmit  the  1548  signal  engine 
trouble  developed  and  I  had  to  reel  in  aerial,  before  actually 
landing,  starting  to  reel  in  at  a  height  of  300  feet.  Some  of 
our  Destroyers  then  came  into  sight. 

5.  Whilst  on  the  water  a  "  Town  "  Class  Cruiser  passed  us> 
so  I  semaphored  to  her  the  direction  the  enemy  were  steering. 

6.  The  "  Engadine  "  then  came  into  sight  and  ordered  us 
to  be  hoisted  in-board. 

7.  From  the  time  of  sighting  the  enemy  to  the  breaking 
of  the  petrol  pipe,  I  saw  none  of  our  Ships  in  sight ;  also  as  it 
was  essential  to  get  the  information  through  before  the  enemy 
jambed  the  W/T,  it  was  impossible  in  the  short  space  of  time 
to  gauge  our  bearings  from  our  own  Ships. 

8.  The  signals  transmitted  by  me  were  : — 

1530.  Three  enemy  Cruisers  and  5  Destroyers,  distance 
from  me  10  miles  bearing  90°,  steering  course 
to  the  N.W. 

1533.     Enemy's  course  is  South. 

1545.  Three  enemy  Cruisers  and  10  Destroyers  steering 
South. 

1548.     Four  enemy  Cruisers  and  10  Destroyers  steering 
South. 
(This  signal  was  not  completed  owing  to  enforced 
descent.) 

9.  I  attempted  to  call  up  H.M.S.  "  Engadine  "  and  a 
"  Town  "  Class  Cruiser,  when  on  the  water,  with  the  lamp,  but 
apparently  it  was  not  seen. 

10.  The  enemy  Cruisers  seen  had  three  fumiels,  like  the 
"  Tiger's  "  funnels  (one  of  the  funnels  of  one  Ship  painted  red), 
and  hulls  were  about  the  length  of  the  "  Warrior  "  Class.  They 
did  not  appear  sufficiently  large  for  Battle  Cruisers  and  I  could 
not  distinguish  their  turrets. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

G.  S.  TREWIN, 
Observer. 
(Assistant  Paymaster,  R.N.) 

Flight  Lieut.  F.  J.  Rutland,  R.N., 
H.M.S.  "  Engadine." 


268  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND 


CAPTAIN'S  REPORT— H.M.S.  "  CANTERBURY." 

Enclosure  No.  25  to  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Letter  No.  B.C.F.  01 

of  12.6.16. 

H.M.S.  "  Canterbury," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1915. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  proceedings  of  this  ship  from 
30th  May  to  Friday  2nd  June,  during  which  period  I  was  attached 
to  a  portion  of  your  force,  viz.,  first  to  Third  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron,  and  later  to  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

Left  Scapa  Flow  in  company  with  3rd  B.C.S.  at  9  p.m. 
Tuesday  30th  May,  and  took  station  five  miles  ahead,  "  Chester  " 
being  five  miles  astern.  Shaped  course  as  necessary  to  maintain 
position  ahead  of  Grand  Fleet,  steaming  in  S.  73  East  direction 
until  3.45  p.m.  31st,  when  in  latitude  57*40  North,  Longitude 
5 '40  East,  course  was  altered  to  South  South  Eeast. 

At  2.25  p.m.  Wednesday  31st  reports  of  enemy's  vessels 
commenced  to  be  received,  continuing  to  5.40  p.m.,  when  in 
latitude  56-58  North,  6- 14  East,  Third  B.C.S.  turned  round  to 
about  N.  30  West.  I  immediately  turned  to  the  same  direction 
and  increased  to  full  speed,  quicldy  closing. 

At  about  5.52  p.m.  Third  B.C.S.  opened  fire  to  port,  and 
immediately  after,  a  four-funnelled  cruiser  of  "  Roon  "  class  and  a 
three-funnelled  cruiser  were  sighted  on  out  port  bow  ahead  of 
the  enemy's  battle  cruisers,  distance  about  12,000  yards,  steering 
in  southerly  direction. 

To  follow  Third  B.C.S.  it  would  mean  running  past  the 
battle  cruisers,  and  considering  this  inadvisable  I  turned  roughly 
16  points  to  port  and  engaged  enemy's  fight  cruisers,  who  were 
then  administering  heavy  punishment  to  two  British  destroyers, 
one  of  whom  was  on  fire  aft,  and  the  other  standing  by  her  : 
our  approach  soon  reduced  the  fire  on  them — we  fired  40  rounds 
of  6-in.  and  35  rounds  of  4-in.  at  a  range  of  10,000  yards. 

The  three-funnelled  cruiser  was  seen  to  be  badly  on  fire  aft, 
while  this  ship  although  surrounded  by  falhng  shot  was  only 
hit  once.  A  4-1-in.  high  explosive  armour-piercing  shell  hitting 
her  in  the  ship's  side  just  abaft  after  6-in.  gun,  passing  through 
two  bulkheads,  the  main  deck  and  landing  in  the  fresh  water  tank 
— failing  to  explode. 

I  was  then  joined  at  about  7.15  p.m.  by  3rd  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron,  and  asked  permission  to  join  up  under  the  Rear- 
Admiral,  taking  station  next  astern  of  him  in  Falmouth,  and 
with  3rd  Light  Cruiser  squadron  engaged  enemy's  head. 

I  remained  under  the  orders  of  Rear-Admiral  Third  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron  until  8.35  p.m.  1st  June,  when  I  received  orders 
to  prQceed  to  Har"wach  to  join  Commodore  (T). 

At  3.20  a.m.  I  received  orders  from  the  C.-in-C.  to  proceed 
to  the  assistance  of  H.M.S.  "  Marlborough,"  and  sighted  her 
off  the  Humber  2.45  p.m.  2nd  June. 


Plajtt'  23- 


^^4 


'S'-ar. 


Platt23. 


to  5  mtles. 
;CALE 


_  Canterbury  \ 

.VLCS. 

■  l»*'A3"'B.CS.  I  Explanati 

-  Enemy  B.C.S.orCruisers\ 

-  Enemy  Crujsers  } 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  269 

During  the  action  the  firing  of  the  German  hght  cruisers  was 
all  by  director,  each  salvo  falling  in  a  space  of  30  yards,  and  being 
very  rapid. 

"  Invincible  "  was  seen  to  blow  up  at  6.35  p.m.,  a  terrible 
explosion  taking  place,  the  ship  being  split  in  two,  her  bow  and 
stern  standing  on  one  end  entirely  separated.  In  addition  to  the 
light  cruisers  already  reported  one  battle  cruiser  (No.  2)  was 
seen  to  be  heavily  on  fire. 

Attached  a  rough  track  chart  of  the  impression  that  remains 
in  my  mind  of  the  approximate  movements.^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

PERCY  ROYDS, 
Vice-Admiral,  Captain. 

Commanding  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 


1  Plate  23 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  269 

During  the  action  the  firing  of  the  German  light  cruisers  was 
all  by  director,  each  salvo  falling  in  a  space  of  30  yards,  and  being 
very  rapid. 

"  Invincible  "  was  seen  to  bloAv  up  at  6.35  p.m.,  a  terrible 
explosion  taking  place,  the  ship  being  spUt  in  two,  her  bow  and 
stern  standing  on  one  end  entirely  separated.  In  addition  to  the 
light  cruisers  already  reported  one  battle  cruiser  (No.  2)  was 
seen  to  be  heavily  on  fire. 

Attached  a  rough  track  chart  of  the  impression  that  remains 
in  my  mind  of  the  approximate  movements.^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

PERCY  ROYDS, 
Vice- Admiral,  Captain. 

Commanding  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 


1  Plate  23 


270  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

REAR-ADMIRAL'S  REPORT— 2nd  CRUISER  SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  10  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20  June  1916 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleet. 

No.  110/001/13. 

H.M.S.  "Minotaur," 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  as  follows  concerning  the 
movements  of  the  Second  Cruiser  Squadron  in  the  action  with 
the  German  Fleet  on  31st  May  : — 

2.  The  cruiser  line  was  proceeding  in  disposition  L.S.  1-16, 
the  ships  being  stationed  from  port  to  starboard  as  follows  : — 

"Cochrane"  "Shannon"  f"  Minotaur  "  (flag). 

^  "  Hampshire." 
[^(Linking  with  C.-in-C.) 

/"  Defence  "    "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "     "  Black  Prince." 
\"  Warrior." 

3.  At  5.40  p.m.  heavy  firing  was  heard  ahead  and  soon  after 
ships  were  seen  in  the  mist.  Ships  of  Second  Cruiser  Squadron 
were  recalled  and  formed  into  hne,  and  signal  made  to  engage 
the  enemy.  The  conditions  were  exceedingly  difificult ;  there 
appeared  to  be  one  enemy  cruiser,  but  the  others  were  doubtful, 
but  before  fire  was  opened,  a  reply  to  the  challenge  was  received 
and  showed  the  ships  to  be  our  own  3rd  B.C.S.  The  cruiser 
was  not  seen  again. 

4.  At  5.52  p.m.  a  signal  from  "  Defence  "  indicated  that 
battle  fleets  would  shortly  be  engaged.  I  therefore  proceeded 
for  my  assigned  position  2  points  on  the  engaged  van  of  the 
battle  fleet.  A  somewhat  wide  sweep  was  made  and  there  was 
a  Uttle  delay  owing  to  an  alteration  of  course  by  the  battle  fleet, 
but  correct  station  was  finally  assumed  and  maintained. 

5.  At  7.17  p.m.  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "  joined  my  flag. 

6.  At  7.11  p.m.  I  proceeded  with  the  squadron  at  20  knots 
to  take  up  station  astern  of  the  battle  cruiser  fleet  who  were 
then  engaged  with  the  enemy.  Orders  were  given  to  open  fire 
if  favourable  opportunity  occurred.  The  control  officer,  however, 
quite  rightly  withheld  his  fire,  as  he  could  see  nothing  to  range 
on  or  to  spot  by,  and  considered  it  would  be  an  absolute  waste 
of  ammunition  which  might  well  be  required  the  following 
morning.  The  cruiser  squadron  was  successful,  however,  in 
drawing  some  of  the  enemy's  fire.  One  salvo  fell  short  on  the 
starboard  bow  of  "  Minotaur  "  and  some  others  in  close  proxi- 
mity ;  others  near  to  other  ships  of  the  squadron.  Later  on, 
observing  that  the  battle  cruiser  fleet  was  altering  course  away 
from  the  enemy,  I  followed  suit. 

7.  Throughout  the  action,  only  on  a  verj'^  few  occasions 
were  the  enemy  ships  actually  seen,  and  then  extremely  indis- 
tinctly.    Even  when  the  salvoes  referred  to  in  the  preceding 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  271 

paragraph  fell,  no  more  than  the  flashes  of  the  enemy's  guns 
could  be  seen,  and  as  the  range  seemed  well  outside  that  of  the 
9'2-in.  and  7-5-in.  guns  I  did  not  consider  it  desirable  to  waste 
ammunition,  and  made  no  signal  to  open  fire. 

8.  The  "  Chester  "  joined  my  flag  before  dark  and  reported 
her  condition.  I  therefore  ordered  her  at  dayhght  to  make 
the  best  of  her  way  to  the  Humber,  informing  S.O.,  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet.  There  was  no  particular  incident  during  the 
night. 

9.  At  about  9.20  a.m.  on  Ist  June  the  ship  passed  through 
extensive  oil  patches  with  air  bubbles  rising  from  the  bottom 
in  position  Lat.  56*5  N.,  Long.  6*11  E.  This  position  may  give 
some  clue  as  to  the  nationality  and  class  of  vessel  lying  at  the 
bottom . 

10.  As  regards  the  behaviour  of  officers  and  men,  I  would 
conclude  by  observing  that  the  demeanour  throughout  was  fully 
up  to  expectations,  especially  whilst  the  ship  was  being  fired 
at  and  shots  dropping  close.  The  one  great  disappointment 
was  that  no  opportunity  occurred  of  inflicting  damage  on  the 
enemy  in  return. 


12.  Reports  from  individual  ships,  track  charts^  of  "  Mino- 
taur "  and  an  extract  from  "  Minotaur's  "  signal  log^  are  attached. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
H.  L.  HEATH, 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Rear- Admiral. 

Home  Fleets. 


SCHEDULE   OF  ENCLOSURES   IN  SUBMISSION 
No.   110/001/13  of  4th  JUNE  1916. 

R.A.C.  2nd  C.S.  to  Commander-in-Chief,  H.F. 

No. 

1.  "  Minotaur  "  of  3rd  June  1916. 

2.  "  Hampshire  "  of  3rd  June  1916. 

3.  "  Cochrane  "  of  2nd  June  1916. 

4.  "  Shannon  "  of  4th  June  1916. 

5.  Extracts  from  Log  of  "  Minotaur."' 

6.  Chart  Tracks  of  "  Minotaur. "2 

^  Part  onaitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  covirse  of  the  action. 

»  Plates  24  and  25. 

^  "Minotaur's"  signal  log  not  printed,  as  matter  is  embodied  in 
Record  of  British  Messages. 


272  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

CAPTAIN'S  REPORT— H.M.S.  "MINOTAUR." 

No.  274/14. 

"  Minotaur," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  orders,  I  have  the  honour  to 
submit  the  following  report  covering  the  period  from  noon, 
31st  May,  to  noon,  1st  June  1916  : — 

2.  At  noon  we  were  cruising  in  "L.S.I,"  "Minotaur" 
occupying  position  "  C,"  advancing  14  knots.  At  about  2.30  p.m. 
reports  were  received  indicating  the  enemy's  presence  :  steam 
was  ordered  for  full  speed. 

3.  At  3.30  p.m.  the  cruiser  hne  was  ordered  to  advance  to 
16  miles  ahead,  but  as  the  speed  of  the  Fleet  was  gradually 
increased,  we  never  drew  more  than  12  miles  ahead. 

4.  At  about  5.0  p.m.  firing  was  heard  on  the  starboard  bow 
and,  later  on,  flashes  of  guns  were  seen. 

5.  At  about  5.50  p.m.  several  vessels,  two  of  them  large, 
were  seen  in  the  mist  bearing  down  on  us.  On  receiving  no 
reply  to  the  challenge,  we  altered  course  to  Port  so  as  to  bring 
them  abaft  the  beam,  and  repeated  the  challenge.  Receiving  no 
reply  to  this,  I  ordered  the  starboard  battery  to  open  fire,  but 
almost  immediately  received  a  report  from  the  top  that  they 
could  recognise  one  of  the  vessels  as  the  "  Invincible  "  class,  and 
almost  at  the  same  time  a  ship  came  through  the  mist  and  I 
recognised  her  myself. 

7  (sic).  This  turn  to  Port  took  us  some  Httle  way  out  of  our 
station  and  out  of  sight  of  the  Fleet,  so  we  turned  to  E.S.E. 

8.  At  6.8  p.m.,  having  received  a  report  that  the  enemy  had 
deployed  to  the  Eastward,  we  altered  course  to  the  North  East 
to  take  station  on  our  Fleet,  presuming  that  they  were  doing 
likewise,  at  the  same  time  collecting  our  squadron  and  forming 
line  ahead.  We  very  soon  discovered,  however,  that  this  was 
taking  us  further  aAvay  from  the  gunfiring  and  that  our  Fleet 
was  not  deplojnng  to  the  Eastward,  we  therefore  stood  back 
to  pick  up  our  Battlefieet,  arriving  on  their  Port,  or  disengaged, 
bow  with  all  our  destroyers  and  Light  Craft  between  us  and 
the  leading  Battleship.  This  position  we  maintained  for  some 
time  as,  owing  to  not  having  a  very  great  advantage  over  the 
Battleships  in  speed  and  to  their  constantly  altering  course  to 
starboard,  we  were  unable  to  draw  ahead. 

8.  At  7.10  p.m.  the  position  was  as  foUows  : — We  were 
leading  the  Second  Cruiser  Squadron  in  line  ahead,  being  three 
to  four  miles  on  the  Port  side  of  the  "  King  George  V."  gaining 
on  her  very  slightly,  with  all  the  destroyers  and  Light  Craft 
between  us  and  the  "  King  George  V."  About  four  miles  distant 
on  our  Starboard  Bow  were  the  Battle  Cruisers.  It  was  now 
decided  that  the  place  for  our  squadron  was  on  the  Quarter  of 
the  Battle  Cruisers  Squadrons,  which  would  be  in  conformity 
with  the  plan  of  deployment,  but  this  could  only  be  done  after 


Plctta  24. 


TRACK  OF 

H         M.S.MINOTAUR 

=iOM      b     O      P     M     TILL      DARK     ON      3iST      |y,/^ 


« 


Plate  25. 


Noon  3i'*Ma^ 


Plate  25. 


Noon  31'* Ma^ 


.^: 

~~y3\^ 

i 

Track       of       H    M.  S.    "M  inotaur"                  \ 
Noon     May    31='   to    Noon    June   1='   G.M.T.            \ 

Trocng    from    Chart.     2I82»     «      f07l.                                            \ 

fA 

iA 

OFFICIAi;.   DESPATCHES.  273 

we  had  drawn  clear  of  our  Battleships,  which,  I  have  explained, 
we  were  only  doing  very  slowly.  When  within  about  three  or 
four  miles  of  our  rear  Battle  Cruiser,  we  observed  them  to  be 
lieavily  engaged.  We  could  occasionally  see  the  firing  of  the 
enemy's  guns,  but  that  was  all. 

9.  At  about  8.30  p.m.  salvoes  of  large  calibre  fell  ahead  of 
us  on  our  starboard  bow,  and  shortly  after  one  salvo  fell  short 
abreast  of  the  ship.  I  asked  the  Gunnery  Lieutenant  in  the 
top  whether  it  was  any  use  our  opening  fire,  laying  on  the  flashes 
of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  he  rephed  that  he  thought  it  would 
be  a  waste  of  ammunition  as  he  would  be  unable  to  spot  anything 
but  a  direct  hit,  and  with  this  I  quite  agreed,  so  we  hauled  out 
a  couple  of  points  so  as  not  to  steam  into  the  salvoes.  Shortly 
after  this  the  firing  ceased. 

10.  The  whole  night  we  spent  steaming  south,  keeping  on 
the  Port  quarter  of  the  Battle  Cruisers. 

11.  At  2.45  a.m.  we  turned  to  the  Northward.  From 
o.O  a.m.  until  noon  we  were  conforming  to  the  movements  of 
the  Battle  Cruisers,  or  getting  into  touch  with  and  forming  on 
the  Battlefieet,  which  movements  are  best  described  by  the 
chart  tracing  enclosed.^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  C.  S.  HUGHES  D'AETH. 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron. 

CAPTAIN'S  REPORT— H.M.S.  "  HAMPSHIRE." 

No.  7B/83. 

H.M.  Ship  "  Hampshire," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  signal  1150  of  2nd  June  1916, 
I  have  the  honour  to  forward  the  attached  report  of  proceedings 
from  Noon,  31st  May,  to  Noon,  1st  June  1916. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

H.  J.  SAVILL, 
The  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron. 

REPORT   OF   PROCEEDINGS. 

At  noon  on  31st  May,  H.M.  Ship  under  my  command  was 
in  position  observed  Lat.  58' 10  N.,  Long.  3-20  E.  steering 
S.  50  E. ;  speed  of  advance,  14  knots.  The  special  duty  of  tho 
ship  was  to  act  as  linking  ship  between  "  Minotaur  "  at  position  C 
and  "  Active  "  at  jDosition  J  in  L.S.  1  diagram. 

A  Plates  24  and  25. 
X    12872  S 


OFFICIAi;-   DESPATCHES.  273 

we  had  drawn  clear  of  our  Battleships,  which,  I  have  explained, 
we  were  only  doing  very  slowly.  When  within  about  three  or 
four  miles  of  our  rear  Battle  Cruiser,  we  observed  them  to  be 
heavily  engaged.  We  could  occasionally  see  the  firing  of  the 
enemy's  guns,  but  that  was  all. 

9.  At  about  8.30  p.m.  salvoes  of  large  calibre  fell  ahead  of 
us  on  our  starboard  bow,  and  shortly  after  one  salvo  fell  short 
abreast  of  the  ship.  I  asked  the  Gunnery  Lieutenant  in  the 
top  whether  it  was  any  use  our  opening  fire,  laying  on  the  flashes 
of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  he  rephed  that  he  thought  it  would 
be  a  waste  of  ammunition  as  he  would  be  unable  to  spot  anything 
but  a  direct  hit,  and  with  this  I  quite  agreed,  so  we  hauled  out 
a  couple  of  points  so  as  not  to  steam  into  the  salvoes.  Shortly 
after  this  the  firing  ceased. 

10.  The  whole  night  we  spent  steaming  south,  keeping  on 
the  Port  quarter  of  the  Battle  Cruisers. 

11.  At  2.45  a.m.  we  turned  to  the  Northward.  From 
5.0  a.m.  until  noon  we  were  conforming  to  the  movements  of 
the  Battle  Cruisers,  or  getting  into  touch  with  and  forming  on 
the  Battlefleet,  which  movements  are  best  described  by  the 
chart  tracing  enclosed.-^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  C.  S.  HUGHES  D'AETH. 
The  Rear-Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron. 

CAPTAIN'S  REPORT— H.M.S.  "  HAMPSHIRE." 

No.  7B/83. 

H.M.  Ship  "  Hampshire," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  signal  1150  of  2nd  June  1916, 
I  have  the  honour  to  forward  the  attached  report  of  proceedings 
from  Noon,  31st  May,  to  Noon,  1st  June  1916. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

H.  J.  SAVILL, 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron. 

REPORT   OF   PROCEEDINGS. 

At  noon  on  31st  May,  H.M.  Ship  under  my  command  was 
in  position  observed  Lat.  58-10  N.,  Long.  3-20  E.  steering 
S.  50  E. :  speed  of  advance,  14  knots.  The  special  duty  of  tho 
ship  was  to  act  as  Unking  ship  between  "  Minotaur  "  at  position  C 
and  "  Active  "  at  position  J  in  L.S.  1  diagram. 

^  Plates  24  and  25. 
X     12872  S 


274 


BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 


At 

3.  0  p.m 

At 

3.  5  p.m 

At 

3.25  p.m 

At 

4.10  p.m 

At 

5.10  p.m 

At 

5.35  p.m 

At    5.40  p.m. 
At    5.47  p.m. 

At    5.52  p.m. 


5.56  p.m. 


Hdmpshire 


Speed   of   advance   increased   to    17    knots,    and 
course  altered  to  S.E.  by  S.,  and 
,S.  29  E.  and  20  knots. 

Speed  21  knots. 

Altered  course  S.  40  E. 

Being  then  haz}^  visibility  about  5  miles, 
"  Defence  "'  from  position  D  asked  course  and 
speed,  and  could  "'  Hampshire  "  see  "  Mino- 
taur." Course  and  speed  were  given,  and 
bearing  and  distance  of  "  Minotaur  ""—  S.  60  E. 
9,000  yards  from  "  Hampshire." 

Firing  was  heard  bearing  south. 

Flashes  of  guns  could  be  seen  S.S.W..  and  at 
same  time  "  Defence  "  was  observed  firing. 

A  ship  was  sighted  on  Starboard  Bom'  steering 
to  N.E.  and  challenged.  At  the  same  time 
course  was  altered  to  N.  70  E.  to  conform 
with  "  Minotaur."  The  challenged  shij)  replied 
"  Zwanzi,"  and 

fire  was  opened  on  her  at  9.500  vards  bearing 
S.  \  E. 

This  ship  appeared  to  be  a  three-funnelled 
cruiser,  probably  the  "  Kolberg  "  type,  and 
appeared  to  be  standing  to  the  N.E.,  and 
one,  possibW  two,  more  ships  (Battle  Cruisers?) 
appeared  in  the  haze  for  about  two  minutes 
ahead  of  her.  Four  salvoes  were  fired  at  her 
in  three  minutes ;  the  first  missed  to  the  right, 
the  second  appeared  to  hit  and.  Hght   smoke 


0? 


eo 


i 


M/nataur 


IV&rrior 
Defence 


I 


£nemy 
Cruiser 


At 

6. 

4  p.m 

At 

6. 

7  p.m 

At 

6. 

7  p.m 

OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  275 

and    steam    appeared    from    the    base    of    the 

centre    funnel.     After    the    second    salvo    the 

enemy  turned  away  and  were  lost  in  the  haze. 

These  ships  seemed  almost  white. 
At    6.  2  p.m.     Another  battle  cruiser  was  sighted,  which  replied 

to  the  challenge  correctly. 
Course  was  altered  to  fS.  (50  E.,  and 

to  N.  70  E.,  to  conform  with  "  JV'Iinotaur." 
Our  Battle  Fleet  appeared  to  be  deploying  to 

Starboard  and  it  was  reported  to  '"  Minotaur." 
At    6.20  p.m.     Ordered   to    close    "  Minotaur,"'    and   arrived   in 

Station  astern  of  "  Shannon  "  at 
6.50  p.m.         "  Chester  ""   forming   astern   of   "  Hampshire." 

"  Duke    of    Edinburgh  "    also    came    up    and 

eventually    formed    ahead    of    "  Hampshire." 

Uj)  to  this  time  station  had  been  kept  between 

battle  fleet   and   "  Minotaur,"   the   "  Active  " 

having  been  lost  sight  of. 
At  this  time,  7.0  p.m.,  squadron  was  abreast  of 

the  van  of  the  Battle   Fleet,  the  2nd  Battle 

Squadron  leading. 
At    7.20  p.m.     The  tw^o  leading  ships  of  the  squadron  passed 

ahead  of  the  Battle  Fleet,  but  "  Hampshire  " 

had  to  keep  to  port  and  eventually  got  back 

into    station    again,    when    the    Battle    Fleet 

altered  gradually  to  S.W. 
At    8.  0  p.m.     Heavy    firing    was    heard    from    Battle    Cruiser 

Fleet,  which  was  ahead  and  to  Starboard  of 

our  line,  and  continued  for  some  time. 
At    9.42  p.m.     Course   was   altered  to   S.,    speed    17   knots   for 

the  night. 
At  11.35  p.m.     The  reflection  of  flashes  from  guns  was  observed 

abaft  the  Port  Beam. 
At    3.15  a.m.     A     Zeppelin    was    observed     over    the    Battle 

Cruiser  Fleet,  bearing  S.S.E.  and  reported  to 

"  Minotaur  "  and  "  Lion." 
From  now  till  noon,  1st  June  1916,  "Hampshire"  remained 
in  close   touch   with    "  Minotaur."     The   report   of   the   Control 
Officer  is  included  in  foregoing. 

SUBMARINE   REPORTS. 

A  number  of  reports  from  Submarine  Look-outs  were  made, 
but  the  following  cases  appear  on  investigation  to  be  reUable. 

Many  of  these  reports  were  made  due  to  the  extraordinary 
way  in  which  the  water  was  churned  up  by  the  number  of  vessels 
at  high  speed  in  close  proximity. 

At  6.  5  p.m.  A  periscope  was  reported  on  port  bow  and  ship 
was  turned  tow^ards  it  and  fire  opened  on  it. 
"  Midge  "  also  went  towards  it.  This  was 
undoubtedly  a  dummy,  and  was  observed  very 
clearly  from  the  Fore  Bridge. 

s  2 


276  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

At  6.54  p.m.  Fire  was  opened  on  a  periscope  on  port  beam, 
and  ship  turned  in  that  direction.  It  was 
seen  by  Officer  of  Y  Group,  Fore  Turret,  and 
Control  Top.     It  dived  and  was  not  seen  again. 

At  8.40  p.m.  An  unmistakable  jar  was  felt  in  Fire  Control 
position.  Fore  Turret,  "  A  "  Turret,  Fore  T.S., 
Fore  Cross  Passage,  and  Fore  "  A  "  and  "  B  " 
Shell  Rooms,  and  a  very  large  swirl  as  from 
a  submarine  almost  breaking  surface  was  seen 
in  our  wake, .  and  must  have  passed  about 
20  yards  from  Starboard  Beam  of  "  Chester." 
Also  the  periscope  was  seen  at  an  angle  by  at 
least  two  observers.  The  shock  was  sufficient 
to  knock  down  a  projectile  in  the  Fore  Turret, 
cause  the  men  in  the  Fore  Shell  Room  to 
inquire  if  the  Ship  had  been  torpedoed,  and 
nearly  knock  men  in  submerged  flat  oflf  their 
feet. 

CAPTAIN'S   REPORT— H.M.S.  "COCHRANE." 

No.  143/B.W.  H.M.S.  "  Cochrane," 

Sir,  2  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with  your  Signal  1150  of  2  June  1916, 
I  have  the  honour  to  forward  an  account  of  the  proceedings  of 
H.M.S.  "  Cochrane  "  from  noon,  31st  May,  to  noon,  1st  June. 

2.  At  noon,  31st  May,  "  Cochrane  "  was  in  Lat.  58°  20  N., 
Long.  3°  47  E.,  steering  to  the  S.E.,  speed  of  advance  16  knots, 
being  the  left-hand  ship  of  Cruisers  spread  in  L.S.I — 10  miles, 
Destroyer  "  Mischief  "  accompanied  "  Cochrane."  3rd  B.C.S. 
was  occasionally  in  sight  hull  down  ahead.  Battle  Fleet  (B.F.) 
on  starboard  quarter.  Visibility  to  the  Sd.  not  so  good  as  to 
the  E.  and  N. 

3.  At  2.23  p.m.  we  received,  by  intercepted  W/T  Signal, 
the  first  intimation  of  enemy  being  sighted  by  the  Cruisers  from 
Rosyth — some  70  miles  to  the  Sd.  of  us.  At  2.40  p.m.  steam 
was  raised  for  full  speed.  Speed  of  advance  was  increased  to 
18  knots  at  3.5  p.m.,  and  to  20  at  3.25  p.m.  Heavy  firing  was 
heard  to  the  Sd.  about  4.0  p.m.  At  6.0  p.m..  Cruisers  were 
closed  and  formed  single  Hne  ahead  in  the  order — "  Minotaur," 
"  Cochrane,"  "  Shannon,"  "  Hampshire  " — course  South  to  close 
the  B.F. 

4.  From  this  time  "  Cochrane  "  was  astern  of  "  Minotaur  " 
until  noon  1st  June,  so  a  detailed  account  of  movements  is  not 
given,  but  a  short  narrative  of  what  occurred. 

5.  While  we  were  closing  in,  the  B.F.  steered  to  the  S.Ed., 
then  S.,  and  then  S.W.,  the  enemy  being  away  to  the  W.  and  N. 
of  our  battle  line.  Six  of  our  Battle  Cruisers  (B.C.F.)  were  well 
ahead  of  our  B.F.,  steering  to  the  S.Wd.,  and  all  Battleships 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  277 

and  Battle  Cruisers  were  heavily  engaged  off  and  on,  the  heaviest 
firing  coming  as  a  rule  from  the  van  and  rear.  5th  B.S.  was  not 
seen  on  the  31st,  and  I  presumed  they  were  in  the  rear  with  the 
remaining  Battle  Cruisers.  Our  Squadron  gradually  drew  ahead 
along  the  disengaged  side  of  the  B.F.  and  reached  the  van  soon 
after  8.0  p.m.,  having  been  joined  by  the  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  " 
at  7.20  p.m. 

6.  At  about  8.0  p.m.  we  crossed  the  bows  of  the  leading 
Battleship  ("  King  George  V  ")  and  made  for  the  disengaged 
quarter  of  the  B.C.F.  At  this  time  the  B.C.F.  was  steering 
about  S.W.  and  the  B.F.  had  altered  course  more  to  the  Sd., 
the  gap  between  them  about  4  miles  and  increasing  rapidly. 
The  leading  ships  of  the  B.F.  were  not  then  engaged.  The  weather 
was  hazy,  visibility  about  8  to  10  miles,  and  owing  to  this  and 
the  smoke  from  "  Minotaur,"  which  entirely  blocked  our  view 
to  starboard  most  of  the  time,  it  was  very  seldom  possible  to  see 
anything  of  the  enemy  beyond  the  flashes  of  their  guns.  At  no 
time  could  I  distinguish  what  their  ships  were.  Later  the  B.F. 
altered  to  W.,  but-must  have  then  been  out  of  sight  of  our  B.C.F. 

7.  The  B.C.F.,  which  were  on  our  starboard  bow,  became 
heavily  engaged  about  8.45  p.m.,  and  enemy  salvoes  could  be 
seen  falling  amongst  the  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  on  their 
disengaged  bow,  while  one  salvo  ap})eared  to  straddle  the  rear 
ship  of  our  line — "  Hampshire  "  or  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh." 
Firing  ceased  before  10.0  p.m.,  when  it  was  nearly  dark,  and 
by  10  p.m.  our  Fleet  had  all  turned  to  Course  8.,  speed  17  knots, 
for  the  night. 

8.  At  2.45  a.m.  on  1st  June,  Course  was  altered  to  the  N., 
we  being  then  in  I.at.  55°  3  N.,  Long.  6°  10  E.  The  morning  was 
very  hazy  and  throughout  the  forenoon  visibility  was  seldom 
more  than  3  or  4  miles.  At  3.40  a.m.  a  Zeppelin  was  sighted 
from  the  Main  Top,  South  (right  astern)  a  long  way  off.  At 
9.0  a.m.  there  was  heavy  firing  in  the  direction  of  the  B.F.  for 
about  half  an  hour.  Position  at  noon  1st  June  was  Lat.  56°  16  N., 
Long.  5°  35  E.,  Course  N.W.,  speed  20  knots. 

9.  A  short  report  from  the  Officer  controlling  in  the  Fore  Top 
— Lieutenant-Commander  G.  C.  Dillon,  R.N. — is  enclosed. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

E.   LEATHAM, 
The  Rear  Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron. 


Enclosure  to  my  ("  Cochrane' s  ")  Letter  No.  143/^.1^.  of  2  June 

1916. 

About  4.0  p.m.  heard  firing  on  starboard  bow. 
View,  during  practically  the  whole  of  the  action  was  obscured 
by  funnel  smoke  of  "  Minotaur." 


278  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

Visibility  was  very  variable  the  whole  time. 

Battle  Fleet  opened  fire  and  deployed  into  single  line.  No 
splashes  of  enemy  shots  were  visible. 

Sighted  B.C.F.  taking  station  ahead  of  B.F. 

L.C.S.  on  our  starboard  beam  engaged,  supported  by  B.C.F. 
Saw  occasional  glimpses  of  enemy  ships  through  the  smoke, 
but  could  not  make  out  details.  Our  salvoes  appeared  to  be 
falling  close  to  enemy  unit,  spread  of  about  500  yards. 

B.C.F.  and  L.C.S.  ceased  firing,  and  L.C.S.  took  station  in 
rear  of  B.C.F.,  Cruiser  Squadron  being  on  port  quarter  of  B.C.F. 
throughout. 

Later,  B.C.F.  engaged  enemy  at  what  appeared  to  be  fairly 
close  range.  Flashes  of  enemy  guns  were  visible  from  "  Coch- 
rane." 

Enemy  salvoes  were  consistently  about  2,000  yards  over  B.C.F. 
and  appeared  very  ragged.  A  number  of  shell  were  observed 
to  burst  on  graze. 

B.C.F.,  L.C.S.  and  Cruisers  turned  to  port;  enemy  fired 
one  or  two  salvoes  at  rear  ship  of  cruiser  line  ("  Chester  ")  which 
fell  over.  A  few  minutes  later  enemy  fired  a  star  shell  which 
lit  up  an  area  of  about  1,000  yards. 

About  3.0  a.m.  sighted  B.C.F.  and  L.C.S. 

About  4.0  a.m.  Zeppelin  was  sighted  astern.  L.C.S.  opened 
fire  at  her  shortly  afterwards. 

E.  LEATHAM, 

Captain. 

CAPTAIN'S   REPORT— H.M.S.     'SHANNON." 

No.  M.  6/1. 

H.M.S.  "  Shannon," 
Sir.  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  enclose  herewith  the  following  : — 

(1)  Report  on  the  proceedings  of  H.M.S.  "  Shannon," 
including  signals  received,  in  company  with  your  Flag 
during  the  24  hours  from  Noon,  31st  Mav.  to  Noon.  1st  June 
1916. 

(2)  Report  by  the  Officer  in  the  Control  Top. 

(3)  Report  by  the  Squadron  Wireless  Officer,  Lieutenant 
Charles  G.  Fothergill,  R.M.L.I.,  who  was  on  board  H.M.S. 
"  Shannon."! 

(4)  List  of  the  cyphers  received. ^ 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your,  obedient  Servant, 
F.  DUMARESQ, 
The  Rear  Admiral  Commanding,  Captain. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron, 
H.M.S.  "  Minotaur." 

^  Not  pfinted. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  279 

PROCEEDINGS   OF   H.M.S.    "SHANNON,"    2nd    CRUISER 

SQUADRON,    DURING    THE    PERIOD    FROM    NOON, 

3  1st  may,   to   noon,  1st   JUNE    1916. 

Dispositions. 

The  Cruisers  Avere  in  L.S.  1-12,  and  were  spread  in  the 
following  order  : — 

"  Cochrane  ''  "  Shannon  "  "  Minotaur  "  "  Hampshire." 
from  North  to  South. 

The  1st  Cruiser  Squadron  were  spread  continuing  the  line  to 
the  southward. 

"  Chester  ''  and  "  Canterbury  "  were  stationed  about  6  miles 
ahead  of  the  Cruiser  Line. 

Noon . 

"Shannon's"    position    Lat.    o810    N.,    3-31    E.     Course, 
S.  50  E.,  advancing  16  knots. 

Positions. 

C.-in-C.*s  reference  position,  58*9  N.,  2'o9  E. 

Weathei'. 

Visibility  about  15  miles.  Sea  calm.  Horizon  slightly 
misty. 

Fidl  Speed 

Received  the  C.-in-C.'s  general  signal  to  raise  steam  for 
Full  Speed. 

P.M. 

2.55.     Cruisers  increased  to  18  knots. 

5.10.     Destroyer    "'  Hardy  "'    screening    "  Shannon  "   proceeded 

to  investigate  a  Norwegian  Barque,  she  was  ordered 

by  signal  to  keep  on  her  course  (1710).     Time  did  not 

permit  of  investigation. 
5.20.     Passed  Norwegian  Barque  "  Candace  ""  about  five  cables 

on  starboard  beam  steering  N.N.W. 

Submarines. 

5.25.  Opened  fire  on  Periscope  on  Starboard  Quarter.  Sub- 
marine appeared  to  come  from  direction  of  Barc^ue. 

5.27;  Periscope  rejjorted  on  port  Quarter.  Opened  fire. 
These  submarines  were  apparently  waiting  near  the 
Barque  in  case  she  were  boarded. 

5.35.  ■•  Hampshire  ""  opened  fire  on  a  Periscope  and  hauled 
out  of  line  towards  it. 

5.38.     "  Shannon  "  stationed  "  Hardy  "  six  cables  ahead. 

Heavy  Firing. 

5.40.     Heard  heavy  firing  S.S.W. 

5.45.  A  Danish  Steamer  with  the  Funnel  Markings  of  the 
Danish  United  Steamship  Company  bearing  South, 
crossed  ahead  from  starboard  to  Port.  This  ship 
altered  course  twice  when  on  port  bow  and  reduced 
speed.     Considered  suspicious. 


280  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

P.M. 

5.50.     Observed  Gun  Flashes  8.S.W.,  visibility  now  was  from 

4   to    5   miles.     Grey   ships   were   observed   from   the 

Fore  Top. 
5.55.     Opened  Fire  on  Periscope  on  starboard  quarter.  Observed 

tremendous  explosion  about  this  tim«  and  bearing  S. 
6.  5.     III.  B.C.S.  sighted  8.  30  E.,  5  miles,  steering  8.W.  to 

join  B.C.F. 
6.  8.     III.  B.C. 8.  at  this  time  altered  course  to  the  northward. 
6.11.     At  this  time  "  Cochrane  "  rejoined  from  the  northward. 

"  Minotaur  "  noM^  altered  course  gradually  32  points 

to  port. 
6.26.     "  Minotaur  "   stationed  attached  T.B.D.'s  one  mile  on 

port  beam. 
6.28.     Observed  Battle  Fleet  deploying  to  8.E.  by  E. 
6.38.     Visibility  now  about  six  miles. 

Observed  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "  bearing  South  between 

K.G.V.  and  the  enemy.     At  this  time  also  "  Chester  " 

was    observed    approaching    from    the    Southward    to 

take  station  in  the  Cruiser  Line  having  been  damaged 

in  action. 
6.53.     Passed  the  Xlth  Flotilla  on  the  starboard  beam. 
6.58.     "  Lion  "    leading    Battle    Cruisers    bearing    8.    40    W., 

5 1  miles. 
7.14.     "Duke  of  Edinburgh"   joined,   coming  from   the  van. 

"  Lion  "   and  Battle  Cruisers   altered  course  to  port 

and  opened  fire  to  8.W. 
7.26.     Cruisers  trying  to  cross  ahead  of  van  to  take  up  Battle 

Station.     At  this  time  K.G.V.   leading  the  van  was 

six  cables  distant  on  the  starboard  bow  of  "  Shannon." 

If  it  had  not  been  for  the  Battle  Fleet  reducing  to 

15   knots,    the   Cruisers   would   have   been  unable   to 

cross  ahead. 
7.26.     Xlth  and  Xllth  Flotillas  now  came  up  on  the  beam 

between  K.G.V.  and  the  Cruisers  to  take  station  in 

readiness  for  attack.     At  this  time  the  IVth  L.C.S. 

passed  through   these   Flotillas   and   took   station   on 

the  engaged  bow  of  K.G.V. 
8.  0.     Observed  "  K.G.V.  "  altering  to  starboard. 
8.  5.     At    this    moment    "  Shannon  "    passed    a    small    boat 

painted    grey    inside    and    out,    three    cables    on    the 

starboard  beam.     This  boat  looked  like  a  Norwegian 

Pram. 
About   8.15  passed   many  dead  fish   floating,   also   one 

ammunition  case  of  foreign  pattern  floating. 
8.18.     Lost   sight   of    "K.G.V."    at   this    time   on   a   bearing 

N.  10  E.     Battle  Cruisers  on  the  starboard  bow  opened 

fire  to  the  westward. 
8.30.     Observed  a  salvo  of  five   12-in.  fall  about   1,000  yards 

short  of  "  Minotaur." 
About  the  same  time  one  heavy  shell  fell  about  500  yards 

beyond  "  Hampshire." 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  281 

p,M.      Cruisers  then  altered  course  to  port  together  to  open 

the  range. 
8.40.     "  Shannon  "   struck  some  object   which   bumped  along 

under  the  bottom. 
8.45.     "  K.G.V.  "  in  sight  N.N.E.  5  miles. 

"  Lion  "  and  Battle  Cruisers  bear  W,  6  miles. 
8.47.     Hauled    out    to    starboard    to    clear    the    smoke    from 

"  Minotaur  "  and  "  Cochrane." 
9.37.     Sighted  "  Lion  "  and  Battle  Cruisers  on  port  bow  altering 

to  port. 
10.15.     About   this   time   the   enemy   fired   a  large   magnesium 

Hght  lasting  two  minutes,  bearing  N.W. 

A.M. 

2.45.  "  Lion  "  and  B.C.S.  at  this  time  in  sight  bearing  South 
6  miles,  and  the  IVth  L.C.S.  West  6  miles. 

3.19.  Heard   "  Indomitable  "   firing  at  Airship.     This  airship 

passed    to    the    southward    of    the    Battle    Cruisers 
steering  S.W. 
5.11.     Sighted  Vth  B.S.  South  five  miles. 

5.20.  Sighted  "  Colossus  "  S.  46  W.  four  miles. 
7.  0.     Passed  Dutch  Fishing  Smack. 

7.  5.     Passed  Dutch  Schooner  "  Europa." 

7.40.  Sighted  "  Agincourt  "  and  rear  ships  of  1st  B.S.  with 
Destroyers  N.  18  W.,  5  miles. 

9.  0.  Heard  firing  N.N.W.  This  was  most  probably  "  Marks- 
man "  sinking  "  Sparrowhawk." 

9.19.  "Minotaur"  sent  two  Destroyers  to  examine  a  floating 
object  which  looked  Hke  the  conning  tower  of  a 
submarine.  T.B.D.'s  reported  it  was  a  capsized  ship, 
probably  German  Destroj^er.  Considered  most 
probable  this  was  "  Sparrowhawk  "  not  yet  completely 
sunk.     This  was  the  position  signalled  by  "  Marksman." 

9.23.  Observed  Steam  Trawler  on  starboard  beam  steaming 
fast  S.S.W. 

9.55.     Passed  a  large  patch  of  oil  on  the  starboard  hand. 
10.10.     Sighted  IVth  L.C.S.  and  Vth  B.S.  bearing  S.  by  W. 

Note. — Signals,  being  included  in  record  of  British  Messages, 
have  been  omitted  from  this  Enclosure. 

A   REPORT   BY   LIEUTENANT-COIVIMANDER    (G) 

F.    W.    BENNETT,    CONTROL   OFFICER    STATIONED 

IN   FORE    TOP    (PRIMARY   CONTROL). 

H.M.S.  "Shannon." 
May  Mst. 

Noon  to  3.  p.m. — "  Shannon  "  steaming  in  a  South  Easterly 
direction.  Half  of  Anti-T.B.  Armanent  closed  up  on  Submarine 
Watch.     Half  of  Main  Armament  manned. 

At  3  p.m. — "  Action  "  Stations.  Everything  prepared  in 
every  way  for  immediate  action  with  enemy. 


2S2  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

Sea  calm.     Wind  2-3.     Visibility  seven  miles  and  decreasing. 
Between  4  and  o..'i()  p.m. — Periscopes  were  reported  on  both 
quarters  (probably  3  submarines  in  all,  one  showing  two  peri- 
scopes);   all  were  fired  on  by   12-pdrs.  bearing  and  30  rds.  of 
12-p(lr.  IS  cwt.  Common  shell  were  expended. 

From  Fore  Top  none  were  actually  seen,  these  reports  being 
received  from  aft ;  these  periscopes  are  definitely  reported  b}'^  the 
following  Officers  : — 

Major  Troup,  R.M. 
Lieut.  Durnford,  R.N. 
Lieut.  Lambert,  R.N. 
Lieut.  Wilhams,  R.M. 

as  well  as  by  a  number  of  Gunlayers,  Guns  Crews,  a  signalman, 
and  a  Rangetaker. 

No  direct  hits  on  them  are  claimed,  but  many  shells  burst 
in  their  immediate  proximity  and  all  ajjpeared  to  drop  asterri 
or  dive. 

It  is  noted  that  during  this  period  when  Submarines  were 
undoubtedly  present  in  considerable  numbers  a  large  sail,  flying 
a  conspicuously  new  Norwegian  Ensign,  with  name  ''  Candace  " 
"  Norge,"  and  two  Norwegian  Ensigns  painted  on  her  starboard 
side,  was  also  in  the  vicinity. 

I  do  not  think  that  she  had  been  examined,  and  under  the 
circumstances  it  certainly  was  not  possible  for  Second  C.S.  to 
do  so. 

At  about  5.35.  "  Hampshire,"  who  was  at  this  time  next 
astern  of  "  Shannon,"'  opened  fire  on  a  periscope  and  turned 
out  of  fine  to  Port  in  an  endeavour  to  ram  submarine. 

At  about    5.40    heavy  firing    was    heard    on  Starboard  bow' 
i.e.,  from  a  Southerly  direction),  this  was  presumed  to  be  our 
Battle  Cruisers  and  5th  B.S.,  who  had  been  reported  jjreviously 
as  by  W/T  as  being  engaged. 

At  5.50. — Gun  flashes  were  seen  in  this  direction.  Visibility 
of  Grey  shij^js  was  at  this  time  about  10,000  yards. 

At  5.55. — Our  Battle  Cruisers  were  sighted  with  their  Starboard 
sides  engaged  Avith  an  enemy  invisible  from  us — at  about  tliis 
time  a  large  explosion  was  seen  to  occur  apparently  ahead  of 
and  beyond  our  Battle  Cruisers.  The  tongue  of  flame  from  it 
appeared  to  me  to  reach  a  height  of  about  300  ft.  and  to  hang 
into  the  air  .for  a  very  appreciable  time  (say  20  sees.).  It  was 
a  dullish  yellow  in  colour  and  left  no  smoke  visible  from 
"  Shannon  "  on  subsidence. 

From  this  time  until  about  9.10  i).m.  our  Battle  Cruisers 
were  intermittently  engaged. 

At  6.30  p.m. — Some  of  our  Battleships  were  heard  to  be  in 
Action  on  Starboard  Quarter  of  "  Shannon,"  but  it  was  not 
known  with  whom  they  were  engaged.  No  enemy  shells  appeared 
to  fall  close  to  them. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  283 

From  this  time  onward  reference  is  made  to  the  attached 
sketches^  made  from  rough  drawings  taken  at  the  time  by 
8ub-Lieutenant  B.  C.  Brooke,  R.N..  who  was  stationed  as  Rate 
keeper  in  Fore  Top  of  "  Shannon." 

Fig.  (1).     Conditions  at  6.50  p.m. 

"  Shannon's  "  course,  S.  40  E. 

"  Chester  "  had  just  come  over  from  Westward  and  taken 
station  astern. 

Battle  Fleet  apparently  engaged  with  an  enemy  bearing  S.W. 
Battle  Cruisers  were  not  now  engaged. 

Fig.  (2).     Conditions  at  7.5  p.m. 

"  Shannon's  "  Course  S.  10  W. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron  endeavouring  to  take  up  station 
on  engaged  bow  of  Battle  Fleet. 

Battle  Fleet  still  engaged. 

Battle  Cruisers  not  engaged  and  turned  slightly  to  Port. 

Fig.  (3).     Conditions  at  7.22  p.m. 

"  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "  had  now  taken  station  astern  of 
"  Shannon." 

Battle  Cruisers  were  engaged,  and  had  wheeled  to  Starboard. 
Leading  ships  of  2nd  C.S.  starting  to  cross  boM's  of  Battle  Fleet 
from  Port  to  Starboard. 

Observed  two  enemy  ships  apparently'  on  fire  on  Starboard 
beam  of  centre  of  Battle  Fleet. 

Battle  Cruisers  firing  intermittently. 

Light  Cruisers  making  May  through, 11th  and  12th  Destroyer 
Flotillas  to  attack  enemy  Light  Cruisers. 

Fig.  (4).     Conditions  at  7.31  p.m. 

Battle  Cruisers  heavily  engaged. 

Observed  a  few  enemy  shells  falKng  short  of  Battle  Cruisers, 
but  the  great  majority  of  splashes  could  not  be  seen  at  all  from 
"  Shannon."' 

"  ]VIinotaur  "'  and  "  Cochrane  "  had  crossed  bows  of  K.G.V. 
from  port  to  starboard. 

"  Shannon  "  was  unable  to  do  so  and  had  to  shear  off  to 
Port. 

Light  Cruiser  Squadron  engaged  bearing  N.W.  from  "  Shan- 
non." 

At  7.50  p.m.  "  Shannon  "  crossed  to  engaged  bow  of 
"  K.G.V.",  visibility  decreasing. 

At  8.0  p.m.  Battle  fleet  altered  course  to  starboard  to 
close  enemy  and  by  8.15  were  lost  to  sight  bearing  about  N.  by  E. 

At  8.5  p.m.  passed  small  empty  boat,  apparently  a  skiff 
not  of  British  Naval  build. 

8.10  to  8.15  p.m.  observed  many  dead  fish  floating,  as  if 
kiUed  by  explosion  of  mine  or  ship,  also  one  ammunition  case  of 
foreign  pattern. 

^  Xo  trace  of  receipt  at  the  Admiralty. 


284  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  .* 

Passed  another  empty  boat,  looking  like  cutter  of  foreign 
pattern. 

At  8.15  p.m. — Battle  Fleet  out  of  sight  from  "Shannon" 
was  heard  to  be  in  Action. 

British  Battle  Cruisers  re-opened  fire  on  enemy,  probably 
enemy  Battle  Cruisers,  who  answered  hotly. 

Fig.  (5).     Conditions  at  8.27  p.m. 
Course  of  2nd  C.S.,  West. 

"  Shannon  "  was  now  in  a  position,  for  the  first  time,  in 
which  her  guns  could  be  trained  on  to  what  were  considered, 
it  is  believed  rightly,  to  have  been  the  enemy's  flashes.  This 
was  done,  and  the  Gunlayers  subsequently  rejiorted  no  great 
difficulty  in  taking  them  as  their  point  of  aim.  Sights  were 
set  to  a  purely  arbitrary  range  of  15,000  yards  and  fire  could 
have  been  opened,  though  with  no  possibility  of  either  range- 
taking  or  spotting  the  result  might  have  been  of  negligible  value. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  desirability  of  husbanding 
ammunition  for  the  closer  Action  which  appeared  at  that  time 
to  be  imminent,  and  the  fact  that  no  permissive  order  to  open 
fire  had  been  received,  fire  was  withheld. 

A  salvo  of  enemj'  shell  were  observed  to  fall  about  1,000  yards 
short  of  "  Minotaur  "  and  another  salvo  fell  "  over  "  between 
"  Shannon  "  and  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  '"  and  some  straggling 
shots,  possibly  rico's,  also  fell  close. 

At  8.30  "  Minotaur  "  altered  course  outwards  to  S.  25  W. 
"  Shannon  "  followed,  and  although  the  Battle  Cruisers  Action 
was  continued  no  more  enemy  flashes  or  Fall  of  shot  were 
observed. 

Visibility  of  grey  ship  was  now  about  9,000  yards. 

At  8.40  p.m. — A  report  was  received  from  Transmitting 
station  and  from  Main  Top  that  a  submarine  had  been  rammed 
by  "  Shannon."  Though  not  seen,  this  was  distinctly  felt  in 
Fore  Top,  and  on  subsequent  inquiry  it  appears  that  Officers 
and  men  in  Engine  Rooms,  Boiler  Rooms,  Magazines,  and 
Passages,  and  in  all  Turrets  noticed  and  remarked  on  a  loud 
bumping  and  grating  sound,  and  considerable  shock  to  the 
ship  at  about  this  time. 

At  8.45  p.m. — "  King  George  V."  again  sighted  bearing  N.N.E- 
Visibility  had  again  improved  and  her  range  was  estimated  at 
10,000  yards. 

Conformed  to  her  course,  i.e.  S.  75  W.  to  close  enemy. 

At  9.10  p.m. — Battle  Cruisers  reported  that  they  had  lost 
enemy  in  the  mist. 

At  about  9.30  p.m. — Hands  were  sent  to  Night  Action  Stations 
and  all  secondary  armament  was  kept  completely  manned  all 
night.  9-2-in.  Turrets  were  kept  completely  manned  and 
7-5-in.  turrets  manned  with  reduced  Crews. 

The  night  passed  without  incident. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  285 

June  \si. 

At  2.20  a.m. — Hands  were  sent  to  Action  stations. 

Desultory  firing  was  heard  from  3.0  till  3.30  a.m.  and  again 
for  about  15  minutes  at  4  a.m. 

The  remainder  of  the  Morning  and  Forenoon  passed  without 
incident. 

At  Noon. — Reduced  armament  to  ordinary  daily  watch - 
kee])ing  conditions. 

FREDERIC  BENNETT, 

Lieut. -Comdr.   (G). 
No.  111/001/13. 

Commander-in-Chief, 
Home  Fleets. 
Submitted   in  continuation  of  my  report  No.    110/001/13  of 
4th  June  1916. 

H.  L.  HEATH, 
"  Minotaur,"  Rear-Admiral. 

5th  June  1916. 

CAPTAIN'S  REPORT— H.M.S.  "DUKE  OF  EDINBURGH."! 

Enclosure  No.   11  to  submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20.6.16. 

From  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

Noon  31st  May  to  Noon  1st  June  1916. 

No.  1/32. 

H.M.S.  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh," 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  at  Noon  on  the  31st  May 
1916  the  First  Cruiser  Squadron  was  spread  ahead  of  the  Battle 
Squadron  in  accordance  with  "  Cruising  Diagram  No.  1  "  as 
follows  :— "  Defence  "  and  "  Warrior  "  in  position  "  D,"  "  Duke 
of  Edinburgh"  in  position  "  F,"  "  Black  Prince  "  in  position  "  G," 
ships  five  miles  apart.  Course  S.  50°  E.  advancing  16  knots. 

At  1.6  p.m.  a  destroyer  was  sighted,  bearing  South  distant 
about  5  miles,  and  at  1.33  p.m.  the  "  Black  Prince  "  reported 
that  she  was  the  "  Moon." 

At  2.21  p.m.  the  "  Galatea's  "  signal  to  the  Senior  Officer, 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  reporting  the  presence  of  hostile  cruisers 
was  received. 

At  2.40  p.m.  the  Senior  Officer  of  Cruisers  ordered  steam  to 
be  raised  for  full  spead. 

At  3.20  p.m.  Cruisers  opened  out  to  8  miles  apart  in  accordance 
with  Signal  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  increased  speed 
of  advance  to  18  knots. 

At  3.56  p.m.  Course  was  altered  to  S.E.  by  S.  by  order  of  the 
Senior  Officer,  Cruisers. 

At  4.40  p.m.  "  Defence  "  signalled  that  she  was  steering 
S.E.  to  close  the  "  Minotaur  " — presumably  on  account  of  the 

1  Plate  11  a.  ^ 


286  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

decrease  in  visibility.  This  Signal  was  passed  to  "  Black  Prince," 
and  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  ''  altered  course  and  increased  speed 
to  close  "  Defence." 

By  n.lM)  p.m.  the  distance  apart  of  Cruisers  was  about  six 
miles  and  the  visibility  was  shghtly  greater. 

At  5.40  p.m.  "  Black  Prince  "  signalled  by  searchlight, 
"  Light  Cruisers,  3,  bearing  8.8. E.,  steering  N.E.,  challenged 
answered  correctly  "  (which  signal  was  passed  to  "  Defence  "). 
At  the  same  moment  the  Light  Cruisers  were  sighted  bj'  "  Duke 
of  Edinburgh  "  and  observed  to  be  in  action;  the  enemy  were 
invisible  except  for  the  flashes  of  their  guns.  The  Light  Cruisers 
appeared  to  be  the  2nd  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

At  5.42  p.m.  I  altered  course  to  port  to  close  "  Defence  " 
by  signal  and  increased  to  full  s])eed ;  at  the  same  time  I  observed 
that  "  Black  Prince  "  had  turned  about  12  points  to  port.  This 
was  the  last  I  saw  of  "Black  Prince,"  but  at  8.56  p.m.  inter- 
cepted a  signal  from  her,  "  L^rgent,  Submarine  on  port  hand, 
Lat.  56°  55  N..  Long.  6°  11  E.  2048." 

2.  The  first  indication  of  any  proximity  of  the  enemy  Fleet 
was  at  5.40  p.m.,  when  I  observed  dropping  shots  falling  between 
me  and  the  Light  Cruisers  and  in  the  distance  a  large  amount 
of  smoke  and  mist  and  I  presumed  that  they  were  being  chased 
by  a  superior  force. 

At  5.50  p.m.  the  "  Defence  "  and  "  Warrior  "  were  engaging 
a  three-funnelled  enemy  Cruiser,  on  fire  aft,  with  their  starboard 
broadsides,  having  turned  about  4  points  to  port. 

At  6.8  13. m.  I  altered  course  to  Starboard  and  opened  fire 
(2  salvoes  of  port  9-2-in.)  at  the  same  disabled  Cruiser.  I  then 
observed  (on  my  starboard  hand)  the  van  of  our  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron  approaching  on  a  Course  almost  at  right  angles  to  my 
own,  and  altered  course  to  port  parallel  to  them.  The  Battle 
Cruisers  approached  and  passed  us  hotly  engaged  with  the  enemj- 
on  their  starboard  side.  Then  I  observed  the  ''  Defence  ' 
followed  by  the  "  Warrior  "  alter  course  across  the  bows  of  the 
Battle  Cruisers,  the  latter  passing  very  close  to  the  bows  of  the 
"  Lion."  Being  prevented  by  the  Battle  Cruisers  from  following 
the  "  Defence  "  I  proceeded  to  take  up  Station  on  the  engaged 
bow  of  the  Battle  Fleet.  Whilst  being  passed  by  the  Battle 
Cruisers  we  were  also  passed  by  a  large  number  of  Light  Cruisers 
and  Destroyers  proceeding  to  take  up  their  position  at  the  head 
of  the  line,  and  it  was  at  this  period  that  we  and  they  passed 
through  a  zone  of  the  enemy's  fire,  namely,  the  overs  from  the 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  (heavy  projectiles  and  splinters  of  H.E. 
Shells). 

3.  The  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  Light  Cruisers  and  Destroyers 
gained  on  me  and  I  was  then  left  on  the  starboard  bow  of  the 
leading  Battleship ;  but  the  volumes  of  smoke  we  were  making 
was  masking  the  van  Battleships  and  I  crossed  to  get  ahead, 
when  in  that  position  I  saw  the  Second  Cruiser  Squadron  and 
turned  to  port  to  join  up  with  them,  and  remained  with  them 
until  noon  on  1st  June. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  287 

4.  Whilst  ahead  of  the  Battle  Fleet  at  about  0.47  p.m.  the 
Control  Officer  aloft — Lieutenant -Commander  (G)  John  K,  B. 
Birch,  Royal  Navy — observed  the  track  of  a  Torpedo  passing 
from  Starboard  to  Port,  and  it  was  owing  to  his  vigilance  in 
seeing  the  Torpedo  and  his  promptitude  in  informing  me  on  the 
Upper  Bridge  that  1  was  able  to  avoid  it  by  putting  the  helm 
hard  over  to  port,  otherwise  it  would  have  undoubtedly  struck 
my  starboard  side  aft. 

5.  The  highest  speed  worked  up  to  in  endeavouring  to  close 
'  Defence  "  and  failing  that  in  proceeding  to  the  van  of  the 
Battle  Line  was  136  revolutions — about  22  knots,  this  is  the 
same  number  of  revolutions  steamed  on  the  Contractors'  8  hour 
Full  Power  Trial  in  November  1905.  This  took  about  half  an 
hour  to  work  up  to. 

6.  The  volume  of  smoke  made  by  this  Class  of  Shij)  on  all 
occasions  of  increasing  to  full  speed  is  very  large  and  thick  and 
masks  the  fire  of  manj^  ships  in  the  vicinity,  so  that  positions 
different  to  those  originally  intended  or  generally  ordered  have 
to  be  taken  up. 

1  *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

HENRY  BLACKETT, 
The  Rear- Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

Second  Cruiser  Squadron. 

REPORT   OF   CONTROL   OFFICER   ON   ACTION 
OF    31ST   MAY    1916. 

H.M.S.  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh," 
Sir,  4th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  on  the  action  of  the  31st 
May  1916. 

P.M. 

5.20.  Sighted  2  hght  cruisers  on  starboard  bow,  steaming 
towards  us  at  high  speed  and  in  action.  Impossible 
to  see  the  enemy,  only  flashes  of  his  guns  visible. 

5.40.  The  action  closing  us  rapidly,  still  very  hazy,  visibility 
6,000  to  8,000  yards,  occasional  glimpses  of  enemy. 

5.50.  Saw  what  appeared  to  be  two  enemy  battle  cruisers. 
"  Defence  "  and  "  Warrior  "  opened  fire  with  their 
starboard  broadsides.  A  number  of  Light  Cruisers 
passing,  at  close  range,  between  this  ship  and  the 
enemy  prevented  us  oldening  fire. 

6.00.  "  Defence  "  and  "  Warrior  "  in  action.  I  noticed  the 
"  Defence  "  was  straddled  twice  by  what  aj^peared 
to  be  large  calibre  projectiles. 

1  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


288  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

P.M. 

6.08.  Altered  course  to  Starboard ;  this  took  us  clear  of  our 
Light  Cruisers  and  enabled  us  to  open  fire  on  an 
enemy  3-funnelled  cruiser — apparently  the  "  Augsburg." 
At  this  time  the  enemy's  heavy  ships  appear  to  have 
turned  to  the  Southward,  leaving  this  Cruiser  isolated, 
and  for  a  short  time  a  number  of  ships  concentrated 
on  her.  She  received  a  good  deal  of  punishment, 
was  much  reduced  in  speed,  on  fire  aft,  and  was  struck 
twice  amidships  by  a  heavy  projectile.  She  continued 
firing  her  bow  gun  at  intervals. 

6.12.  The  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  overtook  and  passed  us, 
they  were  engaged  with  the  enemy  abaft  their  beam — 
the  enemy  had  apparently  resumed  their  original 
course — and 

0.25.  From  6.12  to  6.25  a  number  of  projectiles  fell  short  of 
and  over  the  ship.  I  noticed  "  Defence  "  and  "  War- 
rior  "  circle  to  starboard  and  pass  between  the  Battle 
Cruisers  and  enemy,  apparently  with  the  intention  of 
forming  up  astern  of  the  Battle  Cruisers.  While 
turning  up  I  observed  a  fire  in  "  Defence,"  and  also 
saw  an  explosion  on  board  "  Warrior,"  which  might 
have  been  a  torpedo  on  her  starboard  side  and  abreast 
of  her  foremast. 

6.35.     The  action  drew  away,  lost  sight  of  the  enemy. 

6.38.     Passed  sunken  vessel;    she  was  broken  in  halves,  with 
the  bow    and 
stern     out     of 
the  water. 

Upper  works  painted  white  or  light  grey,  green  stripe, 
probably  at  waterhne  and  red  bottom  colour.  The 
crew  were  in  a  small  boat,  and  were  going  towards  a 
destroyer  as  we  passed. 

6.47.  Observed  track  of  a  torpedo,  approaching  from  starboard, 
which  was  avoided  by  altering  course  to  Starboard 
and  passed  50  yards  clear  astern. 

6.55.  2nd  and  7th  Cruiser  Squadrons  arrived.  Took  station 
astern  of  "  Hampshire."  The  Battle  Squadron  were 
now  in  action.  No  enemy  visible  from  our  position, 
only*flashes  of  guns. 

7.30.  Still  endeavouring  to  get  into  position  ahead  of  Battle 
Fleet,  our  Battle  Cruisers  altering  course  to  Starboard 
(approximately  S.W.  by  AV.)  to  head  off  enemy. 

7.55.  Several  rounds  of  3-pr.  fired  at  submarines  reported  on 
our  port  bow  by  "  Hampshire."  I  think  this  was 
only  a  school  of  porpoises ;  in  any  case  the  reported 
position  was  one  most  advantageous  to  attack  us  or 
the  Battle  Fleet,  and  though  a  careful  watch  was 
kept,  no  tracks  of  torpedoes  were  seen. 


sei ,     sue    Wets    uiuis.cii   iii    iio-ivco 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  289 

P.M. 

8.00.     In  position  on  Battle  Fleet. 

8.25.^  Battle  Cruisers  engaging  again;    saw  flashes  of  enemy's 
to     i>     guns.     Occasional    firing    going  on,    enemy    invisible 
9.20.  J      from  our  position. 
9.25.     Star  shell  fired. 
10.00,     Too  dark  for  long  range  firing,  went  to  night  Defence 
Stations. 

Nothing  more  seen  of  the  enemy. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

J.  K.  B.  BIRCH, 
Lieutenant-Commander  (G). 

Captain  Henrv  Blackett,  Royal  Navv, 
H.M.S.  "Duke  of  Edinburgh."  " 


CAPTAIN'S  REPORTS— H.M.S.  "  WARRIOR." 

Enclosure  No.   12  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

H.M.S.  "  Engadine," 
Sir,  31st  May  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  I  abandoned  H.M.S. 
"  Warrior  "in  Lat.  57°  21'  N.,  Long.  3°  2'  E.  under  the  following 
circumstances  : — 

2.  "  Warrior  "  and  "  Defence,"  after  sinking  an  enemy 
Light  Cruiser,  came  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  Battle  Cruisers. 
"  Defence  "  was  observed  to  blow  up  shortly  afterwards,  having 
been  struck  by  two  salvoes  in  quick  succession.  "  Warrior  " 
also  received  pretty  severe  j^unishment,  both  engine  rooms  being 
very  soon  flooded  by  Kits  well  below  the  water  line,  as  well  as 
by  several  hits  about  the  water  fine  and  through  the  upper  deck. 
The  engines,  however,  continued  to  revolve  and  carried  the 
Ship  out  of  action  in  rear  of  our  line. 

3.  Every  possible  step  was  taken  to  shore  bulkheads,  stop 
leaks,  and  cover  holes  in  the  deck. 

4.  H.M.S.  "  Engadine  "  at  my  request,  took  "  Warrior  "  in 
tow  at  about  8  p.m.,  and  at  9  p.m.  I  signalled  by  W/T  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  : — 

"  Both  engines  disabled,  am  in  tow  of  H.M.S.  '  Engadine.' 
Proceeding  to  Cromarty." 

5.  At  this  time  I.  had  every  hope  of  saving  the  Ship.  During 
the  night  the  wind  freshened  from  S.S.W.  to  S.W.,  and  the  sea 
continued  to  rise.  This  made  the  Ship  worse,  and,  combined 
with  the  seas  washing  over  the  decks,  flooded  the  main  deck. 

X     12872  T 


2i)()  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

G.  After  obtaining  the  opinions  of  the  Engineer  Commander, 
Commander,  and  next  Senior  iinwounded  executive  Officer,  as 
to  the  chances  of  saving  the  Ship,  as  well  as  my  own  personal 
inspection,  I  decided  that,  as  it  was  impossible  to  save  the  Ship 
under  the  existing  weather  conditions,  she  should  be  abandoned 
and  the  ])ersonnel  saved. 

7.  I  then  ordered  the  "  Engadine  "  to  come  alongside,  a 
proceeding  involving  considerable  risk  owing  to  the  weather, 
and  transferred  the  whole  ship's  company  to  her,  including 
badly  wounded  cot  cases,  one  of  whom,  owing  to  the  motion 
of  the  two  ships,  and  in  spite  of  every  care,  was  dropped  over 
board  in  the  operation,  but  Avas  afterwards  recovered  dead. 

8.  After  consulting  the  Officer  in  Command  of  "  Engadine," 
I  decided  he  should  make  for  Queensferry,  and  I  directed 
"  Engadine  "  to  report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  the  position 
in  which  "  Warrior  "  was  abandoned.  This  signal  could  not  be 
passed  owing  to  W/T  congestion  till  2.0  p.m. 

9.  I  regret  to  report  the  casualties  as  shown  on  the  attached 
list.     A  hst  of  which  has  been  telegraphed  to  Admiralty.-^ 

10.  A  fuller  report  will  be  made  as  soon  as  oj^portunity 
admits,  but  I  must  at  once  state  that  all  ranks  and  ratings 
behaved  in  accordance  with  the  finest  traditions  of  the  Service, 
and  every  exertion  was  made  to  save  the  Ship  subsequently. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

V.  B.  MOLTENO, 
Commander-in-Chief,  Captain. 

Home  Fleets. 


Enclosure  No.   13  to  Submission  No.   1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

H.M.S.    "WARRIOR,"    ACTION   OF   THE    31st   MAY    1916. 

Admiralty, 
Sir,  7  June  1916. 

In  amphfication  of  my  letter  of  the  1st  June  (dated  in 
error  the  31st  May),  reporting  the  abandonment  of  H.M.S. 
"  Warrior "  on  1st  June,  I  have  the  honour  to  report  as 
follows  : — 

General  Narrative  of  Events. 

At  about  5.40  p.m.,  G.M.T.,  being  in  company  with  "  Defence  " 
(5  cables  astern)  in  position  D  (L.S.  1-10),  steering  S.E.  by  S. 
at  20  knots,  flashes  were  observed  about  2  points  before  the 
Starboard  beam,  which  I  imagined  (quite  correctly)  were  our 
battle  cruisers,  engaging  the  enemy's  battle  cruisers.  Our  own 
light  cruisers  appeared  to  be  on  the  disengaged  bow  of  our  battle 

^  List  not  printed. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  291 

cruisers,  steering  so  that  I  was  on  their  Starboard  bow.  Tliese 
light  cruisers  came  in  sight  at  the  same  time  as  the  more  distant 
flashes  of  our  battle  cruisers  guns.  As  our  light  cruisers 
approached  smaller  natures  of  ])rojectiles  were  observed  to  be 
falling,  generally  speaking  short  of  them,  also  heavier  natures  of 
projectiles  apparently  short  of  the  enemy  Battle  Cruisers,  fired 
by  our  own  Battle  Cruisers.  These  projectiles  were  seen  to  be 
falling  before  any  enemy  vessels  were  seen. 

At  about  5.47  I  observed  about  4  points  on  my  Starboard 
bow  (course  still  S.E.  by  S.)  three,  and  possibly  four,  enemy 
light  cruisers. 

"  Defence  "  altered  course  about  3  points  to  port  and 
brought  the  second  or  third  light  cruiser,  which  was  closer  than 
the  others,  to  the  bearing  of  Green  80.  She  1:hen  signalled 
"  open  fire  "  and  "  ship  interval  12  sees." 

This  vessel  had  3  funnels  and  appeared  to  be  one  of  the  type 
building  in  Germany  for  Russia  of  which  Lieutenant  (G)  had 
obtained  a  silhouette. 

I  ordered  speed  to  be  increased  to  21  knots  to  close  "  Defence." 
Three  salvoes  were  fired  by  "  Defence  "  and  three  by  "  Warrior," 
but  all  our  shots  falling  short,  I  ordered  "  check  fire."  "  Defence  " 
then  altered  course  to  Starboard,  bringing  the  enemy  light 
cruiser  almost  ahead  and  shortly  after,  by  another  turn  to 
Starboard,  to  about  Red  40.  Time  noted  of  making  this  second 
alteration  of  course  was  6.1  for  "  Warrior." 

Our  light  cruisers  had  now  passed  under  our  stern  fairly 
close  to  us  and  projectiles  of  6-in.  and  4-in.  guns  were  falling 
fairly  well  round  us  from  the  aforementioned  light  cruiser. 

At  6.5  Port  guns  had  opened  fire  on  the  same  enemy.  I  saw 
her  hit  both  by  '"  Warrior's  "  and  "  Defence's  "  2nd  salvo, 
and  she  appeared  to  be  crippled,  and  very  soon  nearly  stopped. 
"  Defence  "  continued  to  close  her  to  about  5,500  yards  before 
turning  away  to  Starboard  at  6.17,  and  "Warrior"  closed  to 
about  3  cables  of  "  Defence  "  going  about  135  revolutions  (just 
22  knots). 

At  6.19  "Warrior"  turned  to  Starboard,  and  "Defence" 
Avas  observed  to  be  hit  by  two  salvoes  in  quick  succession. 
A  huge  furnace  appeared  to  be  under  her  fore  turret  for  quite 
an  appreciable  time  (10  sees,  perhaps)  and  then  she  blew  up 
and  disappeared. 

From  the  time  of  about  6.7  onwards  "  Defence  "  and 
"Warrior"  were  being  straddled  by  heavy  salvoes  (11-in.  to 
14-in.). 

At  6.17  1  ordered  the  Lieut. -Commander  (N)  to  work  the 
ship  from  the  conning  tower,  and  entered  it  myself  and  continued 
to  work  the  ship  from  that  position  till  the  action  was  over, 
Lieut. -Commander  (T)  and  Signal  Bosn.  remaining  just  outside, 
as  there  was  no  room  for  them  inside.  A  shell  a  few  moments 
afterwards  wrecked  the  bridge  and  wounded  Lieut. -Commander 
{T)  (Lieut. -Commander  Bromley)  outside  the  C.T, 

T  2 


2!>2  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

"  Defence  "  having  gone  at  about  6.20  p.m.  and  light  crui.ser 
Russian  type  sinking  just  afterwards,  I  decided  to  Avithdravv 
and  obstruct  tJie  fire  of  the  B.C.  fleet  and  5th  B.S.  as  little  as 
possible,  but  I  noticed  that  the  ship  was  losing  her  speed  as 
I  turned  away,  and  sent  a  message  to  keep  the  engines  going 
at  all  costs. 

At  6.32  I  received  a  rejwrt  that  Starboard  engine  room  was* 
disabled,  and  at  6.33  that  both  engine  rooms  were  disabled, 
and  sliortly  afterwards  that  there  were  two  or  three  fires  on 
the  Main  Deck,  one  especially  bad  round  the  .Ship's  and  Armament 
offices,  which  blocked  access  to  the  Engine  Rooms.  During  the 
whole  time  the  "  Warrior  "  was  withdrawing  she  drew  the  fire 
of  at  least  four  of  the  enemy's  heavy  ships,  first  they  appeared 
to  be  Battle  Cruisers,  but  latterly  were  certainly  Battle  Ships. 

I  passed  some  distance  astern  of  the  5th  B.S.  except  "  War- 
s.pite,"  who  was  considerably  astern  of  the  remainder  of  5th  B.S. 
and  to  Starboard  (enemy's  side)  of  the  Hne.  I  should  have 
passed  astern  of  her  also  had  she  not  turned  to  Starboard  and 
passed  under  my  stern,  thereby  screening  me  from  the  enemy's 
fire.  This  was  a  particularly  gallant  act  as  the  "  Warspite  " 
had  just  been  having  a  very  severe  pounding  herself,  and  she 
probably  saved  "  Warrior  "  being  sunk  then  and  there. 

"  Warrior  "  then  passed  the  rear  of  our  own  Battle  Fleet 
and  observed  one  of  our  armoured  cruisers  almost  astern  of  the 
Battle  Fleet,  about  4  miles  away. 

Lieut.  Sargent,  R.N.R..,  who  was  stationed  in  the  Main  top, 
reported  that  he  observed  a  ship  of  "  Black  Prince  "  class  blow 
up  about  10  minutes  after  the  "  Defence."  Owdng  to  ofHcers 
and  men  having  dispersed,  I  am  unable  to  get  this  report 
confirmed,  but  I  think  it  quite  probable. 

After  passing  the  rear  of  our  battle  fleet  I  shaped  a  course 
for  Kinnaird  Head,  and  almost  At  once  sighted  the  "  Engadine." 
I  directed  her  to  stand  by  me,  as  I  was  badly  disabled.  Both 
engine  rooms  were  filled  with  water  to  within  10  ft.  of  the  Main 
Deck,  but  the  engines  continued  to  revolve,  giving  the  ship 
a  speed  of  quite  10  to  12  knots. 

Having    ascertained    that    there    was    no    possibility    of    the . 
engines  working  for  more  than  another  hour,  at  8  ]).m.  I  directed 
H.M.S.  "  Engadine  "  to  take  "  Warrior  "  in  tow,  which  she  did, 
and  proceeded  towing  at  a  speed  of  8.2  knots  for  the  first  hour, 
and  1  had  good  hopes  of  saving  the  ship. 

At  7  a.m.  next  day,  speed  was  about  6  knots,  as  "  Warrior  " 
by  then  had  sunk  so  low  aft. 

Officers  and  men  worked  most  heroically  in  shoring  bulkheads, 
stopping  shell  holes  and  leaks,  and  manning  the  hand  pumps, 
but  owing  to  the  rising  sea  and  the  list  to  Port  which  was 
increasing,  it  was  impossible  to  keep  the  water  from  rising  on 
Main  Deck. 

At  about  7.45  a.m.  I  decided  that  unless  the  ship  were 
abandoned  immediately  most  of  the  ship's  company  and  all  the 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  293 

wounded  would  perish;  I  therefore  decided  to  abandon  her. 
However,  as  I  did  not  know  but  that  a  vessel  might  be  close 
by  to  tow  her,  and  that  the  weather  might  possibly  get  quite 
smooth,  I  closed  all  the  W.T.  openings  before  quitting  her.  As 
it  turned  out  the  ship  was  quitted  only  at  the  very  last  moment, 
after  which  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  the  "  Engadine  " 
to  get  alongside  and  take  off  the  ship's  company, 

I  consider  that  two  to  three  hours  was  the  maximum  time 
she  could  have  remained  afloat,  under  the  weather  conditions 
that  prevailed.  Every  sea  was  washing  over  the  upper  deck, 
and  her  stern  was  within  3  ft.  of  the  water,  and  a  list  of  about 
6°  to  Port  (Windward). 

The  position  in  which  "  Warrior  "  was  abandoned  is 
estimated  to  be  15  miles  North  Magnetic  from  that  given 
originally,  viz.,  Lat.  57.21  N.,  Long.  3.2  E.  This  position  is 
determined  after  correcting  the  reckoning  when  ''  Engadine  " 
made  May  Island  at  1  a.m.  next  morning.  At  the  time  I 
signalled  Lat.  57.21  N.,  Long.  3.2  E.  this  position  agreed  almost 
exactly  with  the  reckoning  of  "  Engadine  "  and  the  position 
was  only  subsequently  found  to  be  in  error  as  explained  above. 

I  have  already  forwarded  through  the  V.A.,  B.C.F.,  the 
action  I  took  in  regard  to  the  confidential  books  and  papers  on 
board,  and  an  additional  copy  is  forwarded  herewith.^ 

To  assist  in  maldng  out  an  accurate  account  of  the  battle 
I  have  drawn  out  the  attached  series  of  plans ^  illustrating  the 
positions  of  other  vessels  relative  to  "  Warrior,"  but,  of  course, 
all  the  vessels  that  were  -within  the  radius  of  vision  are  not  put 
down,  but  those  only  which  I  and  my  Lieut. -Commander  (N) 
and  Lieut.  (G)  can  remember  observing. 

The  times  were  taken  by  my  Clerk,  Mr.  0.  H.  Matthews  in 
the  lower  C.T.  with  a  watch  set  for  G.M.T. 

As  regards  the  movements  of  the  other  ships  of  the  squadron, 
just  before  opening  fire  I  enquired  what  v/ere  the  movements  of 
the  other  two  ships  of  1st  C.S.  I  was  informed  that  the  ship 
at  G  was  moving  to  her  station  on  deployment,  that  at  F  was 
trying  to  follow  "  Warrior,"  and  as  I  looked  round  T  saw  the 
ship  at  F  about  2|  miles  W.  by  S.  from  "  Warrior." 

I  saw  neither  of  them  again  during  the  action,  but  I  was 
informed  just  as  "  Warrior  "  left  the  action  and  got  out  of  range, 
that  "  Duke  of  Edinburgh  "  (but  jDrobably  this  was  "  Black 
Prince  ")  had  been  under  very  heavy  fire  during  the  action. 
I  cannot  say  who  the  officer  or  man  was  who  made  this  report, 
but  it  was  not  Lieutenant  Sargent,  R.N.R. 

H.M.S.  "  Engadine  "  was  most  skiKully  handled,  first  when 
taking  in  tow  and  subsequently  in  coming  alongside.  Her 
Captain  and  Officers  behaved  splendidly  in  caring  for  us,  and 
I  am  making  an  application  for  the  Royal  Humane  Society 
Medal  for  Fhght-Lieutenant  Rutland,  R.N.,  Avho  gallantly  risked 
his  life  to  save  a  wounded  man. 

1  Not  printed.  ^  pi^te  26  a—g. 


2{»4  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

I  am  t()i\\ar(liii<;'  this  incompleted  narrative  with  the  attached 
plans,  wliicii  arc  not  to  scale,  in  order  to  give  a  general  idea  of 
what  occurred,  but  1  shall  forward  a  further  amplifying  report 
in  a  few  daj^s. 

All  Officers  and  Men,  except  those  in  the  following  list,  have 
been  sent  to  their  respective  Depots  to  be  kitted  up,  and  to  have 
10  days'  leave.  The  Officers  mentioned  below  I  am  retaining 
in  London  to  coinplete  my  reports.  I  have  applied  for  and 
obtained  a  room  at  the  Admiralty  where  we  can  meet  and  M^here 
I  can  be  communicated  with  : — 

Commander  G.  J.  P.  Ingham. 
Lieutenant-Commander  E.  J.  Birch. 
Engineer-Commander  H.  W.  Kitching. 
Fleet-Paymaster  R.  W.  Walker. 
Lieutenant  R.  Mends. 
.    Engineer-Lieutenant  G.  Morgan. 
Artificer-Engineer  A.  J.  Daniels. 
Mr.  Matthews,  Clerk. 

By  orders  of  the  First  Sea  Lord,  Avho  expressed  a  wish  to 
see  me,  I  am  forwarding  a  copy  of  this  report  direct  to  the 
Admiralty. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

V.  B.  MOLTENO, 
The  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  Captain, 

and  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Grand  Fleet. 

Enclosure  No.  14  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 
1  *  *  *  *  * 

GENERAL    OBSERVATIONS,     DATED     8th    JUNE     1916. 

By  captain,  H.M.S.  "  WARRIOR." 

VisibiHty  was  quite  11  miles  at  4.0  p.m.,  but  grew  steadily 
less  up  to  7  p.m.,  when  it  was  onty  about  8  miles. 

It  was  much  clearer  looking  to  North  and  West  than  towards 
South  and  East. 

The  enemy  vessel  sunk  was  the  only  one  which  could  be 
certainly  recognised  by  me,  but  I  am  almost  certain  of  seeing 
the  "  Moltke  "  as  well."^ 

The  Signal  Boatswain  is  sure  of  recognising  the  "  Konig  " 
or  "  Kaiser  "  class  of  ship. 

Lieut. -Commander  (N)  is  certain  that  leading  battleship  was 
one  of  the  "  Kaiser  "  class. 

^  Part  omitted  referring  only  to  damage  inflicted  on  "  Warrior." 


rictte  269" 


31  -  V-    16 

5.  40  P.  M 


British 


^  'SatiJe 
Fleet 


■  10' 


Minotaur  r> 


Warrior    De  Pence 


D  of  E  or      . 
Black  Prince 


Black  Prince 
or  D  of  E 


SE  by  S 


\    British  Light 
\   Cruiser  Squadrun 
\  {emerging  fhom  mist) 
t  Distant  from  Warrior 
about  10  miles. 


..•••.  Hereabouts,  flashes 
\  ':  from  guns  of  Battle 
'••■■■'  Cruisers,  apparently 

firing  to  South  eastward. 


Grand   Fleet     in     LSI    -   10. 


ozii^tee'pina     (i^~if)  so'^t-- n  to 


MaibyASons.L.ih 


FioJe.26^ 


31  -V-  16 

5.50  P.M. 


Grand  Fleet 
apparently 
commencing 
deployment 


Warner     Defence 


D  of  E  or 
Black  Prince  ^ 


Black  Prince 
.^   orPofE.^    \. 
Light  ^ 

Cruiser        ^^ 
Scfuadron    \ 


Battle 

Cruisers    ' 

(firing  toSE)t 

f 


t 


Enemy  Light . 

Cruiser       \ 

fat  high  speed) 

Splashes       \    J 
apparently 
from  Battle 
Cruisers  (British) 


SE   hy  S 


T 


U-HIl 


Enemy   Light    Cruiser    as    seen   from    War 


nor. 


lOon- 3*a9a/ftni    <f*^   soooii»o 


McJby&Sons.Llth. 


/'/.,/.•  :v;j 


31  -  V  -  16 

5.  56  P.  M. 


'■^^  Grand  Fleet 
y     deploying. 


Warrjor 
octned  fire 


Defence 


5^^  BS      ^" 


y 


/ 


/  Battle 
Cruisers 


/ 


O  IVarsp/te 

not  under  control 


Enemy    \ 
Liqht  Cruiser 


SE  by  S 


lootr  2*xt«l  Pins.  (iS5i   seooiito 


MaIby*Sons.L;tfi. 


riat/>.  28"^ 


31-  V  -   16 

6.0  P.M.  (about) 


Warrior 


"11^'     ^Defence 


Battle 
Cruisers      f 

f 
f 


r 
f 


Enemy 
Light  Cruiser 


Enemy 
Dreadnought 


O  Wars  pit  e 


SE  by    S 


Leading   Enemy    Dreadnougr)t    Kaiser    C/ass . 


1017    2*2es/pin3.  ^Td)  fooo  II  to 


MajbyifcSonsA 


PhiO'  26^:  31  -  V      16 

6/0  P.M.  (about) 


Battle 

f 

t 

Cruisers 

A 
/ 

f 

5'^BS  I 

\  Warrior 

f 

\pefence 

'  Enemy 

♦—  Light 
G  Warrior  Cruisers 


SE  by  S 


'^'c.nemy 
Dreadnoughts 


ioozTz^2se/Pin3.  (^fooc/iio  Malby&Son:,.L.th 


PUxLe  2£f 


31-V-  16 

6  20  P.M.  (about) 


Battle  ' 

Cruisers     ' 


:th 


5^'^  B.S. 


Warrior      ) 
Defence  / 


Enemy  light  cruiser 
/stopped  &  heavily  on 

fire . 


Q  Warspite 


Ureaancughts 


■  E  by  S 


Defence     blew    up    about    chrs    time. 


loo-ii-  z*tte/ Pim    li£D  sooo  ,i    to 


Mg.'bv&Sor  r,  Ir^ 


PLate  269 


31  -V-  16 
6.30   P.M.  (about) 


Battle 
Fleet 


A  Cruiser 
I  Black  Prince 
Class 


Warrior 


t  Warsp, 


ite 


0 

Enemy 
Drea  d noughts 


SE  by  S 


-Warrior    then    passed   astern     of   Battle    Fleet    and    was     taken     in 
tow   by    Fngadine. 


•  r»«  rmt.  JB3)  S09Q  'Zto 


MalbyftSons,Lith 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  295 

Lieutenant  (G)  is  almost  certain  of  the  "  Moltke  "  or  "  Von 
der  Tann." 

Fire  from  the  German  heavy  ships  was  by  director  and  very 
accurate  from  the  first.  Salvoes  fell  close  to  the  ship  almost 
before  the  enemy  could  be  seen. 

Calibration  was  very  close  indeed,  about  75  yards  spread 
usually. 

To  the  smallness  of  spread  is  undoubtedly  due  the  fact  that 
the  "  Warrior  "  was  not  hit  more  often.  The  whole  salvo  missed 
as  a  rule.     There  was  practically  no  spread  for  direction. 

At  least  three,  and  probably  four,  heavy  ships  were  firing  at 
"  Warrior  "  and  "  Defence  "  from  6.5  p.m.  till  6.40  p.m. 

"Warrior"  was  holed  at  least  fifteen  times  by  11 -in.  to 
14:-in.  calibre  guns,  and  about  six  times  by  6-in.  or  4-in. ;  one 
of  the  latter  hit  the  fore  turret  early  in  the  action  doing  very 
little  damage. 

"  Warrior  "  was  being  hit  by  6-in.  or  4-in.  projectiles  before 
the  enemy  light  cruisers  were  Avithin  range  of  her  guns. 

The  light  cruiser  which  was  sunk  was  seen  to  use  smoke  boxes. 
These  were  floating  on  the  water  and  gave  out  a  large  dirty- 
white  cloud  which  at  times  completely  hid  her,  and  v/ere  a 
great  hindrance  to  the  spotting  officer. 

With  regard  to  spotting,  the  "  over  "  splashes  of  a  salvo 
which  straddled  were  usually  visible,  but  this  was  not  the  case 
with  shots  which  fell  further  over. 

Owing  to  the  hazy  atmosphere  and  the  great  vibration  aloft 
only  very  low  power  glasses  could  be  used.  The  vibration  was 
abnormal  owdng  to  rigging  being  cut. 

Spray  from  splashes  fell  several  times  into  fore  top  and  put 
the  spotter  out  of  action  for  about (sic). 

At  the  time  "  Warrior  "  was  close  to  "  Warspite  "  the  enemy 
vessels  were  no  longer  visible,  but  only  the  flashes  of  their  guns, 
while  "  Warspite  "  and  "  Warrior  "  were  receiving  very  heavy 
fire. 

There  were  100  casualties,  19  of  these  were  in  the  engine  room, 
and  most  of  the  remainder  on  the  main  deck. 

V.  B.  MOLTENO, 

Captain. 


LETTER    OF    PROCEEDINGS— FROM    COMMODORE, 
4th  LIGHT  CRUISER  SQUADRON. 

Enclosure  No.  15  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

No.  C.  14. 

"  Calliope," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  hereA\Tlth,  in  the  form  of  a 
diary,   the  proceedings   of  the  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron 


2!)t)  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

when  not  actually  in  station,  during  the  Fleet  action  of  31st 
May  1916. 

2.  The  diary  has  been  compiled  from  the  reports  and  track 
charts^  forwarded  by  ships  of  the  Squadron. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
.Sir, 
Your  obedient  (Servant, 
C.  E.  Le  MESURIER, 
Commodore, 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 

Grand  Fleet. 


(Enclosure  to  4th  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  Letter  No.  C.  14  of 

3rd  June  1916.) 

DIARY   OF  PROCEEDINGS. 
Date,  31st  May  1916.  All  times  G.M.T. 

P.M. 

5.45.     Heavy  firing  S.S.W. 

6.12.  One   Enemy   Light   Cruiser   to    Southward,    on   fire   and 

stopped. 

6.13.  4th  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  turned  to  East  in  line  ahead. 

Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  2'  South,  steering  East,  engaging 
enemy  Battle  Cruisers  on  parallel  course. 

6.20.     One  enemy  four-funnel  Light  Cruiser  observed  to  sink. 

6.22.     "  Queen  Mary  "  blew  up. 

6.32.     "  Invincible  "  blew  up. 

6.35.  "  Acasta "  badly  hit,  i)assed  through  Squadron  from 
Southward. 

6.35.  Centre  and  Rear  Divisions  of  Battle  Fleet  opened  fire. 
6.45.     Altered    course    to    close    "  King    George    V."    division. 

Received  signal  for  deployment. 

7.0-7.15.     Took  up  action  station  on  "  King  George  V." 

7.15.  One  enemy  Battle  Cruiser  (?  "  Lutzow  ")  bearing  West 
surrounded  by  T.B.D.'s  steering  slowly  to  N.W. 

7.18.  Two  enemy  Battle  Ships  "  Konig  "  class,  engaged  by 
"  Orion  "  division,  observed  heavily  on  fire. 

7.22.  Ordered  bj^  Commander-in-Chief  to  attack  enemy  de- 
stroyers. Latter — a  half  fiotilla — bearing  N.W.  by  N., 
steering  towards  head  of  "  King  George  V."  division. 
Opened  fire  8,000-9,000  yards,  leading  T.B.D.  dis- 
appeared, one  other  disabled. 

7.25-7.35.  At  least  six  torpedoes  observed  in  Squadron  to  pass 
ahead  or  through  the  Squadron's  track. 

7.36.  Enemy   destroyers   retired,    4th   Light   Cruiser   Squadron 

resumed  station  on  "  King  George  V." 

1  I'late  liVf 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  297 

P.M. 

8.5.  "  Castor  "  and  T.B.D.'s  turned  to  West,  a  smoke  screen 
observed  W.N.VV. — 1st  Division,  "  Calliope,"  "  Con- 
stance," and  "  Comus  "  turned  to  support  "  Castor." 

8.18.  Opened  fire  on  enemy's  destroyers,  a  half  flotilla  steering 
towards  rear  of  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  in  direction  S.8.W. 

8.24.  Enemy  destroyers  made  smoke  cloud  and  retired  on 
own  line. 

8.26.  Sighted  enemy  Battle  Fleet  N.W.,  8,000  yards,  "  Pom- 
mern  "  class  centre,  "  Kaiser "  class  rear  divisions, 
course  south. 

8.28.     Enemy  Battleships  opened  fire  on  Light  Cruisers. 

8.30.  "  Calliope  "  fired  a  torpedo  at  leading  ship  of  "  Kaiser  " 
division  at  6,500  yards — Light  Cruisers  retired  on  "  King 
George  V."  divisions  heavily  shelled  by  three  enemy 
battleships. 

8.35.     Enemy  ceased  firing. 

8.38.     An  explosion  noticed  on  one  "  Kaiser  "  class  Battleship. 

8.45.  "  Calhope  "  took  station  on  2nd  Battle  Squadron.  "  Con- 
stance "  and  "  Comus  "  proceeded  through  the  fine 
to  get  ahea.d  of  the  "  King  George  V." 

8.45.  "  Carohne  "  and  "  Royahst  "  (ahead  of  '^  Castor  "  and 
destroyers)  who  Avere  ahead  of  "  King  George  V." 
observed  three  enemy  Battleships — pre-Dreadnoughts 
N.N.W.  closing  slowly — leading  enemy  ship  challenged 
by  Searchlight  towards  "  Castor." 

0.5-9.10.  "  CaroHne  "  fired  two  torpedoes  and  "  Royahst  " 
fired  one  torpedo  at  enemy,  mean  range  8,000  yards. 
Enemy  opened  fire  on  "  Carohne  "  and  "  Royahst," 
also  on  "  Comus  " — rejoining  "  CaroMne."  Latter  and 
"  Royahst  "  turned  away. 

9.14.     Enemy  ceased  firing. 

9.17.     Enemy  fired  one  large  star  shell. 

9.35.  "  Calhope  "  reached  head  of  fine,  4th  L.C.S.  formed  astern 
of  her.  Squadron  closed  on  "  King  George  V."  at 
2.0  a.m.  1st  June. 

REPORT   FROM   COMMANDING   OFFICER— 
H.M.S.  "ABDIEL." 

Enclosure  No.  16  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

H.M.S.  "  Abdiel" 
Sir,  7th  June  1916. 

T  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  report  of  "  Abdiel's  " 
proceedings  during  the  action  with  the  German  Fleet  on 
31st  May  and  until  arrival  at  Queensferry,  8  p.m.,  on  1st  June. 

During  the  day  and  until  coming  in  contact  with  the  enemy 
at  5.40  p.m.,  "  Abdiel  "  was  in  company  mth  the  4th  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron,  who  were  acting  as  a  screen  from  four  to 
five  miles  ahead  of  the  Battle  Fleet  and  spread  |  of  a  mile  apart 


298  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

to  starboard ;    "  Abdiel  "  being  f  of  a  mile  on  the  port  beam  of 
the  Commodore's  ship — "  Calliope  " — the  port  wing  ship. 

P.M. 

5.45.     Steering  S.E.  ))y  S.  at  11>|  knots,  observed  ships  in  action 
bearing  South  and  steering  East. 

Closed   "  Calliope  "   on  her  ordering  the  4th  L.CS.   to 
close  and  form  single  line  ahead. 

Remained  close  the  "  Calliope,"  conforming  as  far  as 
possible  to  the  movements  of  the  Squadron  without 
geeting  in  their  way  until  the  Battle  Fleet  had  deployed 
at  about  6.15  p.m.,  when  I  proceeded  to  the  centre 
of  the  disengaged  side  of  the  Fleet  according  to  orders, 
and  remained  there  during  the  action. 
10.15.  Having  received  orders  by  W/T  from  C.-in-C.  to  lay 
mines  as  directed  in  Operation  Memo.  "  M "  of 
31st  Ma}'^,  proceeded  S.S.E.  at  31  knots. 

A.M.  Isf  June. 

0.30.     Sighted  Horns  Reef  Light  Ship  ;  bearing  E.  by  S. 
1.24.     Arrived  at  a  position  15  miles  215°  from  Vyl  Lightship; 
reduced  speed  and  ran  a  line  of  80  mines,   10  to  the 
mile,  set  for  15  ft.  deep  at  low  water,  steering  S.  9  E. 
(mag.)  for  the  first  40  and  S.   34  W.   (mag.)  for  the 
remainder,  zig-zagging  on  each  course. 
2.  4.     Finished  laying  mines  and  proceeded  North  at  30  knots. 
2.20.     A/c  to  N.  77  W. 
2.55.     A/c  to  S.  79  W. 

3.50.     Heard  heavy  firing  S.W.  about  10  miles  off. 
4.30.     Reduced  to  25  knots. 
7.40.     A/c   to  N.   46  W.,   having  passed  round  the  South  of 

Area  1  Minefield  according  to  orders. 
4.40.  Passed  four  of  8th  Flotilla  Patrol  and  arrived  at  Queens- 
ferry  at  8  p.m.,  having  met  or  seen  nothing  else. 
While  laying  the  mines  the  lights  of  3  Fishing  Vessels 
were  seen,  but  I  am  of  opinion  that  they  did  not 
observe  "  Abdiel  "  or  what  she  was  doing,  as  it  was 
not  daylight  and  visibiHty  was  very  lo^^•  OMing  to 
drizzhng  rain  and  overcast  sky.  • 

No  mines  were  seen  to  remain  on  the  surface. 
The  ship  was  not  hit  during  the  action. 
T  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Your  obedient  Servant, 

Grand  Fleet,  B.  CURTIS, 

H.M.S.  "  Iron  Duke."         Commander  in  Command. 

C17/1.  II. 

Commander-in-Chief,  Grand  Fleet. 
Submitted. 

C.E.C.M., 
Commodore,  4th  Light  Cruiser  Squadron. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  299 

H.M.S.  "  Oak  " — Report  of  Proceedings  during  the  Action 

OF  31sT  May,  191(5. 
No.  0/13. 

Commander-in-Chief, 
Home  Fleets. 

Forwarded. 

H.M.S.  '•  Iron  Duke,"  FRED   C.   D.   DREYER, 

10th  June  191G.  Captain. 


Enclosure  No.  17  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

H.M.S.  "  Oak," 
Sir,  9th  June  1910. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  make  the  following  report  on  the 
movements  of  H.M.S.  "  Oak,"  and  of  the  observations  from 
that  vessel,  of  the  action  fought  on  31st  May  and  of  the  night 
action  which  followed. 

At  5.55  p.m.  "  Oak  "  took  up  her  station  for  the  approach 
2  cables  astern  of  H.M.S.  "  Canada,"  and  at  6.04  p.m.  the  fleet 
deployed  to  port,  to  South,  and  speed  was  reduced  to  18  knots. 
"  Oak  "  turned  so  as  to  keep  about  2,500  yards  on  the  disengaged 
beam. 

A  very  -^ddely-spread  salvo,  from  the  enemy,  here  straddled 
the  "  Iron  Duke,"  the  nearest  shot  being  about  1,000  yards 
over. 

At  6.08  p.m.  "  Iron  Duke  "  opened  fire  at  what  appeared  to 
me  to  be  a  battleship  of  the  '■  Koenig  ""  class.  She  had  two  tall 
funnels.  The  first  salvo  was  short,  the  second  over,  and  the 
third  straddled  with,  I  think,  two  hits.  Each  subsequent  salvo 
appeared  to  me  to  straddle,  with  varying  hits  between  1  and  3 
from  each  salvo. 

At  6.12  p.m.  course  was  altered  to  S.E.  by  S.  The  above 
enemy  ship  was  last  seen  by  me,  enveloped  in  a  mist  of  steam 
or  white  smoke,  with  occasional  bursts  of  flame  coming  from  her. 

During  this  period  I  gradually  increased  the  distance  from 
the  line  to  3,500  yards,  as  a  few  overs  had  begun  to  pitch  about 
2,500  to  3,000  over.  These  were  all  isolated  shots,  and  the  return 
fire  from  the  enemy  at  the  4th  and  1st  Battle  Squadrons,  appeared 
to  me  to  be  very  wild.  Salvoes  were  badly  spread,  which  is  not 
usual  with  German  fire,  and  most  of  them  were  pitching  very 
badly  short.  It  struck  me  that  the  enemy's  morale  was  already 
badly  shaken.  The  only  hit  seen  by  me  on  our  battle  line  was 
one,  on  a  vessel  of  the  "  Hercules  "  class.  No  shots  were 
observed  to  be  fired  at  the  2nd  B.S. 

Also  during  this  period  the  ]st  cruiser  squadron,  which  had 
been   on   a   beam   bearing   from   the    "  Iron  Duke,"   turned   to 


30(J  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

starboard  and  engaged  the  enemy  at  close  range,  on  an  oj)posite 
course,  apparently  about  6  to  7  thousand  yards.  Enemy's,  fire 
at  these  ships  was  fairly  good,  but  even  these  salvoes  were 
observed  to  be  badly  spread  out,  usually  about  800  to  1,000 
yards.  Shots  from  one  salvo  were  seen  to  hit  "  Defence  "  aft, 
and  the  after  magazine  exploded.  The  flame  and  smoke  from 
this  explosion  rose  at  least  a  1,000  feet  into  the  air.  The  sliip, 
however,  continued  to  steam  on,  but  a  second  salvo  hit  her  and 
she  then  disappeared.  The  actual  sinking  of  the  "  Defence  " 
and  "  Black  Prince  "  was  not  observed. 

At  6.22  p.m.  speed  was  reduced  to  14  knots,  and  shortly  after 
course  was  altered  by  divisions  to  S.S.E.  The  leading  ships  then 
ran  into  a  heavy  bank  of  mist,  in  which  the  visibilitj^  was  reduced 
to  about  4,000  yards. 

At  6.30  p.m.  course  was  altered  by  divisions  to  South. 

An  enemy  Battle-Cruiser  of  the  latest  type  was  then  observed 
bearing  about  West,  heading  S.S.E.  and  making  very  little  way 
tlirough  the  water.  She  had  tA\o  funnels  spaced  very  far  apart, 
the  visible  section  of  which  appeared  to  be  almost  square.  At 
that  range  no  masts  could  be  seen,  so  they  must  have  been  of  the 
light  pole  variety,  or  else  they  had  been  shot  away.  SMps 
opened  on  her  in  succession  and  she  was  badly  punished ;  she 
still  continued  to  fire,  however,  but  their  fall  was  only  occasion- 
ally seen.  One  salvo  from  "  Iron  Duke  "  was  observed  to  start 
a  very  big  fire  in  her  just  abaft  the  after  superstructm'e  and  before 
the  after  turret.  The  ship  was  evidently  doomed,  and  to  screen 
her  from  further  damage,  or  perhaps  to  enable  her  crew  to  be 
rescued,  a  division  of  enemy  T.B.'s  were  observed  to  close  our 
hue,  heading  about  S.S.E.  and  lajdng  a  smoke  screen.  "  Iron 
Duke  "  opened  fire  Avith  6-in.,  and  the  leading  boat  shortly 
disappeared  behind  the  splash  of  a  salvo.  A  heavy  salvo— I 
think  from  "  Benbow  " — accounted  for  another  boat.  The  salvo 
pitched  mth  a  percentage  of  shots  short,  and  pieces  of  the  T.B. 
were'  observed  in  the  air.  When  the  splash  subsided  the  boat 
could  not  be  seen.     The  remaining  boats  then  made  off. 

At  about  7.35  p.m.  the  track  of  a  torjDcdo  was  observed  to 
cross  the  track  of  our  ships,  about  200  yards  ahead  of  "  Iron 
Duke."  Torpedo  was  travelling  sloA^ly.  Track  finished  about 
2.000  yards  on  the  port  side  of  the  line  and  the  torjjedo  sank. 
Direction  of  the  track  was  S.E. 

No  more  enemy  ships  were  seen  after  tliis.  "  Oak  "  conformed 
to  the  movements  of  the  battle  line  until  9.15  p.m.,  when  she 
was  ordered  to  keep  close  to  '"  Iron  Duke  "  during  the  night. 
Station  was  taken  up  2  cables  2  points  before  the  Port  beam. 

After  this  actions  were  observed  to  be  taking  jDlace  on  a 
bearing- S.W.  and  also  between  the  bearings  N.W.  to  N.  by  E 
between  9.30  and  midnight.  A  few  smaller  rounds  Mere  seen 
to  be  fired  in  the  early  j^art  of  the  middle  Avatch  right  astern  of 
the  fleet.     No  signals  were  received    however,  which  would  have 


OFFICLIL    DESPATCHES.  301 

indicated    the    nature    of    the    action    which    was    going    on    to 
Northward. 

When  dayhght  broke,  station  was  taken  up  5  cables  on  the 
port  bow  of  "  Iron  Duke." 

■  I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  DOUGLAS    FAVIELL, 

Home  Fleets.  Lieut. -Commander. 

(Through  the  Flag-Captain 
H.M.S.  "  Iron  Duke.") 

CAPTAIN'S  REPORTS,   H.M.S.  "  ACTIVE." 

Enclosure  No.  18  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C.  Home  Fleets. 

H.M.S.  "Active," 
Sir,  9th  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  at  about  11.15  p.m.  on 
Slay   31st   H.M.   Ship   under  my  command  was   felt   to   strike 
something.     No  damage  was  apparent  from  the  inside  of  the, 
ship,  and  no  leak  developed. 

On  June  8th  divers  were  sent  down,  and  it  was  found  that 
some  15  feet  of  the  Starboard  Bilge  Keel  had  been  torn  back, 
and  was  projecting  about  4  feet  from  the  ship's  side. 

A  sketch  is  attached  showing  the  extent  of  the  damage.^ 

It  is  submitted,  that  as  a  temi^orary  measure,  the  Bilge  Keel 
be  cut,  as  shown  by  the  dotted  red  line  in  the  sketch,  and  any 
ragged  edges  removed  from  the  fracture. 

The  ship's  approximate  position  at  11.15  p.m.  May  31st  was 
Lat.  56°  r  N.,  Long.  5°  55'  E.,  Course  South,  Speed  17  knots, 
following  astern  of  the  2nd  Battle  Squadron. 

I  have  the  honour  to  ])e. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

PERCY    WITHERS, 
The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

1st  Battle  Squadron, 

H.M.S.  "  Royal  Oak." 

Commander  in  Chief, 

Submitted.  I  requested  Lieut.  Catto  to  examine  the 
Bilge  Keel  and  he  reports  that  he  can  cut  off  the  pieces  if  he 
has  the  loan  of  the  pneumatic  tools  and  divers  from  "  Iron 
Duke." 

CECIL  BURNEY, 
Vice  Admiral  Commanding 
9tli  June  1916.  First  Battle  Sc^uadron. 

^  Xot  reprinted. 


3(.>i  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND  : 

Enclosure  No.  H)  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/ IG 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

H.M.S.  "Active," 
Sir,  10th  June  1916. 

In  accordance  with    your    signal    0800  of  to-day's    date, 
I  have  the  honour  to  report  that  : — 

(1)  H.M.S.  "Active"  during  the  advance  was  acting  as 
linking  ship  in  position  "  J." 

(2)  At  about  6.0  p.m.  an  enemy  Cruiser,  apparently  of  the 
"  Wiesbaden  "  class  was  sighted  on  the  starboard  bow,  and 
eni'a<'ed  bv  H.M.S.  "  Shannon  "  and  one  other  Cruiser,  which 
were  between  "  Active "  and  the  enemy.  As,  owing  to  the 
misty  weather,  it  was  not  possible  to  get  an  accurate  range, 
two  salvos  were  fired.  These  fell  a  long  way  short,  and  cease 
firing  was  sounded.  The  signal  to  deploy  being  then  made,  no 
opportunity  of  closing  the  vessel  occurred. 

(3)  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  not  being  present,  and  not 
having  the  speed  of  the  4th  L.C.S.,  I  took  station  on  the 
disengaged  beam  of  the  leading  Battle  Squadron,  and  repeated 
signals. 

(4)  When  the  Fleet  formed  up  for  the  night,  "  Active  "  took 
station  astern  of  2nd  Battle  Squadron. 

(5)  At  about  10.15  p.m.  an  action  took  place  lasting  for  from 
5  to  10  minutes,  just  abaft  the  starboard  beam,  about  3  miles 
.distant. 

(6)  At  about  11.0  p.m.  a  squadron  of  what  appeared  to  be 
Light  Cruisjers  opened  fire  from  the  starboard  quarter  at  a  ship 
about  a  mile  astern  of  "  Active."  The  After  Control  Officer 
describes  this  vessel  as  having  four  funnels,  and  two  masts,  the 
mainmast  having  a  large  top,  and  having  shown  a  red  light  over 
a  green  just  before  the  action  commenced.  One  funnel  was 
apparently  shot  away  during  the  action,  which  lasted  about 
10  minutes.  The  ship  burst  into  flames  and  appeared  to  sink, 
the  fires  suddenly  going  out.  Fire  was  not  ojjened,  as  there 
were  doubts  as  to  which  were  hostile  ships,  in  addition  to  which 
I  did  not  feel  justified  in  indicating  the  position  of  the  Battle 
Fleet. 

(7)  At  about  11.15  p.m.  the  ship  was  felt  to  bump  something 
heavily,  subsequent  investigation  reveahng  the  fact  that  some 
15  ft.  of  the  Starboard  Bilge  Keel  has  been  torn  back.  This 
has  formed  the  subject  of  a  separate  report. 

(8)  Several  actions  subsequently  took  place,  but  so  far  astern, 
that  only  the  flashes  in  the  sky  could  be  seen. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

PERCY    WITHERS, 
The  Vice  Admiral  Commanding  Captain. 

1st  Battle  Squadron, 

H.M.S.  "  Royal  Oak." 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  303 

REPORTS  OF  COMMODORE  (F). 

Enclosure  No.  20  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/10 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

N.  0017/2.  H.M.S.    "Castor," 

Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  of  my 
movements  on  the  night  of  31st  May-lst  June. 

At  about  8.30  p.m.  on  31st  May  the  Enemy's  Destroyers 
were  sighted  on  starboard  bow  of  our  van,  and  the  "  Castor  " 
and  Half  Flotilla  proceeded  to  attack,  the  Commodore  of  4th 
Light  Cruiser  Squadron  detaching  3  Cruisers  to  support. 

2.  The  enemy  (iestroyers  did  not  develop  their  attack,  and 
"  Castor  "  returned  to  her  position  ahead  of  the  Fleet,  com'se  S.W. 

3.  At  about  9.0  p.m.  the  Battle  Fleet  turned,  leaders 
together,  to  South,  the  Flotilla  remaining  on  Starboard  bow  of 
Second  Battle  Squadron,  and  a  Une  of  Battle  Cruisers  was  then 
sighted  on  the  Starboard  quarter  closing  Fleet.  They  appeared 
very  much  like  enemy  Battle  Cruisers,  but  by  an  intercej^ted 
signal  from  Vice-Admiral  2nd  B.S.  to  the  Commodore,  4th  L.C.S., 
the  Vice-Admiral  2nd  B.S.  was  apparently  satisfied  they  were 
our  own. 

Soon  after  sighting  them  these  Battle  Cruisers  ojDened  tire  on 
two  of  the  4th  L.C.S.  ahead  of  the  Flotilla. 

I  turned  the  Flotilla  away  from  the  Battle  Cruisers,  and 
expected  the  Fleet  to  open  fire  on  them. 

The  leading  Battle  Cruiser  then  fired  a  star  shell,  which 
appeared  to  justify  the  opinion  that  they  were  enemy  ships ; 
but  as  the  Fleet  still  held  their  fire  I  could  not  attack,  as  it  was 
not  dark  enough  to  make  an  attack  unsupported  by  fire  from 
the  Fleet. 

The  Battle  Cruisers  turned  off  to  starboard  and  were  lost 
sight  of. 

4.  At  9.45  p.m.  Flotillas  were  ordered  to  take  station  astern 
of  Battle  Fleet. 

5.  At  about  10.5  p.m.,  when  on  the  starboard  quarter  of  the 
Fleet,  ships  were  sighted  on  the  starboard  bow. 

They  challenged  us  by  the  first  two  signs  of  the  challenge  of 
the  day. 

They  then  made  T,  followed  by  R. 

When  about  2,500  yards  away  the  two  leading  sliips  switched 
on  search  hghts  and  opened  fire  on  "  Castor." 

"  Castor  "  oiDcned  fire,  and  was  seen  hitting  A^ith  range  on 
guns  of  2,000  yards.  The  bursting  of  shells  from  the  6-in.  guns 
was  the  most  noticeable. 

"  Castor  "  then  fired  a  torpedo,  high  speed  setting,  and  turned 
to  Port. 

6.  With  regard  to  the  eight  Destroyers  which  "  Castor  "  was 
leading,  two  destroyers  fired  torpedoes,  but  the  remainder  of 
them  which  were  near  "  Castor  "  say  they  were  so  bhnded  by 


304  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

"  Castor's  "  guns  they  could  not  see  anything,  and  the  others 
were  so  certain  in  their  own  minds  that  a  mistake  had  Ijeen 
made,  and  that  we  were  being  fired  on  by  our  own  ships  that 
tliey  decidetl  not  to  fire  their  torpedoes. 

7.  Three  Captains  of  Destroyers  infoim  me  that  their  Engineer 
Lieutenants  reported  feehng  a  violent  detonation  under  water  at 
the  time  "  Castor  "  "  Magic  "  and  "  Marne  "  fired  their  torpedoes, 
and  that  they  themselves  observed  the  lights  of  the  second  ship 
go  out  and  the  glow  of  an  explosion  on  her  side ;  but  this  was 
not  felt  in  "  Castor,"  probably  as  she  was  receiving  other  shocks 
at  the  time. 

8.  The  Flotilla  then  proceeded  South  after  the  Battle  Fleet, 
my  object  being  to  be  within  reach  of  the  Fleet  at  daybreak 
should  the  Fleet  have  found  the  enemy  and  a  Fleet  action  take 
place. 

9.  At  about  12.15  a.m.  I  sighted  a  Torpedo  Boat  on  the 
starboard  bow.  As  soon  as  it  was  distinguished  as  an  enemy 
craft,  "  Castor  "  turned  to  ram  her  and  opened  fire. 

The  torpedo  boat  Mas  too  quick  on  the  helm,  and  just  avoided 
being  rammed,  but  received  the  fire  of  all  guns  at  point  blank 
range,  and  was  not  seen  again. 

A  flare,  probably  from  shell  explosion  was  seen  on  her  deck  aft. 

Beheving  her  to  be  sunk,  "  Castor  "  turned  again  to  South 
to  follow  the  Fleet. 

There  \vould  appear  to  be  no  doubt  that  she  was  sunk,  as 
she  was  not  seen  by  any  of  the  destroj^ers  who  passed  the  spot 
where  she  was  fired  on  by  "  Castor." 

10.  With  reference  to  paragraph  5,  the  Enemy  consisted  of 
three  or  more  cruisers,  of  which  the  leading  ship  appeared  to  be 
a  large  cruiser. 

Their  firing  was  not  really  very  good,  and  though  "  Castor  " 
was  straddled  by  the  first  salvo  this  was  not  remarkable 
considering  the  range. 

"  Castor  "  drew  the  whole  fire  of  the  two  cruisers,  and  it  is 
unfortunate  that  this  element  of  doubt  existed  in  the  minds  of 
the  Captains  of  the  Destroyers  as  to  whether  the  ships  were 
enemj%  as  a  good  opportunity  of  firing  torpedoes  was  lost. 

"Castor"  could  make  no  signals  to  the  destroyers,  as  her 
communication  and  wires  were  cut  and  W/T  temporarily  out 
of  action. 

The  handhng  of  the  destroyers  was  remarkably  good, 
considering  no  signals  could  be  made. 


14.  I  would  mention  that  some  ship  ahead  of  the  Second 
Battle  Squadron  at  about  9.0  p.m.  made  the  signal  by  searchlight  : 
"  Please  give  me  the  Challenges  and  Rephes  for  the  day,  as  I 
have  lost  mine." 

^  Part  omitted  here   referring  solely  to  persoimel,  recommendations, 
&c  ,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  305 

I  did  not  see  a  reply  made,  but  evidently  the  signal  was 
taken  in  by  one  of  our  ships,  and  the  Captain  of  the  "  Manneis  " 
informs  me  he  saw  the  reply  being  made. 

It  is  possible  that  this  was  one  of  the  enemy's  ships  asking, 
and  may  account  for  "  Castor  "  being  challenged  by  at  any 
rate  part  of  the  correct  challenge  for  the  day. 

15.  The  effect  of  fire  on  "  Castor  "  Mas  as  follows  : — A  large 
hole,  4  ft.  by  4  ft.  6  in.  Starboard  side  under  No.  2  4-in.  gun, 
evidently  high  explosive  shell  which  burst  in  the  heads,  splinters 
passing  through  the  bulkhead  into  the  Recreation  Space, 
destro3dng  Fire  Main  service,  Ventilation  service,  and  Voice  Pi])es 
to  4-in.  guns. 

Two  men  were  killed  in  the  heads,  and  three  of  the  ammunition 
supply  party  in  Recreation  Space. 

(2)  One  shot  passed  through  Upper  Mess  Deck  just  above  the 
water  line,  cut  through  an  iron  ladder,  and  passed  out  tlirough 
the  Port  side,  evidently  exploding  whilst  passing  out. 

(3)  Three  shells  struck  Fore  Bridge,  doing  extensive  damage 
to  bridge,  cutting  all  electric  circuits  and  damaging  Bridge 
Steering  Gear  (which  was  not  being  used).  .Five  men  were  killed 
on  the  Bridge. 

(4)  One  shell  exploded  on  the  Forecastle,  kilhng  two  men 
but  not  doing  any  material  damage  to  speak  of. 

(5)  Several  shells  hit  the  ship's  side  on  the  armoured  plating, 
fragments  passing  up  and  causing  damage  to  after  4-in.  guns, 
Funnels,  After  Control,  Casings  and  Boats. 

(6)  One  shell  struck  Motor  Boat,  which  set  Jier  on  fire  and 
completely  shattered  her. 

(7)  In  all  there  were  23  wounded.  These  men  were  chiefly 
forward  ammunition  supplj''  parties,  and  others  consisted  of 
men  stationed  at  foremost  and  after  4-in.  Guns  and  First  Aid 
Party. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
J.    R.   P.   HAWKSLEY, 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Commodore  (F). 

Grand  Fleet. 

Enclosure  21  to  Submission  No.  1415/0022  of  20/6/16 
from  C.-in-C,  Home  Fleets. 

From—The  Captain  (D),  4th  Destroyer  Flotilla. 
To— The  Commodore  (F),  Grand  Fleet  Flotillas. 
No.  0110. 
Date—(nh  June  1916. 

Submitted  with  reference  to  your  general  signal  1800  of 
2nd  instant,  I  attach  reports  Avhich  have  been  received  from 
Destroyers  of  4th  Flotilla  relative  to  the  action  with  the  enemy 
on  31st  May  and  1st  June  1916. 

X     12872  U 


306  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

The  report  from  H.M.8.  "  Broke  "  will  be  forwarded  as  soon 
as  it  lias  been  received. 

E.    O.  GLADSTONE, 
"  Hecla."  Captain  (D). 


4th  Destroyer  P'lotilla. 


II. 


No.  0017/2. 
Commander-in-Chief, 

Grand  Fleet. 

Submitted. 

J.  R.   P.   HAWKSLEY, 

"  Castor,"  Commodore  (F). 

Gth  June  1916. 

H.M.S.    "SPITFIRE," 

Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  that  I  observed  the  following 
damage  to  enemy  ships  on  night  of  31st  May,  between  11.0  and 
11.40  p.m. 

1.  "  Spitfire  "  torpedoed  a  4-funnelled  cruiser,  class  not. 
determinable,  but  she  had  4  very  tall  funnels.  She  was  observed 
to  heel  over  immediately  on  being  struck  and  appeared  to  be 
in  a  sinking  condition. 

2.  "  Spitfire  "  was  rammed  by  and  rammed  (port  bow  to  port 
bow)  a  cruiser  of  "  Freya  "  class  (presumably).  20  feet  of  her 
skin  plating  from  upper  deck  to  below  scuttles  is  now  in  "  Spit- 
fire." 

3.  A  battle-cruiser  of  "  Moltke  "  type  passed  close  astern 
of  "  Spitfire  "  at  about  the  same  time.  She  was  going  very 
fast,  but  appeared  to  be  on  fire  between  her  funnels  and  on  her 
fore  mess  deck,  but  there  was  no  flame — only  smoke. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 

C.  TRELAWNY, 
The  S.O..  4th  Flotilla.  Lieut. -Comdr. 

COPY  OF  NAVAL  SIGNAL  CONTAINING  SUMMARY  OF 
REPORTS  OF  CERTAIN  DESTROYERS. 

Fro7n — The  Naval  Depot,  North  Shields. 

To— R.A.  "  Cyclops  "  for  "  Hecla,"  4  a.m. 

"  Spitfire  "  reports  position  unknown  owing  to  loss  of  Bridge 
times  approximate  was  next  astern  "  Tipperary  "  about  11  p.m. 
3 1st  May  when  attacked  by  four  enemy's  Cruisers  from  North 
West  which  sank  "  Tipperary  "  (stop)  "  Spitfire  "  fired  torpedo 
at  second  in  line  seen  to  hit  (stop).  Had  noticed  list  badly, 
believed  sunk  (stop)  Had  four  very  tall  funnels  (stop)  "  Spit- 
fire "    rammed    port    boA^-    to    port    boAV    enemy's    cruiser    Math 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  307 

3  perpendicular  funnels  1  red  band  on  every  funnel  2  crane 
(stop)  "  Spitfire  "  carried  off  20  feet  of  enemy's  side  plating 
(stop)  About  11.30  p.m.  enemy  Battle  Cruiser  with  2  funnels 
far  apart  passed  close  astern  of  "  Spitfire  "  steering  between 
South  and  West  observed  on  fire  between  funnels  and  on  girdle  ( ? ) 
(stop)  "  Porpoise "  reports  saw  one  large  ship  blow  up  at 
3  a.m.  1st  June  position  unknown  (stop)  "  Contest  "  reports 
Blank  ( ?)  (stop)  Report  of  "Broke"  will  follow  to-morrow 
Sunday. 

(2240) 
4th  June  1916. 


COPY  OF  TELEGRAM— CLAIM  BY  "  ACASTA." 

Frmn — S.N.O.  Aberdeen. 
To — R.A.  Longhope. 
Date—^vd  June,  1916. 

For  "  Hecla."     Considered  that  torpedo  hit  leading  Enemy's 
Battle  Cruiser  at  6.14  p.m.  (G.M.T.). 

Explosion  seen,  unable  to  assess  damage  caused  by  gunshot. 
"  Acasta."     (1630.) 

H.M.S.   "ACASTA," 

Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  following  report  of  action 
on  31st  May. 

In  company  vdih.  "  Shark,"  "  OpheUa  "  and  "  Christopher  " 
screening  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 

P.M. 

5.50.  Steering  N.W.  in  line  ahead  on  port  quarter  of  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadron.  Enemy  Light  Cruisers  and  De- 
stroyers sighted  ahead,  opened  fire  at  5,000  yards. 
Enemy  course  Westerl5^ 

6.  0  (approximately).     Altered  course  to  East. 

6.  5.     Enemy  turned  16  points. 

6.10.  Division  altered  to  port  and  "Shark"  stopped,  so  I 
returned  to  "  Shark's  "  assistance  as  she  was  badly 
hit.  While  doing  so  "  Acasta "  was  holed  forward 
and  aft. 

6.12  to  6.18.  Fired  foremost  tube  at  leading  enemy  battle 
Cruiser  which  apparently  hit  as  explosion  was  observed 
by  independent  witnesses — range  4,500  approximately. 
"  Acasta  "  was  badly  hit  in  engine  room,  which  burst 
several  steam  pipes  and  caused  five  casualties,  one  of 
whom  was  Engineer-Lieutenant  J.  Forrest,  and  engine- 
room  had  to  be  evacuated.  Steering  gear  was  shot 
awav  and  I  was   unable  to  steer  or  stop  the  engines 


until  6.30. 


u  2 


308  BATTLifi    OF    JUTLAND  : 

)Ship  was  under  extremely  heavy  fire  from  enemy  Light 

Cruisers    and    Destroyers    and    a    Battle    Cruiser   from 

0.5  to  6.25. 
The  moral  of  the  ship's  company  was  excellent. 
At  9.0  p.m.  a  Cruiser,  apparently  German,  was  observed  heavily 

on  fire  to  the  S.W.  and  subsequently  seen  again  after 

2  a.m. 


At  noon,  1st  June,  "  Nonsuch  "  took  me  in  tow  until  2.30  p.m., 
2nd  June ;  his  assistance  was  invaluable  as  I  had  no 
oil  left  and  met  heavy  weather. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 
JOHN   O.   BARRON, 
Captain  (D),  Lt.-Comdr. 

4th  Flotilla. 


COPY  OF  TELEGRAM— REPORT  BY  "CONTEST." 

From  —Naval  Depot,  North  Shields. 
To—'  Cyclops,"  for  "  Hecla." 
Da/e— 4th  June,  1916. 

"  Contest  "  now  reports  she  fired  Torpedo  at  large  3  funnelled 
ship  11.35  p.m.,  seen  to  hit.     (1520). 

H.M.S.  "ACHATES." 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  an  account  of  "  Achates'  " 
part  in  the  action  on  the  night  of  Wednesday,  31st  May. 

Orders  having  been  received,  shortly  after  10  p.m.,  for 
4th  Flotilla  to  take  station  5  miles  astern  of  the  Battle  Squadron, 
single  line  ahead  in  the  following  order  was  assumed  at  about 
10.50  p.m.  : — 1st  Half  Flat.  :  "Tipperary,"  "  Spitfire,"  "  Sparrow- 
hawk,"  "  Garland  "  and  "  Contest  "  ;  followed  by  27id  Half 
Flot.  :  "  Broke,"  "  Achates,"  "  Ambuscade,"  "  Ardent," 
"  Fortune,"  "  Porpoise  "  and      "  Unity." 

Our  course  was  then  South,  speed  18  knots.  Position  (approx.) 
at  11.15 :   Lat.  55°  48'  N.,  Long.  6°  23'  E. 

At  approx.  1 1.30  p.m.,  heavy  firing  Avas  observed  on  our  starbd. 
bow  and  directed  towards  the  head  of  our  fine,  and  shortly 
afterwards  the  "  Tipperary  '  was  observed  to  haul  out  of  the 
fine  to  starboard,  badly  hit  and  burning  furiously.  Shortly  after 
this  the  "  Broke  "  hauled  out  of  the  line,  apjjarently  hit  and 
not  under  control,  and  "  Achates,"  narrowly  avoiding  coUision 

^  Part  omitted  here,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations 
&c.,  in  no  way  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  309 

with  her,  endeavoured  to  join  up  with  1st  Half  Flotilla.  Firing 
at  this  time  was  general  in  the  enemy's  line  on  our  starbd.  bow 
and  beam  and  the  range  close,  the  order  to  fire  was  passed  to 
the  tubes  as  sights  came  on.  I  subsequently  cancelled  the  order 
to  fire  torpedoes  being  under  the  impression  that  our  Cruisers 
were  engaging  the  enemy  between  us  and  the  enemj^'s  line  and 
fearing  that  mj'  torpedoes  would  cross  the  line  of  our  own  ships. 

I  re.spectfullj'  submit  that  in  future  the  maximum  amount  of 
information  may  be  given  to  destroyers  as  to  the  disposition  of 
our  own  forces,  observing  the  difficulty  of  recognition  by  night. 

At  approx.  midnight  the  "  Achates  "  and  "  Ambuscade  "  were 
chased  by  enemy's  cruisers  to  the  Eastward,  and  failing  to  cross 
ahead  of  the  enemy's  line  (Enemj^'s  course  appeared  to  be  S.E.), 
1  worked  round  to  the  North  and  eventually  West  and  (South 
passing  in  rear  of  their  line  and  endeavouring  to  join  Commo- 
dore (F). 

I  lost  touch  with  "  Ambuscade  "  about  12.30  a.m.  and 
continued  to  search  until  5  a.m.,  when  I  intercepted  a  signal 
from  "  Porpoise  '"  that  he  required  assistance,  and  I  endeavoured 
to  join  him.  "  Porpoise  "  was  eventually  joined  by  "  Garland," 
and  as  I  was  by  this  time  running  short  of  fuel,  I  proceeded  to 
Rosyth,  arriving  there  at  4  a.m.,  2nd  June,  and  after  fuelling 
returned  to  this  base  arriving  at  9  p.m.,  2nd  June. 

I  wish  to  bring  to  your  notice  the  excellent  manner  in  which 
all  destroyers  of  my  division  were  handled  during  the  daj'  and 
night  action  on  the  31st,  and  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the 
Commanding  Officer  of  "  Ambuscade  "  in  particular,  who  Avas 
more  immediately  under  my  notice,  by  skilful  handhng,  brought 
his  ship  undamaged  out  of  action. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

R.   B.   C.   HUTCHINSON, 
Captain  (D.),  Commander. 

4th  Flotilla. 

H.M.S.  "  AMBUSCADE." 
Sir,  3rd  June. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  forward  the  account  of  "  Ambus- 
cade's "  part  in  the  night  action  between  the  4th  Flotilla  and 
the  enemy  s  Battle  Fleet  on  the  night  of  31st  May. 

The  flotilla  was  in  single  hne  ahead,  the  1st  half  under 
"  Tipperary  "'  leading,  followed  by  "  Broke,"  "  Achates,"  "  Am- 
buscade," "  Ardent,"  "  Fortune,"  "  Porpoise  "  and  "  Unity." 
steering  South,  five  miles  astern  of  the  second  Battle  Squadron. 

At  11.30  p.m.  enemy  cruisers  were  observed  on  the  starboard 
bow  steering  South-east  at  high  speed.  "  Tipperary  "  drew 
enemy's  fire,  and  was  passed  about  5  cables  on  starboard  beam, 
apparently  in  a  sinldng  condition. 

I  attacked  with  2  torpedoes,  and  from  a  violent  explosion 
shortly  afterwards,  consider  a  hit  may  have  been  obtained.     It 


310  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND: 

is  believed  "  Fortune  "  was  sunk  about  this  time.  I  then  hauled 
off  to  the  Eastward,  following  "  Achates,"  eventually  turning 
South. 

At  about  11.55  p.m.  we  encountered  enemy's  Battle  Fleet 
steering  South  East.  The  third  torpedo  was  fired  at  ships  whose 
fire  was  concentrated  on  "  Ardent."  A  red  flah  was  observed 
at  water  line  between  searchUghts  of  centre  ship,  and  these 
momentarily  went  out,  giving  the  possibility  of  a  hit,  observing 
that,  though  improbable,  "  Ardent  "  may  also  have  been  aVile 
to  fire.     The  "  Ardent  "  was  not  seen  after  this. 

All  torpedoes  were  now  discharged,  and  by  smoke  screen,  and 
continual  alteration  of  helm,  I  got  away  to  the  Eastward,  and 
failing  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  "  Achates,"  turned  North,  and 
eventually  South,  joining  Commodore  (F)  at  3.0  a.m.  on 
June  1st. 

The  enemy's  fire  and  working  of  searchlights  was  extremely 
accurate,  while  their  use  of  star  shells  rendered  a  surprise  torpedo 
attack  almost  impossible. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

GORDON  A.  COLES, 

Lieut.  Commander. 

REPORT  OF  COMMANDING  OFFICER,  H.M.S.  "  ARDENT.  ' 

M.F.A.  "  China," 

Hospital  Ship  No.  VI, 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  REGRET  to  report  the  loss  through  enemy  gunfire  of 
H.M.S.  '•  Ardent  "  at  about  12.30  a.m.  (G.M.T.')  June  1st. 
Single  line  ahead  was  formed  astern  of  the  Battle  Fleet  after 
dark  on  31st  May.  As  far  as  I  could  judge,  the  hne  "'  Ardent  " 
was  in  consisted  of  :  "  Achates,"  "  Ambuscade,"  '"  Ardent," 
■'  Fortune,"  and  several  other  Torpedo  Boat  Destroyers  in  rear. 
Course  South,  speed  17  knots.  "  Tipperary's  "  Hne  appeared  to 
be  well  out  to  the  Starboard  of  us. 

2.  Various  other  ships  were  seen  dimly  and  much  firing  going 
on,  on  either  side  until  just  after  midnight,  when  four  large  ships 
appeared  closing  in  on  our  Starboard  hand,  Course  about  S.  by  E. 
The  leader  challenged  by  switching  on  and  off  several  groups  of 
Green  and  Red  lamps.  Almost  immediately  they  switched  on 
Searchlights,  picked  up  "  Fortune  "  and  opened  fire.  "  For- 
tune "  was  hit  at  once.  I  altered  to  Starboard  and  endeavoured 
to  assist  "  Fortune,"  and  from  a  very  favourable  position  from 
about  2,000  yards  on  her  port  beam  fired  a  torpedo  at  the  leading 
enemy's  ship,  which  undoubtedly  scored  a  hit.  the  explosion  was 

*  Part  omitted  here  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  way  hearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  311 

seen,  and  the  enemy  ship's  foremost  searchlights  went  oft'  and 
she  turned  to  Starboard.  The  second  Ship  in  the  Hne  then 
fixed  her  searchhghts  and  opened  fire  on  "  Ardent,"  so  I  increased 
speed  and  turned  away  to  Port.  1  could  see  the  "  Foitune  " 
badly  hit,  on  fire,  and  apparently  sinking,  but  still  firing  her 
gims  in  a  most  gallant  manner  at  her  big  adversary. 

A  few  minutes  after  this  I  altered  course  to  South  to  try  to 
pick  uj)  "  Ambuscade."  steered  for  what  T  thought  was  hei" 
smoke,  to  find  I  was  rapidl}'  closing  four  large  German  Ships 
crossing  my  bows  from  Starboard  to  Port,  course  about  N.N.E. 
at  a  high  speed.  It  was  too  late  to  get  away,  so  I  attacked 
immediately  and  fired  a  torpedo  from  a  favourable  position  at 
the  leader,  I  could  not  see  if  it  hit,  as  at  once  a  most  devastating 
fire  was  poured  in  on  the  "  Ardent  "  from  the  two  leading  Ships, 
who  both  had  their  searchlights  on  us.  This  bombardment 
continued  for  about  five  minutes  when  the  enemy  ceased  fire 
and  switched  off,  after  which  period  the  Ship  was  a  total  wreck, 
and  appeared  to  be  sinking.  I  then  sank  the  Secret  books,  etc., 
and  went  aft  to  trj^  and  make  a  Raft,  all  our  boats,  Carley  floats, 
&c.  being  smashed  to  bits.  At  this  moment  the  enem}^ 
recommenced  firing  from  point  blank  range,  I  gave  the  order 
"  save  yourselves,"  and  about  forty  survivors  jumped  into  the 
sea,  \nth  no  suj^port  bej^ond  lifebelts,  waistcoats,  &c.,  and 
shortly  after  the  Ship  sunk  with  her  colours  flying. 

I  was  in  the  water  about  five  hours  before  being  picked  up 
by  "  Marksman,"  and  regret  that  up  to  date  have  heard  of  no 
more  survivors.  It  is  perhaps  unnecessarj^  for  me  to  add  that 
the  Officers  and  Ship's  company  of  the  '"  Ardent  "  behaved 
according  to  the  liighest  traditions  of  the  British  Navy.  All 
Ranks  and  Ratings  fought  the  Ship  until  every  gun  was  out  of 
action  with  the  utmost  determination. 

When  all  did  theii-  duty  it  is  im]iossible  for  me  to  naine  any 
individual  for  special  recommendation. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  Obedient  Servant, 

A.  MARSDEN, 
The  Captain  (D),  Lieut.  Commander,  H.M.S.  "  Ardent." 

Fourth  Flotilla, 

H.M.S.  "Hecla." 

H.M.S.    ■  PORPOISE," 

3id  June. 

REPORT   ON   FLEET   ACTION. i 

Str, 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  rejiort  the  following  :— 
The  various  phases  of  the  action  and  actions  can  be  better 
ascertained  from  large  ship  accounts  up  to  9.47  p.m.  SJst.  when 

'   Plate  27. 


312  BATTLE    OF   JUTLAND: 

4th  Flotilla  was  steering  N.  and  N.N.E.  18  knots  in  2  columns — 
"  Tippeiary,"  "  Spitfire,"  "  Sparrowhawk."  and  "  Garland,'' 
"Contest,"  to  starboard:  'Broke,''  2nd  di\nsion,  "Porpoise" 
and  "  Unity."     Course,  South,  18  knots. 

At  10.54.  D  4  ordered  2nd  half  tlotilla  to  take  station  astern 
of  1st  half  flotilla,  at  same  time  "  Porpoise  "  and  "  Unity  " 
Imported  enemy  destroyers  astern,  steeling  east. 

About  midnight,  actions  were  going  on  all  round  us,  chiefly 
to  westward.  An  enemy  armoured  cruiser  came  up  abaft  the 
starboard  beam,  challenged,  opened  fire  on  "  Fortune  "  and 
"  Porpoise."  "  Foitune  "  was  at  once  hit  badly.  I  had  to  star- 
board my  helm  to  clear  her  and  was  hit  by  an  8-in.  projectile 
which  hit  base  of  the  after  funnel,  killed  one  man  at  midship 
gun,  stunning  gun's  crew,  killing  the  L.T.O.  at  Foremost  tube, 
wounding  No.  2.  The  air  chamber  of  spare  torpedo  exploded, 
blowing  the  deck  in  and  bending  and  bursting  main  steam  pipe. 
The  forebridge  wheel  and  telegraphs  having  gone,  I  went  aft, 
and  from  the  top  of  E.R.  hatch  got  the  helm  to  starboard  from 
its  being  10°  to  port.  H.M.S.  "  Fortune  "  was  lying  between 
''  Porpoise  "  and  the  enemy,  emitting  clouds  of  smoke  and 
steam,  both  shi]is  being  shelled,  but  enemy  searchhghts  being 
somewhat  screened  by  "  Fortune's  "  smoke  and  steam.  We 
connected  after  steering  position  and  telegraphs  and  got  ship's 
head  N.  by  W.,  steaming  about  100  revolutions,  but  losing  water 
rapidly,  so  stopped  main  engines  with  i-in.  in  boiler  gauge  glasses 
and  J  ton  in  R.F.W.T.  We  plugged  exhaust  pipe  and  ran  down 
Nos.  3  and  4  boilers  to  R.F.W.T.  and  eventually  got  under  way, 
gradually  working  up  from  100  revs,  to  145  revs,  in  the  course 
of  the  day  and  following  night. 

Fell  in  with  H.M.S.  "  Garland  "  and  "  Contest  "  in  Lat. 
56.40  N.,  3.50  E.  at  11  a.m.  who  escorted  "Porpoise"  to  the 
Tyne.  H.M.S.  "  Contest  "  having  a  broken  stem,  H.M.S. 
"  Garland  "  (Lieut. -Comdr.  Goff)  took  "  Porpoise  "  alongside  and 
took  her  up  the  River  Tyne  in  a  most  seamanlike  manner. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

H.  D.  COLVILLE, 

Commander. 

H.M.S.  "UNITY," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  the  part  taken  by  H.M.S. 
"  Unity  "  in  the  night  action  on  31st  May-lst  June  and 
subsequent  proceedings  : — 

At  about  10  p.m.  on  31st  May,  when  in  company  Avith 
4th  Flotilla,  station  was  taken  5  miles  astern  of  Battle  Fleet, 

^  Part  omitted  her?,  referring  solely  to  personnel,  recommendations, 
&c.,  in  no  wav  bearin.];  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


Plate  27. 


looTi-  Z'lHie.'PiiT}  (13)  S06,;  ,!.  20 


Malbv.^Oon^Lith, 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  313 

Course  South,  speed  18  knots.  "  Unity  "  was  the  last  ship  in 
the  line  of  12  destroyers. 

At  10.45  p.m.  observed  three  enemy  destroyers  approaching 
on  the  starboard  quarter;  the  leading  boat  fired  a  torpedo  and 
immediately  altered  course  away,  I  avoided  the  torpedo  by 
going  full  speed  and  turning  towards  it,  using  full  helm. 

At  11.30  p.m.  sighted  two  enemy  destroyers  on  starbd.  beam  ; 
fire  was  opened  on  them  and  they  turned  a^ay. 

About  the  same  time  "  Tipperary  "  and  leading  destroyers 
of  our  line  appeared  to  be  in  action  with  large  ships.  I  observed 
the  destroyers  ahead  alter  course  to  port  on  a  S.Ely  course, 
and  therefore  increased  speed  to  get  into  position  for  a  torpedo 
attack. 

About  midnight  I  realised  I  was  following  a  strange  British 
Flotilla,  and  having  lost  sight  of  my  own,  decided  to  remain  with 
them. 

At  1  a.m.,  1st  June,  course  was  altered  to  S.W.  by  the  leading 
T.B.D.  and  speed  increased  to  28  knots.  No  large  vessels  were 
seen  at  any  time  which  I  could  have  attacked. 

At  daylight  I  found  myseK  in  company  with  "  Lydiard  "  and 
10  destroyers  of  the  9th  and  13th  Flotillas.  I  parted  company 
at  5.45  a.m.  to  look  for  the  fleet  as  the  other  destroyers  were 
apparently  returning  to  their  base  to  oil.  At  7.45  a.m.  I 
searched  for  "  Achates,"  but  as  I  could  not  find  her,  and  being 
short  of  oil,  decided  to  make  for  Aberdeen  to  complete. 

Arrived  Aberdeen  at  10  p.m.,  1st  June,  and  proceeded  at 
3  a.m.,  2nd  June,  after  oiling,  to  make  further  search  for  the 
Fleet,  in  the  event  of  being  required  for  screening  duty. 

Owing  to  bad  weather,  returned  at  5  p.m.,  2nd  June,  to 
Aberdeen  for  further  instructions. 

I  sailed  again  at  6  a.m.,  3rd  June,  and  returned  to  the 
Northern  Base. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

A.  M.   LECKY, 
The  Captain  "  D,"  Lieut. -Commander. 

4th  Destroyer  Flotilla. 


H.M.S.  "CHRISTOPHER," 
2nd  June  1916. 

REPORT    OF    PROCEEDINGS    ON  31st  MAY   1916. 

In  accordance  with  orders  received,  H.M.S.  "  Christopher  " 
left  Scapa  at  8.50  p.m.  on  the  30th  May,  forming  screen  for 
3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 

At  5.45  p.m.  on  the  31st  May,  being  then  in  position  on  port 
quarter  of  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  steering  North,  the 
enemy  were  sighted  on  the  port  bow,  consisting  of  three  light 


;j|4  BATTLE    OF   JLTTLAND  : 

cruisers  (three  funneLs)  and  a  destroyer  flotilla  with  a  Flotilla 
Cruiser.  The  division  then  attacked  destroyer  flotilla,  coming 
under  heavy  fire  from  light  cruisers  and  destroyer  flotilla,  and 
shortly  afterwards  from  three  Battle  Cruisers.  The  division 
then  turned  sixteen  points  to  regain  position  ahead  of 
:h'd  Battle  Cruiser  .Squadron.  Thirty  rounds  were  fired,  but  the 
range  was  about  10,000  yards  and  visibility  low  and  no  direct 
hits  could  be  observed.  The  enemy  destroj-ers  turned  away, 
"  Christopher "  and  "  Ophelia "  then  took  station  ahead  of 
Battle  Cruisers.  Only  one  opportunity  of  firing  a  torpedo  at  the 
leading  Battle  Cruiser  occurred,  l)ut  range  was  then  masked  by 
light  cruisers.  H.M.S.  "  Christopher  "  again  came  under  fire  at 
8. .30  p.m.  from  three  Battle  Cruisers  M'hile  screening  engaged  side 
of  Battle  Cruisers  ("  New  Zealand  ").  No  damage  was  sustained 
and  no  casualties  occurred.  H.M.S.  "  Cliristo'pher  "  remained 
screening  Lst  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron,  and  no  further  action 
took  place. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

F.  M.  KERR, 
Lieutenant-Commander. 


H.M.S.  "  GARLAND," 
Sir,  2nd  June  1916. 

I  BEG  to  forward  the  following  report  of  my  proceedings 
on  the  night  of  31st  May -1st  June  : — 

P.M. 

!J.  2.  Sighted  4  German  T.B.D.'s,  ship  was  in  the  midst  of  a 
16  pt.  turn  at  the  time.  Germans  closed  and  showed 
recognition  lights.  Then  red  lights  vertical.  I  at 
once  opened  fire  on  them.  The  two  leaders  turned, 
fired  a  torpedo  each  and  made  off  at  full  speed  to 
westward.  The  torpedoes  missed  me  astern.  I  at  once 
reported  German  T.B.D.'s  presence  to  Captain  "  D." 

10.35.  Sighted  a  German  Cruiser  of  "  Graudenz  "  class  bearing 
W.,  course  S.,  estimated  speed,  17  knots.  This  was 
reported  to  Captain  "  D." 

11.25.  A  line  of  German  ships  appeared  on  starboard  beam  of 
flotilla,  on  a  slightly  converging  course  and  opened 
fire  on  Destroyers.     We  returned  their  fire. 

11.28.  Being  in  a  favourable  position,  I  turned  and  fired 
torpedo  from  after  tube  at  a  3  funnelled  Cruiser,  the 
third  ship  in  enemy's  line.  Torpedo  was  seen  to 
explode  abreast  of  Cruisers  mainmast,  but  as  I  was 
thereafter  engaged  in  avoiding  collision  with  other 
Destroyers,  I  did  not  see  if  vessel  sank  and  was  unable 
to  find  her  again  later. 

11.40.  Closed  "  Tipperary,"  whose  fore  part  was  burning 
previously,  in  order  to  render  her  assistance ;    but  as 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  315 

soon  as  I  eased  down  close  astern  of  her,  two  enemy 
cruisers  steamed  across  her  bows  at  close  range  and 
opened  fire  on  both  of  us,  so  I  had  to  leave  her  and 
P.M.  was  chased  away  to  eastward. 

11. 55.     Joined  up  with  "Achates,"  "  Fortune  "  and  "  Porpoise." 

12.  0.  Sighted  a  line  of  German  Battleships  on  stbd.  bow, 
steering  south. 

Leading  Battleship  switched  on  recognition  lights 
and  then  searchlights  and  opened  fire  on  us. 

12.  5.  Turned  to  port  and  fired  torpedo  from  fore  tube  at 
leading  ship,  which  appeared  to  be  one  of  the 
"  Deutschland  "  class.  Range  about  800  j^ards.  Tor- 
pedo hit  and  was  seen  to  explode  abreast  of  the  two 
foremost  funnels,  ship  was  seen  to  take  on  a  heavy 
list  to  i)ort,  but  whether  she  sank  or  not  I  was  unable 
to  ascertain  as  I  was  chased  to  the  N.E. 

I  was  unable,  after  this,  to  again  find  remainder 
of  flotilla,  but  later,  fell  in  with  "  Contest,"  who 
could  onh'  steam  20  knots.  We  sighted  several  German 
T.B.D.'s,  who  all  made  off  at  full  speed  on  seeing  us. 
2.25.  .Sighted  four  German  T.B.D.'s  heading  S.S.E.  at  full 
speed.  Altered  course  to  cross  their  bows  and  opened 
fire  at  about  5,000  yards.  Germans  at  first  began  to 
turn  on  to  a  parallel  course  and  returned  our  fire,  and 
then  thought  better  of  it  and  turned  away.  At  least 
one  shot  Avas  seen  to  take  effect  on  the  stern  of  one 
German  T.B.D. 

As  there  was  now  no  possibility  of  finding  rest  of 
Flotilla,  I  shaped  course  for  Tyne,  with  "  Contest,"  and 
later  searched  for  and  found  "  Porpoise,"  both  of 
whom  I  escorted  to  the  Tyne. 

With  the  exception  of  one  boat,  which  was  hit  by 
a    6-in.    shell,    no    damage    was    sustained    and    no 
casualties. 
1  *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

R.  S.  GOFF, 
The  Captain  "  D,"  Lieut.-Comdr. 

4th  Destroyer  Flotilla. 

H.M.S.  "  OPHELIA," 
Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  rei)ort  that  H.M.S.  "'  Opheha  "  was 
in  action  on  May  31st. 

H.M.S.  "  Ophelia  "  left  Scapa  in  company  with  H.M.  Ships 
'•  Shark,"  "  Acasta,"  and  "  Christopher,"  "  Shark  "  being  Senior 

^  Part  oniitted  here,  referring  solely  to    i)eiso?inel,  recommendations. 
&<?.,  in  no  waj'^  bearing  on  the  course  of  the  action. 


3ir»  BATTLK    OF    JUTLAND: 

Officer,   on  May  30th  at   9  p.m.   to  screen  3rd  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron. 

About  0  p.m.  May  31st  a  German  Light  Cruiser  and  about 
ten  T.B.D.'s  were  sighted  off  port  bow.  "  Shark,"  followed  by 
''  Acasta  "  "  Ophelia,"  and  "  Christopher,"  altered  course  to 
engage  them.  The  Enemy  were  steaming  in  a  Nly.  direction 
and  we  were  steaming  in  a  Wly.  direction. 

About  6.15  p.m.  "  Shark  "  altered  course  16  points  to  port 
and  at  the  time  was  being  heavily  fired  on  bj'  enemy's  light 
cruiser,  I  altered  course  before  arriving  in  "  Shark's  "  wake  so 
as  to  avoid  enemy's  fire. 

Shortly  after  altering  course  "  Shark  "  was  put  out  of  action, 
and  I  retired  towards  our  light  cruisers  under  the  enemy's 
superior  fire,  continually  altering  course  to  avoid  enemy's  salvoes. 

The  enemy  soon  altered  course  to  the  Southward  and  I 
proceeded  at  full  speed  to  attack  enemy's  Battle  Cruiser,  and 
at  6.29  i).m.  fired  torpedo  at  about  8,000  yards,  afterwards 
proceeding  to  join  Light  Cruisers. 

Some  few  minutes  after  firing  torpedo  an  upheaval  of  water 
was  observed  by  enemj^'s  port  quarter. 

Subsequently  I  rejoined  3rd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadron. 

There  were  no  casualties  and  damage  to  ship  was  immaterial. 

I  consider  great  credit  is  due  to  Eng.  Lieut. -Comdr.  George 
D.  Campbell  and  C.E.R.A.  Jesse  Wadham  for  the  way  the  Ship 
steamed  at  high  speed. 

This  being  the  first  time  under  way  except  for  passage  from 
Sunderland  to  Scapa. 

No  Torpedo  or  Gunnery  Practices  have  been  carried  out  b}-^ 
"  Ophelia,"  and  crew  of  "  Hardy  "  have  not  yet  turned  over 
to  her. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 
L.  E.  CRABBE, 

Commander. 

H.M.S.  "OWL," 
Sir,  June  2nd. 

I    HAVE    the    honour    to    report    in    accordance    mth 
Commodore  F.'s  signal,  that  at  9.30  a.m.  on  June  1st,  in  about 
Lat.  56°  11'  N..    Long.  6°  10'  E.    "  Owl  "  passed  wreckage  and 
the    bows    of   a    torpedo  craft,    about  6  feet  floating  stem  up. 
It  looked  as  if  she  had  been  rammed  and  cut  in  two  and  that 
her  fore  part  floated.     It  is  thought   this  was   a   German  craft 
as  there  was  no  ring  in  bows  for  the  towing  wdre  as  fitted  in 
our  Boats,  also  several  lifebuoys  painted  red  were  observed, 
I  have  the  honour  to  be. 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant, 

R.   G.   HAMOND, 
Captain  "D."  Comdr. 


OFFICIAL   DESPATCHES.  317 


REPORTS   OF   SURVIVORS   OF   H.M.S.    "SHARK." 

Office  of  Rear-Admiral  Commanding, 
East  Coast  of  England, 
No.  696/W.  962.  Immingham  Dock,  Grimsby. 

Sir,  3rd  June  1916. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  report  the  following  survivors  of 
H.M.S.  "  Shark  "  were  picked  up  by  the  Danish  S.S.  "  Vidar  " 
about  10.0  p.m.  on  Wednesday  the  31st  May,  about  70  miles 
from  the  Danish  coast  : — 
*William  Charles  Richard  Griffin,  Petty  Officer  1st  class,  official 

number  201404 — Portsmouth. 
*Josei)h  Owen  Glendower  Howell,  A.B.,  official  number  230192 — 

Portsmouth. 
Charles  Filleul,  Stoker  Petty  Officer — Portsmouth. 
Charles   Cleeberg   Hope,   A.B.,    S.G.,    official   number   238376 — 

Portsmouth, 

Charles  Smith,  A.B.,  S.T.,  official  number  J.  13416 — Portsmouth. 
Thomas  Walton  Swan,  A.B.,  Portsmouth. 

(The  two  marked  *  are  in  naval  hospital  in  Hull,  suffering 
from  wounds  and  shock,  the  remainder  are  in  R.N.  Depot, 
Immingham,  and  will  be  sent  to  Portsmouth  Barracks  on 
3rd  June.) 

2.  The  survivors  state  that  they  Mere  in  company  with 
the  following  vessels  : — "  Acasta,"  "  Ophelia,"  "  Contest  "  or 
"  Christopher  "  or  "  Cockatrice,"  and  at  6  p.m.  the}^  engaged 
a  four-funnel  German  cruiser.  "  Shark  "  fired  one  torpedo  at 
her,  which  Charles  Smith,  who  was  stationed  at  the  after  tube, 
states  that  he  saw  hit  the  cruiser  and  explode,  and  he  further 
states  that  the  ship  stopped  and  seemed  to  be  on  fire. 

3.  At  this  time  "  Invincible,"  "  Indomitable  "  and  "  Inflex- 
ible "  were  from  two  to  four  cables  on  the  starboard  beam. 
They  also  fired  at  the  German  cruiser. 

4.  About  6.15  the  ship  eased  down  and  stopped  owing  to 
the  pipes  to  the  oil  suctions  having  been  damaged.  The  fore 
steering  gear  was  also  put  out  of  action  at  this  time  and  shortly 
afterwards  was  shot  away  altogether. 

5.  Two  enemy  destroyers  now  attacked  "  Shark,"  who  had 
been  left  behind  by  the  other  vessels.  One  of  them  was  driven 
off  by  gunfire  from  the  midship  gun  (the  only  gun  left  in  action), 
and  the  second  was  also  hit,  but  succeeded  in  firing  two  torpedoes 
at  "  Shark  "  from  a  range  of  about  1,500  to  1,800  yards,  one 
of  which  hit  "  Shark  "  abreast  the  after  funnel.  The  enemy 
destroyers  were  painted  fight  grey. 

6.  "  Shark  "  took  a  heavy  list  and  sank  almost  immediately. 
This  was  about  7  p.m. 


318  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAND  : 

7.  Stoker  Pett}'  Officer  Filleul  reports  that  before  the  ship 
was  torpedoed  the  Captain  gave  orders  for  all  men  not  engaged 
at  the  guns  to  lie  down  on  the  deck.  He  states  that  "  Shark  " 
at  this  time  was  between  the  opposing  Battle  Fleets  and  that 
shrapnel  was  being  fired  at  them.  This  is  confirmed  by  the 
fact  that  the  two  wounded  men  are  suffering  from  shrapnel 
wounds — not  severe. 

8.  The  boats  were  all  riddled  and  useless,  but  two  Carley 
Floats  floated  off  and  14  or  15  men  got  into  each, 

9.  While  they  were  in  the  water  about  ten  or  more  enemy 
battle  cruisers  or  battleships  passed  about  5  miles  off,  followed 
by  a  large  number  of  our  battle  ships  within  a  mile  who  were 
engaging  the  enemy  heavily.  A  lot  of  enemy  shells  were  faUing 
"  over  "  our  ships. 

10.  The  water  was  very  cold  and  the  survivors  gradually 
succumbed  until  at  about  10  p.m.,  when  they  were  picked  up, 
only  seven  were  alive.  The  seventh.  Chief  Stoker  (Pensioner) 
Francis  Newcombe,  0.  No.  155192  died  after  getting  on  board 
S.S.  "  Vidar,"  and  his  body  was  taken  to  Hull.  The  survivors 
were  treated  very  well  by  the  Captain  and  crew  of  the  "  Vidar." 

11.  The  Captain  of  the  "Vidar"  told  the  survivors  that 
a  little  while  before  he  picked  them  up  he  saw  what  looked  Uke 
the  bow  of  a  big  German  Man-of -War  standing  out  of  the  water ; 
the  draft  marks  were  in  metres. 

12.  After  being  picked  up  they  passed  a  large  (presumably 
German)  Man-of-War  heavih'^  on  fire. 

13.  The  following  information  relative  to  the  officers  of 
"  Shark  "   has   been  given  : — 

The  Captain,  Commander  Loftus  Jones,  had  his  left  leg 
shot  awa}^  before  the  vessel  sank,  and  although  he  had  a  life- 
belt cannot  have  survived  long. 

Sub-Lieutenant  P.  H.  G.  I.  Vance  was  killed  before  the  ship 
sank. 

Midshipman  Thomas  Smith,  R.N.R.,  was  seen  after  the 
ship  was  torpedoed,  but  not  at  all  in  the  water. 

No  definite  information  can  be  given  as  regards  the  other 
officers. 

14.  It  is  considered  that  the  men  mentioned  in  paragraph  1 
are  the  sole  survivors. 

It  is  submitted  that  the  kind  action  of  the  Master  of  the 
Danish  S.S  "  Vidar  "  (now  at  Hull)  should  be  suitably  recognised. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
Sir, 
Your  obedient  Servant. 

STUART  NICHOLSON. 
Rear-Admiral  Commanding, 
East  Coast  of  England. 
The  Secretary, 

of  the  Admiralty. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES.  319 

No.~9oS/W.  9G2. 

Subject. — H.M.S.  '"  Shark."     Report  by  Torpedo  Coxswain. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty. 

29th  July  1916. 
With  reference  to  my  submission  No.  696/W.  962  of  3rd  June 
1916,   the  attached  report  of  Wilham  Charles  Richard  Griffin, 
P.O.  1st  Class,  Official  Number,  201404,  late  Torpedo  Coxswain  of 
H.M.S.  "  Shark,""  is  submitted. 

He  was  the  senior  of  the  ratings  saved  from  H.M.S.  "  Shark," 
but  was  not  interviewed  at  the  time  of  writing  my  previous  letter 
as  he  was  in  hospital. 

2.  This  Petty  Officer  has  now  practically  recovered.  Able 
Seaman  Howell,  the  other  survivor  from  H.M.S.  "  Shark,"  who 
was  sent  to  hospital  in  Hull,  will  probably  not  be  fit  to  travel 
for  six  to  eight  weeks. 

STUART   NICHOLSON, 

Rear- Admiral  Commanding, 

East  Coast  of  England. 

TO   REAR-ADMIRAL   COMMANDING   EAST   COAST 
OF   ENGLAND. 
Sir, 

I.  Wm.  Griffix.  Torpedo  Coxswain,  Avill  endeavour  to 
give  you  the  information  to  the  best  of  m}^  knowledge  of  the 
action  and  sinldng  of  the  H.M.S.  "  Shark."  We  were  in  company 
with  the  Battle  Cruisers  "  Invincible,"  &c.,  also  four  destroyers 
(including  the  "  Shark  ");  during  the  daj^  31st  of  May  we  were 
told  by  the  Captain  that  we  would  probably  meet  the  enemy. 
During  the  afternoon,  about  3  o'clock,  I  should  say,  the  report 
of  the  enemy  was  sighted,  which  was  in  great  number,  and  action 
stations  was  rung  on  the  alarm  bell.  We  then  proceeded  at  a 
speed  of  25  knots.  The  signal  was  made  open  fire,  in  which  we 
altered  course  to  Port,  the  course  being  N.E.,  the  Starboard  guns 
being  used.  Again  we  altered  course  to  Port,  the  course  being  N., 
it  was  then  that  our  steering  was  hit,  I  report  steering  gear  gone. 
Sir,  which  the  captain  gave  orders  to  me  to  man  the  after  wheel, 
it  was  then  that  I  got  Mounded  in  the  head  and  over  the  right 
eye,  we  then  went  to  Starboard  making  use  of  our  guns  on  the 
Port  side,  this  was  when  the  Forecastle  gun's  crew  Avere  com- 
pletely blown  away,  gun  and  all ;  about  this  time  the  "  Acasta  " 
arrived,  and  the  captain  of  the  "  Acasta  "  asked  if  he  could 
assist  us,  and  the  cajjtain  replied  don't  get  sunk  over  us,  we  then 
with  our  steering  gear  and  engines  out  of  action,  she  was  helpless 
and  wath  onlj'  one  gun  firing  which  was  the  midship  gun,  and 
the  captain  came  off  the  bridge  and  spotted  for  the  midship  gun, 
during  that  time  he  gave  me  orders  for  the  boats  and  rafts  to 
be  lowered  and  got  out,  but  the  boats  was  useless,  he  also 
gave  orders  for  the  collision  mat  to  be  got  out,  which  was  done ; 


32U  BATTLE    OF    JUTLAJSD: 

all  this  time  the  enemy's  Light  Cruisers  and  destroyers  were 
constantly  shelling  us ;  several  of  the  enemy  dest